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Preface
Mankind has often degraded the local and even the
regional environment. Only recently, however, has
the possibility been envisaged that local actions
could lead to irreversible global changes. The most
awful example, of course, is the nuclear war scenario.
But consider also the worldwide rise in atmospheric
concentrations of CO2 , methane, and chloro-
Auorocarbons.
There are few historical analogies to guide us on
the consequences of these global changes, and the
predictions of simulation models are rather uncer-
tain. How then is society to respond? This is a typical
high-impact, low-probability risk management
problem for which the stakes are very high indeed.
Within this context, the IIASA Feasibility Study
on Sustainable Development of the Biosphere was
formulated in early 1983. A Prospectus outlining
the Study was prepared by Dr. W. C. Clark and
circulated widely in the summer of 1983. Sub-
sequent meetings in Ottawa, Cambridge (MA).
Mainz, Toronto, Moscow, and Leningrad helped to
clarify the framework for the Study, which has the
following points:
(l) To synthesize in policy terms our understand-
ing of global ecological and geophysical systems
as they are linked with industrial and resource
development activities.
(2) To characterize the issues of global environ-
mental change in terms of their ability to inhibit
or promote regional development.
(3) To explore institutional and organizational
designs for more effective international
research, policymaking, and management, con-
cerning interactions between environment and
regional development.
These ideas were elaborated at a Task Force
Meeting held at IIASA, 27-31 August, 1985. The
consensus of that Meeting was that it was timely
and, indeed, urgent to begin a long-term research
investigation of the sustainable development of the
biosphere - in the context of resource management.
The overview papers presented at the Task Force
Meeting were subjected to very wide ranging
reviews at the Meeting and subsequently. These
papers are contained in this volume, together with
a number of commentaries written later by persons
not necessarily present at the Meeting. We believe
that the authors have provided a new perspective
on resource development in a world of ecological
uncertainty and surprise.
Subsequent to the Workshop, a number of impor-
tant developments have taken place with respect to
the Feasibility Study. These include a successful
Symposium and Planning meeting, Moscow, 14-16
March, 1985, when:
(l) The name of the study was changed to Ecologi-
cally Sustainable Development of the Biosphere
to emphasize the ecological aspects of
development.
(2) A memorandum assuring collaboration
between Soviet and IIASA scientists was signed
by Academician Yuri Izrael (Chairman of the
USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology
and Control of the Natural Environment) and
Professor Thomas Lee (Director of IIASA).
Another important development in 1985 was the
approval by the IIASA Council (June 1985) of the
Biosphere Project as one of IIASA's major activities
during the next several years. Several national
members of IIASA have indicated their intention
to support the Project. and the Canadians have
already launched a counterpart study.
We are indebted to the Government of Canada
for substantial financial su pport provided to the
organization of the Task Force Meeting and to
subsequent editing and publication of this book. In
fl
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fact, it is fair to say that the Meeting might not have
happened without the intellectual and financial
commitment made by Canada.
Preface
Additional support for the Task Force Meeting
was provided by the German Marshall Fund of the
United States.
William C. Clark and R. E. Munn
Editors
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PART ONE
OVERVIEW

Introduction
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Review (Oxford University Press, 1982). In 1983, Dr.
Clark was named a MacArthur Prize Fellow.

Chapter 1
W. C. Clark
Introduction
Sustainable development of
the biosphere: themes for a
research program
Economic and environmental
interdependence
The long sweep of human history has involved
a continuing interaction between peoples' efforts
to improve their well-being and the environ-
ment's ability to sustain those efforts. Environ-
mental constraints have always limited where
and how people conduct their lives. Sometimes
the constraints have yielded to technological or
organizational innovation, allowing further
social development. At other times development
has yielded to environmental constraints, contri-
buting to social stagnation and human suffering.
The productive capacity of individual ecosystems
has been sometimes enhanced, sometimes
degraded as a result of their encounters with the
human species.
Throughout most of history, the interactions
between human development and the environment
have been relatively simple and local affairs. But
the complexity and scale of these interactions are
increasing. What were once local incidents of pollu-
tion shared throughout a common watershed or air
basin now involve multiple nations - witness the
concerns for acid deposition in Europe and North
America. What were once acute episodes of rela-
tively reversible damage now affect multiple genera-
tions - witness the debates over disposal of chemical
and radioactive wastes. What were once straightfor-
ward questions of ecological preservation versus
economic growth now reflect complex linkages -
witness the feedbacks among energy and crop pro-
duction, deforestation and climatic change that are
evident in studies of the atmospheric "greenhouse
effect" .
These linkages are both economic and environ-
mental. Even one hundred years ago the demand
for wood and agricultural products in Europe was
shaping patterns of deforestation and wetland con-
version in lands surrounding the Indian Ocean.
More recently, changes in world energy prices, pre-
cipitated by events in the Middle East, have
increased the utilization of biomass for fuel
throughout the world. In the future, the degree to
which today's developing countries participate in
the international grain markets could well shape
the use and degradation of environmentally mar-
ginal land in the American Great Plains.
Humanity is thus entering an era of chronic,
large-scale, and extremely complex syndromes of
interdependence between the global economy and
the world environment. Relative to the earlier gen-
erations of problems, these emerging syndromes
are characterized by profound scientific ignorance,
enormous decision costs, and time and space scales
that transcend those of most social institutions. The
difficulties posed by these changes will intensify over
the next century as the number of people on Earth,
the amount of industrial production, and the
demand for agricultural products increase doubly
or more.
A major challenge of the coming decades is to
learn how long-term, large-scale interactions
between environment and development can be
better managed to increase the prospects for eco-
logically sustainable improvements in human well-
being. Management is not the same as prediction.
6The distinction is an important one, for manage-
ment can be improved despite the enormous uncer-
tainties and downright ignorance that will continue
to make detailed predictions illusory. This point
was eloquently argued by the distinguished
members of the Bellagio Conference on Science,
Technology, and Society:
The world faces serious problems today, which
require concerted effort by all nations for their solu-
tion. Much has been written about these problems,
and the limitations within which solutions can be
found. But the limitations are not those frequently
assumed. Nature offers us many opportunities to
readjust our technologies to solve problems.
Nevertheless, some physical limitations, particularly
those imposed by the ecological balance of which
man is part, are real and must be respected. We must
learn to live with a naturally dynamic ecosystem and
not make unreasonable demands for short term
stability. Rather, those long term trends that are more
likely to determine the survivability of human society
must be identified and properly managed. In ecologi-
cal terms we urge that greater heed be given to
resilience rather than stability [l].
Which long-term trends of environmental change
could most severely limit societies' development?
How can we obtain more usable knowledge about
these limits and the options for avoiding or relaxing
them? What scientific research, institution building,
or technological innovation might be undertaken
over the next decade to increase future freedom of
action in the quest for a sustainable development
of the biosphere?
Intellectual foundations
At the time of the Stockholm Conference on the
Environment in 1972, efforts to address such ques-
tions were constrained by the virtual absence of
relevant data, explanatory hypotheses, and interdis-
ciplinary research experience. Over the last decade,
however, advances in a number of fields have begun
to lay the foundations for effective research on
interactions of the global economy and the world
environment. Consider the following specifics:
(1) Studies of the biosphere have been revolution-
ized by the emergence of an integrative global
perspective that emphasizes biogeochemical
processes and their connections with climate.
SustainabLe development of the biosphere
Plans for new international research programs
on "Global Ecology", "Global Habitability",
"Global Change", and the like, stress the needs
and opportunities for close collaboration among
biologists, atmospheric specialists, oceanogra-
phers, geologists, and other earth scientists [2].
(2) Efforts to understand the broad patterns and
processes of human development have been
comparably stimulated by the rise of the "world
system" view of modern history. This pas
focused on the interplay of institutions, tech-
nologies, and resources over what Braudel has
called La Longue duree, thus providing fertile
ground for the collaboration of economists, his-
torians, and geographers [3].
(3) Parallel advances have occurred in the formula-
tion of concepts and methods needed to deal
with the multiple equilibria, thresholds, and dis-
continuities that increasingly seem to be the
norm rather than the exception in interactions
between human activities and the environment.
Atmospheric scientists, ecologists, students of
sociotechnical systems, and others are converg-
ing on a usable understanding of how such
complex behaviors arise from nonlinear systems
operating across a range of time and space scales
[4].
(4) Finally, over the last decade or so a great deal
of experience has accumulated in the conduct
of interdisciplinary studies that link incomplete
science with policy problems. The strengths and
limitations of alternative approaches to syn-
thesis and analysis have become better under-
stood through this experience. New hybrid
styles are emerging combining the best of the
expert committee and formal modeling
approaches [5].
The challenge is to capitalize on these independent
advances by integrating them in ways that can help
to fashion more effective tools for understanding
and managing interactions between the global
economy and the world environment.
A program on sustainable development
This book concludes the first phase of a new inter-
national program, EcoLogically SustainabLe DeveLop-
ment of the Biosphere, based at the International
Themes for a research program
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA). It
involves a collaborative network of historians,
engineers, geographers, environmental scientists,
economists, managers, and policy people from
around the world. The program began in 1982
when IIASA's then Director, C. S. Holling, asked
the present author, then at Oak Ridge Associated
Universities (USA), to undertake an assessment of
what additional work beyond that already underway
would most help to realize the potential for better
management of interactions between development
and environment [6]. My initial draft report to
IIASA was reviewed, critiqued, and built upon
through a series of meetings hosted by the Canadian
Government in Ottawa and Toronto, the American
Academy of Arts and Sciences in Cambridge and
Washington, and the Soviet Academy of Sciences
in Moscow and Leningrad. Emerging from this
process was a conviction that the program would
best complement existing work on environment-
development interactions by emphasizing four
characteristics: a synoptic perspective, a long-term
time horizon, a regional to global scale, and a
management orientation.
Synoptic perspective
Most studies of interactions between development
and environment have concentrated on individual
problems like soil erosion, ozone depletion, "green-
house" effects, deforestation, acid deposition, and
the like. In fact, however, individual human
activities, such as fossil fuel burning or land-clear-
ance, simultaneously affect many such problems.
Conversely, many of the individual problems are
simultaneously affected by multiple economic
activities and natural processes. Studies of
individual causes and effects are inadequate for
policymakers who confront the increasingly com-
plex and threatening syndromes of environmental
and economic interdependence. The need is rather
for a synoptic approach that addresses those inter-
dependencies directly.
Long-term time horizon
Many environmental problems reflect unantici-
pated, long-term consequences of development
activities originally undertaken for their short-term
benefits. Most environmental studies, however,
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focus on the more or less immediate impacts and
ameliorative measures. Needed is a complementary
program that adopts a sufficiently long-term time
horizon to encompass the full interplay between
developmental and environmental processes.
Analyses of these processes indicate a time horizon
one century into the future and, for perspective, at
least two centuries into the past.
Regional to global scale
Many of the most intractable environmental prob-
lems arise because either the causes or the con-
sequences of development activities extend far be-
yond the local or even national areas responsible
for managing these activities. Most environmental
studies, nonetheless, focus on local and national
interactions with human development. The need is
for complementary work to analyze the relevant
processes over spatial scales sufficiently broad to
encompass the extensive interactions of contem-
porary development activities with the world's
environment. Analysis of these processes lead us to
focus on interactions that become important on
scales of large regions (e.g., 1 x 106 km2 or more) to
the globe as a whole. Our effort is an attempt to
"think globally while acting locally" - that is, to link
our large-scale perspective on consequences and
implications to the smaller scales at which specific
actions and policy choices are undertaken, and at
which their impacts are experienced.
Management orientation
Little is to be gained from just another effort to
predict impacts of development on the environment
over the broad time and space scales that concern
us here. Our challenge is rather to characterize
potentially intense interactions between future
development efforts and the environment, and to
identify specific policies and management actions
that could make these interactions more to societies'
liking, and less threatening to global life-support
systems.
The plan of this chapter
The international meetings and discussions
described above outlined a set of review papers that
would provide innovative points of departure for
the planning of a specific research program.
Authors were identified and asked to explore the
contributions that their respective areas of interest
might make to an assessment of long-term, large-
scale interactions between development and
environment. Special attention was paid to identify-
ing linkages between traditionally unrelated disci-
plines and to articulating agendas for collaborative
research. The initial essays were reviewed in late
1984 at an international workshop attended by the
essay authors, other scholars, and policymakers.
The essays were revised, often extensively, to reflect
discussions at the workshop. A further critical
dimension was provided by the independent Com-
mentaries that accompany each chapter in this
volume. Taken together, these contributions pro-
vide the foundations and initial scaffolding on which
our continuing inquiry into a sustainable develop-
ment of the biosphere is being built.
In the remainder of this introductory chapter, I
draw from the chapters a sketch of the central ques-
tions that need to be better understood if we are to
shape a more usable understanding of long-term,
large-scale interactions between environment and
development.
An Earth transformed by human
action
Today's concerns about a sustainable development
of the biosphere are part of a long intellectual
tradition. The evolution of this tradition reflects
both changing scales of interactions between human
activities and the environment and changing visions
of what these interactions should be. We cannot
expect the Biosphere Program to free itself from
its cultural and historical contexts, nor, indeed,
should it. But if the Program is to be much more
than propaganda in support of one or another
preferred social agenda, then it must be built on a
self-awareness of these contexts and the biases they
entail. I have found the writings of Gilbert White,
Lvnton Caldwell. Ian Burton, and Robert Kates to
be particularly helpful in establishing this self-
Sustainable development of the biosphere
awareness [7]. Related perspectives in this volume
are provided by Williams, Timmerman, and Ravetz.
Malthusian perspectives
Concerns about possible environmental limits to
human development extend back about as far as
one is willing to look. Plato, in his Critias, was already
lamenting that agricultural activities had trans-
formed the land of Attica into the "bones of a wasted
body ... the richer and softer parts of the soil having
fallen away, and the mere skeleton being left [8]."
The terms of the modern debate, however, were
defined by Malthus. Writing almost two centuries
ago, he characterized human well-being in terms of
the ratio of environmental resources to human
population. Malthus' assessment was bleak, for he
saw in food production a land-limited resource that
could not possibly be increased quickly enough to
keep pace with a growing human population [9].
Events proved Malthus wrong, at least for most
of the world over most of the last two hundred
years. But, as Williams and Timmerman point out
in their contributions to this volume, the Malthusian
vision has nonetheless persisted, shaping the think-
ing of subsequent generations. Figure 1.1 shows
how both the numerator and the denominator of
Malthus' argument have evolved through time [10].
Malthus' worries about agricultural limits to
Britain's growth have become today's worries about
the limits that food, materials, energy, water, and
the biosphere's absorptive capacity might impose
on human development of the planet.
Malthus was provoked to write his Essay on the
Principle of Population by what he saw as the utopian
visions of Condorcet. Supporters of Adam Smith's
competing vision were immediately provoked to
refute Malthus. Ever since, the debate has swung
between two poles of thought. As characterized by
Burton and Kates:
In its extreme form, one pole is determinist in its
view of nature, Malthusian in its concern with the
adequacy of resources, and conservationist in its pre-
scription for policy. The opposite pole is possibilist
in its attitude toward nature, optimistic in its view of
technological advance and the sufficiency of re-
sources and generally concerned with technical and
managerial problems of development rIll.
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Figure 1.1 Historical changes in the
numerator and denominator of the
"Malthus Ratio", from Kates and
Burton [10].
Both poles have been articulately and extensively
defended. The conservationist tradition runs from
George Perkins Marsh's The Earth as Modified by
Human Action (1874), through F. Osborn's Our
Plundered Planet (1948), Harrison Brown's The
Challenge of Man's Future (1954), Rachel Carson's
Silent Spring (1962), and the Meadows' Limits to
Growth (1972), to the US Government's mammoth
report, Global 2000 (1980). Exponents of the possi-
bilist view have ranged from Reclus' La Terre et les
Hommes (1876), through numerous publications
from Resources for the Future and the Hudson
Institute in the 1960s and 1970s, to Julian Simon's
The Resourceful Earth (1984) and the World
Resources Institute's recent celebration of The
Global Possible [12].
The rhetorical gifts of advocates on both sides of
the debate have been so strong as to leave many
bystanders, myself included, under the spell of
whichever has been most recently encountered. But
as Alvin vVeinberg has remarked, "one's reac-
tion ... is as much a reflection of one's own prefer-
ences and biases as it is an objective estimate of the
correctness of [the] divergent views [13]." My own
biases are possibilist, though of the "despairing
optimist" variety portrayed by Rene Dubos. As is
evident elsewhere in this volume, other participants
in our Biosphere Program have entered from the
conservationist side of the debate. We have not
attempted to eliminate or even to balance the biases
these different perspectives entail. Rather, as urged
by Thompson (this volume), we are striving for
a pluralism that keeps our biases explicit while
benefiting from the multiple perspectives they
generate.
The increasing scale of interactions
The debate between the conservationists and the
possibilists concerns the prospects and implications
of interactions between human development and
the environment. The swings of this debate,
however, should not obscure the increasingly global
scale that these interactions have assumed over the
last hundred years [14].
The emergence of a global perspective on the
impacts of human habitation on the Earth can be
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traced back to the nineeteenth century. A con-
venient reference point is George Perkins Marsh's
The Earth as Modified by Human Action, published
in 1874 [15]. Drawing on his own extensive travels
and reading, Marsh set out "to indicate the charac-
ter and, approximately, the extent of the changes
produced by human action in the physical condi-
tions of the globe we inhabit." Successive chapters
"traced the history of man's industry as exerted
upon Animal and Vegetable Life, upon the Woods,
upon the Waters, and upon the Sands." Though
global in the scope of his concerns and examples,
most of Marsh's examples described modifications
of individual localities or small regions as a result
of human development. The possibility of larger
modifications to come, however, was raised in a final
chapter on "Great projects of physical change
accomplished or proposed by man". Marsh's pre-
scient account included discussion of a sea level
Panama canal, diversion of the Nile and Colorado
Rivers, adjustment of the water level in the Caspian
and Aral Seas by diverting the rivers of central
Russia, urban waste disposal, intentional weather
modification, and the unintended cumulative
impact of agricultural and industrial activity. His
balanced and graciously written analysis pointed
out the human benefits that such developments
could entail, but also cautioned that unexpected
and deleterious environmental side-effects might
occur.
Fifty years later, the world's population had
increased by almost 50%. Its industrial activity had
grown more than five-fold. The increasing scale
and significance of these human developments as
agents of global environmental change were force-
fully articulated by a remarkable group of scientists.
These included the French theologian and paleon-
tologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, the Austrian-
born American biophysicist Alfred J. Lotka, and,
above all, the Russian mineralogist Vladimir
Ivanovitch Vern adsky.
The writings of Teilhard de Chardin were, as
often, obscure if inspirational. But Lotka could have
been contributing to a present-day government
report when he wrote, in 1924:
[W]hatever may be the ultimate course of events, the
present is a n eminently atypical epoch. Economically,
we are living on our capital; biologically we are
changing radically the complexion of our share in
the carbon cycle by throwing into the atmosphere,
Sustainable development of the biosphere
from coal fires and metallurgical furnaces, ten times
as much carbon dioxide as in the natural biological
process of breathing ... [16).
Vernadsky's perspective was even deeper and more
prophetic. Recapitulating in 1945 themes he had
first annunciated in lectures and books 20 years
earlier, he described the concept of:
... the biosphere, the only terrestrial envelope where
life can exist. Basically, man cannot be separated
from it ... He is geologically connected with its
material and energetic structure [17].
Echoing the Italian geologist Stoppani, Vernadsky
argued that the most significant aspect of man's
development was not his technology per se, but
rather the sense of global knowledge and communi-
cation engendered by that technology [18]. He por-
trayed this "noosphere" or "realm of thought" as
a new geological phenomenon on our planet. In it
for the first time man becomes a large-scale geologic
force ... Chemically, the face of our planet, the bio-
sphere, is being sharply changed by man consciously,
and even more so, unconsciously [19).
Vernadsky and his contemporaries had neither the
data nor the instruments to convert their insights
into useful analytical tools for understanding the
global environmental impacts of human develop-
ment. Over the last 50 years, however, and
especially since the International Geophysical Year
(IGY) of 1956-1957, the needed data and measure-
ments have begun to be accumulated. Equally
important, so have the breathtaking photographs
from space that portray the biosphere from a global
perspective. From this new knowledge and vision
has been built a still incomplete, but nonetheless
quantitative and detailed picture of the global
environmental consequences of human
development.
The major features of this picture were sketched
in a recent report of the International Council of
Scientific Union's Scientific Committee on problems
of the Environment (SCOPE). They are worth
quoting at length:
• Man's activities on earth today induce fluxes of
carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus and sulphur that are
of similar magnitude to those associated with the
natural global cycles of these elements; in limited
areas man's influence dominates the cycles. The
Themes for a research program
likely increase of man's activIties during the re-
mainder of this and during the next century will
undoubtedly mean significant disturbances of the
global ecosystem.
• The most important ways whereby man is inter-
fering with the global ecosystem are:
- fossil fuel burning which maya) double the
atmospheric CO2 concentration by the middle of the
next century; b) further increase the emissions of
oxides of sulphur and nitrogen very significantly;
- expanding agriculture and forestry and the
associated use of fertilizers (nitrogen and phos-
phorus) significantly alter the natural circulation of
these nutrients;
- increased exploitation of the fresh water system
both for irrigation in agriculture and industry and
for waste disposal.
• According to our present understanding, the
most important impacts of these changes in the long-
term perspective are:
- a gradual change towards a warmer climate, the
details and implications of which we know very little
about;
- the concentration of ozone will decrease in the
stratosphere, due to the increased release of N20
and chlorine compounds and increase in the tropo-
sphere, due to the increased release of NO, and
hydrocarbons:
- an increase of the areas affected by lake and
stream acidification in mid-latitudes and possibly also
in the tropics; the ion balance of the soils may be
significantly disturbed, as is now being found with
regard to aluminum;
- a decrease of the extent of tropical forests, which
will enhance the rate of increase in atmospheric CO2
concentration and release other minor constituents
to the atmosphere; this may also contribute to soil
degradation;
- due to loss of organic matter and nutrients, soil
deterioration will occur and this implies a reduced
possibility for the vegetation to return to pristine
conditions... ;
- a trend toward the eutrophication of estuarine
and coastal marine areas;
- more frequent development of anoxic conditions
in fresh-water and marine systems and sediments.
• The development and continuation of highly
productive units in agriculture and forestry means
an increasing dependence on technological advances
that, to be properly directed, requires profound
knowledge about long term modifications of the soil.
• The long-term implications of exploiting the
natural resources of the earth are not well under-
stood, nor do we understand what is permissible in
order to guarantee that present or future (possibly
higher) levels of productivity will not later decline ...
[20].
The modern world described by the SCOPE report
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supports three times the human population and
100 times the industrial activity that it did a century
ago, when Marsh described the Earth "as modified
by human action." As the SCOPE report shows, this
vast increase in human activity has left the Earth
not just modified, but fundamentally transformed.
The Earth as garden
What images are appropriate for thinking about
an Earth transformed by human action? As empha-
sized by Holling, Timmerman, and Thompson in
their contributions to this volume, the choice of the
images or myths we use to structure our accounts
of the world is a fundamental one, which radically
constrains the questions we ask and answers we get.
Much of what Burton and Kates characterized as
conservationist thinking seems to be based on an
image of nature in its "original state", perturbed
by sporadic human blundering. The concerned
possibilists, in contrast, have embraced the image
of "spaceship Earth" as a creation of and responsi-
bility for enlightened engineering.
Neither image, however, will quite do. On the
one hand, the Earth has been transformed by
human activity, with hardly a corner that is not now
being managed, at least in some limited sense. On
the other hand, we have learned just enough about
the planet and its workings to see how far we are
from having either the blueprints or the operator's
manual that would let us turn that diffuse and
stumbling management into the confident captaincy
implied by the "spaceship" school of thought.
Reflecting on these inadequacies, Harvey Brooks
has argued that today's Earth "is more like a garden
than a primeval forest, even if the garden is ill-kept
[21]." I like the "garden" image, not the least
because it emphasizes the human use of Earth for
productive purposes. I should add, however, that
my personal gardening experience is not of trim
English hedges, but rather of the tense encounter
in the foothills of the American Appalachian Moun-
tains between vines, bugs, beasts, tornados, and the
would-be gardener.
If we accept the garden image as a useful one,
two questions arise: What kind of garden do we
want? What kind of garden can we get?
The first of the questions - "What kind of garden
do we want?" - ultimately calls for an expression
of values. The values on which we have based this
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study - the kinds of garden we want - are suggested
in our choice of title: The Sustainable DeveLopment
of the Biosphere. The commonsense meaning of
"sustainable" is a good first approximation of our
intended meaning. We seek to distinguish garden-
ing strategies that can be sustained into the
indefinite futur~ from those that, however success-
ful in the short run, are likely to leave our children
bereft of nature's support.
There is a strong anthropomorphic bias in these
"sustainability" values - people worry about nature
primarily in terms of what nature means for
people's own welfare. If environmental degrada-
tion occurs perhaps it can be traced to people's
failure to define their welfare in sufficiently long-
run terms to include their descendants. Other less
anthropomorphic biases are possible, but I suspect
that most of us eventually return to our essential
humanness.
The second question raised above is one of feasi-
bility: "What kind of garden can we get?" While
not divorced from value judgments, this latterques-
tion is fundamentally one of knowledge and know-
how. Environmental degradation results not only
from insufficient value placed on the long run, but
also from sheer ignorance of how environment and
development interact. What kinds of long-term
development pressures are likely to be the sources
of the next century's environmental transforma-
tions? What are the implications of these transfor-
mations for the biosphere's productive capacity?
How can the transformations be managed to shape
a garden more to our liking, yet still enhance our
children's options?
Managing global change:
technologies, institutions and
research
What kind of research program might actually pro-
duce usable knowledge for the management of
long-term, large-scale interactions between
development and environment?
Our study has set as its ultimate goal the iden-
tification and evaluation of strategic interventions
through which societies might change the long-
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term, large-scale interactions between development
and environment. In particular, we seek to show
how important technological, institutional, and
research strategies that might be set in place over
the next decade could affect the prospects for a
sustainable development of the biosphere. Before
describing these goals in more detail, it is useful to
emphasize two things our objectives are not.
First, our objective is not to produce yet another
set of detailed predictions about future environ-
mental impacts. Such predictive efforts are naive
on two counts: technical infeasibility and practical
irrelevance. They are infeasible because of the com-
plexity of the environmental syndromes arising
from interactions with development, the depen-
dence of these interactions on unknowable future
patterns of social choice and evolution, and the
incomplete state of the sciences required for their
assessment. They are irrelevant because there is
little serious demand for detailed predictions on
the part of experienced politicians, businessmen,
or managers. Such action-oriented people have
shown themselves to be less interested in dubious
predictions of "what's going to happen" than in
understanding how they might intervene to make
what actually does happen more to their liking and
benefit [22].
Second, our objective is not to produce yet
another lecture on "what society should do". The
syndromes arising from the interactions between
development and environment are simultaneously
global and local. All people on Earth are affected
by them. now and in the future; no person and few
nations can do much unilaterally to alterthem. What
people do today will change both the constraints
and opportunities that face later generations. The
nature and severity of environmental syndromes -
the kind of garden that "we" want - will thus differ
greatly among people, times, and places. Useful
tools for managing the changes of our global garden
will be tools that can serve differing (and evolving)
local, national, and generational perceptions of the
good and proper life.
The design and evaluation of options
for intervention
In practice, technologies, institutions, and research
are not independent entities. Studies of the bio-
sphere over the last 100 years provide an excellent
Themes for a research program
example of how the questions asked by researchers
are influenced by the kinds of measurement tech-
nologies available to them. Likewise, as Harvey
Brooks points out in Chapter II, the assessment of
any major technology requires an appreciation of
the institutionalized "operating" system and social
structure within which it is embedded. Finally, it
should by now be universally accepted that sig-
nificant technologies shape the societies that employ
them. Nonetheless, it is useful to focus initially on
questions regarding the individual technologies,
institutions, and researches that we need to explore
in order to evaluate their potential as tools for
managing long-term, large-scale interactions of
development and environment.
Technologies
Many of the most significant changes in the nature
and consequences of long-term, large-scale interac-
tions between development and environment over
the last several centuries have been intimately
associated with technological innovation. For
example, Richards (Chapter 2) tells how the Mallee
scrublands of Australia resisted clearance until
roller dragging technologies were invented. The
fuel wood crisis of eighteenth century Europe was
resolved through the development of coal burning
technologies, which thereby contributed to the
reforestation of much previously cleared land.
In these examples, and many others documented
later in this volume, the transformation of the
environment is essentially a by-product of techno-
logical change. Arguments summarized in the next
two sections suggest that the most environmentally
significant technologies over the long term and
large scale tend to be those directly involved in the
transformation of land, water, fuel, and other
mineral resources. Within each of these "transform-
ing technology" categories, we seek to characterize
several strategic options that might be pursued over
the next decade in one or more large regions of
the globe. One example is the energy system of
horizontally integrated fuel sources and zero pollu-
tion emissions described by Hafele and his col-
leagues in Chapter 6. Another might be the major
river diversions now being implemented or planned
in several parts of the world [23]. A third is the
choice between agricultural technologies (including
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the genetic engineering of crops) that are more or
less intensive in their use of land, fuel, and fertilizer
inputs. In all cases, our aim is to characterize how
such transforming technologies, adopted at specific
rates and over specific areas, would alter the
environmental consequences of economic and social
development.
Institutions
The institutions through which people, economies,
and governments decide upon and implement their
activities also provide a potential means of interven-
ing in the interactions between environment and
development. At one extreme, these include formal
international organizations, such as FAO, IAEA,
and UNEP; multilateral agreements, such as the
Law of the Sea or the Ozone Convention; the laws
and regulations that embody policies of the world's
nation states. Somewhat less formal are the market
structures and command hierarchies that probably
mediate the majority of interactions between
development and environment. At the informal
extreme, it is important to appreciate the implica-
tions of different cultural and religious beliefs for
sustainable development practices. (In a recent
experiment several Islamic scholars drafted a cor-
pus of environmental law based on the United
States' National Environmental Policy Act, but
invoking the Koran rather than the State as the
primary source of motivation and authority.)
Experience suggests that some kinds of institu-
tions provide better means of dealing with certain
kinds of large-scale, long-term environmental syn-
dromes than others [24]. For example, "commons"
problems, such as the depletion of stratospheric
ozone by halocarbon releases, are particularly resis-
tant to market-mediated resolution. At least when
substitutes have been available, however, they have
sometimes been mitigated through formal inter-
national negotiations or even moral suasion (see
Majone, Chapter 12, and Haigh's Commentary). On
the other hand, intergenerational trade-offs of the
sort involved in soil erosion or hazardous waste
disposal require quite different institutional
responses. Perry has recently reviewed the perform-
ance of various international science organizations
with a view toward identifying strengths, weak-
nesses, and functional gaps [25]. But further work
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on designing useful typologies of institutions and
syndromes is urgently required [26].
Research and monitoring
In the very long run, increased knowledge about
the ways in which economic activities interact with
the environ ment may prove to be our most powerful
tool for managing a sustainable development of the
biosphere. Experience suggests that much of the
research agenda will take care of itself. For the long
term that concerns us here, the most useful returns
will almost certainly come from studies on the
fundamental processes that link the chemical, phy-
sical, geological, and biological components of the
Earth system. The broad research programs now
being formulated In discussions of "Global
Change", "Global Habitability", and the like, if
adequately funded, can be expected to provide the
foundations of knowledge on which specific
management actions can be built. Our challenge is
to provide policymakers with rapid access to, and
a critical appreciation of, these foundations, so that
development decisions can be taken with the best
possible understanding of their environmental
implications.
There remain, however, areas in which greater
attention to the specific scientific understanding
required for informed development choices could
generate useful additions to the research agenda.
As one example, Dickinson (Chapter 9) argues that
for the "greenhouse" syndrome of fossil fuel burn-
ing, deforestation, and climatic change, more policy
and research attention should be devoted to the
nature and consequences of low-probability, high
magnitude climatic warmings. And Parry (Chapter
14), in his treatment of the managerial implications
of long-term climatic changes, shows that more
research on the relation between the changing
means and the changing frequency of extreme
events might be extremely useful. Still required
are systematic means of assessing the special
research tasks in the natural sciences that are
needed to inform long-term, large-scale develop-
ment choices.
It is in the area of environmental monitoring,
however, that I suspect a consideration of future
development possibilities could have the greatest
impact on the natural science studies. Michael
Gwynne, the Director of the Global Environmental
Sustainable development of the biosphere
Monitoring System (GEMS), notes in his Commen-
tary to Chapter 13 that early monitoring efforts were
designed with too little attention to the eventual
practical application of their results. For example,
it is not entirely unfair to say that much of the
history of the Landsat satellite program and its
relatives has been one of rather too many answers
(those beautiful, false-color photos on everyone's
walls) in search of a few urgent questions. Recent
monitoring initiatives have done somewhat better
in this respect (see Regier and Baskerville, Chapter
3). The new generation of monitoring systems cur-
rently being designed need to have ways of being
even more responsive to future management needs.
This does not mean subordinating basic scientific
goals to short-term perceptions of crisis. It does
mean recognizing that the next generation of large-
scale environmental monitoring systems will be with
us for many decades into the future. Over that
period, the environment will be transformed sig-
nificantly by human activities. Both science and
management will be better served if the design of
monitoring systems reflects some systematic
thought on the nature and magnitude of the pos-
sible transformations, the practical problems they
may create, and the managerial choices they will
require. As Thomas Schelling put it at our planning
conference, the challenge is to devise an approach
that, if it had been in use 20 years ago, would have
led us then to begin monitoring the health and
growth of the forests that now suddenly seem to be
suffering from their proximity to intensive indus-
trial activities. (In Chapter 13, Izrael and Munn
emphasize the fact that acid deposition networks
have traditionally not included biological monitor-
ing of the health of the ecosystem being impacted.)
The biosphere: using our
knowledge of global change
In order to evaluate how alternative strategies of
technological, institutional, and research manage-
ment can affect the prospects for a sustainable
development of the biosphere, it is necessary to
shape a synoptic understanding of how human
activities transform the environment. The last
decade has seen the emergence of an integrated
view of life on Earth that emphasizes the linkages
Themes for a research program
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Figure 1.2 The relationships among biological, chemical, and geophysical processes in the biosphere.
Redrawn from Bretherton [27].
between the Earth's atmosphere, oceans, soils, and
biota (see McElroy, Chapter 7, and Lovelock's Com-
mentary). One common thread weaving through
these systems is the flow of the major chemical
compounds of carbon, nitrogen, oxygen, sulfur,
and phosphorus. Another is the flow of energy that
d rives the atmospheric and oceanic circulation, gen-
erates the climate, powers photosynthesis, and sur-
rounds us with light, heat, and ionizing radiation.
A third is the ubiquitous inAuence of life on the
interacting flows of materials and energy (Figure
1.2). These interactions are complex, often non-
linear, and occur over a great variety of time and
space scales. They give the biosphere a propensity
for discontinuous change, characterized by thresh-
old responses and multiple domains of stability. As
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McElroy and Holling point out in Chapters 7 and
10, the "cycles" and "equilibria" prevalent in earlier
writings on the biosphere seem increasingly hard
to find.
.Earth sciences under the aspect of Gaia
As foreseen by Lotka and Vernadsky, man is indeed
one of the living organisms that influences the inter-
actions of the biosphere. But contrary to the conven-
tional wisdom of even a decade ago, the role of
nonhuman life-forms in determining the character
of the global environment now appears both
ubiquitious and powerful [28]. James Lovelock
argues that the global environment has remained
habitable for life over the past several billion years
precisely because of the feedback control that life
has exerted on the global environment [29]. Love-
lock's "Gaia" or "Mother Earth" hypothesis
remains controversial. But whatever the fate of its
details, "Gaia" has clearly provided a unifying con-
cept around which chemists, biologists, geophysi-
cists, oceanographers, geographers, and others are
now conducting a variety of exciting and cross-
disciplinary studies.
This emerging, unified perspective on the
sciences of Earth has provided tentative answers to
a number of long-standing questions regarding the
nature and origins of environmental change. We
can now document long-term, large-scale patterns
of variation in the biosphere's temperature,
chemical composition, and biomass distribution. We
have some solid understanding about which natural
processes - physical, chemical, and biological- con-
trol these pulses. We have the beginnings of an
ability to model quantitatively these interactions and
to predict future patterns of environmental change
[30].
A great deal, nonetheless, remains unknown. For
all its accomplishments, the rapid growth in our
knowledge of the Earth's biogeochemical and cli-
matic processes has raised at least as many questions
as it has answered. We are still unable to make
confident predictions regarding such potentially
important questions as the climatic effects of the
increasing concentration of atmospheric carbon
dioxide or the large-scale environmental con-
sequences of massive land-use changes in the
tropics. We cannot explain the complex patterns of
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mortality and morbidity occurring in forests of the
industrialized regions. We do not know· why the
atmospheric concentration of important gases like
methane is rising. We understand far too little about
how future agricultural practices will affect the
crucial role of soil microorganisms in mediating gas
exchange between the atmosphere and the bio-
sphere.
Active discussions within the scientific community
are exploring how a useful integration of future
research among disciplines and nations could best
be achieved. The International Council of Scientific
Union's recent symposium on "Global Change"
outlined some of the priority concerns and likely
results of such an integrated program. The "Over-
view" paper for that symposiurn concluded:
It is thus of fundamental importance to develop a
knowledge base through a sharply focussed aggre-
gate of research programs sharing a common global
view of the Earth system that emphasizes the con-
nectedness of all intervening parts. These programs
should ultimately be designed to assess trends and
anticipate natural and anthropogenically-caused
change over a 50-100 year time-scale. To accomplish
this goal, they must focus on the major bio-
geochemical cycles involving the atmosphere, hydro-
sphere, lithosphere and biosphere over the full range
of time-scales, and they must consider the energy
sources and energy transfer processes internal and
external to the earth; not merely the major inputs
but also those minor contributions which affect man-
made systems and may playa triggering role in the
causes of global change .... The time interval of
approximately one hundred years for which trends
in global change should be assessed exceeds by almost
an order of magnitude that contemplated in most
current or planned programs. Existing programs will
thus have to be complemented or expanded accord-
ingly [31].
Toward a synoptic framework
In Chapter 8, Crutzen and Graedel provide an
illustration of the kind of synoptic framework this
study hopes to create for synthesizing ongoing
research of the biosphere in a such a way that it
will become usable for managing interactions
between development and environment. Crutzen
and Graedel focus on the implications of human
development activities for the atmosphere. Parallel
syntheses are needed for the land and soil, the
hydrosphere, and the biota [32].
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Valued environmental components
Our basic approach to the creation of a synoptic
framework is drawn from experience in environ-
mental impact assessment [33]. We seek to establish
the causal relationships between "valued environ-
mental components" and potential sources of
environmental change. Valued environmental com-
ponents, in the sense used here, are attributes of
the environment that some party to the assessment
believes to be important. Which environmental
components are valued in a particular case will
depend upon specific social, political, and environ-
mental circumstances, as well as on the level of
aggregation appropriate for the intended use. In
general, policymakers, interest groups, and scien-
tists may all argue for inclusion of specific com-
ponents. However the list is eventually derived, it
represents an explicit value judgment defining the
terms in which users of the assessment are willing
to describe the environment aspects of "what kind
of garden they want". One of the clearest lessons
from assessment experience of the last decade is
that unless some definite - and preferably short -
list of (most highly) valued environmental com-
ponents is specified as a focus for assessment, the
subsequent "factual" analysis is unlikely to be useful
to anyone.
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Figure 1.3 Major impacts of atmo-
spheric chemistry on valued
atmospheric components. The yellow
squares indicate that the listed
chemical is expected to have a
significant direct effect on the listed
property of the atmosphere.
Definitions of the atmospheric
properties are given in Table 1.1. Data
are from Crutzen and Graedel (Chap-
ter 8) and the National Research
Council [34], modified as a result of
personal communications from R. C.
Harris and P. Crutzen.
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Table 1.1 Definitions of valued atmospheric components and sources of disturbance. a
Valued atmospheric components
Ultraviolet energy absorption
Thermal radiation budget alteration
Photochemical oxidant formation
Precipitation acidity
Visibility degradation
Material corrosion
Sources of disturbance b
Oceans and estuaries
Vegetation and soils
Wild animals
Wetlands
Biomass burning
Crop production
Domestic animals
Petroleum combustion
Coal combustion
Industrial processes
Definition
This property reflects the ability of the stratosphere to absorb
ultraviolet solar radiation, thus shielding the Earth's surface
from its effects. This property is commonly addressed in
discussions of "the stratospheric ozone problem"
This property reflects the complicated relationships through
which the atmosphere transmits much of the energy arriving
from the sun at visible wavelengths while absorbing much of
the energy radiated from Earth at infrared wavelengths. The
balance of these forces, interacting with the hydrological cycle,
exerts considerable influence on the Earth's temperature. This
property is commonly addressed in discussions of "the green-
house problem"
This property reflects the oxidizing properties of the
atmosphere, caused by concentration of a variety of highly
reactive gases. The treatment here focuses on local-scale
oxidants that are often implicated in problems of "smog",
crop damage, and degradation of works of art
This property reflects the acid-base balance of the atmosphere
as reflected in rain, snow, and fog. It is commonly addressed
in discussions of "acid rain"
Visibility is reduced when light of visible wavelengths is scat-
tered by gases or particles in the atmosphere
This property reflects the ability of the atmosphere to corrode
materials exposed to it, often through the chloridation or
sulfidation of marble, masonry, iron, aluminum, copper, and
materials containing these
Definition
Includes coastal waters and biological activity of the oceans
Does not include wetlands or agricultural systems, for which
see below; does include activities of soil microorganisms
Does not include domestic or marine animals, for which see
below; does include microbes, except for those of soils, for
which see above
An important subcomponent of vegetation and soils; does not
include rice, for which see below
Includes both natural and anthropogenic burning
Includes rice, but not forestry; includes fertilization and irri-
gation
Includes grazing systems and the microbial flora of the guts
of domestic animals
Includes impacts of refining and waste disposal
Includes impacts of mining, processing, and waste disposal
Includes cement production and the processing of nonfuel
minerals
a This table provides definitions of terms used in the text, adapted from Crutzen and Graedel (Chapter 8).
b The sources are largely self-explanatory. The notes provided are confined to special considerations important in the
text. For more details, see Crutzen and Graedel (Chapter 8).
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For purposes of this example, the valued environ-
mental components identified by Crutzen and
Graedel and described in Table 1.1 are an adequate
point of departure. The managerial goal is to
understand the relationships (if any) between these
valued properties of the atmosphere and the natural
fluctuations and human activities that might be
sources of significant change in them. Recent
advances in our understanding of atmospheric
chemistry and its interactions with the biosphere
raise the practical possibility of specifying such
relationships in terms of fundamental biological,
chemical, and physical processes [34].
19
Interactions
Present knowledge regarding the valued atmo-
spheric components affected by changes in specific
atmospheric chemicals is given qualitative
expression in Figure 1.3, in which the convention
used indicates only direct effects [35]. Note that
many components are affected by multiple
chemicals. Present knowledge regarding the specific
atmospheric chemicals affected by changes in poten-
tial sources Gf disturbance is given qualitative
expression in Figure 1.4, again using the convention
of indicating only direct effects. Note that many
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Figure 1.5 Chemical interactions in
the atmosphere. A framework for
assessing interactions among the
chemical compounds listed in Figures
1.3 and 1.4
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atmospheric chemicals are affected by multiple
kinds of sources. The pervasive influence on atmo-
spheric chemistry exerted by changes in the bio-
sphere - in ocean life, plants, soils, and animals -
is also evident in the figure.
To complete the chemical connection between
sources and valued atmospheric components, it is
finally necessary to attend to the matter of indirect
effects - the fact that sou rce-induced changes in
chemical species A may affect a given valued
atmospheric component through an intermediate
influence on chemical species B [36]. Tracking the
indirect effects of chemical interactions is one of
the central tasks of contemporary atmospheric
science. The immense complexity of ~ven the rela-
tively well understood interactions precludes their
discussion here [37]. Conceptually, however, the
substance of such a discussion can be captured in a
matrix constructed along the lines of Figure 1.5.
The chemical compounds of Figures 1.3 and 1.4
thus provide the common denominator for an
anal ysis of biogeochemical processes that link
sources of changes to consequences of changes in
the atmosphere.
The three figu res discussed above can be com-
bined to provide a synoptic framework for atmo-
spheric assessment [38]. As suggested in Figure 1.6,
we can begin with a valued atmospheric component
like "precipitation acidification" and its immediate
chemical causes (Figure 1.3), trace these back
through their interactions with other atmospheric
chemicals (Figure 1.5), and finally identify the
sources responsible for initiating those interactions
(Figure 1.4). The ultimate product is a synoptic
matrix that shows the impact of each potential
source of atmospheric change on each valued
atmospheric component. Crutzen and Graedel's
initial effort to construct such a synoptic matrix is
shown in Figure 1.7. Their assessment is qualitative,
as befits the present state of knowledge. It also
includes an estimate of the reliability of that
knowledge, thus addressing a central goal of
our Program as elaborated by Ravetz in Chapter
15.
Figure 1.7 A synoptic assessment of
impacts on the atmosphere. This
figure, adapted from Crutzen and
Graedel (Chapter 8) gives a completed
version of panel D from Figure 1.6.
The valued atmospheric components
defined in Table 1.1 are listed as the
column headings of the matrix. The
sources of disturbances to these
components are listed as row head-
ings. Cell entries assess the relative
impact of each source on each com-
ponent and the relative scientific cer-
tainty of the assessment. "Column
totals" would, in principle, represent
the net effect of a II sou rces on each
valued atmospheric component.
"Row totals" would indicate the net
effect of each source on all valued
atmospheric components. These
totals are envisioned as judgmental,
qualitative assessments rather than
as literal, quantitative summations.
The significance of the letters in the
cells is described in the text.
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Environmental assessments
The simplest atmospheric impact assessments
involve only a single cell of the matrix. A typical
example is the study of effects of a single source,
such as a new coal-fired power station, on a single
valued environmental component, such as precipi-
tation acidification (location a in Figure 1.7). More
complex atmospheric assessments have addressed
the question of aggregate impacts across different
kinds of sources. A contemporary example is the
study of the net impact on the Earth's thermal radi-
ation budget caused by chemical perturbations due
to fossil fuel combustion, biomass burning, land-use
changes, and industrialization (e.g., locations d in
Figure 1.7) [39]. The assessment then becomes a
column total (location e) in the synoptic framework.
Even more useful for the purposes of policy and
management are assessments of the impacts of a
single source on multiple valued environmental
components. The simple study noted above would
fall into this category if the impacts of coal combus-
tion were assessed not only on acidification, but also
on photochemical oxidant production, materials
corrosion, visibility degradation, etc. (e.g., locations
b in Figure 1.7). The impact assessment then
becomes a row total in the synoptic matrix (location
c) [40].
Among, the most troublesome interactions
between development and environment are those
that involve cumulative impacts. In general, cumu-
lative impacts become important when sources of
perturbation to the environment are grouped
sufficiently closely in space or time that they exceed
the natural system's ability to remove or dissipate
the resultant disturbance. This isa complicated issue
on which systematic work is just beginning [41].
The basic data required to structure such assess-
ments are the characteristic time and space scales
of the relevant environmental constituents and
development activities. The scales for chemical con-
stituents of the atmosphere plotted in Figuri 1.8
should be accurate to within a factor of 2 or 3 [42].
Data on a comparably defined scale and relevant to
a number of human development activities are
noted later. Even without the development data,
Figure 1.8 Characteristic scales of
atmospheric constituents. The figure
applies to the clean troposphere
above the boundary layer. The
abscissa indicates the amount of time
required for the concentration of the
listed chemicals to be reduced to 30%
of their initial values through chemical
reactions. The ordinate indicates the
mean horizontal displacement
(square root of East-West times
North-South displacement) likely to
occur over that lifetime. Data are from
Crutzen [42], modified as a result of
personal communications from P. J.
Crutzen and R. C. Harris.
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however, Figure 1.8 suggests how scale information
can be used to structure cumulative impact assess-
ments.
For example, perturbations to the gases repre-
sented in the upper-right corner of Figure 1.8
accumulate over decades to centuries, and around
the world as a whole. Today's perturbations to these
gases will still be affecting the environment decades
hence; perturbations occuring anywhere in the
world will affect the environment everywhere in the
world. These gases are all radiatively active (see
Figure 1.3), thus giving the "greenhouse" syndrome
its long-term, global-scale character. At the other
extreme, the heavy hydrocarbons and coarse parti-
cles represented in the lower-left corner drop out
of the atmosphere in a matter of hours, normally
traveling a few hundred kilometers or less from
their sources. The environmental components of
visibility reduction and photochemical oxidant for-
mation associated with these chemicals (Figure, 1.3)
thus take on their acute, relatively local character.
The middle of Figure 1.8 represents a group of
chemicals associated with the acidification of pre-
cipitation, all with characteristic scales of about a
couple of days and a couple of thousand kilometers.
Since the world's nation states tend to have spatial
dimensions of the same order (ca. 1000 km), we
should not be surprised to see acidification accumu-
lating across national borders.
Figure 1.8 also reflects the fact that concerns for
the accumulation of acidification impacts through
time are based not on the accumulation of relevant
chemicals in the atmosphere, but rather on the
accumulation in other media, such as soil and water,
and on the accumulation of sources in societies'
growing use of fossil fuels. Expanding the synoptic
framework of Crutzen and Graedel to contend with
these additional environmental and developmental
dimensions is a major part of the Biosphere Pro-
gram [43].
Extending the framework
The framework developed by Crutzen and Graedel
must be expanded before it can provide a truly
synoptic environmental framework for assessing
interactions between development and the atmo-
spheric environment. A relatively easy addition
would be one or more valued environmental com-
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ponents that reflect the role of atmospheric
chemicals as direct fertilizers or toxins for plants.
Such a modification would allow the integrated
treatment of such phenomena as the stimulation of
plant growth by carbon dioxide and its inhibition
by sulfur oxides - both products of fossil fuel com-
bustion [44]. Somewhat more ambitiously, the
approach could be expanded beyond its present
chemical focus to include the appropriate physical
and biological processes, and the sources of distur-
bance to them. Dickinson's (Chapter 9) sketch of a
comprehensive framework for understanding the
impact of human activities on climate shows the
potential of such an integrated approach [45]. Ulti-
mately, the need is for a qualitative framework that
puts in perspective the impacts of human activities
and natural fluctuations, not just on the atmo-
spheric environment, but also on soils, water, and
the biosphere as a whole.
Additional extensions to the framework are
needed to provide it with spatial and temporal
dimensions. Crutzen and Graedel's initial effort
focused on present day impacts across a mix of local,
regional, and global conditions. They are now pre-
paring separate versions of the framework shown
in Figure 1.7 for the global, regional, and local
interactions suggested in Figure 1.8. Their assess-
ment will eventually consist of a single, global-scale
analysis, plus several analyses for specific, large-
scale regions (e.g., Europe), selected to reflect
"interesting" interactions of development and
environment.
For each of these spatially defined perspectives,
the need is for a sequence of figures that show how
the relations between sources and valued environ-
mental components change through time. As sug-
gested in Figure 1.9, this might consist of a separate
version of Figure 1.7 created to reflect a "slice"
through the evolving conditions at 25- or 50-year
intervals. In the version we are presently exploring,
this sequence will extend several hundred years into
the past and a century into the future. The result,
it is hoped, will help to put the changing character
of interactions between human activities and the
environment into a truly synoptic historical and
geographical perspective.
This historical dimension, however, focuses
attention back on the question of human develop-
ment patterns. To extend the Crutzen and Graedel
framework as proposed, we need to know how
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to the atmosphere, as might be
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source-impact matrices, such as that
shown in Figure 1.7.
much and what kind of relevant human activity
was being carried out at specific times in the past,
and how much and what kind might be conducted
in the future.
Human development: long-term
trends and broad-scale patterns
In this section, my focus shifts from the biosphere
to human development per se. I attempt to sketch
some of the major lines of thought that need to be
explored for an understanding of the pressures on
the environment that arise through people's efforts
to improve their well-being. I concentrate here on
the long-term, large-scale patterns that reflect the
continuities of human development across con-
tinents and centuries. I reserve until the next section
a consideration of the sources and consequences of
the important discontinuities - the surprises, inno-
vations, and unique events - that make mere trend
extrapolation an inadequate guide to past or future
histories of the interactions between human
development and the environment.
The modern world system
A dominant featu re of human development over
the last several centuries has been its increasingly
global interdependence. As Richards writes in
Chapter 2, "Modern history is only comprehensible
when we consider both the unique qualities and
experiences of national or local units and the pro-
cesses of world change undergone through time."
A growing body of scholarship seeks to analyze the
origins, nature, and implications of the "modern
world-system" [46]. Some of the most significant of
the long-term, large-scale processes discussed in this
literature are summarized by Richards on pages
53-54.
(I) Expansion of the European frontier of settle-
ment into the New World, the great Eurasian
steppe, and Australasia.
(2) A steady growth in human population from 641
million estimated for 1700 to 4435 million for
1980.
(3) A dramatic growth in the population and spatial
extent of the world's cities.
(4) Increased use of fossil fuels and hydroelectric
power, which helped to create a revolution in
transport, communications, and industrial pro-
duction.
(5) Development of scientific methods, institutions,
and technical means for research and discovery
in the biological and physical sciences.
(6) Development of new weaponry with global
reach and the capacity for near-global
destruction.
(7) Dramatic advances in our ability to cure ill or
injured individuals and to control the spread
of disease at the collective level.
(8) A steady growth in the scale, efficiency, and
stability of large-scale complex organizations
(i.e., bureaucracies), in both private and public
modes.
(9) The emergence of self-regulating, price-fixing
global markets for goods and services.
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(10) The emergence of a world division of labor
between the developed countries of the North
(or core) and the developing countries of the
South (or periphery).
(11) The expansion of more intensive sedentary
agriculture and the simultaneous compression
of tribal peoples engaged in shifting cultivation
or in pastoral nomadism.
In our Biosphere Program we seek to illuminate
the nature and consequences of interactions
between these world development processes and
the global environment.
Demographic patterns
Human population growth at the global scale has
exhibited perhaps three periods of relatively rapid
increase followed by episodes of relative stability.
The popular image of an inexorable exponential
increase is a distortion produced by the use of short
time horizons and inappropriate graphing tech-
niques (Figure 1.10).
The most recent period of rapid population
increase in the densely settled parts of the world
began in the eighteenth century. Malthus wrote just
as the momentum of this growth was gathering
force. A consensus is now emerging that the
momentum will be spent toward the end of the next
century, to yield another period of relative stability
in human numbers, this time with a world popula-
tion of between 8 and 11 xl 09 people [48J.
The last decades of the twentieth century thus
occur in the midst of what Kates and Burton have
called "the Great Climacteric": a critical period,
more persistent than a crisis, where significant
change and unusual danger may occur [49]. This
latest climacteric extends from roughly 1700 to
2100, during which time the world's population will
likely experience about four doublings. The first
three have already occurred. The fourth, and prob-
ably last in the present climacteric, will near comple-
tion within the lives of our grandchildren.
Spatial distributions
To see what these human developments mean in
terms of their transformations of the Earth,
however, it is essential to understand their spatial
2xl09 Population
0
105 8xl04 6x 104 4x 104 2x104(a)
1010 Population Figure 1.10 Historical growth in
human population of the world. (a)
Typical arithmetic plot of changes
over the last 10 000 years. The
107 impression is one of a long, static
period followed by a contemporary
explosion. (b) Logarithmic plot of
changes over the last million years.
104
Three population surges appear,
reflecting the revolutions of tool-
106 105 104 103 102 making, of agriculture, and of
(b) Years ago industry. Figure from Deevey [47J.
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Figure 1.11 Cumulative distribution
of human development on the Earth's
land The curves ("Lorenz" curves)
are formed by ranking regions of the
Earth from most densely to least
densely developed, and th~n plotting
the cumulative proportion of the
development activity that occurs on
increasing portions of the Earth's total
land area. Separate curves are plotted
for population, agricultural produc-
tion, and energy consumption. Thus,
for example, the middle curve indi-
cates that about 60% of the Earth's
population is found on the most
crowded 10% of its land area [50].
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Figure 1.12 Geographical distribution of current population density, mapped for areas of about 5 x 106 km2
Note that the density scale is geometric [51).
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Figure 1.13 History and projections of population densities for the world as a whole and for continental
regions (note the logarithmic density scale) [52].
densities of people in Europe and South and Eas
Asia stand out. At the broad regional scale of reso-
lution used here, densities range from more than
200 people per km\? in China proper, through a
world average of about 30, to less than 1 person
per kn/ in Alaska and the Canadian Territories.
The patterns of relative crowding reOect· d in
Figure 1.12 have persisted through much of history
and will almost cenainly COlllinu into the future.
Figure 1.13 shows the historical growth of popula-
tion densities on the continental scale sin T 1750
and typical projections to the end of the next cen-
tury. These demonstrate that today's relatively high
densities in Europe and South and East Asia are
ssentially perman nt structures of human settle-
ment over the thre centuries that concern us here.
Den ities in this relatively crowded 15% of the Earth
have remained more than double those of the
remaining 85%. Moreover, population densitie in
Europe and China have remained similar
throughout the period. The Americas, Africa, 2nd
the SSR have supported r ·markably similar
densities over most of the last century, diverging
only in the morc distant past and future. By early
in the next centull', three major density groupings
seem likely to emerge on the contin ntal seal . The
highest, as for the last 200 years, will be represented
by Asia and Europe. An order of magnitude less
dense, on average, will be the lowest group onsist-
ing of orth America, the USSR, and Oceania. In
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between will be a medium density group consisting
of Latin America and Africa.
Absolute densities
The absolute densities suggested in Figure 1.13 are
also of interest [53]. The density of 20 people per
km2 already reached in Asia and Europe by 1750
is only now being achieved in Africa and Latin
America and will not be exceeded, on average, in
North America or the USSR even over the next
century. More significant is the average density of
100 people per km2 typical for Asia and Europe
today. This is at least double the figure likely to be
reached for any other large region of the Earth
over the next century. In other words, we already
have a century of historical experience in Europe
and China with continental population densities of
40 or more people per km 2 - densities as high as,
or higher than, those likely to develop in the
Americas, Africa, or the USSR over the next 100
years.
The only historically unprecedented densities
likely to exist on the continental scale by the end
of the next century will probably occur in Asia.
Approaching 200 people per km2 , it will reach a
density of the order of twice that of contemporary
Europe. Even these relatively high future densities,
however, are less than those encountered in many
individual countries today. Bangladesh, for
example, now has over 600 people per km2 , Japan
over 300, West Germany almost 250, and the UK
more than 200.
The relevance of these population densities for
interactions between development and environ-
ment will become clearer when we examine what
the populations are doing - i.e., their patterns of
economic activity.
Economic patterns
Not surprisingly, regions with high population
densities generally support high densities of
economic activity and impose comparably dense
pressures on the environment. But the patterns of
economic activity cannot be understood solely in
local terms. Indeed, by the beginning of the eigh-
teenth century at the latest, a true "world economy"
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had emerged. Throughout the entire period that
concerns us here, demands for many goods and
services arising in one part of the Earth have been
met with supplies drawn from half a world away.
Prices of many goods and services have tended to
be regulated in a global market, with relatively few
sustained deviations among regions. Since the
beginning of the eighteenth century, the volume of
world trade has risen by a factor of 500 or so [54].
International trade now represents about one third
of the world's total GNP, a figure that would be
even higher if long-distance trade within large
countries was included [55].
The expanding world economy consists of a
number of interrelated human activities that exert
pressures on the total environment. Some of the
most important pressures, as we saw earlier, are
related to the activities of agricultural production
and energy use. Global histories of the environ-
mental consequences of agricultural production
and energy consumption would provide invaluable
guidance for the assessment of sustainable develop-
ment options. Unfortunately, as Richards (Chapter
2) and Williams (Commentary to Chapter 2) point
out, such global reconstructions are only now begin-
ning to be assembled. Richard's own work suggests
the potential of such studies. He documents a 300-
year wave of global land transformation radiating
outward from economically developed core areas
into the developing peripheries. Driven primarily
by increasing population and by increasingly long-
distance trade in agricultural products, this wave
has doubled the amount of arable land on Earth
since the middle of the nineteenth century. In some
regions it has entailed virtually total deforestation,
in others the drainage of hundreds of thousands
of square kilometers of wetlands. For the world as
a whole, it has brought more than 2 million km2 of
land under irrigation.
We still lack synoptic histories of energy-related
activities with anything like the depth and resolution
of the land transformation studies. Nonetheless,
global reconstructions of fossil fuel consumption
that extend back to the middle of the last century
have been attempted, and reveal the patterns shown
in Figure 1.14. More detailed analyses reaching back
to the early part of this century are summarized by
Darmstadter in Chapter 5. The pictures emerging
from these studies are incomplete, particularly with
regard to the environmental implications of energy
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1960 1985 Figure 1.14 History of world fossil
fuel energy consumption, as reflected
in carbon emissions [56).
consumption based on fuel wood, hydropower, and
nuclear fission [57]. But the increasing magnitude,
pace, and global inclusiveness of environmental
transformations throughout the last centuries are
evident.
Present trends
Today's patterns of agricultural and energy activity
reflect the patterns in population density already
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considered. Most agriculture is carried out, and
most energy is consumed, on a relatively small
amount of the Earth's surface (Figure 1.11). Ten
percent of the Earth supports nearly one half of
the world economy's food production and
experiences nearly three quarters of its fuel con-
sumption. The world's present patterns of agricul-
ture and energy densities are shown in Figures 1.15
and 1.16. As can be seen in the maps, and even
more clearly in the graphical format of Fi.gure 1.17,
Figure 1.15 Geographical distribution of current agricultural production density, mapped for areas of about
5 x 106 km 2 . Note tllat the density scale is geometric [58).
30
KEY.
Ton oil
equiv./km2
>64
0 16-64
D 4-16
o <4
Sustainable development of the biosphere
Figure 1.16 Geographical distribution of current energy-consumption density, mapped for areas of about
5 x 106 km 2 Note that the density scale is geometric [59].
densities of energy consumption and agricultural
production are correlated. The regions of Earth
exposed to the greatest environmental pressures
due to crop production also tend to be exposed to
the greatest pressures from energy consumption.
Partial exceptions occur for India and China, where
the ratio of energy use to agricultural production
is relatively low, and for Eastern Canada, South
Africa, and Oceania, where the ratio is relatively
high. Nonetheless, the relationship is surprisingly
strong, almost certainly testifying to the funda-
mental role played by population density in deter-
mining the environmental pressures of human
development.
Looking to the future
Ultimately, I hope it will be possible to use informa-
tion like that conveyed in Figure 1.17 to construct
a typology of "kinds" of pressures t.hat different
stages and patterns of human development impose
on the surrounding environment [61). A useful
effort would be to chart the temporal evolution of
va rious regions through the space of Figure 1.17.
The objective of such an exercise would be to search
for situations in which the past history of d velop-
ment. densities and environmental problems in one
region could serve as an analog for future histories
of environmental problems in another region about
to pass through a similar development pattern. I
suggest that the long history of relatively high popu-
lation densities in Eu rope shou ld be able to teach
us something about the future environmental pres-
sures of regions just now reaching the density of
popu lation that Eu rope su pported 200 yea rs ago.
The power of such analogies should be much
stronger as we move from population, the ultimate
source of environmental pressures, to the more
immediate sou rces represen ted by energy con-
sumption and agricultural production activities.
To use the past evolution of regional develop-
ment densities as a guide to future pressures on the
environment will require that something be said of
the possible future histories of energy use and
agricultural production. The performance of past
forecasts of global patterns of development activities
is reviewed by Crosson and Darmstadter (Chapters
4 and 5). The record does not inspire much
confidence in future predictions [62J. More useful
than yet another set of such dubious forecasts would
be a carefully selected set of future world develop-
ment scenarios, constructed with a view toward
articulating the environmental constraints that they
might entail and the social responses to these con-
straints that might impove the prospects for a sus-
tainable development of the biosphere.
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Figure 1.17 Plot of present densities
of agricultural production (units are
the logarithm of total value added in
US $100 per km 2) versus densities of
energy consumption (units are the
logarithm of total coal equivalent in
103 kg per km 2) [50]. Key: A, China
(Turkestan and Tibet); B, China
(proper); C, China (Manchuria); D,
Japan; E, India; F, Asia (Southeast);
G, Near East; H, Europe; I, European
USSR; J, USSR (Kazakhstan); K,
USSR (Siberia); L, Africa (North); M,
Africa (Sahel); N, Africa (West); 0,
Africa (Mid); P,Africa (East); Q,Africa
(South); R, Canada (East); S, Canada
(West); T, America (North); U, USA
(East); 0, USA (West); V, America
(Middle); X, Brazil; Y, America (Tem-
perate South), Z, Oceania.
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Interactions between development
and environment: discontinuities
and surprise
bursts. [f there is no framework of expectation or
understanding then the abrupt changes are per-
ceived as surprises - as crises or opportunity [64J.
The intensifying interactions between development
and environment have motivated a number of
studies over the last several decades. As Brooks
notes in Chapter 11, however, many of those studies
have been based
... on an evolutionary paradigm - the gradual, incre-
mental unfolding of the world system in a manner
that can be described by surprise-free models, with
parameters derived from a combination of time
series and cross sectional analyses of the existing
system [63].
This evolutionary approach has its uses, particularly
in elucidating the long-term trends and broad-scale
patterns discussed in the previous section. But, as
C. S. Holling has forcefully argued, experience
shows that significant
... change can also occur in abrupt, discontinuous
Surprise-free forecasts are therefore necessary, but
insufficient, tools for efforts to improve the manage-
ment of long-term interactions between develop-,
ment and environment. By leaving out the external
shocks, nonlinear responses, and discontinuous
behavior so typical of social and natural systems,
surprise-free analysis leaves us unprepared to inter-
pret a host of not improbable eventualities. By leav-
ing out the social learning called into play by the
resultant crises and climacterics, it also reduces the
challenge of designing adaptive management
strategies to the mindless, repetitive implementa-
tion of past mistakes (see Cantley, Commentary to
Chapter 11).
A need for concepts and methods
The problem is not that analysts have been unaware
of the shortcomings of surprise-free thinking, but
..,
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rather that they
... lack ... usable methodologies to deal with discon-
tinuities and random events. The multiplicity of con-
ceivable surprises is so large and heterogeneous that
the analyst despairs of deciding where to begin, and
instead proceeds in the hope that in the longer sweep
of history surprises and discontinuities will average
out, leaving smoother long-term trends that can ...
provide a basis for reasonable approximations to the
future [65).
But real history turns out to be far from an "averag-
ing out". The distinguished historian W. H. McNeill
concluded his remarks at a symposium on "Re-
sources for an Uncertain Future" as follows:
I believe historians' preoccupation with catastrophe
might be useful to economists, if they care to listen.
Extreme cases, breakdowns, abrupt interruptions of
established market relations - these are not staples
of economic theory, and are, I believe, usually dis-
missed by statistically minded analysts of the norm
and its fluctuations. But human societies are a species
of equilibrium, and equilibria are liable to catas-
trophe when, under special limiting conditions, small
inputs may produce very large, often unforeseen, and
frequently irreversible outputs. I believe there is a
branch of mathematics that deals with catastrophe -
sudden changes in process; I must say that I, as an
historian contemplating the richly catastrophic
career of humanity across the centuries, venture to
recommend to economists a more attentive consider-
ation of such models - at least when trying to contem-
plate the deeper past and long-range future [66).
A central challenge of our Biosphere Program is to
see how far we can go in developing the methods,
models, and concepts necessary to move beyond
surprise-free analyses to a more realistic treatment
of the interactions between development and
environment. The "catastrophe" theories and their
relatives referred to by McNeill have played an
im portant role in providing an alternative paradigm
to surprise-free analysis [67]. But to move beyond
the empty generalities and vague analogies that
have so inflated the "catastrophe" literature, it is
necessary to assemble a great deal of carefully docu-
mented case material and to fashion a family of
specific and rigorously tested explanatory models.
As described by Holling and Brooks in Chapters
10 and 11, the necessary work has only just begun.
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A sampler of potential surprises
To give some specific flavors to the subsequent
discussion, let us sketch a sample of the kinds of
discontinuous, potentially surprising behaviors
likely to be encountered in efforts to manage inter-
actions between development and environment.
Atmosphere-biosphere interactions
Hydroxyl radicals are important "cleaners" of the
atmosphere, removing by reaction those gases, such
as carbon monoxide, hydrocarbons, and the
nitrogen and sulfur compounds, involved in pre-
cipitation acidification. An important reaction path-
way involves methane, the atmospheric concentra-
tion of which is now rising at least in part due to
land clearance, biomass burning, and paddy rice
production in the tropics. Crutzen [68] argues that
where background concentrations of nitrogen
oxides in the lower troposphere are below a thresh-
old value of about 100 p.p.t.(v), an increase in
methane leads to a decrease in hydroxyl concentra-
tion and thus to an increase in the often problematic
gases that the hydroxyl radical would otherwise
have removed. Above this threshold value an
increase in hydroxyl concentration will occur.
Where background concentrations of nitrogen
oxides are above another threshold value of about
30 p.p.t.(v), an increase in methane leads to strong
increases of ozone concentrations. The critical
threshold values that separate these reaction path-
ways are exceeded in regions of heavy industrial
development and fossil energy use, but not in less
densely developed areas. Thus, as development
proceeds and nitrogen oxide emissions increase, the
atmosphere experiences a potentially surprising
"flip" from a state of low oxidative potential to one
of high oxidative potential. Such a "flip" could be
implicated in a variety of chemical and biological
impacts associated with industrialization.
Resource management interactions
Holling (Chapter 10) and Regier and Baskerville
(Chapter 3) describe a variety of renewable resource
cases in which abrupt changes intruded on what
were supposed to be surprise-free management
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strategies. I summarize just one of these examples.
The regional development of Eastern Canada in
the 1950s was heavily dependent on its forest
products sector. When further development was
threatened by the irruption of a forest pest called
the spruce budworm, a successful control strategy
was implemented using unprecedentedly large-
scale applications of insecticides guided by one of
the most sophisticated models of insect population
dynamics ever constructed. Protected by the insecti-
cides, both the forest and the forest economy pros-
pered. But their very prosperity made them ever
more vulnerable to catastrophic failure in the event
that the budworm should escape from the control
imposed by the insecticides. Amid continuing insti-
tutional denials that the short-term management
success had become a long-term liability, a combina-
tion of events indeed precipitated a budworm epi-
demic. The unprecedented extent and intensity of
this outbreak left the surprised regional economy
scrambling to sell off a sea of dead timber and
wondering how to feed all the modern pulpmills
that had been designed on the basis of surprise-free
forecasts of wood supply.
Technology-economy interactions
Brooks (Chapter 11) presents a menu of examples
of technological surprise. Among the most interest-
ing is the case of the USA automobile industry. It
began its life in the early part of this century in
what Brooks calls a period of "exuberant
experimentation", open to new ideas, new firms,
and new opportunities presented by the evolving
structure of American society. Steam, electric, and
diesel power all competed credibly with the internal
combustion gasoline engine. By the mid 1920s,
however, the lead established by Alfred P. Sloan's
managerial innovations gave the gasoline strategy
a lead that economies of scale and more rapid pro-
gress along the learning curve of manufacturing
skills rapidly converted into a total dominance of
the market. The domain of feasible experimenta-
tion and innovation became progressively more
narrow, focusing on incremental cost savings rather
than strategic design alternatives. What Brooks calls
a "technological monoculture" had emerged. At
the same time, however, the very success of the
automobile In penetrating throughout the
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American economy imposed on society increasingly
heavy externalities: highway and urban congestion,
environmental pollution, a rising toll of traffic
accidents. These mounting externalities, plus exter-
nal shocks like the oil price increases of the 1970s,
placed strong pressures for change on the
automobile industry, pressures for which its
"monoculture" structure gave it little capacity to
respond. Unable to adapt to a changing world, a
surprised automobile industry saw its customers
turning to cheaper, better, and more diversified
foreign products.
Toward a general understanding
Careful analyses of many cases such as those noted
above have led to the beginnings of a general
understanding concerning the nature and origins
of at least some kinds of surprise and discontinuous
change. In reviewing this understanding, Holling
(Chapter 10) emphasizes the critical importance of
processes operating on multiple time scales. In par-
ticular, he argues that the discontinuous change of
one or more "fast" variables (in the cases described
above, the oxidant potential of the atmosphere, the
density of budworms, and the sales of the USA
automobile industry) can often be understood as a
consequence of specific alterations in the underlying
system structure that result from the continuous
change of one or more "slow" variables (i.e., the
rate of NO emissions, the density of the forest, the
"species diversity" of USA automobile designs).
Holling's summary of the key features of "discon-
tinuous change" systems he has studied is quoted
below, with my own parenthetical glosses added to
provide context [69]. Several of the features are
illustrated in Figure 1.18.
(1) There can be a number of locally stable equilibria
and stability domains around these equilibria
[due to the existence of significant nonlinear
processes in the system].
(2) [Discontinuous j]umps between the stability
domains can be triggered by exogenous
events ... the size of these domains is a measure
of the sensitivity to such events.
(3) The stability domains themselves expand, con-
tract, and disappear in response to changes in
slow variables ... and, quite independently of
exogenous events, force the system to move
between domains.
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(4) ... different classes of variability ... emerge from
th form of the equilibrium surfaces [which
reflect potential stable levels of the last variables
if the slow variables were held constant, and vice
versa] and the manner in which they interact
[i.e., inttTsect]. There can be conditions of low
equilibrium with little variability.... And there
can be dynamic disequilibrium in which there is
no global equilibrium condition and the system
moves in a ralastrophic manner between stability
domains .. ' . There also exists the possibility of
"chaotic" behavior
, . discontinuous change is [thus] an internal
property of each sys~elll. For long periods change is
gradual and discontinuous behavior is inhibited.
Conditions are eventually reache'd, however, when
a [discontinuous] jump "'\'cnt becomes increasingly
likely and ultimately inevitable.
The potential of utility of Holling's approach can
be illustrated by current debates over the impacts
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of climatic variability and change on society, Parry
(Chapter 14) characterizes the problem as follows:
What, for example, were the real "causes" of the
Sahel ian crisis, .. meteorological drought or
enhanced vulnerability due to economic and political
developments insensitive to an environment that has
always been changeable)
He points a way to its resolution, however, wit.h a
distinction
. , . between contigently necessary ane: contingently
sufficient conditions for an occurrence. it is probable
that increased vulnerability was a necessary condition
(or precorleftion) for the Sahelian disastr'l; without
it the economic Systt'\ll might have f)";'n more
resilient to the met<..:orological drought. It w,'~ 110t,
howev r. a sufficient condition, became' it required
a fUrlher event ... to precipitate i b: ,,;icct. [71].
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Figure 1.18 Isocline of equilibrium
conditions (solid line) and dynamics
(dotted line) for a model of interac-
tions between an insect pest and a
forest. The insect has a rapid growth
rate and behaves as a "fast variable"
relative to the "slow variable" of
forest growth, For branch densities
between F' and F" there are three
equilibrium densities of the insect
Ire highest and lowest are stable, the
middle unstable. As branch density
rises from F' to F", insect densities
"track" at equilibrium along the
lowest equilibrium surface, As branch
densities rise above F", two of the
insect equilibria disappear, and the
insect population density rises rapidly
and catastrophically to the highest of
the equilibrium surfaces, Alterna-
tively, random fluctuations or
immigrations of insects of quantity t.F
or g:sater can "flip" the system from
the lowest to the highest equilibrium
surface. Once the high insect
densities are reached, the forest
slowly dies back, with insect densities
slowly declining, When forest density
drops below F' the two upper equili-
bria disappear, and the insect popula-
tion collapses [70].
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In the conceptual framework introduced by
Holling, the "contingently necessary" economic
and political developments would thus seem to play
the stage-setting role of slow variables. Meteoro-
logical drought is one possible condidate for the
exogenous triggering event. And the disaster of
ensuing famine is the discontinuous change that
society, lacking an adequate framework of under-
standing, reacts to with surprise.
Whether this perspective on discontinuous
change can help to develop tools and understand-
ing that will be useful in managing the interactions
between human· activities and the environment in
35
places like the Sahel remains to be seen. At a
minimum, however, it focuses attention on the need
to assess, much more systematically than has nor-
mally been the case and across the full range of
space and time scales, those processes that might be
significantly involved in particular interactions
between development and environment. Much
more empirical and modeling work needs to be
done to explore the potential of the research direc-
tions on discontinuous change sketched above. Of
particular importance, as pointed out by di Castri
in his Commentary to Chapter 10, will be efforts to
construct a spatial analog to the "fast variable/slow
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Figure 1.19 Characteristic time
scales for climatic, social, and eco-
logical processes. The time plotted is
that required for the listed process to
change by a factor of e or 2.7, plotted
in logarithmic units of years. Thus, the
time required for an energy source,
such as oil, to increase its share of
the total world energy market by a
factor of 27 is about 10 years [73].
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variable" distinction that could be used in coupling
the
... local surprise (of a biological but mostly societal
type) and global change (considered chiefly from a
biogeochemical point of view) [72].
The initial steps in the Biosphere Program to iden-
tify and scale the processes reievent to interactions
among climates, ecosystems, and societies have been
L(log km)
Continents
River drainage (50 largest)
Lake drainage (typical)
2
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reported elsewhere and are summarized in Figures
1.19 to 1.21.
Next steps
The elements of a general understanding of discon-
tinuous change as outlined above should certainly
be pursued through a vigorous program of case
studies, modeling, and theoretical analysis. But at
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Figure 1.20 Characteristic space
scales for climatic, social, and eco-
logical patterns. The space plotted is
that of the square root of the area
covered by the listed pattern, plotted
in logarithmic units of kilometers.
Thus, the mean size of the world's
nations is about 1000 km across [74J.
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Figure 1.21 Scales of interactions
among climates, ecosystems, and
societies. The figure combines
characteristic time and space scales
from Figures 1.19 and 1.20. Four bands
of phenomena are evident. At a given
spatial scale, ecological processes are
slowest, meteorological processes
fastest, and social and climatic pro-
cesses overlap at an intermediate
time scale [75].
this early stage in the investigation it would be
unwise to let our studies of surprise be limited to
those approaches that lend themselves most easily
to formal mathematical representation. A variety
of exploratory approaches, utilizing as wide a range
of perspectives as possible, is also needed.
One set of directions that might be pursued has
been outlined by Brooks in Chapter lIon the
"typology of surprise". He characterizes the kinds
of surprise arising in the interactions of tech-
nologies, institutions, and development as follows:
(I) Unexpected discrete events, such as the oil shocks
of 1973 and 1979, the Three Mile Island (TMI)
reactor accident, political coups or revolutions.
major natural catastrophes, accidental wars.
(2) Discontinuities in long-term trends, such as the
acceleration of USA oil imports between 1966
and 1973, the onset of the stagflation
phenomenon in GECD countries in the 1970s,
the decline in the ratio of energy consumption
growth to GNP growth in the GECD countries
after 1973.
(3) The sudden emergence into political conscious-
ness of new information, such as the relation
between fluorocarbon production and strato-
spheric ozone, the deterioration of central
European forests apparently due to air pollution,
the discovery of the recombinant DNA tech-
nique, the discovery of asbestos-related cancer
of industrial workers [76].
,38
Torsten Hagerstrand and Robert Kates have
approached the problem somewhat differently, list-
ing a number of techniques (including some dis-
cussed above) for constructing surprise-rich
scenarios:
(I) Contrariness: How can the surprise-free assump-
tions be changed?
(2) Perceived expert surprise: What are the tails of
the distributions of relevant tasks, events, and
outcomes?
(3) Imaging: Given an unlikely future, what
sequence of events might be used to reach it?
(4) System dynamics: How could known current
trends produce counterintuitive results due to
interaction?
(5) Surprise theory: Are there underlying principles
that would let us understand unexpected events
and developments?
(6) Historical retrodiction: Are the seeds of future
surprises always present with hindsight, and how
can they be recognized [72]?
One approach to using surprise-rich scenarios in
exploring management strategies for future his-
tories of interactions between development and
environment is described in the next section.
Future histories of the biosphere:
policy exercises for sustainable
development
There is a great potential for usable knowledge in
the converging research advances sketched in this
chapter. But if that potential is to be realized, we
will also need the appropriate methods for synthesis
(Brewer, Chapter 17). These methods will have to
contend with the two central challenges to the
efforts to shape the sustainable development
strategies that 1 identified at the beginning of this
chapter: the wide range of perceptions concerning
what kind of "garden" we want to develop out of
the biosphere, and our incomplete scientific under-
standing of what kind of "garden" we can obtain
using alternative management strategies.
Common approaches to synthesis
The two synthesis methods that are commonly used
for handling scientific knowledge with policy im pli-
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cations are the expert panel and the formal model.
Experience has shown that both have special
strengths and special weaknesses.
"Blue Ribbon" panels
The expert or "Blue Ribbon" panel is the longest
established and most widely used synthesis method.
National academy committees, presidential com-
missions, international working groups, and their
relatives have expressed opinions on most topics
that bear on the interactions between development
and environment. Surprisingly, little systematic,
critical appraisal has been carried out of the perfor-
mance of such panels. What seems generally clear,
however, is that the great strength of the typical
"Blue Ribbon" panel is its ability to bring together,
at short notice, small, interactive, ad hoc groups of
the very best people in whatever business is at hand.
When a consensus of panel members can be
reached, and especially when the consensus is sanc-
tioned by a suitably distinguished convening
organization, the ad hoc expert group can be an
efficient and effective way for producing syntheses
of rapidly developing knowledge as it applies to
complex problems.
Two major difficulties limit the occasions in which
such desirable results emerge. The first and less
serious is the expert panel's relatively poor ability
to create new knowledge or perspectives rather than
just synthesizing what its distinguished members
already know. Competing demands on members'
time, strong social pressures to defer to colleagues'
areas of expertise, and limited panel lifetimes all
contribute to this limitation, which can be only par-
tially mitigated by good staff support. The second
and more serious difficulty arises when the con-
sensual mode of synthesis is impossible or inap-
propriate. Unfortunately, this is precisely the case
for many of the value laden, incompletely under-
stood issues that arise in the evaluation of strategies
for a sustainable development of the biosphere.
Reflecting on the history of expert groups that have
addressed such issues as desertification or the
environmental implications of energy options, one
is forced to conclude that the "Blue Ribbon"
approach is at risk whenever there is both scientific
uncertainty and high political stakes (see Ravetz,
Chapter 15).
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Formal models
In Chapter 17, Brewer reviews the substantial
literature regarding the strengths and weaknesses
of formal modeling as a method of synthesizing
scientific knowledge for policy purposes. Models
clearly have the potential for handling large
amounts of technical information in a reproducible
and systematic way. Nonetheless, Brewer and many
others have concluded that the large computer
simulation studies that have become so much a part
of the resource management and environmental
assessment literature are part of the problem, not
of the solution [78].
In large measure, the difficulties arise from the
sheer mass of most formal modeling studies that
try to tackle significant practical problems. Major
models require orders of magnitude more time and
resources to build and run through to their con-
clusions than do even the most expensive expert
panels. As a result, even the best intentioned
modelers find it difficult in practice to experiment
with different perspectives and problem formula-
tions. A single approach to the problem, usually
reflecting a single set of underlying assumptions, is
often seen to take on a life of its own, demanding
continual embellishment and justification. For a
program that seeks to illuminate the complex, ill-
defined "syndromes" arising from interactions
between development and environment, this prac-
tical inability of formal models to explore alternative
perspectives is a serious drawback. Brewer summa-
rizes the case against large modeling efforts as
follows:
(l) Such work is more adversarial than most
realize ...
(2) The work is one-sided; it presents but one per-
spective on a future rich in potentialities ...
(3) Quality control and professional standards are
nil ...
(4) Data inputs have obscure, unknown, or unknow-
able empirical foundations, and the relevance of
much data, even if valid, is unknown ...
(5) [The work ignores] the most interesting aspect
of any analysis ... the set of assumptions used to
fashion it ... [79].
More useful means of practicing how to manage
the complex and incompletely understood interac-
tions of the environment and development are
badly needed. An extensive review and evaluation
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of experience with alternative approaches (Brewer,
Chapter 17, and Sonntag's Commentary) has led us
to explore what we have called "policy exercises":
organized efforts that bring together decision
makers, planners, scientists, and technologists to
practice writing "future histories" of how we might
manage interactions between societies' develop-
ment activities and the global environment. What
a usable "policy exercise" would actually look like
is something we seek to discover through an experi-
mental program of specific case applications and
subsequent evaluations.
The history of political gaming
The basic concept of the policy exercise was sug-
gested by approaches developed in support of pol-
itical-military strategic planning during the late
1950s and early 1960s [80]. At that time, experience
had shown that formal models were inadequate to
capture the contingencies, the unquantifiable fac-
tors, and the contextual richness that seemed cen-
tral to the main lines of political evolution between
the great powers in the period 1955 to 1965. The
models also tended to strengthen rather than relax
the barrier between analysts and practitioners of
political and military strategy. In attempting to
design more useful integrative approaches, Herbert
Goldhamer of the Rand Corporation realized that
his "problem was similar to that confronting his-
torians. He was faced with the task of writing a
'future history' to clarify his ideas about the motives
and influences affecting the behavior of great
powers, their leaders, and others in the real political
world [81]."
The method devised by Goldhamer and his col-
leagues to write these future histories was dubbed
"political gaming". Teams of human (as opposed
to computer) participants were confronted with
generally realistic problem scenarios and required
to work through responses both to the scenario and
to the moves made by other teams. The role of
"Nature" was played by a control team that deter-
mined the impact on conditions of play resulting
from the moves of the teams, injected unexpected
events, introduced constraints on allowable
responses, and so on [82].
Brewer (Chapter 17) describes four "difficult
questions that eluded or exceeded the capacity of
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alternative analytic tools" that were explored by the
original political exercises. These questions
sufficiently resemble those that confront us in learn-
ing to cope with the interactions between develop-
ment and environment to warrant quoting here:
(1) What political options could be imagined in light
of the conflict situations portrayed? What likely
consequences would each have?
(2) Could political inventiveness be fostered by hav-
ing those actually responsible assume their roles
in a controlled, gamed environment? Would the
quality of political ideas stimulated be as good
or better than those obtained conventionally?
(3) Could the game identify particularly important,
but poorly understood, topics or questions for
further study and resolution? What discoveries
flow from this type of analysis that do not from
others?
(4) Could the game sensitize responsible officials to
make potential decisions more realistic,
especially with respect to likely political and
policy consequences [83]?
Experience with political gaming indicates that
each of the preceding questions can be given an
answer of "yes, but only under favorable condi-
tions". The games were very time-consuming to
prepare, suffered from acute problems of managing
the vast quantities of data involved, and suffered
from lack of critical review and evaluation due to
the sensitive status of their subject matter. The
military moved on to emphasize man-machine and
machine-machine games, with less than satisfactory
results [84].
From political gaming to policy
exercises
Despite the difficulties with early strategic political
games, however, some of the basic ideas and
experiences involved in their evolution suggest that
they might be adapted to complement formal
models and expert committees in a new approach
to addressing the problems of sustainable develop-
ment. Brewer (Chapter 17) has called the needed
hybrid approach a "policy exercise". Several of the
most important potential linkages between political
gaming experience and possible exercises for
environmental policy are summarized below.
The political games were found to perform better
than alternative approaches in studying " ... poorly
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understood dynamic processes ... [and] institu-
tional interactions" and in " ... opening participa-
tion to many with different perspectives and special
competences, on a continuing basis over time"
(Brewer, Chapter 17, pp 462-463). The need to
accommodate multiple political and environmental
perspectives in efforts to learn effective manage-
ment responses to sustainable development prob-
lems has been emphasized throughout this chapter.
The "poorly understood" nature of our knowledge
of long-term, large-scale environmental processes
and institutional responses likewise requires no
further elaboration. Policy exercises, whatever they
turn out to be, must be designed in ways that will
let us address these critical issues.
Reviewing experience with political gaming,
Brewer and Shubik concluded
The selection of competent professionals to partici-
pate in the political exercise proved to be critically
important. This situation is analogous to that in chess
or other games when inferior players tend to consoli-
date their own bad habits rather than being stimu:
lated to improved or inspired play 185].
To be useful, policy exercises on the interactions of
development and environment would almost cer-
tainly have to involve several of the very top scien-
tists involved in research on the biosphere, plus
their opposite numbers from the world of politics,
finance, and industry. The political gaming
experience suggests that there is little point in carry-
ing out such exercises using second rate consultants
and middle level bureaucrats. Securing the partici-
pation of sufficiently senior and innovative people
may not be as difficult as it sounds. In carrying out
the first phases of the Biosphere Program we have
often found the best scientists and best policy people
expressing a growing dissatisfaction over their
inability to address each other, except through
stultifying layers of reports and bureaucracy or in
ritualized and guarded public encounters. Carefully
designed policy exercises might provide the channel
and forum of communication they seek.
Finding a way to order, to evaluate, and ultimately
to use the great volume of literature now being
generated on the scientific and practical aspects of
interactions between development and environ-
ment is becoming increasingly urgent. The
occasional grand Conference or Commission has a
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role to play in linking theory to its practical implica-
tions, but this role is limited. Goldhamer and Speier
commented on their early experience with political
exercises that
[O]ne of the most useful aspects of the political game
was its provision of an orderly framework within
which a great deal of written analysis and discussion
took place ... [O]ral or written discussion of political
problems that arise during the game is one of its
most valuable features [86].
The difficulties of managing this flow of data, of
analysis, and of discussion turned out to be one of
the weak points of realistic political games. The
potential for mitigating such difficulties with
modern microcomputers has been demonstrated
in a number of related exercises (see Sonntag in his
Commentary to Chapter 17) and provides one more
reason for experimenting with hybrid "policy exer-
cise" approaches in the Biosphere Program.
Time sequences of management actions
The "future history" orientation of the exercises'
output should make them an excellent vehicle for
exploring response options in terms of the time
sequences of coordinated action that they imply.
Experience suggests that one of the most common
and important factors that limits the effectiveness
of proposed interventions is likely to be time [87].
The entire Malthusian debate that sets the context
for our study can be seen as a question of whether
population growth will allow enough time for
development activities to mobilize adequate re-
sources to insure acceptable conditions of human
well-being. As a specific example, long-term energy
studies have consistently concluded that the ques-
tion is not whether adequate quantities of fuels exist,
but rather whether technologies for harnessing
them and the infrastructure for supporting them
can be developed and implemented on a time scale
consistent with the rates of rising demands and
falling supplies of alternative fuels [88]. In general,
potentially damaging impacts of development on
the environment take time to detect in terms unam-
biguous enough to motivate action. International
negotiations on which interventions to adopt can
take even longer. Finally, actions, once agreed on,
can take a very long time indeed to be implemented
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over sufficiently large areas to make a difference.
As a result, much of the history of efforts to manage
large-scale environmental change can be summa-
rized as "too little, too late".
It is therefore of fundamental importance to
explore the timing constraints that limit the
effectiveness of the technological, institutional, and
research management options described earlier. As
an example of what can be done, one of the most
illuminating approaches to assessing energy options
for dealing with the "greenhouse" syndrome has
addressed the timing question by showing when
various technological strategies would have to be
initiated in order to keep future environmental
changes to within specified limits [89]. A long tradi-
tion of research on the rate and pattern of adoption
for technological innovations can be tapped to facili-
tate explorations of timing constraints in future
histories of environment and development. Less
well explored, but presenting no obvious barriers
to investigation, are comparable studies for institu-
tional innovation (see earlier and Chapter 12).
Very little systematic study has been given to the
question of timing constraints on the fruits of
research and monitoring programs that deal with
interactions between development and environ-
ment. The early political exercises did help to refine
future research priorities for technical participants
and their staffs by exposing them to the kinds of
questions that their political masters would need
answered, under a range of often unconventional
but still plausible future histories. This is an
extremely important result since
[T]he game ... may under favorable circumstances
make more effective use of existing knowledge than
other modes of intellectual collaboration, but it would
be placing an intolerable burden on it to treat it as
a machine that displaces theoretical thought and
empirical research [90].
Likewise, policy exercises would in no sense be a
substitute for the careful research on basic science
and response options that is required to improve
the basic tools that can be used in fashioning
effective social responses. But the exercises might
help the research community to learn which answers
- which tools - are likely to be most needed by
policy people across a wide range of plausible future
histories of the interactions of development and
environment [91].
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If experience with political gaming is any guide,
we should expect that many of the ostensibly useful
answers now being sought by scientists and analysts
are ones for which no policy people are ever likely
to ask the relevant questions. Conversely, we are
likely to find a number of urgent questions emerg-
ing in the course of the policy exercises that scien-
tists could be studying, but are not. I suggested
earlier that such practically important, but under-
studied, questions might include "row assessments"
of the net impact of development-related policy
actions across a range of environmental com-
ponents. More generally, the design of global
environmental monitoring and data systems useful
for management could benefit from such policy
exerCises.
Writing future histories
The challenge for the policy exerCises will be to
design ways of realizing the potential outlined
above, thus providing a means of writing useful
"future histories" of a sustainable development for
the next century. As we envision our first round of
experiments, a policy exercise would work through
several development scenarios [92], each consisting
of a set of trends in population, agriculture, and
energy over the next century, set against a back-
ground of specific geopolitical and other events (see
earlier). The policy people and scientists who par-
ticipate in the exercise would work through success-
ive time intervals of the development scenario and
attempt to manage and maintain what I have called
"the kind of garden they want". The particular
goals of the Biosphere Program will lead us to
emphasize the kinds of gardens that improve
human well-being to the greatest extent possible,
while assuring that the improvements are ecologi-
cally sustainable over the long run and on a global
scale.
At each time interval throughout the game (per-
haps every 5 or 10 years of game time), participants
would evaluate the environmental implications of
their "past" and possible "future" development
activities, and intervene in the scenario's interac-
tions between development and environment with
whatever management activities they judge
appropriate. Following the arguments introduced
earlier, their responses can draw on a range of
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possible technological, institutional, or research
innovations, each with a characteristic effectiveness
and lead-time requirement. The "control" function
provided by the organizers of the exercise would
update the condition of the scenario's environment
in accord with these management actions, drawing
on the synoptic framework for environmental
assessment described earlier. Explicit allowance
would be made for uncertainties in the scientific
knowledge and for possible unexpected surprises.
The participants would be presented with this
updated scenario as a point of departure for their
next cycle of play.
The objective of the participants in the exercise
would be to arrive at the end of the 1DO-year gaming
period with a sustainable and otherwise desirable
garden intact, and an internally consistent "future
history" about how it was cultivated. Several cycles
of the exercise, based on several different scenarios,
would give an opportunity for learning about how
to deal with problematical time lags, uncertainties,
and surprises and for writing a set of alternative
future histories for a sustainable development of
the biosphere.
The problem-solving experience and internally
consistent sequences of effective management
actions resulting from the policy exercises should,
we hope, complement the other research initiatives
sketched in this chapter and described in more
detail throughout the remainder of this volume.
With luck, they will also provide an integrative tool
for helping us to reach the larger objective of
identifying and evaluating strategic interventions
through which societies might enhance the long-
term, large-scale interactions between development
and environment [93].
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47
from neoclassical growth, Geographical Analysis, 13,
315-327; Lorenz, E. N. (1984), Irregularity: a
fundamental property of the atmosphere, Tellus,
36A, 98-110; and Holling, Chapter 10.
[68] Crutzen, P. j. (1986), The role of the tropics in
atmospheric chemistry, in R. Dickinson (Ed),
Geophysiology of Amazonia (Wiley, New York).
[69] Holling, Chapter 10. The original statement of these
ideas can be found in Holling, C. S. (1973),
Resilience and stability of ecological systems, Annual
Review of Ecology Systematics, 4, 1-23.
[70] From Clark, W. C. (1979), Spatial structure relation-
ships in a forest insect system: simulation models
and analysis, Mitteilungen Schweizerischen
Entomologischen Gesellschaft, 52, 235-257.
[71] Parry, Chapter 14, p 382.
[72] di Castri, Commentary to Chapter 10.
[73] Clark, W. C. (1985), Scales of climate impacts, Cli-
matic Change, 7,5-27.
[74] See note [73].
[75] See note [73].
[76] Brooks, Chapter II, p 326.
[77] Kates, R. and Hagerstrand, T. unpublished
memorandum (International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis, Laxenburg, Austria).
[78] See, for example, Ascher, note [62]; and Holling,
note [33].
[79] Brewer, Chapter 17, p 461.
[80] Goldhamer, H. and Speier, H. (1959), Some
observations on political gaming, World Politics, 12,
72-83.
[81] Brewer, G. and Shubik, M. (1979), The War Game:
A Critique ofMilitary Problem Solving, p 101 (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA).
[82] Exercises of this sort have been described under the
term "free-form, manual games" in the American
literature. See Goldhamer and Speier, note [80];
Brown, T. A. and Paxton, E. W. (1975), A Retrospec-
tive Look at Some Strategy and Force Evaluation Games,
R-I619-PR (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica,
CAl; Brewer and Shubik, note [81].
[83] Brewer, Chapter 17, p 462.
[84] Brown and Paxton, note [82]; Brewer and Shubik,
note [81],
[85] Brewer and Shubik, note [81], p 10 I.
[86] Goldhamer and Speier, note [80], pp 77-78.
[87] Schelling, T. (1984), personal communication.
[88] Hafele, W., Anderer, j., McDonald, A, and
Nakicenovic, N. (1981), Energy in a Finite World
(Ballinger, Cambridge, MA).
[89] Marchetti, C. and Nakicenovic, N. (1979), The
Dynamics of Energy Systems and the Logistic Substitution
Model, Research Report RR-79-13 (International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Laxenburg,
Austria); Perry, A. M., Draj, K. j., Sulkerson, W.,
Rose, D. j., Miller, M. M., and Rotty, R. M. (1982),
Energy supply and demand implications of carbon
dioxide, Energy, 7(12), 991-1004; Laurmann, j. A.
(1985), Market penetration of primary energy and
48
its role in the greenhouse warming problem, Energy,
10(6), 761-775.
[90] Goldhamer, H. (1973), personal communication
reported in Brewer and Shubik, note [81], p 103.
[91] A necessary condition for success of the policy exer-
cises will be our ability to incorporate in them the
large amounts of "theoretical thought and empirical
research" referred to above. A related difficulty in
past exercises has been handling the massive quan-
tities of information necessary to describe and check
the consistency of successive states of the game's
"play". It seems almost certain that in addressing
these problems we will want to make extensive use
of formal models that deal with particular aspects
of the exercise. In other words, formal models have
an important though limited role to play in support
of any policy exercise that I can envision.
The crucial distinction between popular com-
puter simulation studies of global environmental
impacts and the policy exercise approach envisioned
here is thus not one of modeling per se. Rather, the
policy exercises assign a variety of supporting roles
to a variety of specialized models, whereas many
previous studies have granted "super-star status" to
a single, ostensibly comprehensive formal model.
The "bit parts" played by models in these support-
ing capacities could range from the "scratch pad" .
Sustainable development of the biosphere
exploratory tools, described by Sonntag in his Com--
mentary to Chapter 17, to existing state-of-the-art
models of key biogeochemical, ecological, and cli-
matic processes, to the artificial intelligence-based
simulations of "minor player" responses that have
been introduced into some of the most recent politi-
cal gaming exercises [see Davis, P. K. and Winner-
feld, J. A. (1983), The Rand Strategy Assessment Cen-
ter: An Overview and Interim Conclusions about Utility
and Development Options, R-2945-DNA (The Rand
Corporation, Santa Monica, CA)]. It can be assumed
that some of these supporting models will sometimes
offer contradictory results. This is a strength rather
than a"weakness, however, since it provides a vehicle
for the methodological pluralism that is so necessary
if we are to create usable knowledge for a sustainable
development of the biosphere (see contributions to
this volume by Ravetz, Timmerman, Rayner, and
Thompson).
[92] For a discussion of the use of scenarios in this con-
text, see Brewer, Chapter 17, and Ascher, W. and
Overholt, W. H. (1983), Strategic Planning and
Forecasting Oohn Wiley, New York).
[93] My thanks to Anna Clark for performing much of
the analysis in the section on Human Development
and to R. E. Munn and R. W. Kates for critical
readings of earlier drafts of this chapter.
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Chapter 2
]. F. Richards
World environmental
history and economic
development
Editors' Introduction: Human activities have always modified the natural environment.
But the emergence of an integrated world economy during the last few centuries has
increased both the intensity and scale of these modifications. Today's environment is not
just modified by human action: It is fundamentally transformed.
In this chapter recent efforts of environmental historians to document the human
transformation of the biosphere are described, focusing on global changes in patterns of
land use over the last 300 years, with special attention given to the processes of defores-
tation, wetland drainage, irrigation, and conversion of grazing lands. The long-term,
large-scale economic linkages that underlie these processes are described.
Introduction
Historians today, wrItmg in the space-age latter
decades of the twentieth century, have turned more
and more toward a global perspective. It has become
increasingly evident that national or even regional
histories cannot be written in isolation, since
exogenous forces generated by international trends
and processes shape local and national histories.
Modern history is only comprehensible when we
consider both the unique qualities and experiences
of national or local units and the processes of world
change undergone through time. This perception
has been heightened by a growing sense that every
human history shares an unprecedented inter-
dependence with every other society in the modern
world. Terms such as "modern world economy" or
"modern world system" are now found in the his-
torical lexicon [I]. At this juncture the view of
historical scholarship converges with the everyday
perception of common sense that the world has
become interdependent in ways unknown to our
grandparents. Moreover, the velocity and intensity
of interaction has accelerated dramatically in the
past few decades. The case for a truly unified world
history of mankind is being made by events.
Even the most cursory look at world history of
the past three centuries, since 1700, reveals that a
number of major processes and changes are under-
way. These have become truly global in scope and
impact, and are seemingly irreversible. They have
caused and continue to effect profound changes in
human society: none is readily susceptible to control
or alteration. Some of the forces that have created
our late twentieth-century world economy and
world order are:
(1) Expansion of the European frontier of settle-
ment into the New World, the great Eurasian
steppe, and Australasia.
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(2) A steady growth in human population, from
641 million estimated for 1700 to 4435 million
estimated for 1980 [2].
(3) A dramatic growth in the population and
spatial extent of the world's cities.
(4) Increased use of fossil fuels and hydroelectric
power, which helped to create a revolution in
transport, communications, and industrial
production.
(5) Development of scientific methods, institu-
tions, and technical means for research and
discovery in the biological and physical
sCiences.
(6) Development of new weaponry with global
reach and the capacity for near-global
destruction.
(7) Dramatic advances in our ability to cure ill or
injured individuals and to control the spread
of disease at the collective level.
(8) A steady growth in the scale, efficiency, and
stability of large-scale complex organizations
(i.e., bureaucracies), in both private and public
modes.
(9) The emergence of self-regulating, price-fixing
global markets for goods and services.
(10) The emergence of a world division of labor
between the developed countries of the North
(or core) and the developing countries of the
South (or periphery).
(11) The expansion of more intensive sedentary
agriculture and the simultaneous compression
of tribal peoples engaged in shifting cultivation
or in pastoral nomadism.
Historians examining these and other develop-
ments through the wide-angle vision of global his-
tory have improved our understanding of the
changes in human institutions and relationships
during the recent past. But these historians have
not considered, nor adequately studied, modern
man's changing relationship with the natural
environment. Most tend to treat the environment
as a constant that can safely be ignored, instead of
as a significant variable Even economic historians
have ignored environmental issues in their concern
to tally accumulation of wealth and enhanced
human productivity arising from industrialization.
It is therefore the business of the environmental
historian to study and analyze world environmental
change, a task especially important for the post-
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1700 period. All of the processes of world develop-
ment listed above have caused sweeping changes in
the natural world: the global habitat of the 1980s
is vastly different from that of 1700.
A corollary to the construction of a world
economy is the commensurate ability of man to
intervene in the natural order. When these inter-
ventions have been studied and analyzed by his-
torical geographers, forest historians, and others,
the emphasis has been on local or regional syn-
theses, not on the global picture.
Historians working in the nascent field of
environmental history may see other tasks before
them. They may wish to study changes in the phy-
sical environment that are not the result of human
intervention, such as changes in climate, which may
have had profound consequences for local or
regional history. In the exciting area of climate
history a consensus seems to be forming: practition-
ers agree that meaningful climatic changes have
occurred in the historical past and that these
changes have made appreciable differences in the
human condition. They may be traced not only
through the long span of human and geological
history, but also through the early-modern and
modern worlds. Climate, in other words, must be
treated as a meaningful variable by environmental
historians. Newly identified climatic sequences for
any world region must be examined for possible
effects on the natural environment and on the
human society in that region [3].
Nevertheless, improving our understanding of
environmental change in the early-modern and
modern worlds has a singular urgency. The cumula-
tive effect of human activity upon water, soils, and
vegetation throughout the world has drastically
accelerated - we may have already set in motion
physical processes of change that are irreversible.
For example, the release of CO2 and other gases
into the atmosphere seems to have risen sharply
with the intensified burning of fossil fuels. Similarly,
trace gases released by human action may also be
changing the composition of the atmosphere. To
measure these developments we need to know more
precisely the causes and the rates of environmental
change in each world region.
Another important consideration may be the
extent to which development of the modern world
economy has relied upon consumption of natural
resources. Wild game, topsoil, wood, water, and
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minerals have all been put to human use in quan-
tities and at rates unimagined in earlier centuries
[4]. Detailed measurement of the use of these
resources in the post-l 700 epoch constitutes a sig-
nificant challenge for historians of the global
environment. Analysis of the implications of this
exploitation may suggest issues and questions for
future human development. For example, the
environmental historian may discover deep-seated,
cross-cultural attitudes and values that encourage
exploitation and heavy use of "wild" (unowned)
resources as opposed to careful husbanding of
"domestic" (owned) resources. The whole issue of
cultural attitudes toward the environment demands
much further exploitation and careful scrutiny.
Expansion of world arable land
For the historian of the world environment a critical
long-term trend, active since 1700, is the expansion
of arable land which, along with the spread of
human rural settlement, has been a global
phenomenon. Historians have not hitherto fully
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recognized the scale or the importance of this
change. For every region of the world - whether
New World areas of settlement or Old World areas
of long-standing peasant cultivation - the growth
of arable land has been startling. My estimates for
the past 120 years are given in Table 2.1 [5], which
shows that conversion of land to regular cropping
was pursued in Eurasia as vigorously as in the New
World. Many parts of Asia and even Europe
experienced pioneer frontier settlement conditions
analagous to those found in North and Latin
America. Picturing a Taiwanese, Bengali, or
Russian peasant as a sturdy pioneer with axe, gun,
and homestead lands is somewhat difficult for a
historian of the Americas to comprehend.
Nevertheless, the similarities between the nine-
teenth-century Ohio and Burmese settlement fron-
tiers are much greater than the differences.
Table 2.1 also discloses the unreversed nature of
this trend. Only in North America, Europe, and
East Asia do we see any substantial reversion of land
from cropping. Until quite recently the major form
of investment in rural productivity was extensive
rather than intensive, with world agricultural invest-
ment taking the form of land clearance or reclama-
tion. Only in the post-1920 period has the shift to
intensive investment with fertilizers, high-yield
Table 2.1 Land areas converted into regular cropping (106 hal.
World region First period Second period
(1860-1919) (1920-1978)
To crops From crops To crops From crops
Africa 15.9 90.5
North America 163.7 2.5 27.9 29.4
Central America and Caribbean 4.5 18.8 0.4
South America 35.4 65.0
Middle East 8.0 31.1
South Asia 49.9 66.7
Southeast Asia 18.2 39.0
East Asia 15.6 0.2 14.5 8.4
Europe (excluding Soviet Europe) 26.6 6.0 13.8 12.7
USSR 88.0 62.9
Australia/New Zealand 15.1 40.0
TOTAL 440.9 8.7 470.2 50.9
Net area 432.2 419.3
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Table 2.2 Crude estimates for rates of global soil
erosion
1.5 x 109 ha [7], a figure that suggests the 1860 base
for world arable land was about 600 x 106 ha, or
perhaps more (to allow for some reversion). The
1860 base for total land used in world agriculture
is, in itself, the result of an earlier expansive drive.
A similar exercise for the 1700 to 1860 period would
show huge gains in agricultural land in North
America alone. In short, over the last 300 years
there has occurred a remarkable surge in the con-
version of lands to sedentary agriculture. The most
dramatic increases have occurred in the period since
1860.
We may presume, therefore, that unpreceden-
tedly severe and all-encompassing environmental
changes in world habitat have occurred since the
latter decades of the nineteenth century. For
example, the effect of agricultural growth upon the
world's soils has been profound - and potentially
very grave. The changeover from land covered with
natural vegetation to fields causes a pronounced
increase in soil erosion. Golubev suggests that "soil
erosion on a field is on average two orders of magni-
tude more than that under a forest and one order
of magnitude more than from non-forested land-
scapes [8]." In a set of calculations for each major
climate zone of the world - tropical, subtropical,
subboreal, and boreal - he estimates that water-
induced erosion of soils has increased to 91.1 x 109
tons of soil worldwide each year. This represents a
more than fivefold increase (74.7 x 109 tons) over
the rate of erosion in the preneolithic past when no
cropland agriculture existed. If we extend this rea-
soning to the estimated expansion of arable lands
from an 1860 base of 600 x 106 ha to the current
total of 1.5 x 109 ha, the rate of increase in soil
erosion must have risen in proportion. By one very
crude estimation the rate of global soil erosion
would have progressed as in Table 2.2. In brief, the
last 120 years has probably seen a near-doubling of
the pace of soil erosion in the world, as a direct
result of worldwide growth in cropland [9].
seeds, and machinery caused land to be removed
from cultivation; and only in North America has
there been a net loss of cropland. Recent substantial
reversion of cropland to pasture, scrubland, or
second-growth forest in the highly industrialized
USA and Western Europe has led many observers
to assume that a similar process will occur elsewhere
in the world as development proceeds - highly
capital-intensive agriculture requires less cropland.
But the ever-rising worldwide demand for food and
commodities suggests that this countertrend may
not continue in the future. Pierre Crosson and
Sterling Brubaker have recently pointed out that,
in response to export-led demand, American far-
mers increased cropland by 24 x 106 ha between
1972 and 1980. They suggest that continued export
demand may result in conversion of an additional
24 to 28 x 106 ha of pasture, rangeland, and forest
to crops in the next 30 years [6].
The driving impetus behind this spread of
agricultural land is not due directly to pressures of
population growth. Obviously, swelling numbers of
people demand more food and other agricultrual
products, but agricultural expansion has not, on the
whole, been the work of subsistence farmers. Most
land clearance and plowing has been undertaken
by peasant proprietors, sharecroppers, or estate and
plantation workers - all responding to market
forces. The development of an integrated world
economic system has generated a vigorous, lucrative
demand for foodstuffs, fibers, narcotics, and indus-
trial crops. Cash sale and profits were the motor
propelling this trend (after all, it requires some
capital to create new arable land). By the nineteenth
century provision of global road, rail, and steamship
links made the rapid, large-scale physical movement
of agricultural products possible; provision of tele-
graphic and postal services made market informa-
tion readily available; and provision of banking,
credit, and reliable monetary systems accounted for
the necessary fiscal element. Admittedly, in more
recent decades the correlation between swelling
populations and agricultural expansion seems
direct. The consuming market - especially for
foodstuffs - is much closer to the small-commodity
producers.
When aggregated, the estimates of the original
study show a total world expansion of arable lands
of 852 x 106 ha for the entire 120 year period. The
1979 FAO world estimate for cultivated lands is
Soil erosion
( x109 tons/yr)
Preagriculture
16.4
1860
46.3
1978
91.1
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The recent global increase in cultivated area has
meant, quite simply, that more and more areas of
land have come under direct and continuous
human control for the first time. Initially, this may
have been in the form of some private tenure. Later
the state imposed constraints on private control (or
ownership) and in extreme cases, as with forest
reserves, the state directly claimed vast areas of wil-
derness not previously controlled by anyone: used
on occasion, yes - controlled, no. Today virtually
every hectare of land on the continents can be said
to be managed, so we can consider all land as being
in human use at all times. In short, the potential
for further systematic intervention has increased as
settlement and, subsequently, the reach of the state
have expanded.
The above assertions regarding global trends can
be better supported and developed with a discussion
of the most significant forms of agricultural
expansion. The mechanics of intervention and land
conversion vary according to the ecological condi-
tions encountered, such as forest and woodland;
wetland; arid and semiarid land; and grassland.
Despite some overlap in these categories, man has
evolved characteristic approaches toward interven-
tion in each of these regimes. It is to the nature,
scale, and effects of these forms of expansion of
world arable land that we now turn.
Deforestation
Throughout the world retreat of wood and forest
is concurrent with the advance of arable land. Not
all, but much of the land newly brought under the
plow has emerged from forest clearance, and urban
settlement and transportation requirements for
land increase the pressures for clearance. The result
has been a massive conversion of woodland into
other uses, which thus puts a definitive end to the
prospect of regrowth. Abandonment and regrowth
is always possible, but thus far (as we have seen) the
global trend has not inclined toward reversion of
agricultural or settlement lands.
Exploitation and degrading of forests are other
aspects of deforestation that cannot be ignored [10].
Demands for fuel, for construction timber, and for
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forest grazing have mounted steadily, with a resul-
tant sustained and growing pressure on virtually all
save the most inaccessible of the world's forests and
woodlands. Frequently, forest cutting and con-
sequent degrading has been a prelude to clearance
and conversion of land to sedentary agriculture.
Easier access and smaller growing stocks facilitate
the work of the pioneer settler.
Encroachment upon their habitat by sedentary
agriculture has also caused shifting cultivators to
change their ways. Reduced or compacted ranges
have forced tribal peoples universally to reduce the
period of fallow and thereby put heavier pres-
sure on the forest, with the inevitable effects of a
less substantial regrowth and a degraded cover. In
some cases the period of fallow has been sufficiently
reduced to place the shifting cultivators on the verge
of sedentary cultivation.
Intensified exploitation and conversion of land
to agriculture are the twin engines of modern world
deforestation with its attendant consequences. In
other words, world economic development has been
the direct cause of global deforestation. Just as
world development has followed an uneven trajec-
tory, so also has forest clearance and conversion.
Just as we can trace the spiraling, expanding pattern
of European exploitation, trade, conquest, and
settlement, so also can we trace a spiraling, expand-
ing pattern of world deforestation. Western
European forests felt the earliest impacts of exploi-
tation for industrial purposes and clearance for
agriculture in the sixteenth century. By the eigh-
teenth to nineteenth centuries, unremitting pres-
sures on these woodlands had created the pastoral,
managed landscapes of France, England, and Ger-
many, so pleasing to our own sensibilities today. As
early as the seventeenth century the forested plains
of eastern Germany and Poland underwent steady
clearance and plowing as the market for eastern
European wheat expanded. By the eighteenth cen-
tury New World lands in eastern North America
and in coastal Brazil felt pressures for marketable
wood and arable land. By the early nineteenth cen-
tury forested covers in India and the midwestern
USA were being felled for development purposes,
and in the midnineteenth century rapid defores-
tation had begun in Himalayan India, Australasia,
Southeast Asia, South Africa, Manchuria, Taiwan,
and elsewhere. The end of the century brought east
and west Sub-Saharan Africa, the American far
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west, and Siberia into this process. The twentieth
century has seen a nearly global onslaught on wood-
lands with, after World War II, swelling pressures
for economic development in the era of decoloni-
zation.
Clearance of woodland seemingly evokes a com-
mon human aesthetic of destruction and removal.
Felling trees, or burning, and thus opening up the
forbidding woodland for civilized activities has a
broad, cross-cultural appeal. The forest is an
ominous, forbidding realm, destroyed by the pio-
neer in order to build and grow again; to open up
a larger, more spacious visual horizon is a satisfying
achievement. This impulse is reinforced by the clear
hierarchy of economic activity maintained by
European and all other major world civilizations.
The gathering of forest produce and hunting forest
game are savage and demeaning activities. Progress
involves their replacement by plowing, sowing, and
reaping, by stock rearing and other more produc-
tive pursuits of the husbandman. Economic stimuli
for development are reinforced by weighty cultural
norms.
Since 1700 the expanding spiral of global defores-
tation has not reversed itself. Some lands, fallen out
of cultivation, have reverted to forest in western
Europe and North America, but the overall trend
is toward faster degrading and land conversion over
wider, more remote areas. The pressures of popula-
tion and economic development have mounted
rather than diminished. Technological advances
and refinements, such as new generations of bull-
dozers or other advanced land clearance equip-
ment, or even the humble portable chainsaw, ease
the cost and difficulty of deforestation.
How do we obtain an accurate measurement of
world deforestation during the past three centuries?
Conventional history's neglect of environmental
and land-use studies has made this a difficult ques-
tion to answer. Some assistance may be gained from
historical geographers who have completed local
studies, but an overall synthesis of reliable data is
still lacking. A first step might be simply to list those
forests that have been severely depleted, or have
completely disappeared, as we do not yet possess a
reliable, accessible inventory of the missing forests.
To set out the causes, the timing, and the ultimate
fate of large tracts of land formerly covered by the
same mix of trees would, indeed, be instructive.
Depending, of course, on scale and definition there
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could be more than 100 major world forests that
no longer can truly be said to exist in recognizable
form.
To illustrate this approach, and to support the
arguments made earlier, a sample list follows. The
first two examples consist of forests subjected to
continuing and intensifying pressure over the past
four or five centuries. In each case the final spurt
of clearance and conversion occurred in the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries. The last three case
studies are much more dramatic in their timing:
each forest was intensively cleared in the last half
of the nineteenth century and the first decades of
the twentieth century.
The mixed deciduous-coniferous forest
of European USSR
The triangle formed by the CitIes of Petrograd,
Moscow, and Kiev dominates the forested heartland
of European USSR. This is the land of pine and fir
conifers and oak, aspen, and birch deciduous
species that have played such a prominent role in
the cultural perceptions of generation after gener-
ation of Russians. To the north the land is covered
by the northern coniferous taiga forests; to the
south by the increasingly sparse broad-leaved
species of the black earth regions.
From as early as the eleventh century a sustained
process of Slavic settlement, colonization, and clear-
ance advanced into the mixed forest zone. By the
sixteenth to seventeenth centuries Russian peasants
had abandoned a form of slash and burn cultivation
with long fallows in favor of more intensive three-
field farming practices. Steady encroachment of the
woodland accompanied the movement of pioneer
colonists to the richer soils of the south, onward
toward the forest steppe. Industrial demands for
timber, charcoal, potash, tar, pitch, turpentine, and
other forest products encouraged heavy cutting of
the woodlands [11]. After a pause, punctuated by
some land abandonment in the seventeenth cen-
tury, vigorous, sustained clearance and conversion
continued from ca. 1700 to World War I.
During this period the mixed deciduous-coni-
ferous woodlands of European USSR diminished
from six tenths of the total land area to just over
one third of the total, while arable land increased
by a comparable amount. Tsvetkov has made a
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thorough analysis of the amount of forest clearance
for each province in European USSR from records
of official surveys at various dates. He used data
back to 1696 for 12 of the 16 provinces in the mixed
woods zone (Table 2.3). Two centuries of coloni-
zation and clearance reduced the woodland by
14.4 x 106 ha in these provinces. For the 16 prov-
inces land clearance between 1796 and 1914 shrank
the forests by 13.3 x 106 ha, in which period the
forest diminished from one hdf to one third of the
total land area (49.6 to 34.5%) [12]. In the early
twentieth century "the forest lands of Russia's
southern central strip are a mere dwindling remi-
niscence ofthe past, and preserved as a luxury [13]."
Table 2.3 Forest clearance in European USSR [12].
1696 1796 1914
Forest area
(x103 ha) 37573 32836 23136
Percentage of
total land area 60.6 53.0 37.4
Overall, Tsvetkov calculated that the 48 provinces
of European USSR lost 67 x 106 ha, about 28 %, of
its forest and woodlands between the end of the
seventeenth and beginning of the twentieth cen-
turies. Deforestation in World War I, the Revo-
lution, and thereafter proceeded without appreci-
able let up.
The subtropical Atlantic coastal forest
of Brazil
In AD 1500 the subtropical forest of the
southeastern Brazilian coastal provinces (Espirito
Santo, Rio de Janeiro, Minas Gerais, and Sao Paulo)
covered about 500 000 km2 , or about 6%, of the total
land area of Brazil [14]. Well watered by the sea-
sonal winds bringing moisture from the tropical
South Atlantic, this was a canopied forest closely
related to the Amazonian rain forest. The larger
trees, brazilwood and ironwood, reached 30 m in
height with a closed canopy entwined with lianas
and other vines. By the early twentieth century most
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of this area had disappeared save for "a few patches
of the primary forest [14]." Lands once forest have
become areas of human settlement, arable land
(including sugar and coffee plantations), and range-
land for cattle.
The process of deforestation began with
European settlement in the sixteenth century. New
Portuguese and French demands for brazilwood
(Caesalpinia echinata) encouraged intensified cut-
ting by the American Indians of the region. Sub-
sequently, in the seventeenth century, white and
mestizo settlers adapted and intensified the native
slash and burn regime to a cycle that, because of
repeated burning, inhibited forest regrowth. By
1690 the discovery of gold in the region brought
in new migrants. Food and fuel requirements for
the new economy as well as land requirements for
mining encouraged forest burning and clearance
on a wider scale. Dean estimates that perhaps
95000 km2 of forest was cleared in the 100-year
life of the gold fields [15]. By the mideighteenth
century a new export crop, plantation sugar, had
put further pressure on the forest, and in the 1830s
coffee began to overshadow sugar as a money ear-
ner. The widely accepted belief that productive
coffee bushes must be planted in the soil of recently
cleared primary forest lands brought another spurt
in forest felling and burning. The post-1860 spread
of the railways into the forested zone was the last
episode in this sequence, the access to rail lines
encouraging clearance and more 'extensive cattle
ranching and agriculture. The railways themselves
consumed vast amounts of wood for fuel and
sleepers. Only after 1900 were conservationist-issues
raised and small forest reserves set aside "as biologi-
cal research stations [16]."
The forests of the Mediterranean: the
Sila Forest of Southern Italy
A stubborn impediment to an accurate under-
standing of the accelerating pace of world defores-
tation has been the tendency of many authors to
assume that the scope of deforestation in earlier
epochs has been comparable to that of the modern
period - and that often full recovery from the effects
of earlier periods of exploitation has never really
occurred. Frequently mentioned is the presumed
stripping of the Mediterranean forests in classical
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antiquity. In his recent study of forests in the ancient
Mediterranean world, Russell Meiggs points out
that it was really only in the last century that defores-
tation of the Mediterranean lands took place, thus
correcting this assumption. Before the midnine-
teenth century the forests of Italy, Greece, and
Turkey, as well as those of the North African coun-
tries, were relatively abundant. But the "spectacular
growth of population during the nineteenth cen-
tury" generated an "intensive increase in public
and private building" with an accompanying
demand for timber. The construction of railways
added to this demand, but more significantly made
it economically feasible to cut and haul timber from
large areas of hitherto inaccessible Mediterranean
forest lands [17].
The Sila forest of old Calabria in southern Italy
offers one well-documented example of this type
of deforestation. The Sila forest consisted of a dense
growth of mixed deciduous-coniferous species
(pine, fir, oak, beech, and chestnut). Largely
untouched because of poor roads and access, it
offered a hospitable refuge to bandits and other
outlaws, but no incentives for timber merchants.
However, in the last decade of the nineteenth cen-
tury, a railroad was built through Cosenza to the
south and a number of roads penetrated the
uplands, so the timber of Sila became attractive to
contractors for the first time. In the next forty years
a "reckless destruction" of this forest ensued [18].
The traveler Norman Douglas spent several years
on extended walking tours through the uplands of
old Calabria. He wrote in 1915 that "in a few year's
time nearly all these forests will have ceased to exist;
another generation will hardly recognize the site of
them [17]." In his later tours Douglas saw tract after
tract of cutover areas that had been luxuriant groves
of chestnut or large stands of pine and fir on his
earlier visits. Various timber companies - French,
German, Italian - had obtained concessions,
employed large bodies of workmen, built access
roads or even funicular railways to haul the logs,
and were busily cutting. After World War I the Sila
forest was no longer recognizable to traveler and
native alike.
The deltaic rain forests of lower Burma
Prior to British conquest and annexation in 1852,
the primary forest of lower Burma consisted of
Sustainable development of the biosphere
great evergreen rain forests dominated by the
kanazo tree (Heritiera tomes). Along the coasts and
near the Irrawaddy river banks the evergreen
kanazo forest merged with wet mangrove
(Rhizopora) forests. But by far the largest land cover
in deltaic Burma was formed by the kanazo forests
with, under favorable conditions, trees of up to 45 m
in height. This Burmese jungle was the habitat for
elephants, tigers, and wild buffalo. Occasional inter-
ruptions came in the form of kaing or elephant
grass (Saccharum spontaneum), growing up to 3 m in
height.
In 1852 human occupation and penetration of
the rain forest was minimal since the preconquest
Burmese center for agriculture, settlement, and
political life lay in upper Burma. Adas estimates
that between 3.5 to 4 x 106 ha of land in lower
Burma were under rain forest at the midcentury
with only 320 000 ha of land under cultivation [19].
When the British arrived the delta was a jungle
destined to become a settlement frontier.
British colonial officials saw the kanazo jungle as
wasteland that should be converted into agricultural
land as quickly as feasible to tap the productive
resources of Burma and the Burmese people. The
new regime installed new transport, communica-
tions, tax policies, and land tenure designed to
encourage pioneering land clearance and settle-
ment by Burmese peasants in the south. They
encouraged links with the new, booming world
market and rising prices for export rice. Free
to move because of the new policies, Burmese
settlers vigorously cleared and burned the rain
forest and planted paddy rice. Within 60 years, by
World War I, perhaps several hundred thou-
sand hectares remained, only a remnant of the
kanazo rain forests of lower Burma. Thus Burma
became one of the great rice-exporting countries
of the world.
The mallee scrub of South Australia
From the 1840s onward the coastal regions of South
Australia were subjected to survey and settlement.
By the 1930s much of this fertile land was devoted
to grain cultivation, a transformation that came at
the expense of woodland. Of the approximately
155000 km2 settled, much had originally been
under a dense wooded canopy. Over 70% of the
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area (110000 km2) was mallee scrub:
... the characteristic feature of the mallee is the way
in which the dominant eucalyptus (E. dumosa, E.
ucinata, E. incrassata) grow in stunted fashion, the
branches splaying out from a thick shallow root in
an umbrella-like cluster of stems and canopy. The
trees vary in height from 5 to 35 feet, and in density
from impenetrable thicket to a more open scrub with
an understory of brushes and grass [20].
The mallee woodland comprised a difficult, hated
barrier to the expansion of settlement. The earliest
settlers discovered that the hard labor and expense
required to cut and uproot malleee was often more
expensive than the rewards of cultivating the
cleared land.
A turning point came in the 1860s with the
development of a technique for clearing by drag-
ging a heavy log or metal roller over the scrub. The
roller knocked down and uprooted the relatively
slender mallee trunks, thereafter the remains could
be burnt to permit plowing and sowing. Later
developments included much larger rollers and
spring-driven stump plows that together could clear
even the heaviest scrub growth. The Scrub Lands
Act of 1866 and later revisions enlarged the areas
for individual leases and reduced the costs and
effort required to obtain freehold title for settlers.
These incentives, as well as linkage into the world
grain markets, set off a sustained process of clear-
ance and land conversion. By 1897, 844000 ha of
land had been taken up under scrub leases, nearly
all of which was cleared. But most of the nineteenth
century clearance went unrecorded since it was
"regarded as a part of the normal farm operations
that all new settlers faced when colonizing the land
[21]." In 1906, however, the state government
began an effort to compile data on the rate of land
clearance: between 1906 and 1941 mallee rolling
operations cleared 2.9 x 106 ha of scrubland. In all,
about half the settled area in South Australia
(77 000 km2 ) "has had its appearance altered com-
pletely by the clearing of woodland, remnants of
this once enveloping cover existing only on steep
slopes, on the tops of sand ridges, or alongside the
country roads ... [22]."
The five cases of depleted forests listed above
represent a much larger number of forested regions
that have felt the bite of economic development.
The twin processes of degradation and conversion
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are still at work, but many forest reservations have
retained their integrity and some afforestation
efforts have been relatively successful. But the over-
all effect is meagre in the face of global trends
toward deforestation.
Completion of a global inventory of this type
would be an invaluable first step in better defining
the recent forest history of the world. More precise,
better documented data on the extent and rate of
depletion for each individual forest would do much
to correct our perspectives of the global process.
Such an historically oriented inventory could then
be matched with the contemporary inventory and
survey for Latin America, Africa, and Asia com-
pleted recently by the FAO [23]. Finally, this inven-
tory would also throw into sharper relief various
worldwide efforts of afforestation and land recla-
mation.
Land reclamation: The drainage
of wetlands
In the latter decades of the nineteenth century, the
pace and scale of world land reclamation carried
out by draining wetlands underwent a dramatic
increase. After 1870, new world commodity
demands and rising agricultural prices combined
with new technologies to encourage swamp and
marsh drainage. Large-scale production of cheap
clay-tile pipes, development of steam-powered
ditching machines, and other devices such as dipper
dredges alld dragline excavators lowered costs and
enhanc('d !('turns [24]. Evolution of mechanically
powered· pUlllpS and more sophisticated hydrologi-
cal enginccring made feasible drainage systems on
a larger scale. State activity in the form of various
local drainage authorities and boards played an
increasingly critical role wherever the agriculturalist
confronted inundated swamp, marshlands, or even
wet soils that could be drained.
One of the largest efforts at drainage and recla-
mation occurred in the American midwest. By the
midnineteenth century, settlement of the Ohio and
Mississippi river valleys was just beginning.
Throughout the upper midwest the new settlers
found malarial, swampy lands that were potentially
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rich but too wet to farm. A participant on the 1823
expedition to search out the source of the Minnesota
river reported after leaving Chicago that, "the
country presents a low, flat, and swampy prairie,
very thickly covered with high grass, aquatic plants,
and among others the wild rice. .. The whole of
this tract is overflowed in the spring, and canoes
pass i~ every direction across the prairie [25]." In
recognition of the problem in this region and in
the south central states as well, the US Congress
passed the Swamp Lands Acts (1849, 1850, 1860)
that together conveyed 25.9 x 106 ha of wetlands to
the states on condition that funds from their sale
be used to reclaim the lands for agriculture. By the
1950s private and organized drainage efforts in the
north central states had added 10 to 12 x 106 ha of
wetlands to arable land. Improved productivity
could be found on another 15 X 106 ha of formerly
water-logged soils [26]. The 1978 drainage irriga-
tion report from the Agricultural Census showed
21 x 106 ha of drained land in the same region, or
50% of the USA total drained lands [27].
Increasingly effective flood control projects made
it possible to extend drainage and land reclamation
in the south central region - especially in the Mis-
sissippi Delta. Engineering difficulties and costs
were greater than in the corn belt states, but drain-
age continued to grow in the south during the
twentieth century well after completion of much of
the northern efforts. By 1978 18.5 x 106 ha of wet-
lands were dried in the south, or 43.4% of the
national total [27]. In addition to the Delta and the
Mississipi river valley, Florida had 2.6 x 106 ha of
land under drainage [27]. The 1978 census repor-
ted that 42.6 x 106 ha, or 4.2% of the total land area,
were under drainage in the entire USA [27]. It is
likely that a somewhat larger area has undergone
reclamation efforts in the past century or so, since
some private efforts have simply not been recorded
or tabulated; and some systems have been aban-
doned. Wooten and Jones estimated in the mid-
1950s that 50-65 x 106 ha of USA land had been
affected by drainage of which 20-25 x 106 ha was
actual swampland [28]. More precise estimates await
further research, but land reclamation on this scale
has unquestionably made a substantial reduction in
North American and, indeed, world wetlands.
An almost identical pattern of land reclamation
to that of the midwest USA occured in South Aus-
tralia. Australian farmer settlers in that region
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found a large coastal tract of potentially fertile lands
with "sheets of standing water, swamps and water-
logged grounds [29]." This wetlands area extended
over about 1.7 x 106 ha. Between 1864 and 1972
unremitting government and private efforts suc-
ceeded in draining the entire coastal swamp, so
today virtually all is productive agricultural land or
settled. The final episode came in a burst of State
Government activity at the end of World War II,
when several hundred kilometers of new primary
channels and subsidiaries completed the work of
artificial drainage [30]. The "watery waste" of the
southeast Australian coast is now a carefully
controlled agricultural landscape.
Other examples of the large-scale conversion of
wetlands can readily be found. Systematic research
on reclamation of bogs began in Czarist Russia in
the late nineteenth century. Large drainage works
begun in 1872 resulted in the emptying of 2.5 x
106 ha of wetlands by 1898 [31], and drainage
efforts have continued steadily thereafter. The most
recent estimate shows 9.4 x 106 ha of drained
organic soils (histosols) in the USSR [32]. In past
decades Finland has mounted an impressive drive
to drain peat lands, to both improve forest lands
and extract peat; by 1980 5.4 x 106 ha of organic
soils had been drained [31]. Other European
reclaimed organic soils are estimated to total 6.1 x
106 ha [33]. Thus, nearly 21 x 106 ha of European
and Russian organic soils in wetlands have been
affected by drainage measures. By far the greater
part of this activity was carried out during the past
century.
Much reclamation of wetlands has occurred in
tropical regions as well as in the temperate zones.
Incentives identical to those discussed earlier have
led agriculturalists and the state to drain swamps
and marshlands throughout tropical Asia and
Africa. But in many parts of monsoon Asia under
wet-rice cultivation reclamation of swamplands has
not been as heavily dependent upon lowering of
the water table. Instead, cultivators have cleared
tree, shrub, and grass cover, constructed dikes and
ditches, and regulated the flow of water in order
to grow paddy rice. In low-lying, brackish coastal
wetlands, such as mangrove swamps, this procedure
may involve preventing inflows of sea water and
retaining fresh water sources with a relatively high
water table. Thus, swamps and marshes may have
lost their vegetation and animal populations, but
f
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still remain for much of the year a variety of
controlled wetlands under rice culture.
The coastal swamplands and mangrove forests of
present-day Bangladesh, known as the Sundarbans,
fall into this category. This "vast tract of forest and
swamp" comprises 1.7 X 106 ha of land stretching
along the coast of the Bay of Bengal [34]. The lower
part of the Ganges delta was "a tangled network of
streams, rivers and watercourses enclosing a large
number of islands of various shapes and sizes [35]."
In the early nineteenth century the colonial Govern-
ment of Bengal began to issue land grants for
development of the "waste lands" of the Sundar-
bans, and by 1904 the total settled and cultivated
area had reached 522 000 ha [36]. Continued clear-
ance and development throughout the twentieth
century reduced the tidal forested area by 1.3 x
106 ha to 400 000 ha in the 1970s [37]. Virtually the
entire cultivated area in the Sundarbans is devoted
to rice or jute - both wet crops.
Twentieth-century wetland development in
southeast Asia followed a similar pattern. Indepen-
dent Indonesia reclaimed approximately 2.7 x
106 ha of tidal swampland during the past 30 years,
two thirds of which is under wet-rice cultivation
[38]. Colonial and postindependence reclamation
projects in west Malaysia have converted 600 000 ha
to sedentary agriculture - mostly paddy [31].
These examples testify to the brisk rate at which
the world's swamps, marshes, and bogs have been
reclaimed during the past 100 years. Current pres-
sures for productive agricultural lands drive con-
tinuing public and private inroads into wetlands -
especially in tropical Asia. From the global perspec-
tive the massive increase in wet-rice lands under
cultivation during the past century may be seen as
a counterpoint to the depletion of wetlands.
Especially where rice fields are artificially irrigated,
as in many parts of east Asia, rice culture is a
controlled form of world wetlands.
Land reclamation by drainage has had significant
environmental and social effects. The drying up of
marshes and swamps releases, among other ele-
ments, stored carbon to the atmosphere. Changes
in the water table affect local and regional water-
sheds. When this type of habitat disappears many
plant and animal species retreat or disappear.
Similarly, tribal communities, forest gatherers,
shifting cultivators, and others find their source of
subsistence and place of refuge compressed. The
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last group are frequently forced to seek their liveli-
hood as laborers or sharecroppers in the new
agricultural regime.
A preliminary inventory of worldwide land recla-
mation through draining wetlands is an essential
first step for environmental history. Such an under-
taking would provide a much clearer picture than
has hitherto existed of the scope and pace of wet-
lands conversion. An inventory could serve as a
guide and stimulus for further detailed research.
Comprehensive worldwide data is especially impor-
tant in view of the vast areas of undisturbed wet-
lands that remain. For example, the undisturbed
muskeg (peatland) lands of northern Canada are
estimated to stretch 1.3 xl 06 km 2 [39]. The USSR
has an equally large area of peat and marshlands
that could be reclaimed [40]. Economic develop-
ment may indeed make it desirable to encroach
further on both temperate and tropical wetlands.
If so, the global context in the past and the present
should be better understood.
Land reclamation: Irrigation of
arid and near-arid lands
Irrigation is a much more visible and appealing
form of land reclamation than any other. Making
the deserts bloom responds to some of our deepest
aesthetic and cultural instincts. The drama of tower-
ing dams, huge turbines, and massive canal systems
has made large irrigation systems one index of
modernity. Man's potency in halting and diverting
great rivers for irrigation and for hydroelectric
power renders acceptable the equally massive social
investment required to construct these projects.
The pace of irrigation projects has surged forward
since the late nineteenth century, converting mil-
lions of hectares of land in the world's drier regions
into productive agricultural land. This is a major
environmental change that demands detailed analy-
sis from a global perspective.
Perhaps the best known and certainly one of the
largest social investments in irrigation has been in
western USA. Projects such as the Imperial Valley
Project (begun in 1896) to bring water from the
Colorado River; the Twin Falls Project (1903) to
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divert waters from the Snake River in Idaho; the
Boulder Canyon Project (1928) for multiple use of
the Colorado River; the Columbia River Project
(1935), with the Grand Coulee dam as the center-
piece, were all spectacular engineering feats [41].
By the 1930s the US Bureau of Reclamation and
the US Corps of Engineers were planning water
diversion and control for entire river drainage
basins. The Missouri River Basin Plan (1944) and
subsequent legislation called for the eventual irriga-
tion of 2.5 X 106 ha of land by 1950 [42]. These
large, planned systems were clear manifestations of
the organizational skills, power, and resources of
the American state: irrigation on this scale set a new
standard of development. It is far from accidental
that newly independent postcolonial states placed
similarly large irrigation and water control pro-
grams at the core of their own developmental
planning.
By 1890 western American irrigation was well
under way. In that year just over 54000 farms in
the 17 western states (or their territorial equivalent)
irrigated nearly 1.5 x 106 ha of land [43]. Over the
next 40 years a burst of public and private dam and
canal building pushed the total canal-irrigated area
to 6.0 x 106 ha for the same region. The total USA
system boasted just under 25 000 diversion and
storage dams, over 5000 reservoirs, and over
120000 km of main canals. Another 1.7 x 106 ha of
land were irrigated from groundwater by means of
wells and pumping systems in the western states
[44]. Four decades of further expansion added
another lOx 106 ha to the irrigated arid lands of
the 17 western states. In 1978 farmers and ranchers
in the western half of the country irrigated 17.7 x
106 ha [45], one of the largest and most complex
irrigation systems in the world.
Comparable to, and indeed even surpassing the
American efforts, were the massive irrigation sys-
tems of colonial India under British rule. As early
as~he 1850s British engineers began planning and
constructing canal systems designed to bring peren-
nial supplies of river water to near-arid agricultural
regions. The state's aim was to improve agricul-
tural productivity and to reduce the risk of famine
when the monsoon rains faltered. As the early pro-
jects proved themselves, and as the technical capac-
ity and confidence of the Public Works Department
engineers increased, the scope and size of individual
projects grew commensurately. Diversion of the
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waters of the Ganges, the Godavari, the Krishna,
and others of India's major rivers had begun.
Curiously, the aim was fixed pn irrigation - not on
multiple uses, such as hydroelectric power, flood
control, or navigation, as in the USA.
In the 1880s British planners conceived and initi-
ated an ambitious grand plan to reclaim the desert
lands of northwestern India along the Indus River
and its five tributaries. If water could be brought
to the dry lands of Punjab and Sind (present-day
Pakistan) new lands could be reclaimed by agricul-
tural colonists. Troublesome nomadic pastoralists
haunted these tracts, whose only land rights were
those of tradition and belligerence. After an initial
exploratory project, the lower Chenab canal har-
nessed the waters of that river and diverted them
into channels capable of watering a million hectares
of scrub-covered arid lands [46]. By 1895 the first
colonists, settled in newly planned villages, had har-
vested their first crops of wheat.
The centerpiece of the new Punjab canal colonies
was the great Triple Canal Project (1905-1917). In
this boldly conceived enterprise, three separate
linked canals brought surplus water sequentially
from the Jhelum, the Chenab, and the Ravi together
to irrigate a hitherto inaccessible area in Mont-
gomery District. When completed, three colonies of
settlers were able to reclaim 569 500 ha of former
wasteland for grain cultivation [47]. The Punjab
canal colonies eventually covered 2.2 x 106 ha of
reclaimed desert lands that had come primarily
under wheat cultivation [48].
At the end of their rule in India, the British could
rightly claim their canal irrigation systems as one
index of modernization and development. They
saw the Punjab canal colonies with their prosperous
settler-colonists as one of the finest achievements
of the colonial regime.
The total irrigation complex in both north and
south India was indeed impressive. At the outset
of World War II, official figures showed that
116 112 km of canals watered 11.6 x 106 ha of land
in undivided India [49]. The momentum of
development intensified after 1947 in both India
and Pakistan. Five-year plans, the drive for food
self-sufficiency, and foreign aid helped nurture a
wide range of massive water-management projects
in both countries. By 1978 Pakistan counted II x
106 ha under water from canals and India 15.1 x
106 ha. During the same period irrigation by means
j
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of ground water tapped through tube wells
developed rapidly. Thus, the total noncanal irri-
gated area for Pakistan was 3.2 x 106 ha; for India
16.6x 106 ha. In short, some 45.9X 106 ha of dry
lands came under artificial irrigation in 1978 for
both countries [50].
Perennial irrigation schemes also commenced
early in Egypt. Muhammad Ali (1769-1849) and
his successors invested heavily in irrigation schemes
to grow the new Jubel variety of long-staple cotton
for export. After the British conquest in 1882, the
new Cromer regime vigorously planned and
developed further irrigation works with the aid of
experts from the Government of India [51]. Post-
World War II irrigation in Egypt has continued in
this tradition with the construction of the Aswan
High Dam and other impressive projects. In 1979
the FAa estimated that land under irrigation in
Egypt had grown to 2.85 x 106 ha (virtually 100%
of the total cultivated land) [52].
Other countries, such as Mexico, Australia, South
Africa, and the USSR, developed new river diver-
sion irrigation projects from the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries. By the post-World
War II period, as colonies became independent
nations, they turned to state-directed development
efforts, mostly aimed at reclaiming dry lands. State
sponsored, planned, and executed efforts to water
and cultivate arid lands have been a critical part of
the development process. In 1979, 14.3% of the
world's arable lands (207 x 106 ha) were irrigated
[53].
This trend toward controlled watering and culti-
vation of dry lands is continuing - one projection
suggests that the world total will reach 300 x 106 ha
by the year 2000 [54]. Few rivers flowing through
arid or semiarid regions remain untapped by irriga-
tion schemes. Indeed, the steadily growing quan-
tities of water demanded for irrigation have begun
to have an effect on the world hydrological cycle.
The runoff of many rivers is substantially depleted
and in some cases almost entirely dissipated. The
more than 13000 large-capacity storage reservoirs
in the world now have a total capacity of not less
than 5500 km3 , or 12% of the entire estimated
annual runoff of the world's rivers [55]. The supply
of river water may be dwindling, but the supply of
groundwater accessible for recovery by wells is very
large. Investment in irrigation will continue for the
foreseeable future.
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The physical changes wrought by irrigation on
formerly dry lands are consequential. Waterlogging
and increased salinity and/or alkalinity are prob-
lems long associated with artificial irrigation which,
if not anticipated and corrected, can defeat the very
purpose of the irrigation scheme [56].
Placement of irrigation systems on dry-land
hydrological systems has had other important eco-
logical effects. Soil fauna in arid lands that have
adapted to minimal soil moisture (beetles, sand
roaches, carpenter ants, centipedes) have lost their
habitat and given way to the earthworms and
nematodes of irrigated sandy soils [57]. Rodent
populations have experienced phenomenal growths
in numbers when restraints imposed by lack of
water have been removed [57]. In almost every
irrigation zone, significant species shifts in plants
can be found. Aquatic weeds in particular have
flourished in the reservoirs and channels of the new
system. If they are not checked they become a major
obstruction to water movement and, in some cases,
a human health hazard. Enlarged insect popula-
tions, especially malaria-bearing mosquitoes, have
been a recurring problem due to increases in their
breeding habitat. Numerous outbreaks of malaria
have been traced to design and maintenance defects
in irrigation systems [58]. Another important
human health concern is the spread of schis-
tosomiasis associated with irrigation, because the
snails, host to the worm parasite, flourish in sluggish
waters. Infection of human populations moving in
such waters can easily reach epidemic or pandemic
proportions [59].
Finally, for human populations the extension of
irrigation brings drastic socioeconomic adjust-
ments. Nomadic pastoralists have had few alterna-
tives but to contract their normal itinerary of sea-
sonal and yearly movements and withdraw to a
constricted range. Under this process of compaction
(similar to that undergone by shifting cultivators)
they press heavily on brush, scrub, and grass cover.
Alternatively, they may attempt to settle down and
adapt to the new technologies of sedentary agricul-
ture under an irrigation regime. Sometimes the
latter has been in response to force imposed by the
centralizing modern state. If colonists are brought
into the new lands, or if the reclaimed tracts are an
extension of already irrigated areas, the transition
may be easier. In either case cultivation by means
of irrigation does demand a new, more coordinated
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level of social organization, particularly true for new
lands watered by canal systems. The farmer is
integrated, involuntarily, into a large-scale complex
structure.
The magnitude of world irrigation development
over the past two centuries provides strong justifica-
tion for a systematic, intensive historical review. The
physical and ecological changes wrought by con-
tinuous water supplies brought to formerly dry
tracts are manifold and complex; so also are the
human and social consequences of this change. In
the aggregate these changes constitute a significant
shift in the world environment and in human
society.
Grazing lands, large grazing
animals, and man
Grazing lands throughout the world are of critical
importance in the global economy. Savannas,
natural grasslands, shrub lands, forest meadows,
and man-made pastures supply most of the nourish-
ment for domestic livestock and for large, wild
herbivores. Milk and meat from domesticated
animals are primary sources of high-quality protein
for man and meat from wild herbivores remains an
important supplemental source of protein in many
world regions. Since the late nineteenth century
(and the advent of refrigeration) meat and milk
products have been important components of world
economic exchange. In many semiarid parts of the
world harvesting either domestic or wild large her-
bivores may be the most efficient way to use the
land to produce food [60].
The relationship between the world's grazing
lands, grazing animals, both domestic and wild, and
man is tangled and complex. As a result of human
economic development it has been a rapidly chang-
ing relationship, a changing picture that is of inter-
est to the environmental historian. Certain large-
scale worldwide trends are perceptible. Since 1700
a steady reduction has occurred in the extent of the
world's grazing lands, for over the past few cen-
turies millions of hectares of the world's great
natural grasslands have come under the plow. We
can only guess at losses in the American Great
Plains, the South African veldt, the Russian steppe,
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the campos of Brazil, or the pampas of Argentina.
Conversion of grasslands into plowed and cultivated
land is a direct outcome of the global spread of
arable land discussed earlier.
What might be considered a countervailing trend
may also be found. There has been an extension of
controlled grazing lands in some parts of the world
by means of sown artificial pastures, which con-
stitute a large proportion of rural investment in
Australia and New Zealand, for example [61].
Human intervention has inadvertently created
grazing and browsing areas in transportation cor-
ridors left to grass, but cleared of higher bushes
and trees. Thus, highway, railway, and power line
rights-of-way occupy hundreds of thousands of hec-
tares of land in North America that provide brows-
ing and grazing lands for many herbivores [62], but
the overall balance seems to have been heavily
weighted toward diminution.
Another significant worldwide trend has been
that of intensifying human intervention in and con-
trol of world grazing lands. At the present time no
truly uncontrolled grazing lands or wild popula-
tions of large grazing animals exist, all being, in
fact, managed by self-conscious human agency.
Increasingly it is the national state that has acquired
that responsibility. Only the definition of goals and
the efficiency of management remain an issue.
In part human control of grazing lands has been
attained by the forcible displacement of wild her-
bivores to create pasturage for domestic livestock.
Thus, the near demise of bison, elk, and antelope
on the American plains and their replacement by
cattle and sheep herds is a staple theme of North
American history. Similarly, the enormous herds of
gazelle, zebras, antelope, and other grazing and
browsing animals reported in the journals of early
European explorers of Sub-Saharan Africa have all
but disappeared [63]. Cattle, sheep, and goats have
deposed these vast wild populations on the African
plains, a few domestic species thus replacing the
wide variety of wild grazing animals. In Africa there
has been a perceptible trend toward overgrazing
with its attendant consequences: "sharp decreases
in standing crop, increases in unpalatable and in
poisonous species, denudation and erosion and
bush encroachment [64]." The nineteenth century
diaspora of European settlers in the New World
and Australasia made enormous inroads in world
grasslands in a relatively short time.
t
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European invasion of the New World, African,
and Australasian grasslands was the product of the
sudden growth in ranching or extensive commercial
grazing in the second half ofthe nineteenth century.
Steeply rising market demand for beef and wool in
the urbanized regions of western Europe and
eastern North America spurred the growth of
extensive commercial sheep and cattle grazing in
areas of new settlement [65]. In some instances
pioneer ranchers in South America or, most no-
tably, in New Zealand's South Island, entered graz-
ing lands unused by either larger herbivores or
directly by man. Thus, the European settlers of New
Zealand brought exotic sheep, cattle, rabbits, and
horse species with them to a land that did not
contain any native large herbivores. The tussock
grassland of the South Island "was a sea of waving
bunch grasses dotted sparsely with shrubs or the
New Zealand cabbage trees [66]." These 2 to 3 ft
tussocks of grass stretched over 6.5 x 106 ha of land
when the first European grazing animals were intro-
duced [67]. In the latter case 140 years of heavy,
sustained grazing (as well as plowing and conver-
sion) has reduced the area and the luxuriance of
the original cover. Cattle and sheep, and New Zea-
land's exports derived therefrom, have flourished,
but the grasslands have been seriously depleted [68].
Despite ranching's explosive success in the nine-
teenth century the area devoted to extensive grazing
of this type has been shrinking. More intensive,
more profitable mixed farming has pushed
ranchers into the drier regions of poorer vegetation
and soils - into the margin [69]. Ranching is an
efficient means of exploiting the natural pasture of
the semiarid zones, since both carrying capacities
and human populations are very light. Nonetheless,
ranching at present must be accounted for as one
of the sources of pressure upon vegetation in arid
lands.
Pastoralists and nomads throughout the world
have come to share a common fate with ranchers.
Especially during the last century or so sedentary
farming and stock raising have preempted the
favored habitat of the pastoralist. Whether sheep
and goat, horse, camel, or cattle herders; whether
fixed transhumance or wide ranging in their migra-
tions, the world's pastoralists have been steadily
constricted by the agriculturalist and his ally the
state. The pastoralist's best grazing lands have been
lost, and the remaining flocks compressed upon
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smaller and less desirable ranges. Much of the pres-
sure upon semiarid vegetation and the subsequent
progress of desertification can be traced to this
process. The population and habitat of the nomad
and his animals have come under state control,
sharply curtailing his economic and political free-
doms. Control, and eventually settlement as seden-
tary farmers or stock ranchers, is the goal of most
regimes today.
North Africa under colonial rule offers one
important example of this worldwide trend toward
compression of pastoralists. The French established
their protectorate over Morocco in 1912. Within a
relatively brief span, the new colonial regime had
expropriated large tracts of the most fertile agricul-
tural and grazing lands from the tribes and religious
beneficiaries that occu pied and used them. These
lands were redistributed to European settlers, while
other Europeans purchased and occupied lands as
private colonists. By the midcentury, European set-
tlers held 106 ha of land in Morocco, or 6.5% of the
total farm and grazing land in the colony. The
European settlers developed profitable, intensive,
diversified farming in the well-watered north-
western area of Morocco (The Chaouia):
One of the most important results of the develop-
ment of diversified farming was, of course, to reduce
the quality of the land available for the two major
occupations of traditional Moroccan agriculture.
Grain growing was pushed into the marginal area ...
The herder, in turn, found himself moved even
further south onto lands offering highly uncertain
pasturage at best [70].
One of the unanticipated consequences of these
shifts was the rising prominence of goats, as
opposed to cattle or sheep, in the herds of Moroccan
pastoralists. Between 193 I and 1952 the percentage
of goats in the total animal population (goats, sheep,
and cattle) rose from 27.3 to 37.8. Most of the
enhancement occurred at the expense of cattle,
whose numbers shrank from 16.3% in 1931 to 8.3%
in 1952 [7 I ]. In absolute terms the number of goats
nearly trebled from 3.2 xl 06 in 1931 to 9.8 x 106 in
1952. As Stewart comments:
This extension of goat raising had its drawbacks,
since forest and ground cover were seriously
damaged as a result. The herder had little choice,
however, relegated as he was by the extension of
cultivated areas to lands unfit for raising anything
other than the "cow of the poor" [72].
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The current impoverished state of most pastoral-
ists in the Third World can be attributed in large
measure to the working of the same process of
displacement to a less favorable habitat and to graz-
ing ranges severely depleted in area. In the end
economic pressures force many nomads to seek
employment from settled agriculturalists on a sea-
sonal or permanent basis; thus former pastoralists
swell the numbers of the rural proletariat.
Conclusion
Over the past 300 years the Earth's biota has under-
gone massive changes: world vegetation cover has
been profoundly altered, the world's wild land and
sea animal populations have been sharply reduced
in number and range, and even the physical compo-
sition of the oceans and the atmosphere may have
experienced subtle changes. At the same time man's
control over the natural environment has risen to
the point that the natural order is virtually an
anthropogenic or man-determined system. By far
the most important reason for the changes that have
occurred in the biota, the atmosphere, and the
oceans is the growing efficiency and global scale of
man's economic activity. The extension of world
agriculture, producing commodities for a global
market, has been a major, but not the sole, con-
tributor to drastic environmental change. Industrial
development, rapid urban expansion, mining,
large-scale commercial fishing have all contributed
to the transformation of the world's environment.
These enormous changes in man's habitat over this
relatively brief period of time (since 1700) have
forced new adaptations in culture and institutions
upon human society. Moreover, at this point in time,
in the late twentieth century, it does not appear that
the powerful forces driving these trends will be
diverted or reversed. Man's economic actions will
continue to alter drastically the environment in new,
and unexpected, ways in the foreseeable future.
The great task for environmental historians is to
record and analyze the effects of man's recently
achieved control over the natural world. What is
needed is a long-term global comparative historical
perspective that treats the environment as a mean-
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ingful variable. A long-term, three to five centuries
perspective is necessary to discover any large, sig-
nificant trends as opposed to short-term fluctuations
or discontinuities. A global vision is essential
because the integrating world economic order dis-
plays shared patterns of change. After innovation
and acceptance new technologies and new institu-
tional forms have been diffused and used
throughout the world. Especially after the midnine-
teenth century the time required for diffusion and
deployment of new technologies has shrunk. A com-
parative vision is necessary to make effective use of
detailed local and regional studies in environmental
history. Striking localized phenomena may be the
product of peculiar local circumstances and run
contrary to larger worldwide trends. Comparative
examination of analogous circumstances in other
localities, regions, or nations may confirm this or,
alternatively, a comparative check may reveal the
same phenomenon elsewhere.
To be truly effective, a wide-angle global vision
and long-term perspective must be supported by
more precise and accurate data. Historians must be
equipped to measure environmental change over
time more accurately than has been previously pos-
sible. Along one axis this involves exacting attention
to location and to relative scale. Another axis
demands meticulous attention to chronology and
process. In the end more precision requires basic
quantification: How many species of antipastoral
plants were introduced into the overgrazed lands
of X country by which date? How many hectares
of mangrove fell to rice cultivation in Burma
between 1890 and 1900? Naturally, quantification
depends upon the proper and rigorous use of
original sources, especially since direct statistical
evidence may be incomplete or lacking. Nonethe-
less, methods long familiar to economic historians
permit the construction of reliable estimates and
well-grounded time series data.
Obviously, more and better intensive, individual,
local, and regional studies are needed. These can
give us great insights into the detailed analysis of
larger processes of change for it is true that local
cultural responses to larger forces vary widely. The
value of monographic case studies is immense, but
we can also make a case for wide-ranging compara-
tive studies - on a regional or even global basis.
Trying to discover, estimate, and quantify changing
land-use patterns in a single country or group of
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countries over a century or more is one example.
Trying to study and measure the environmental
effects of worldwide technological-institutional in-
novations, such as the railways or chemical fer-
tilizers, is another. These are large projects beyond
the reach of an individual scholar. Some form of
sponsored team research might be the best
approach.
A long-term global vision is essential for any
attempt to discern larger cycles or patterns as well
as trends in man-induced environmental change.
Thus, the larger fluctuations in world economic
cycles have certainly influenced the rhythms of
agricultural expansion in many parts of the world.
The most striking instance of this is, of course, the
impact of the world depression of the early 1930s
upon world agriculture. Whether these fall into
long-term 50 year Kondratieff cycles, or some
variant thereof, is an interesting question yet to be
resolved.
More precise, worldwide, quantified historical
data on land use, animal populations, human settle-
ment, and plant species distributions are the sort
of data that could be meshed with the evolving
capacity for remote-sensing monitoring and com-
puterized mapping. In the end, more and better
data, presented effectively, will enable us to discover
new relationships and to better understand man's
interaction with his world in the past and in the
future.
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Commentary
M. Williams
It is a cliche that we live in a changing world;
nevertheless to understand our changing milieu is
difficult because we live in the middle of it. It is
only when we look back to some historical reference
point that our present position on the line of change
becomes clear, as do some of our likely futures (and
there could be many alternative futures). In his
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chapter Richards attempts to establish some of the
data points for change in the environment and to
quantify the magnitude of a number of key pro-
cesses, such as the expanding extent of arable land,
deforestation, the draining of wetlands, the irrigat-
ing of dry lands, and the elimination of natural
grasslands. The chapter is replete with measures of
hectares affected and processes involved.
It is regrettable that many investigations of future
global environments have ignored the historical
record. This neglect has stemmed in part from a
prevailing mood of pessimism, which has predicted
doom and chaos as humankind increases and com-
petes for finite resources, and in part from a focus
on some future point in time, with a consequent
dismissal of the past as irrelevant - unless it illus-
trates error or how not to do something. The failure
to accord the past its proper place in scientific and
socioscientific enquiry into the future has led to a
disregard of the one reasonably sure record of
change that we possess. Consequently, the credibil-
ity and scholarship of some studies has been under-
mined. Thankfully, this is not the case in the current
investigation into the sustainable development of
the biosphere.
What Richards is saying in this chapter is not
controversial; a moment's thought shows that his
theme is fairly self-evident. Yet it has not always
been so, and it is instructive and illuminating to
look at the sociointellectual background to the idea
that man is an agent of change in the biosphere.
The idea that man alters his environment rather
than the idea that the environment alters man is
fairly recent in European (western?) intellectual
thought. Until the late seventeenth century the con-
cept prevailed that man was steward who tended
and cared for a divinely created world, but altered
little in it. However, as scientific knowledge expan-
ded during the eighteenth century, observation,
record, and enquiry showed that man was not part
of some natural, preordained creation; he had free
will and he exerted a powerful influence on the
world around him. It is significant that Richards
takes 1700 as his starting point, for from about that
time onward, not only does the historical record
sharpen and the rate of change accelerate, but also
the intellectual framework of enquiry begins to
alter.
One person who straddled the old and the new
modes of thinking was Benjamin Franklin. He
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observed that woodland clearance on the east coast
of North America was proceeding at such a rate
that essential supplies were scarce and prices were
rising. As he mused about this change he suggested
fancifully that if there were inhabitants on Mars or
Venus they would see an Earth so bare of vegetation
that it would reflect a brighter light (the first global
perspective of environmental change?). More
important, however, was his warning that not only
did mankind change the environment, but also that
the change might not be for the best:
Whenever we attempt to amend the scheme of Provi-
dence, and to interfere with the government of the
world, we had need to be very circumspect less we
do more harm than good [I].
The three revolutions of the late eighteenth century
- the industrial in Britain, the social in France, and
the political in the USA - introduced new forces
and accelerated old ones already at work in the
4merging network of trade, colonial expansion, and
industrial development, enmeshing the world in a
global economy. Perhaps the two outstanding
environmentally-oriented counterparts to these
political, social, and technical revolutions are
Thomas Malthus' Essay on Population [2] and Char-
les Darwin's Origin of Species [3]. In the Essay it was
postulated for the first time that there was some
relationship between population numbers and
resources, and Origins altered the whole concept
and dimension of human and biological time by
showing that man and his environment were inter-
related parts of a long-evolving relationship. Both
of these concepts had important implications for
man-environment studies.
Lewis Mumford has suggested that an alternative
and more useful typology of the last few centuries
might be one based on stages of technology [4].
Before the late eighteenth century the world had
lived in the dawn age of technology - the eotechnic
- when materials used were wood, stone, and fiber,
and the motive power was supplied by wind, water,
and animals. During the era of ancient technology
- the paleotechnic - from about 1800 onward, the
characteristic materials used were coal and iron,
and the motive power was steam. The railway was
the supreme manifestation of this new technology:
it broke down regional barriers, facilitated expan-
sion, and moved people and goods cheaply and
t
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quickly as never before. Change accelerated and
the world shrank.
By the latter half of the nineteenth century the
impacts of man, aided by new forms of technology
(such as the steam locomotive, the railroad, the
steam ship, steam pumps, steam shovels, dams, and
farm machinery), as well as the gradual, unrecor-
ded, but cumulatively Immense impacts of
individual peasants and farmers who cleared the
forests and tilled the land (all outlined by Richards)
were becoming so evident and so great that George
Perkins Marsh was able to write his celebrated Man
and Nature, or Physical Geography as Modified by
Human Action (1864). This is not the place to sum-
marize this tour de force, but for the present purposes
of achieving perspective it is relevant to note the
following points:
(1) It was, said Marsh, the natural order of things
that man was a " ... disturbing agent. Wherever
he plants his foot the harmonies of nature are
turned to discords [5]."
(2) Consequently, not everything that happened to
the environment was beneficial: man could
create, but equally man could destroy.
(3) The scale of change was no longer local, but
regional and even global. For example, Marsh
speculated on what would happen with the irri-
gation of the Piedmont plain in northern Italy,
the draining of the Maremma and other mar-
shes, the continued deforestation of watersheds,
and the probable effects of great engineering
projects, such as Suez, Panama, Mediterranean-
Dead Sea, and the Caspian Sea of Azov. Above
all, he speculated about the climatic and pedo-
logical-hydrological effects of deforestation.
Taking a broad view, one must say that Marsh's
amazing collection of data and his synthesis of
human action and environmental consequences,
complemented a little later by the writing of Alexan-
der Ivanovich Woekof in Russia, fell on deaf ears.
The triumph of technQlogy, the idea of progress,
imperial expansion and hegemony, and the tangible
results of the development of resources, left little
room for self-doubt about what was happening. It
was perhaps only those writers of the early twentieth
century concerned with the undesirable effects of
urban expansion and urban living that questioned
progress.
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There can be little doubt that World War II
radically changed most previous modes of thinking.
First, not one part of the globe was too small or too
remote to be attacked or defended - strategy and
action was not local, but global. Second, the conflict
showed that resources were limited and that sup-
plies needed protection. Third, the end days of the
war showed the ability of man not only to alter his
world for the worse, but to totally destroy himself
and his environment. It was the ultimate action.
Fourth, after the war, the unbelievable resurgence
of war-torn and war-stressed economies in the
developed world, new orders of political and social
organization in the less developed world, and better
health throughout the world heralded an unpre-
cedented expansion of industr.ial and agricultural
activity, which intensified the global economic inter-
dependence between nations.
In this chapter Richards reemphasizes the role
of man in altering his environment through time,
but also adds new dimensions by attempting to
provide a firm, factual, qualitative basis, in order
to calibrate the nature, magnitude, and rate of
change in seemingly everyday human activities.
Richards has shown that by patient historical
scholarship a dossier or inventory of present land-
use changes and processes can be built from the
monographic works of historians and historical
geographers; a dossier that will ultimately give us
a surer basis for future speculation than anything
we have possessed to date. We may quibble with a
figure here or there, but the trend and magnitude
of change seems incontrovertible. There are, of
course, omissions, but it could not be otherwise in
such a wide ranging chapter. "The great task for
environmental historians is," says Richards, "to
record and analyze the effects of man's recently
achieved control over the natural world [p 68]."
Thus, seemingly mundane questions such as "How
many species of antipastoral plants were introduced
into the overgrazed lands of X country by which
date? [p 68]" or "How many hectares of mangrove
fell to rice cultivation in Burma between 1890 and
1900? [p 68]" assume a new importance that is
crucial to an assessment of the feasibility of achiev-
ing a sustainable development of the biosphere.
Finally, Mumford's typology of technical ages
ended with the neotechnic, the new technology,
born at about the end of the nineteenth and begin-
ning of the twentieth century. Alloys and chemicals
,
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were the characteristic materials of the age; elec-
tricity and petroleum its motive powers. However,
for all its new constituents, the effects of this age
on the biosphere were essentially the same as those
of the paleotechnic, although with vastly intensi-
fied effects and accelerated trends. Since then the
world has entered a fourth age of technology, not
adumbrated by Mumford. It is the "biotechnic" or
even the "nuclear-technic", where the manipula-
tion by humankind of unseen and microscopic con-
stituents and elements of the atmosphere, soils, and
biota, and of static, animal, and even human matter
brings man's ability to alter his environment into
confrontation with the very essence and meaning
of life on the planet. This age also needs documenta-
tion and analysis. Some of its characteristics, such
as genetic change (plant and animal breeding and
adaptation) and chemical fertilizers, have been
mentioned, if only briefly, in the chapter, but there
are many more new fields of human alteration. We
have come to learn, often at great cost (e.g. DDT,
acid rain) the truth of Marsh's warning that
... we are never justified in assuming a force to be
insignificant because its measure is unknown or
because no physical effect can now be traced from it
[6).
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The documentation, quantification, and analysis of
these new "forces" is essential to our understanding
of environmental change and to the feasibility of
achieving a sustainable development of the bio-
sphere. In this difficult task we have an excellent
model in the prospectus set out by Richards in this
chapter.
Notes and references (Comm.)
[I] See The Writings of Benjamin Franklin, edited by
A. H. Smyth (New York, 1905-1907), Vol. III,
Benjamin Franklin, pp 72-73; and B. Franklin to
Richard Jackson, p 133.
[2] Malthus, T. R. (1798) and final version (1830), An
Essay on the Principle of Population, edited by A. Flew
(reprinted, 1970) (Penguin Books, Harmondsworth,
UK).
[3] Darwin, C. (1859), The Origin of Species (Reprinted,
Modern Library, New York).
[4] Mumford, L. (1962), Technics and Civilization, pp
109-110 (Harcourt Brace and World Inc., New York).
[5] Marsh, G. P. (1864), Man and Nature; or Physical
Geography as Modified by Human Action, edited by D.
Lowenthal, p 36 (Harvard University Press, Cam-
bridge, MA).
[6] Note [5], pp 548-549.
Chapter 3
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G. L. Baskerville
Sustainable redevelopment
of regional ecosystems
degraded by exploitive
development
Editors' Introduction: The transformation of the biosphere through human activities has
often degraded the productive potential of individual ecosystems and regions. A central
challenge for strategies of sustainable development is to discover how such degradation
can be reversed through ecosystem redevelopment and rehabilitation.
This chapter is focused on the redevelopment of degraded forestry and fishery resource
systems. It is argued that a useful definition of sustainability must specify the quantity
and quality of the products and services that society seeks to obtain from an ecosystem,
as well as the time period over which performance is to be evaluated. The author's
arguments draw on their experiences as Commissioner of the Great Lakes Fisheries
Commission and Assistant Deputy Minister of Forest Resources for New Brunswick,
respectively.
Introduction
Think globally, act locally
Conventional economic development, which ex-
ploits ecological and other features of a locale, is
usually undertaken with the aim, inter alia, that
benefits will cumulate and contribute to regional
economic growth and to "progress", with some con-
sideration that the people of the locale will also
receive some benefit from the exploitation involved.
Local disbenefits, say in the form of bad ecological
consequences, also tend to cumulate and to become
apparent, eventually, as regional degradation.
Whether intended or not, conventional local actions
and their consequences tend to cumulate power-
fully at regional levels, and thus local actions should
be viewed in a regional context, with respect to good
and bad aspects alike.
We focus our attention on economic development
practiced during recent centuries in North
America, but especially with respect to two case
studies: the New Brunswick forests and the Great
Lakes fish (see Figure 3.1). Part of the economic
development during recent decades in the Third
World may resemble, in some ways, the process of
North American development outlined here. The
resemblance may be weak with some European
countries, where renewable resources have not been
subjected to so rapid a development pressure and
have been managed differently, at least recently.
In his statement on the issues surrounding the
"think globally, act locally" philosophy, Holling [1]
uses global in the sense of biospheric rather than,
say, of some rather arbitrary level of aggregation.
As have others, we have difficulty in demonstrating
local-biospheric links, though we "know" that such
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Figure 3.1 Map of eastern North America showing the Canadian Province of New Brunswick and the
binational Great Lakes.
links are almost infinite in number. We deal in this
chapter with local-regional links and submit that
our contribution may be seen as a small-scale analog
of the issue of links across ga ps of larger scale.
From the perspective of an interested layman,
the conceptual link from the local to the regional
may involve a connection between relatively con-
crete local reality and relatively general and some-
what imprecise regional inferences that are compre-
hensible only as abstract arithmetic summations or
mathematical expressions. A link to a biospheric
level might involve a connection to phenomena that
may appear so abstract (e.g., computer simulations)
as to be almost unreal. How do we demonstrate
interactive and cumulative linkages across different
levels and modes of cognition in such a way that
the new comprehension contributes to the sustain-
able redevelopment of all these levels within levels?
We cannot give clear advice, but we both are
involved with regional projects in which attempts
are underway to forge useful links between the local
and the regional, to be operative in both directions.
Development and redevelopment
Within the context of economic development, to
develop generally means to use available resources
in such a way as to achieve local or regional progress
through increased economic growth, usually measured
by a suitable regional indicator, such as total 'jobs
created, net value added, etc. Underdevelopment
may mean that some resources are not used to their
full economic potential, with the result that local or
regional economic progress is slower than it might
otherwise be. Overdevelopment may mean that
some important resources are overtaxed, again to
the disadvantage of regional economic progress.
Misguided or improper development may mean
that mistakes have been made concerning the
use of some resources, e.g., through the once-
only destructive use or sacrifice of a renewable
resource important to the sustenance of a future
economy. These and other variations on the
concept of development have rather close con-
ceptual parallels in the study of the harvest of
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renewable resources and of the use of the natural
environment.
We do not deal with the extraction of nonrenew-
able resources as related to economic development,
except to mention that some general parallels exist
in North America between improper and excessive
harvesting of renewable resources and improper
and wasteful extraction of petroleum and some
mineral ores. Both of these major processes, as
conventionally practiced, severely disrupted the
natural functioning of the affected ecosystem.
We personally experience no euphoria in con-
templating recent versions of what is implied, in
North America, by economic development,
economic growth, and progress. Nevertheless, these
terms are widely used the world over and have been
accepted as central to our overall study of the sus-
tainable development of the biosphere; we can put
them to objective use without necessarily endorsing
various connotations subjectively. Perhaps we can
help to develop a set of connotations for the term
sustainable redevelopment that may be acceptable for
both objective and subjective purposes.
In many parts of the world the natural environ-
ment and its renewable resources have been mis-
used, overused, and abused to the point of severe
degradation. Sustainability, with respect to some
desirable mix of valued uses, has been vitiated in
such areas through destructive abuse, overintensive
use, or ill-informed practices in general. The only
reasonable option in such areas is a redevelopment
toward sustainability. Various terms or slogans have
been used that relate in some way to a reversal of
the degradation, whether ecological, anthropologi-
cal, social, economic, industrial, or urban, e.g.,
reform, rejuvenation, remediation, restoration,
rehabilitation, reforestation, resettlement, reindus-
trialization, rezoning, renewal, recovery, revital-
ization. Taken together, all of these that are relevant
in a region might constitute redevelopment; ecologi-
cal rehabilitation of such areas is obviously crucial,
else sustainability is an empty or misleading slogan.
Throughout North America in particular, major
aquatic, forest, grassland, and cultured ecosystems
have been degraded. Major, though perhaps only
partial, American initiatives toward ecosystem or
regional redevelopment include the Tennessee Val-
ley Authority initiatives in Southern Appalachia,
the Soil Conservation Service initiatives on the Great
Plains, and regional reforestation in southeastern
USA. In subsequent sections we present two case
studies of more recent initiatives toward redevelop-
ment: the forests of New Brunswick in eastern
Canada and the Great Lakes of central North
America. Our cases are similar yet different. The
New Brunswick case represents a deliberate provin-
cial effort to redevelop a rural community economy
based on forestry before the natural productive base
becomes too severely degraded: opinion leaders in
New Brunswick have suddenly recognized the
associated problems and opportunities. The Great
Lakes case represents deliberate international
efforts, to date costing perhaps over $10 billion
(1985 US dollars), to rehabilitate massively
degraded ecosystems, especially those of the Lower
Lakes. For various reasons the'Great Lakes indus-
trial and agricultural heartland lost its vitality and
vigor, and people recognized that ecosystem degra-
dation was part of the problem. It is now widely
expected that successful rehabilitation of these lake
ecosystems will have both a direct and a catalytic
role in the revitalization of this binational heartland,
even though the apparent additional monetary
benefits of a rehabilitated chain of Great Lakes may
be only a small fraction of the wealth created in the
Basin [2].
In both cases described here we have greatly
simplified the record in the hope of enhancing
understanding. We show that integrated regional
redevelopment of degraded systems must be served
by appropriate information systems, which must
explicitly link the local and regional levels of con-
cern. With respect to spatial and temporal scope
and scale, and to detail of resolution, a regional
information system obviously falls somewhere
between biospheric and ecosystemic information
systems. Information systems already exist in some,
perhaps primitive, form with respect to the
redevelopment initiatives mentioned here. Progress
in redevelopment will likely depend on the further
creative development and thoughtful use of such
information systems.
The forests of New Brunswick
The setting and an historical sketch
The Province of New Brunswick is largely forested
(85% of its 78000 km2 ) and has been so in the ten
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millenia since the last continental glacier melted.
During the past two centuries the economic
development of sparsely populated New Brunswick
has depended primarily on the exploitive use of
forests and secondarily on the exploitive use of
fisheries and agricultu ral soils. The Province has
never served as an industrial heartland to any other
region, nor is it likely to do so in the foreseeable
future. It is relatively free of the pervasive and
massive pollution that attends large industrial and
urban concentrations, though the effects of atmo-
spherically transported acid rain and toxic fallout,
and of climate warming, all due predominantly to
the improper and excessive combustion of fossil
fuels, will soon become as apparent there as else-
where.
In this sketch of the history of conventional
exploitive development and of opportunities for
sustainable redevelopment in New Brunswick we
focus mainly on the forest industry. Consideration
of fisheries and agriculture, of human settlements
and pollution, and of the outbreaks of the spruce
budworm would complicate the account, but would
not greatly affect the inferences that can be drawn
from a simplified account of the forest industry.
The development of the New Brunswick forests
has been a long process [3,4]. In the early 1800s
the forests provided large white pine trees for ship
masts, which involved selecting high-value speci-
mens and bringing these out with considerable care.
While this generated a step in the development of
the local economy, it was at a very low level, and
the quality of life associated with it was, in the
prosaic sense, hardy. At this time the die for future
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development was already cast: "for profit is the first
motive of all men" as Nicolas Denys, a naturalist-
cum-early developer of the early 1700s, wrote in
his diary of 1708 [5].
Continued development (read "progress through
economic growth") was temporarily arrested by the
unavailability of very large, and very old, white pine
trees. However, development proceeded with the
harvest of white pine to less stringent quality stan-
dards in order to produce squared timbers for
building purposes: these were mostly exported.
This involved considerably more local employment
than did the search for masts and resulted in a
modest improvement in the quality of life of the
pioneer communities.
One course then taken in the development
sequence was to broaden the harvest to include
younger, smaller trees. If 300-year white pine are
harvested faster than they are recruited to that age
class, then development may be extended by a shift
to younger, smaller trees. This change is illustrated
in Figure 3.2, where successive steps in the develop-
ment of the white pine industry began with the high
level of minimum standard acceptable for raw
material at point A, development continuing until
the white pine available were of a size characterized
by point B, which then became the acceptable
minimum standard.
By the middle of the 1800s, the next major step
in the process of development began with the emer-
gence of a major sawmill industry that produced
finished timber, again mostly for export. The work
involved in contributing "value added" to the prod-
uct enabled the local society to gain some additional
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Figure 3.2 The diameter of white pine
and white spruce stems as related to
age of the stem. Stem size is a crucial
factor in sawmill efficiency. Early
exploitation began with white pine at
point A, continued using smaller
stems until point B. where it was
equally efficient to switch exploitation
to include large white spruce at C.
Continued exploitation mined the
largest stems until current limits of
acceptability were reached at D.
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economic benefits from the resource, but also the
regionally based lumbering industry gained. To
develop this lumbering industry further, the source
of raw material was again broadened, with respect
to minimum standards of acceptability, to include
not only the remaining large and small white pine
trees available, but also the larger white spruce. This
change is characterized in Figure 3.2 as a movement
in the minimum standard acceptable for raw
material from B to C. The sawmill industry con-
tinued to grow (develop) in a manner that required
quality raw material faster than the forest was pro-
ducing that quality, with the result that the
minimum acceptable raw material gradually moved
from C to D on the lower curve in Figure 3.2.
The sawmill industry reached its peak in the late
nineteenth/early twentieth centuries and has been
declining ever since, with the number of sawmills
in the Province today only a fraction of that in the
heyday of the industry in the late 1800s. The surviv-
ing sawmill industry uses not only the available
spruce logs (and the small amount of white pine
available), but also balsam fir trees. Currently, the
minimum acceptable size for all these species is a
fraction of the original.
While the sawmill industry was developed largely
on the basis of individual trees, a pulp and paper
industry emerged in the province shortly after the
beginning of the twentieth century, and this
industry was based on whole stands of trees. The
arrival of the pulp industry happened to coincide
with poor lumber markets and the relative non-
availability of large individual stems suitable for
efficient use in the kind of sawlog operation that
had evolved in the nineteenth century. Pulp mills
can use smaller trees, although harvesting of larger
trees makes for a cheaper raw material. Just as the
sawmill development was based on harvesting only
the best individual stems and leaving the poor
quality material (hygrading), so pulp and paper
development was based on harvesting the stands of
best species and lowest logging cost while by-passing
lower quality stands (hygrading). Because of the
large wood volumes required by pulp mills there
was a movement to harvest nearly pure stands of
the usable species (spruce and fir), leaving behind
stands of species not usable for pulp. Pulp mills
marked a major development for the local
economy, capturing not only a much larger portion
of the value of the finished resource by spin-off
employment, but also by generating a better quality
of employment.
Initially, the pulp and paper industry used stands
of smaller spruce trees and, as these became less
available, raw material standards were relaxed to
include stands of larger fir trees as well. Since the
mid-1950s the industry has adapted technologically
so that it can use stands of very small trees of
softwood species and some hardwoods. To charac-
terize the impact of the pulp and paper industry
on the resource we examine how these utilization
standards relate to stand development (i.e., natural
production in a stand). Figure 3.3 shows how a
particular softwood stand (i.e., a population/com-
munity of trees) might develop in terms of volume
per hectare and of average tree size, from its regen-
erating stages, through maturity, and over-
maturity, to break up in old age. Combinations of
minimum volume per hectare and maximum trees
per cubic meter determine the operability or avail-
ability of a stand for economic harvest.
At the beginning of the development of the pulp
and paper industry only those stands represented
by the range A and A' in Figure 3.4 were considered
economically usable. These operable stands had
reached both the specified economic minimum total
volume per hectare and the specified economic
minimum average tree size harvestable, but they
had not yet broken up to the point where there was
less than the minimum volume below which it was
not economic to harvest. Clearly, when stands of
type A-A' were harvested faster than they were
recruited to this range, there occurred, over time,
a shortage of material for the mills, which could
have forced a reduction in their output. Analogous
to the case for sawlogs from individual stems, the
answer to such a constraint was to change the utili-
zation limits for whole stands to the range B-B' in
Figure 3.4; the advent of a biomass approach sug-
gests extension to the range C-C'.
New capital investment and technology - of both
hard and soft types - were required to effect a shift
from A-A' to B-B'. This shift then permitted fur-
ther development of the economy in that the
broader utilization standards (at B-B') gave an
almost instant increase in the sustainable produc-
tion. For example, a harvest level of
400000 m 3/year from a forest was not sustainable
when the stand utilization limits were set at A-A',
but was sustainable, and could even be increased to
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Figure 3.3 Softwood stand develop-
ment as seen by the developer.
Above: The accumulation of volume
over time, showing how much wood
is available at various points in time.
Below: Average tree size as it changes
over time. Operability constraints
work in two ways: (a) the stand must
have enough volume per hectare to
be worth developing, e.g. 100 mS/ha,
and (b) the stand must be made of
individual stems large enough to be
commercially harvestable, e.g., 5
trees/ m 3 . The constra ints of a
minimum of 100 m 3/ha and a
maximum of 5 trees/m 3 give the
points A and A', while the constraints
of a minimum 50 m 3/ha and a
maximum of 10 trees/m 3 give the
points Band B'. For the first set of
constraints the stand is harvestable
(operable) between A and A' and B
and B', respectively.
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600000 mS/year when the utilization standards
were set at B-B' (Figure 3.5). Further industrial
development was possible by harvestng stands com-
prising several species only some of which were
suitable for pulping (Figure 3.6). Harvesting in these
mixed stands faced similar utilization standards
with respect to total volume and average tree size
and had the additional logistical problem of work-
ing around the trees of unusable species, but it also
gave a larger growing stock and a more sustainable
harvest.
As with the pulp and paper industry, the lumber-
ing industry also innovated technologically to use
less-valued species, smaller trees, and stems of lower
quality in the manufacture of laminated beams,
plywood, chipboard, etc. Such innovations are
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Figure 3.4 Volume development in a
spruce-fir stand. The curve shows the
merchantable volume per hectare at
any point in time. The ranges A-A'
and B-B' are periods when the stand
is economically operable. The point A
is determined by both a minimum
volume per hectare and a minimum
average tree size. The point A' is
determined by the minimum volume
per hectare. The stand is operable (i.e.,
eligible for harvest) in the range A-A'.
If the operability constraints of
volume per hectare and average tree
size are relaxed then A moves to B and A' moves to B'. In this case the stand is operable for the period
from B to B'. The process may continue to some ultimate state identified here by the extremes C and C'
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Figure 3.5 Three reasonably
possible futures for the same initial
forest, but harvested subject to
different operability constraints.
Curve A: With operability limits set at
A-A' (from Figure 3.4) the total oper-
able growing stock increases at first,
but cannot sustain a harvest of
400000 m 3/year. The growing stock
goes to extinction in the fifth decade.
Curve 8: With operability limits set at
8-8' (Figure 3.4) the total operable
growing stock is larger than in A and
the larger harvest level of
600000 m 3/year is sustainable,
although the growing stock is driven
to a dangerously low level near the
end of the forecast period. Curve C:
With operability limits at C-C' (Figure 3.4) the total operable growing stock is again larger and the harvest
level of 800000 m3/year is sustainable. Note that the initial increases in operable growing stock are artifacts
in that the wood was always there in case A but was not counted because of the operability constraints.
Also note that the apparent gains rn sustainable harvest are each achieved by harvesting younger (poorer
quality) raw material.
capital intensive and involve advanced technology.
In effect, capital and technology are used to mitigate
reduction in the quality of the resource.
Examining the conventional saw- and pulp-mill
examples of development it is clear that both con-
stitute forms of hygrading. The lumber industry
was built on hygrading individual stems and the
industry declined due to inefficiency when recruit-
ment to these quality standards could not match the
level of harvest imposed on the trees of that quality
by the hygrading. The pulp and paper industry was
built on the principle of hygrading at the stand
level, where whole stands of particular species and
size characteristics were removed and the utilization
standards lowered from time to time, as necessary,
to sustain the development [6]. In both cases, it is
clear that the forest resource was used to develop
the economy. In fact it was a very effective use, in
Volume of wood in
stand (m3/ha)
A£je of stand (years from initiation)
All species
Figure 3.6. Volume development in
a mixed stand where only the soft-
wood volume (lower curve) is usable.
The softwood volume is subject to
operability constraints shown in
Figure 3.3. When the softwood
species are harvested all or nearly all
of the other species are left standing.
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that each step in the process:
(l) Allocated a larger proportion of the economic
benefits to the local society.
(2) Increased the number of jobs locally.
(3) Improved the quality of those jobs.
(4) Improved the quality of life in the local society.
At present, however, the Province of New
Brunswick faces a situation where it is no longer
possible to develop further in this sense. In fact, it
will barely be possible to sustain the forest-based
industry even with major forest management efforts
of a redevelopment type [7,8].
Exploitive development
Some further consideration of the concept of
exploitive development is appropriate at this point.
Clearly, without specifications of quantity, quality,
timing, and location the notion of sustainability is
meaningless. A sawmill industry has existed for
almost 200 years, but no one would claim that prod-
uct quality was sustained for any significant period
of time within those 200 years. What did survive
was an industry that used poorer and poorer quality
raw material and was strongly dependent on capital-
intensive technological innovation for the creation
of a quality product out of raw materials of low
quality. A forest industry, broadly defined, was sus-
tained, but the productive structure of the resource
was not.
There are two points to consider with respect to
this resource development. First, development was
not a single step taken to achieve a specified goal,
but rather it involved a continuous expansion of
local and regional economic benefits, narrowly
defined, that became a goal in itself. In this context
there certainly exists for any resource a point in
development beyond which sustainability is no lon-
ger possible because of biological limits of the
resource system. The second point really attacks
the nub of the issue. Historically, development in
resource-rich areas is driven by the clarion call of
government, industry, and enterprising people "to
develop our resources." Clearly, it has been
primarily the resource-based industries that have
been developed, secondarily the regional economy,
and tertiarily the local economies - but the resources
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have not been developed at all. The resources have
been characteristically run-down or ruined by
resource development - surely one of the saddest
paradoxes of man. Hygrading has been degrading.
In New Brunswick the forest-based industry may
now be characterized as overdeveloped and the forest
resource is in urgent need of redevelopment. The
existing economic structure is derived from a
sequental lowering of utilization standards and
broadening of the target species mix. It now appears
that the existing economy could barely be sustained
by a further lowering of utilization standards along
with a very aggressive management program, but
that the limits of development in the traditional
economic sense have been reached. The key here
is that resource development has been measured
throughout this process in terms of the immediate
social and economic results and not at all in terms of
the productivity of the resource that was used. The
resource was used to achieve the development, but
using the resource altered its dynamic structure.
The resource structure changed with respect to:
(1) The size and stature of particular species in the
stands.
(2) The species composition of the various stand
mixes that were available in the forest.
(3) The age structure of the stands in the forest as
a whole.
Instead of progressive overexploitation of the
resource to manage (read "expand") the economy,
it is now necessary to manage (read "redevelop")
the resource in order to maintain the economy. Put
bluntly, it is no longer possible to gain further
development or even sustain the existing level of
development by mining the forest. Maintenance of
the existing level is possible with proper manage-
ment, but any expansionist development must be
delayed several decades until the results of new
management measures take effect [8].
There are some characteristics of these limits to
development that are of interest. Perhaps the most
striking is that each of the individual development
steps took place at the tree or stand level. Local
(tree and stand) actions, which were taken out of
context of the regional forest picture, have accumu-
lated to produce an unacceptable regional result.
The problem literally was created piece by piece at
the local level, and then recognized and felt at the
Sustainable redevelopment of regional ecosystems degraded by exploitive development 83
regional level. Further, the design of the solution
to problems created by development must proceed
from the regional level. The sta nds that have been
hygraded successively for sawlogs now support a
mixture of poor quality stems and unusable species.
Harvest of only the usable species for pulping has
resulted in an increased occupancy of land by non-
economic species. Indeed, the only way left to
develop in the conventional way is by moving to a
lower grade of product which will result in a weaker
economic position, based on the massive mechani-
zation required to use the very low-quality natural
product.
The result of such development has been a dra-
matic change in the productive structure of the
forest. A plausible age structure for the various
stands of the forest prior to development is shown
in Figure 3.7, along with the age structure for the
able to maintenance of the development. Since these
costs were not there previously, they substantially
reduce the economic value of the accumulated
development in conventional economic terms. To
hold its own, the Province must give up some of its
resource-based economic development in order to
achieve resource redevelopment.
Sustainable redevelopment: design and
implementation
Discovering overdevelopment is not easy and
designing redevelopment can be downright trau-
matic. Recognizing incipient overdevelopment is
difficult, in part because the necessary information
is rarely available until after the event. During the
process of nonsustainable development of an
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Age of stanel (years from initiation)
Figure 3.7. Age class structures for
pre- and post-development forests.
The predevelopment forest shows
stands at all stages of development
when related to the volume develop-
ment curve in Figure 3.4. The
postdevelopment forest has been
harvested intensely enough to pre-
vent stands from growing beyond 100
years from initiation. This means that
stands in the range 100 to 160 years,
which would contain the largest
individual trees, no longer occur.
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developed forest. Conventional development has
transformed the productive structure into that of a
you ng forest. Given the present age structu re either
there must be a relaxation of these pressures to
allow some time for recovery or there must be
massive assistance to the natural regrowth of the
forest. To achieve some recovery time requires a
relaxation of harvesting pressure, which implies a
loss of some of the development gained over the
last half century. That is not a socially acceptable
alternative. Intervention in stand and forest
dynamics, to increase the rate of availability of
materials, requires major expenditure in terms of
forest management. These costs are clearly charge-
economy, data gathering with respect to the resource
is centered on such features as the total area avail-
able for use at the time of data collection and the
total volume available for harvest at the time of data
collection. These inventories were designed to pro-
vide a picture of what was available on the ground
at that time. They were carried out and reported
entirely in the context of the development at issue,
i.e., they had an economic (or an accounting) base.
Thus, the first unavoidable sign of overdevelop-
ment was when one of these inventories undertaken
to justify the newest step in development showed
less resource, even after the usual adjustments for
lower utilization standards [3].
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To discover the reason behind why a conventional
inventory showed less material than could be expec-
ted on the basis of the historic sequence, it was
necessary to examine resource dynamics. Not sur-
prisingly, there was not much information on
dynamics, since the information gathering had con-
centrated on a static inventory of material that
possessed immediate economic value. The first
approximations of forest dynamics were therefore
based on simple assumptions [9,10]. The emphasis
of studies of forest dynamics was on forecasting the
availability of particular quantities and qualities of
raw material in the future, rather than on what was
actually there. A major difficulty was that the
problem was perceived at the forest, or regional,
level where data on dynamics were particularly
poor. It was thus necessary to build a bridge from
the relatively data-rich tree and stand levels to the
regional forest level. This exercise in problem defi-
nition is not simple and is resisted by a considerable
amount of rationalization. One hears that "there is
always someone forecasting a timber famine and it
never comes about, and this one won't either;" that
"forecasting is simply not possible;" that "forecast-
ing with models is silly, since everyone knows that
with computers it's garbage in garbage out." The
realists of the world will state incessantly that "what
counts, is what is." Then there are those who are
certain that technology will permit even lower utili-
zation standards or, indeed, the use of materials
other than wood for the production of paper. The
point here is that there is significant resistance to
the recognition of overdevelopment of the industry
and of the need for resource redevelopment, because
such recognition forces change in the established
ways of using the resource for economic gain.
The need for redevelopment of the forest and
the forest-based industries in New Brunswick even-
tually reached the social and political agendas, des-
pite all these forms of resistance. In the end it
became clear, even to the most myopic, that the
local industry was competing in world trade and
that it was inefficient with respect to that market.
The inefficiency in trade was traceable in large part
to a high cost of raw material, which in turn was
the result of the changed forest structure, which of
course was the result of development. The gains in
development in terms of quality of jobs and the
local economy were, in the end, imperiled because
of the inefficiency of the resource with respect to
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the processing part of the system. There were
closures of sawmills that could not adapt techno-
logically to the smaller tree size. There were major
technological changes in pulp mills and a reduction
of interest in maintaining certain pieces of physical
plant associated with past development.
When awareness of nonsustainability finally
dawned, it was simultaneously accepted that it was
no longer possible to manage the economy by min-
ing the resource, so the resource must henceforth
be husbanded. This recognition (or cognition) by
the decisive players in industry and government
was a relatively sudden event, occurring in an inter-
valof about five years, i.e., 1975 to 1980. The turning
point came when the decision makers ceased to
argue about whether or not there was a problem
of maintaining the flow of quality raw material. Once
that occurred, action toward redevelopment fol-
lowed rather quickly [11, 12].
Acceptance of a need for change came first to
the decisive players in industry and government
and not to the general public. The public did,
indeed, voice an earlier need for change; however,
there was a definite air of unreality about their
desires, in that they demanded a continuation of
all (or even more) of the economic benefits of
development in full measure, while corrective
action was to be taken at no cost. Tension developed
because industry and government had inadver-
tently obscured the evidence of the problems of
development by the choice of data collected on the
resource. This incredible lack of public understand-
ing of the historic linkages between the benefits and
the problems persists, indeed has intensified, five
years into the redevelopment program.
In the case of the New Brunswick industries based
on the forest resource, the program of redevelop-
ment has involved several closely related activities.
Once it became clear that the industrial capacity
exceeded the ability of the forest to sustain raw
material of the desired quality, there was a need to
reallocate access to the resource to ensure even (or
steady) resource use, and to prevent hoarding or
wasteful use. The reallocation of access to the
resource was not just in terms of areas of domain,
as had been prevalent in the economic development
phases, but rather related to access to a particular
piece of the productive structure of the forest.
Allocation was to a share of the sustainable
productivity of the resource, rather than to the
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standing inventory on some particular piece of
ground at the moment of allocation [13].
Recognition of the need to allocate access to pro-
ductivity required an entirely new approach to the
acquisition of information on the productive state
of the forest. New surveys of the forest were needed
that sought to characterize the resource in terms
of its dynamic structure, rather than in terms of a
static storehouse of raw material. This required
major expenditure in terms of a new form of aerial
photography for the Province, with special tests of
methods of photointerpretation to discover the best
ways to capture information on the stage of develop-
ment for each stand. Methods for handling this
geographic information had to be developed [14].
Not surprisingly, this has proved to be a complex
task, and it is already clear that the first approxima-
tion of data acquisition on forest dynamics is just
that, a first step.
A major characteristic of the recognition of the
need for redevelopment is the appearance of con-
cern with forecasting future development on the
regional forest scale. During the period of develop-
ment, interest in the future rarely extended beyond
the current-year harvest, and at best to a five-year
harvest plan. Those facing the reality of redevelop-
ment have suddenly acquired time horizons of the
order of 40 to 50 years. The need to forecast wood
availability by amount, quality, location, and timing
has resulted in the development of a large array of
models that attempt to mimic dynamics at the
stand and forest levels. These models were very
simple at first, but are quickly developing as more
information on dynamics becomes available, and as
the necessity for forecasting becomes more clear.
To manage a forest it is necessary to be able to make
explicit forecasts of the availability of raw material
in terms of quantity, quality, location, and time for
a variety of patterns of intervention (harvesting,
planting, thinning, etc.). The development and
acceptance of forecasting tools occurred at a surpris-
ing rate. Approaches that were rejected as
unnecessary, or unrealistic, five years ago are now
embraced and ardently developed to improve their
reliability.
The most traumatic element of redevelopment
has been the need to actually design and implement
management interventions. During the earlier
period of development there was much experi-
mental work with silviculture and, indeed, a certain
amount of what one might term the anecdotal prac-
tice of silviculture. All of this effort was character-
ized by an approach at the local or stand level. The
managers would examine a stand and, based only
on what they saw at the local level, determine the
"best" silviculture action to be taken. Through this
approach some considerable experience had evol-
ved with such tools as planting, precommercial thin-
ning, and fertilization. However, with acceptance
of the need for redevelopment it also became clear
that these local silviculture actions had to be deter-
mined in the context of regional forest dynamics
[8]. Given that the harvest which can be taken is
limited and that money available for silviculture is
limited, it is crucial that forestry actions be taken
in the right places, in the right amount, and at the
right time so that the development of the whole
forest is regulated in the manner necessary to reach
a goal of true resource development (or of economic
redevelopment). Thus, the focus of intervention
design has moved from the stand level to the forest
level [15]. The question is no longer what can be
done at this particular place, but rather "what set
of local actions taken in what places in the whole
forest, and at what times, will cause the regional
forest to transform and grow towards a particular
chosen goal?" For a generation of managers, accus-
tomed to making local stand decisions out of context
of any regional forest picture, the necessity to place
their actions in this regional context is proving
difficult. A major problem here is that virtually all
of the decision aids that have been developed in
past decades are aimed at the stand or local level,
rather than at the regional forest level. That is,
economic decision-analysis methods assumed that,
whenever management began, it would be carried
out by a series of stand-by-stand local decisions.
Major efforts are now underway to develop decision
aids that place local actions in the regional context
of forest dynamics.
Choosing a plan of management interventions
for redevelopment is a complex matter. To be realis-
tic, the plan must recognize that implementation of
redevelopment will be local in nature (just as all of
the actions of development were local in nature),
but that these local interventions must be consistent
with a regional pattern of resource development
[15]. Management planning becomes an orchestra-
tion of local events to achieve a regional goal- what
will be done, to what extent it will be done, when,
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and where - in order that a regional pattern of
development, over time, is achieved. Moreover,
management must address the new real issues of
who pays for management effort and who carries
it out.
Making all this happen on the ground is crucial.
It is necessary to implement the plan as it is drawn
up and to provide a regular audit of performance
of the forest. This problem is unique to the stage
of redevelopment, since it was not necessary during
development to worry about matching management
platitudes with what was actually happening on the
ground. However, during redevelopment it is
absolutely essential, for instance, that the actual
harvest be taken in the same manner as used in the
forecasts for management design. This requires a
high degree of geographic control [14]. If, in the
actual on-the-ground implementation of the harvest
schedule, the oldest first rule is not followed and
any younger stands are harvested because of local
economic advantage, then some older stands escape
harvest and will decay and become nonavailable for
harvest. The net effect of this deviation of the real
harvest schedule from the planned schedule is a
reduction in the actual sustainable harvest. That is,
in management, and particularly in management
for redevelopment, it is necessary that the way
things are done on the ground is the same as the
way things were done in the calculations determin-
ing sustainability. If it is not possible to implement
on the ground the rules as determined in the plan,
then the plan must be changed to show an appropri-
ately lower sustainable level of harvest. This
requirement for making reality match the plans is
perhaps the major source of tension in redevelop-
ment [13].
The fisheries of the Great Lakes
The setting and an historical sketch
The Great Lakes lie at the southern edge of the
ancient Laurentian Shield where they straddle the
Canada-USA border (Figure 3.1). Lake Superior is
the largest and deepest lake, farthest upstream, and
was apparently caused by tectonic events. The other
four lakes were formed, or at least deepened and
enlarged, by the continental glaciation of geologi-
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cally recent times. The current ecological reality of
the Great Lakes Basin is due to some ten millenia
of the natural processes of postglacial succession
and some two centuries of the effects of humans of
western cultures.
Exploitive human uses, direct plus indirect, have
intensified at something like an exponential rate
until about a decade ago; today the overall effect
may no longer be intensifying, but it remains on
balance at a high level. The Great Lakes are down-
wind of the industrialized Ohio Valley from which
airborne pollutants are often carried long distances.
In contrast to the size of the area from which pol-
lutants are transported through the atmosphere
into the Great Lakes, the watershed of the Basin is
small compared to the surface of the water, with
no large rivers flowing into these lakes from the
surrounding landscapes; hence the lakes are not
rapidly flushed. Many of the small rivers and near-
shore areas of the lakes are severely polluted,
though perhaps not as severely as a decade ago.
(The Cuyahoga River flowing into Lake Erie is no
longer a fire hazard!)
Over 35 million humans now dwell in the Basin.
Most live in large urban concentrations with imper-
fect sewerage and sewage treatment systems, but
most of these are less imperfect than they were a
decade ago. Many of the residents work in indus-
tries that pollute because of rather obsolescent
capital stock erected at a time of great interest in
the nonrenewable resources of the Basin (iron, coal,
and limestone) and of little concern for those
resources that were potentially renewable at sus-
tained levels. Major uses (including abuses) of the
Great Lakes have been separated into about 20
classes, of which fishing is but one [16].
By about 1930 the people of the dozen or so
largest cities in the Great Lakes Basin had turned
their backs to the lake shores and coastal waters that
had become degraded; apparently the degradation
was taken to be an unfortunate but necessary
sacrifice to industrial-economic progress. Cities
that thrived had dirty air, foul waters, and some
urban slums. Today, however, the situation has
changed, and people and institutions in the Great
Lakes region are seriously searching for a new basis
for the regional economy. In fact, the waters of the
Great Lakes, and in particular the coastal waters,
are now seen as a great natural resource, at least if
their quality can be improved and then maintained.
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Somehow an ecologically rehabilitated aquatic
ecosystem is expected to contribute directly and also
catalytically to the post industrial redevelopment of
the region [2]. Rehabilitation of the fish together
with restoration of high water quality are beginning
to be linked by the public to the goal of sustainable
redevelopment of the whole Basin's economy. It is
coming to be accepted that the state of the fish
community is a valid integrative indicator of ecosys-
tem quality [17J and - somewhat mOre distantly -
of the regional quality of life for humans. Some
even suggest that the Basin provides the single best
indicator of the state of biospheric husbandry as
practiced in industrialized North America. The lake
trout in the Great Lakes indicate what the white
pine indicate in New Brunswick.
The historical sequence related to hygrading in
forestry has a close counterpart in the fisheries of
the Great Lakes. In fisheries the process is some-
times termed "fishing-up", whether among size or
quality classes within a stock or species [18J, among
locales within an ecosystem or region [19J, or among
species within an entire fish association [20,21]. By
about 1940 the most preferred species in the Great
Lakes were exploited by the fisheries to the point
of a risk of overexploitation, if not, in fact, beyond
the point of overexploitation (see Figures 3.8 and
3.9).
Throughout the process of fishing-up (or pro-
gressive hygrading) the enterprising fishermen also
progressively added value to their products through
salting, refrigeration, freezing, filleting, smoking,
precooking, etc. An approximate parallel to the
plywood and chipboard products may be canned
fish and (as yet experimental) fish sausages. Some-
thing comparable to the pulp and paper stage of
the lumbering industry has not yet emerged in the
Great Lakes, but it has appeared elsewhere with
new Japanese technology to produce surimi prod-
ucts (such as artificial scallops and crab legs) from
the macerated flesh of low-valued fi nfish species.
Serious plans have been drafted to bring this surimi
technology into the Great Lakes fisheries.
Prior to the period 1940-1955 the fish association
of the Great Lakes was strongly and adversely affec-
ted ecologically by four stresses due to humans:
fishing, blocking of streams by dams, loading of
putrescible organic waters into streams and
estuaries, and physical destruction of wetlands.
During the period 1940-1955 these four stresses
were joined, and often su perseded in local intensity,
by four additional stresses: cultural eutrophication,
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industrial pollution, pesticides and other hazardous
man-made chemicals, and expansion of low-valued
or harmful exotic fish species, such as the alewife
and the sea lamprey. These latter four stresses had
appeared locally long before the period 1940-1955,
but it was only then that their effects came to be
regionally pervasive in many parts of the lakes.
Other stresses of various kinds were also acting [16J,
and intensifying in some cases, but they must be set
aside as miscellaneous in this short account.
The year 1955 may be taken as the beginning of
growing public cognition that the Great Lakes, as
parts of a system, were severely debased. In
general, the lower the lake in the overall drainage
system the more thoroughly it was debased. The
total binational cost of all the relevant studies and
corrective efforts since 1955 is uncounted, but might
well exceed $10 billion (1985 US dollars). Most of
the scientific efforts to understand this overall prob-
lem and almost all practical efforts to do something
about it have been focused on locales and have
attempted to deal with the problem one factor (even
one chemical) or one species at a time.
At about this point in our historical sketch, con-
vention would dictate that an account be given of
the structu res and processes of the governance of
these binational Great Lakes, with a strong emphasis
on the role of the International Joint Commission
[22]. It is true that for a study of sustainable
redevelopment of the biosphere we need eventually
to deal in depth with the governance institutions.
Suffice it here to say that no government agency at
any level - binational, federal, provincial, or state
- has asserted or been given a mandate for leader-
ship with respect to an integrated program of sus-
tainable redevelopment that is now so necessary.
There is no government agency with sufficient
responsibility or authority to act locally, think
regionally in an integrated, ecosystemic way. Clearly
the "think regionally" part of the aphorism is made
more difficult to achieve in this multicity, multijuris-
diction, binational situation; however, intergovern-
mental and broader networks are evolving that are
beginning to serve this function.
Within the (as yet) piecemeal efforts to correct
the causes of the degradation of the Great Lakes,
there are many detailed differences in the politics
and practices of different jurisdictional govern-
mental and intergovernmental entities. But these
differences do not obscure the basic unity within
the overall sequence of exploitive development of
the two centuries of domination of the Great Lakes
by Europeans and their descendants. There may
be time lags between jurisdictions, different
priorities, internal inconsistencies, etc., that can be
very annoying, but overall the historical degradative
trends and current corrective efforts are sufficiently
similar that they can all be subsumed under the
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generalized concepts of exploitive development and
sustainable redevelopment.
Exploitive development
We now examine some of the main ecological
phenomena related to exploitive development of
the Great Lakes, and thus also related to sustainable
redevelopment.
Francis et al. [16] have sketched some of the main
effects on the fish association (and on other highly
valued, sensitive ecological subsystems) of the many
stresses operating in the Great Lakes. This approach
has been fine tuned to the very degraded Green
Bay [23] and to the relatively well-conserved Long
Point with its bays [24]. The disheartening real-
ization has emerged that most, if not all, of these
stresses, acting singly or jointly and to excess,
entrain an ecological syndrome of degradation or
debasement [25]. Some features of this syndrome,
as it relates especially to fish, have been sketched
as follows [26, 27]:
(l) The major ecological stresses associated with
human uses as conventionally practiced often
act synergistically within the ecosystem so as to
exacerbate each other's adverse ecological
effects; they seldom act antagonistically so as to
cancel out adverse effects.
(2) The stresses separately and jointly act to alter
the fish association from one that is dominated
by large fish, usually associated with the lake
bottom and lake edge, to one characterized by
small, short-lived, mid-water species. A similar
change happens with respect to vegetation;
firm-rooted aquatic plants originally nearshore
are supplanted by dense suspensions of open-
water (pelagic) plankton algae. Further, the
association of relatively large benthic inverte-
brates on the bottom (such as mussels and cray-
fish) is supplanted by small burrowing insects
and worms (such as midge larvae and sludge
worms). Broadly similar changes occur in the
flora and fauna of the wetlands and nearshore
areas bordering these waters.
(3) With the above changes an increased variability
in abundance of particular species occurs from
year to year, but especially in landings of differ-
ent fish species by anglers and commercial fish-
ermen. Fluctuations are also more pronounced
in the species associations of wetland, benthic,
and pelagic areas.
(4) The shift from large organisms to small organ-
isms is not accompanied by a major increase in
the total standing biomass of living material, but
is accompanied by a reduction in the production
of the most preferred species.
(5) In the offshore pelagic region a new fish associ-
ation, mostly of exotic species, may be created
in which the small fish, such as alewife and smelt,
may serve as a food resource to large predatory
fish, such as salmon, which, however, must be
maintained through the capital-intensive tech-
nology of fish hatcheries.
(6) Market and sport value per unit of biomass are
generally much lower with small mid-water fish
species than with large bottom species, and pro-
cessing costs are higher. Similarly, the aesthetic
value to recreationists of the rooted plants near-
shore is higher than a turbid mixture of suspen-
ded algae and pollutants.
(7) The overall effect on fisheries, in the absence
of the put, grow, and take stocking of hatchery-
reared predators, is that nearshore, labor-
intensive specialized fisheries (sport and com-
mercial) tend to disappear, though highly
mechanized, capital-intensive offshore enter-
prises may persist, if the combined stresses do
not become excessive and if the fish are not so
contaminated as to become a health threat for
those who eat them. Yachtsmen may quickly sail
from polluted marinas through the foul coastal
water to the less-offensive offshore waters.
Beaches are posted as hazardous to health.
(8) The combined effect is one of debasement and
destabilization of the system of the natural
environment and its indigenous renewable
resources with respect to the features of greatest
value to humans.
Rapport et al. [28] have termed the above a general
stress syndrome and have inferred that such a
syndrome may be observed in terrestrial as well as
aquatic ecosystems that are subjected to the stresses
typical of conventional exploitive development [25].
Indeed, we see analogs for each of the above
symptoms in the New Brunswick forest example.
Discovery of this syndrome has rendered obsolete
any general policy of managing human uses of
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ecosystems as though they were ecologically
independent. Recall the point made in the preced-
ing section concerning forests: conventional
development acted destructively on the underlying
natural processes that had generated high-value
resources. Some stress and consequent disturbance
of the natural generative processes are inevitable
when humans intervene, but the extreme, com-
bined destructiveness of the various abuses related
to exploitive development was a result of deeply
misguided policies and practices, which may have
made contemporary sense, but which often involved
self-imposed ignorance. Sustainable redevelopment
must seek to cooperate more closely with the natural
processes that yield resources of high value.
Sustainable redevelopment: design and
implementation
Attempts to arrest and reverse the degradation of
parts of the Great Lakes ecosystem, including its
fisheries, were begun over a century ago. Gross
pollution with organic matter such as sawdust and
offal was contained, in part. Destructive fishery
practices were outlawed, such as dynamiting or set-
ting nets across streams used for spawning. Fishways
were made mandatory for dams, but the fish ways
were seldom effective. With the advent of steam
and electrical power many of the small dams across
tributaries of the Great Lakes fell into disuse and
were washed away. In larger rivers, in this region
and elsewhere, bigger and better dams were con-
structed, often without functional fishways.
Several factors were responsible for the escalation
of the degradative practices - an escalation that
remained uncontained until very recently. These
factors, which must be reformed in a design for
redevelopment, were:
(l) An unstated policy, shared binationally, that
degradative abuses be addressed only after
some particularly abused groups of the public
raised a great clamor. Thus, there were always
time lags, seldom less than a decade, between
the experts' and abused people's awareness of
degradation and some beginnings of corrective
action, almost always initiated slowly through
government action. This problem was not as
severe with the New Brunswick forests, perhaps
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because of the lower population density and the
smaller number of nonconsumptive users. Also
in New Brunswick there was a more direct feed-
back that imperiled the economic structure and
this may have attracted the attention of business
and bureaucracy sooner than in areas where the
links are less direct, as with dirty water in the
Great Lakes.
(2) Such corrective actions as were taken were
designed so as not to impede exploitive develop-
ment to a serious degree, as was also the case
in New Brunswick. Corrective actions were
seldom fully effective, sometimes hardly effec-
tive at all, and sometimes they redirected the
problem to other parts of the ecosystem.
(3) There was an unbroken tempo in the advent of
new user groups with direct and indirect
demands on these ecosystems. The feasibility
(or likelihood) that new users were likely to
exacerbate the environmental impacts of exist-
ing users was generally ignored.
(4) Overall the spatial and temporal scales of the
degradative impact of various user groups ten-
ded to increase with technological advances
related to those uses, but may have become
progressively less apparent to the laymen, even
the most observant, as with acid rain, atmo-
spherically transported toxic contaminants,
leaching from landfill sites, consumptive use of
water, etc. The related effects are not readily
seen until researchers present generalizations
and abstractions of regional impacts.
(5) Corrective action usually consisted of an attempt
to reduce the extent and intensity of the abuse
with little effort at mitigation or at rehabilitative
intervention (ecosystem therapy) to foster
recovery processes consistent with the natural
healing processes. A conventional engineering
approach tends to move a problem to a different
place or time period. It does not appreciate that
biological systems have a memory or imprint of
past actions - that just stopping an abuse does
not necessarily lead to self-correction. Correc-
tive intervention is often required.
The time lag between public awareness of a
serious problem and public perception of an
improvement following corrective action is now
about a quarter of a century. Overall, the aggre-
gated level of ecosystemic degradation in the Great
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Lakes may have peaked (or ecosystem quality may
have "bottomed out") in the early 1980s - or it may
not yet have done so. Problems with contaminants
leaching from landfill sites, from acids and toxic
materials transported atmospherically, and from
consumptive use of water appear to be waxing, while
those due to nutrient loading, exploitive fishing,
and exotic species are waning. Whether or not the
aggregated level has peaked, the evidence does indi-
cate that the rate of degradation has been slowed.
The five policy factors sketched above appear to
apply to both our cases of regional fishery and
regional forestry development. As a policy, sustain-
able redevelopment must establish a framework that
focuses the design of corrective actions on these
factors. At the regional level, focused discussion on
how to correct them, as a systemic set, has been
initiated only recently.
A mandate for a binational policy of sustainable
redevelopment for the Great Lakes, with some
management responsibility at the binational level,
may be inferred from a study of several binational
agreements in the context of what we now know
about the ecological effects of uses and their inter-
relations within the Great Lakes ecosystem. These
agreements include:
(l) The Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909, served
by the International Joint Commission (IJC).
(2) The Migratory Birds Convention (MBC) of
1917 served by an intergovernmental com-
mittee.
(3) The Great Lakes Fishery Convention (GLFC)
of 1954 served by the Great Lakes Fishery Com-
mission.
(4) The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreements of
1972 and 1978 overseen by the IJC.
Crucial gaps remain:
(l) An agreement on long-range transport of
atmospheric pollutants, with its acid rain and
toxic fallout.
(2) An agreement on consumptive use and/or
extra-Basin diversion of water.
(3) An agreement with authority to take specified,
local control actions in a regional control con-
text, i.e., on the water control.
The following ecological features are being
managed - in a weak sense of the word - under the
four rather general agreements sketched above:
water levels, water flows, water quality, and local
air quality (IJC), fish quality and quantity, and the
predaceous exotic lamprey (GLFC), waterfowl,
shorebirds, and, by implication, the wetlands
(MBC). Within an ecosystem context, it is obvious
that most of these features cannot be managed
effectively in the absence of complementary
management of some other features. For example,
the interrelationships between water quality, fish
quality and quantity, the sea lamprey, fish-eating
shorebirds, and wetlands as nursery areas for fish
and birds is well documented in the scientific
literature. Those who have a responsibility for
management must have the full perspective.
An ecosystem approach has been endorsed by
the two national parties to these agreements, as well
as by various lower levels of government. With
respect to water quality, the ecosystem approach
has been endorsed formally at the regional or Basin
level in the 1978 Great Lakes Water Quality Agree-
ment and explicitly, though less formally, at both
the Basin and lake levels, as the policy of the Great
Lakes Fishery Commission. This ecosystem
approach is beginning to be interpreted in the sense
of what we have termed Basin-wide sustainable
redevelopment [29]. As yet no specific codification
of the meaning of the ecosystem approach has been
accepted widely. Ecosystem understanding of sub-
lake ecosystems is quite advanceq [23,24] compared
with that of lake ecosystems or of the entire Basin
ecosystem. In the context of think regionally, act
locally, few people have yet learned to think region-
ally, probably because the latter requires that per-
sonal (economic) issues be subsumed in a larger
community context. That is, we live and see the
local context, but the regional context must be some
sort of abstraction that cannot be seen or felt, but
can only be comprehended.
Public and political commitment, such as it is, to
reverse the degradation of the Great Lakes has come
at a time of growing awareness that major parts of
the old industrial base of the Great Lakes region
will likely wane in absolute terms. Examples are the
steel and automobile industries and related water-
borne transportation services. Urban growth has
slackened and some local jurisdictions have
experienced net reductions in human population.
There is great concern that the region not be rele-
gated to a hinterland of the American Sun Belt
•,
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(disparagingly called the Parched Belt) to which
some of the seeming abundance of fresh water in
the Great Lakes might be diverted. How a thriving
regional modern economy might receive ~ajor
benefits from the sustainable redevelopment of the
Great Lakes Basin ecosystem is not clear, though
many opinion leaders believe that the Great Lakes
themselves are the key to such redevelopment.
Obviously the choice of indicators of redevelopment
is crucial. Think regionally, act locally does not come
easily with respect to a Basin ecosystem that is frac-
tured into many jurisdictions and subject to many
incompatible uses. Somehow the people of the Basin
must together choose a future and make a long-term
. commitment to its realization, rather than just pas-
sively wait for something better to come along.
Attempts to achieve sustainable redevelopment
of the fishery are dependent on the progress of
reform with the fishery and also on rehabilitation
of the habitat of the fish, the environment. In a
properly managed fishery in a properly managed
freshwater ecosystem (of the Great Lakes type) the
fish association is dominated by native, self-repro-
ducing, highly valued, bottom-oriented (benthic)
species that achieve large size and old age in the
natural state. Recall that by 1955 the fish association
was well on its way to an inversion, toward domin-
ance by exotic, low-valued, mid-water (pelagic)
species that remain small and die at a relatively
young age; by 1960 the inversion or debasement
was almost complete. The main stresses responsible
were excessive fishing of the preferred species
(hygrading), invasion by the sea lamprey which had
preferences for fish quite similar to those of
humans, invasion or introduction of small pelagic
fish that thrive in enriched waters, eutrophication
through enrichment, pollution of spawning
streams, and a miscellany of additional causes.
Corrective local measures began to show promise
in the early 1960s. These local measures have gener-
ated local responses, but there is as yet only limited,
mostly informal coordination at the regional Basin
level. These measures include:
(l) Direct control of the sea lamprey through bar-
riers and selective chemical lampricides, with
the sterile male technique due for field testing
in about 1986.
(2) Reform of fishing practices to permit a recovery
of preferred species; in some jurisdictions this
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was done through a limitation of commercial
fishing in favor of sport fishing; the latter is less
capable of exerting intense fishing pressure on
the valued species.
(3) Hatchery rearing and stocking of native species,
such as the lake trout, in an attempt to reestab-
lish self-reproducing stocks where they had
been extinguished in recent decades.
(4) Hatchery rearing and stocking of nonnative
species on a put, grow, and, take basis, especially
salmonids of various species, to suppress the
vast stocks of small pelagic species and to supply
a highly valued sport fishery.
(5) Environmental programs for reduction of the
loadings of phosphates to reverse eutrophica-
tion and to foster oligotrophication, which
favors the valued native species.
(6) Ecological rehabilitation of some streams that
flow into the Great Lakes to provide productive
spawning and nursery areas, especially for
large, native and some nonnative salmonids.
(7) Banning of the use of some persistent pesticides,
such as DDT, which were washed into the lakes
and transported and deposited onto the lakes
by atmospheric processes, and then interfered
with normal development of young fish.
By 1984 all the lakes showed signs that the fish
associations were beginning to revert to a state of
dominance by large benthic species originally native
to the lakes. How quickly or how far this process
will go is largely a function of what humans will
do next with the Great Lakes Basin ecosystem,
and is particularly dependent on how we orches-
trate our more local endeavors within the Basin
context.
The fact that these preferred native species are
so dependent on a healthy aquatic ecosystem has
stimulated interest in proposals to use some of them
as "indicators of ecosystem quality [17]." A deep
oligotrophic ecosystem should support thriving
stocks of lake trout, a shallower mesotrophic part
of the system should su pport walleye and yellow
perch, and a nearshore part of the system should
support black bass and pike. Aquatic systems domi-
nated by such species are likely to provide water of
a quality suitable for domestic use after minimal
treatment, to be productive of fish species that are
highly valued by sport and commercial fishermen,
to be healthy for the contact recreation so important
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in heavily urbanized areas, to be attractive for rec-
reational boating and nature study, and to be
naturally self-regulatory to an important degree if
all the uses are practiced in a manner that is well-
informed in the context of sustainable redevelop-
ment. Sustainability must be defined according to
type, intensity, and frequency of use - subject to
ecosystemic maxims defined locally and regionally.
Sustainable redevelopment of
regional natural resource systems
Degradation and recovery in general
Innis [30], Rea [30], and others have exposed some
far-reaching general parallels in the way various
renewable resources were exploited within Canada
and the USA during the past two centuries for the
purpose of what is now termed economic develop-
ment. Parallels can be traced in the histories of the
exploitation of the New Brunswick forests (see
above) and of the Great Lakes fisheries, though
these parallels may not be as close as between New
Brunswick fisheries in the Gulf of St Lawrence and
New Brunswick forests, or as between Great Lakes
fisheries and Great Lakes forests [31].
The breakdown of ecosystems, as ecosystems,
under human influences and their recovery after
relaxation or mitigation of those influences is
attracting increasing attention [16,32]. With respect
to ecosystem organization in a quite general sense,
the closest biotic counterparts in ecosystems like the
Great Lakes to the dominant species of trees in a
natural forest like that of eastern Canada may be
the dominant, large, relatively sedentary species of
fish [33]. In the pristine forests of eastern Canada
two centuries ago, as in the pristine Great Lakes,
much of the total living biomass was contained
within such dominant species. Elton's energy
pyramid with respect to trophic relationships is
sometimes incorrectly taken as indicative of biomass
proportions in natural biotic associations of lakes,
such as the Great Lakes. In natural lakes the plant
species, both the macrophytes and the phytoplank-
ton, have a quick turnover, but some individuals of
the large species of terminal consumers and preda-
tors survive for decades, such as lake trout and lake
whitefish, and some up to perhaps a century, such
as sturgeon and snapping turtles. These relative
rates (and corresponding biomass proportions) are
reversed in forests between, say, white pine and
insectivorous birds. Note that the turnover rates of
the economically most-valued components are quite
slow in each case and hence recovery following
cessation of abuse will also be slow in each case.
Incidentally, in natural grasslands and wetlands
the relative biomass of producers versus consumers
plus predators may not be as strongly skewed as in
forests or lakes. Grasslands and wetlands appear to
be more at the mercy of climate and natural fire
with "wipe out" events more frequent and less
localized than in either forests or lakes. Neither the
plants nor animals tend to grow very large or old
in grasslands and wetlands. Large animal species of
the forest tend to exploit grasslands and wetlands
for forage, and large animal species of the lakes
tend to use wetlands for spawning and nursery
areas.
Rapport et al. [25] have shown that the terrestrial
and aquatic degradation syndromes caused by
exploitive developments of many kinds are, in some
ways, similar ecologically. The degradation syn-
drome may be seen as a pathological reversal of the
usual natural developmental, successional, and
morphogenetic processes that have been character-
ized by von Bertalanffy [34] as follows:
Bertalanffy's model of hierarchical order was fur-
nished by him with four related concepts: As life
ascends the ladder of complexity, there is progressive
integration in which the parts become more depen-
dent on the whole, and progressive differentiation, in
which the parts become more specialized. In con-
sequence the [system] exhibits a wider repertoire of
[functional] behaviour. But this is paid for by progres-
sive mechanization, which is the limiting of the parts
to a single function, and progressive centralization in
which there emerge leading parts that dominate the
behaviour of the system.
The science of surprise and the practice of adap-
tive environmental management of C. S. Holling
and his colleagues [35] may relate in the first in-
stance to both the normal natural morphogenetic
sequence and the man-caused exploitive degrada-
tive sequences, in a general systems context. For
example, forest resource degradation is a surprise
because we were not collecting data on forest
development and degradation - but if proper data
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had been gathered uch a surprise would have not
occurred or would have been less serious. One of
the implications of Holling's id as is that ecological
sequences have discontinuities that may involve
emergent behavior in the natural morphogenetic
sequence and, presumably, may in olve com-
plcm ntary submergent behavior in the man-
caused degracla ion sequence. Such concepts can be
helpful in comprehending the gener I consequen-
ces of opportunistic exploitation and for designing
rehabilitative husbandry in a policy of sustainable
red velopm nt.
Mobilization of public and political support for
redevelopment is hindered by a variety of incorrect
myths about natural processes and charact ri tics
of ecosystems, such as the following:
(l) Large species lend to be inefficient producers of
resources and should be sacrificed in favor of smaller
species with quicker turnover rates. This ignor s
the elf-regulatory roles of large species that
favor other valued features of th se ecosystems.
It also plays down the difference in p r unit
value, with economic and aesthetic values of
some of the dominant species high in com-
pari on to most of the small speci s. In any case
the relative productivity of harvestable smaller
species in aggregate is not likely to achi ve twice
that of harvestable larger species, and he differ-
ence in per unit net values are likely to be
greater than twofold, in inverse proportion to
the overall rate of production.
(2) Natural succession of lakes involves eutrophication
and thus the prefeTred species of fish that thrive in
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less fertile waters are passing phenomena anyway.
This is basically incorrc t in that im mal ceo. ys-
temic process's within lakes generally involve
oligotrophication, but eutrophication is gen-
erally caused by external processes, such as
atmospheric loading with volcanic ash or by
humans loading nutrients into the lake, which
override the n tural processes that regulate
nutrient levels.
(3) As [orests age theiT suscepti.bility to natural forest
fires, blow downs, and insect pest outbreaks increases
greutl)'. A natu ral forest tends to b a rather
intricate mosaic of somewhat different associ-
ations, all at somewhat different stag s of suc-
cession, and consequently not all at great risk
from natural causes.
General features of sustainable
redevelopment
Let us look again at the concept of su ·tainable
rerlevclopment. One can argue that the pulp and
paper industry has been sustained and expanded
in N w Brunswick, but such sustainability was
achie ed only by virtu' of drastically reducing the
utilization tandarcls for raw material. This has
driven up the cost of raw material since this smaller
material is more costly to harvest and handle (Figure
3.10). The word sustainability must be accompanied
by lefinitions of quantity, quality, time, ancllocation
to be meaningful. Does the conventional develop-
m nt of a white pine industry for 50 years before
it run out of suitable resources constitute sustaina-
bility? Does the existence of pulp mills for 50 years
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constitute sustainability? Is development still
considered sustainable when it results in depre-
ciation of the resource? How is quality of the re-
source to be specified, in that the quality of raw
material determines the quality of the associated
industry?
Where the specifications for sustainability include
quantity, quality, location, and time, one need
expect relatively few resource problems with
development. In the absence of such specifications,
development inevitably wanders into trouble.
Development in our society has meant quick and
short-term economic benefit, with the higher the
interest rate, the shorter the time horizon. Develop-
ment does not refer to the resource, all brave words
at pulp mill or fish plant dedications to the contrary!
Frequently, plans for sustainable development
include all the highest platitudes with respect to
resource management that one could hope to see,
but it is rare to see any mechanism that forces
implementation of these fine ideals.
We could raise the same issues with respect to
fisheries or water quality in the Great Lakes, as
should now be obvious.
Two characteristics of redevelopment need
emphasis. The first is that the transition from
development to redevelopment (or from exploita-
tion to husbandry) necessarily involves substantial
tension. There is tension between industry (whether
forestry or fishery), government, and the public,
and this tension is heightened by a mutual lack of
trust among these players. Industry feels that
neither the government nor the public understand
the intensity of world-level competition in which
it is engaged. Government does not trust
industry to maintain the necessary long-term
horizon for a redevelopment program, and fears
that the public may not understand that redevelop-
ment will necessarily cost a temporary reduction in
the flow of benefits from the resource. The public
does not trust either industry or government,
because they are seen to be creators of the problem,
and hence unlikely candidates to design and
execute a solution. None of these players has a very
good understanding of the relationship between
local actions and regional goals, and consequently
they each occasionally produce rather unrealistic
action proposals. For example, the public has been
so long educated to the effect that a tree should be
planted for everyone cut, or a fish stocked for each
harvested, that the focus on local action is almost
exclusive. Public outcry during the design of
redevelopment has centered on local events, with
the most naive notions about what the forest or lake
system in the regional sense will do if their local
actions are followed, with no sense of the orchestra-
tion of these local actions. A most counterproductive
feature of this tension is the desire of some
members of all parties to demonstrate that it is
some other "they" who are to blame. In fact all
three - industry, government, public - applauded,
and shared in, the development that has caused
the problem.
The second characteristic of redevelopment
worth noting has to do with the geographic reality
of planning the context of acting locally while think-
ing regionally (or globally). Many may talk about
management of a resource and, indeed, about
specific management actions, without ever specify-
ing the actual location of these actions or even
recognizing the need for such specification. Some
may actually plan resource management without
dealing with the regional context of local actions,
although it is not possible to escape the implications
of context. That is, a plan that states that 5000 ha
will be planted every year, 2000 ha precommercially
thinned, and 3000 ha harvested, implies that
someone knows where, in geographic location, each
of these activity sums will be accumulated. (A similar
statement applies to lake trout stocking in the
Lakes.) When it comes to implementing a manage-
ment plan on the ground or in the water, however,
it is not possible without explicit geographic refer-
ence in a regional context and consequently we have
few real redevelopers. To implement any plan it is
necessary to implement a series of local actions,
which together cumulate to the desired regional
effect. If the plan does not specify the geographic
pattern of these local events, then the plan cannot
be implemented. This is perhaps the greatest learn-
ing experience of the redevelopment phase.
So important is geographic control to the
implementation of management that, in the his-
torical absence of a technical capability for geo-
graphic control, exploitation was all that was poss-
ible. Certainly, where it is not possible to relate the
parts of a geographically dispersed system in terms
of both attributes and location, only the broadest
form of management control is possible. Fortu-
nately, such limitations are being rapidly erased by
;
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computerized mapping systems embodying rela-
tional data bases [14]. For the first time these systems
allow the planner not only to design a regional
resource redevelopment strategy, but also to identify
readily the geographic locations where particular
tactical actions must be taken to accomplish the
regional strategy. In systems where broad geo-
graphic extent adds to both the cost and complexity
of resource exploitation, and to the cost and com-
plexity of resource management, the ability to
analyze the same resource data at appropriate scales
for strategic and tactical designs is a major techno-
logical breakthrough. Characteristically, the
exploitation interests have been as aggressive as
management interests in implementing these
expensive systems - this is true of the New Brun-
swick forestry case, but not of the Great Lakes
fisheries case. In resources with many users and
many managers with disparate responsibility and/or
authority it is crucial that a common geographic
data base be employed to avoid antagonistic
strategies and to permit coherent management
design.
There has been much talk about management in
the past and, indeed, a certain amount of planning,
but little of this has corne to grips with the fact that
to make a plan happen on the ground and in the water,
in the forest and lakes where it really counts, it is necessary
to specify where the local events will take place in order
to achieve a specified regional effect. It is not an over-
statement to say that what separates real manage-
ment (or husbandry) from those highest platitudes
of development is a specification of the geographic
control of actions in the sense of: do this, at this
time, to cause this to happen at this place in the
future, so that the whole forest or lake ecosystem
will develop along this desired pattern. Manage-
ment is then acting locally while thinking regionally.
Local and regional decision making
In North America the nature of rights to the direct
use of a renewable resource and to the indirect use
of the habitat that generates the renewable resource
is very complex [27, 36]. The heuristic schema in
Figure 3. J 1 may aid understanding of rights from
the perspective of how these rights are exercised
by the putative owners of them, and of how society
administers the allocation and supervises the exer-
cise of them.
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A right to determine the use of a designated part
of a renewable resource and/or its habitat may be
held exclusively by designated individuals or by
duly constituted groups of individuals, or may be
shared nonexclusively with others. From a com-
plementary but orthogonal perspective, such rights
may be transferred or exchanged between
individuals or groups largely at their own initiative,
or they may not be transferable [37].
Figure 3.11 shows eight different combinations of
these two criteria. The four outer corners are rather
sharply defined, hard or formal manifestations of
the four possible combinations, while the four inner
corners are less clearly defined, soft or informal
counterparts of the outer set. It may be noted that
exercise of an illegitimate right has been included,
in part to complete the schema, but also to take note
of the fact that such illegal actions are not uncom-
mon and do affect the exercise, by others, of their
legitimate rights.
Regier and Grima [36] have suggested that the
set of four hard elements,where they are condoned
in practice by society, may become organized into
a kind of competitively interdependent complex.
In contrast, the soft elements may develop into a
more mutual interdependent complex. In situations
where a particlar complex is dominant the inter-
dependent process may link with the relevant social
mores to effect a kind of positive feedback reinforce-
ment of the dominance, e.g., free enterprise and
exploitation.
In some very general way, the interdependent
hard set may be employed by the forces that domi-
nate conventional exploitive development,
especially as imposed from a metropolis onto a
hinterland. This may happen with private capital-
ism in which the free market is a dominant element
within the set, or with state capitalism in that the
administrative element (linked to the international
market) is dominant.
At the very local level, in an established, healthy
human community, much of the exercise of rights
occurs within the general framework of the soft,
informal set. This is seen most clearly with respect
to sharing within a family, whether nuclear or
extended. This more informal approach to the
identification and practice of rights may be severely
distorted by cultural invasion of the more formal
approaches associated with conventional develop-
ment. Also, some of the smaller scale, less informal
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Exclusive right Nonexclusive right
Rights to use admin-
istered by govern-
ment with a cen-
tral ized bureaucracy,
regulatory boards,
cou rts
Righ ts to free access
to common property,
in a trad ition of un-
trammelled, exploi-
tive use
Exclusive right Nonexclusive right
Nonexclusive right
Rights to use confer-
red through a patron-
age establishment,
publ icly condoned
Rig hts to free access
to community re-
sources in a tradition
of individual
stewardsh ip
Exclusive right
Rights to legitimate
Lise exchanged by
informal bartering
openly in publ1ic
Rights to use priva-
tized in part and ad-
ministered by a com-
munity of users
Rights to legitimate
use exchanged for
money ina free
market institution
Rights to use pur-
portedlyexchanged,
but fraudulently, by
criminal swindlers
Exclusive right Nonexclusive right
Figure 3.11 A perspective, expanded from a schema by Dales [37). on the variety of ways in which rights
to the use of fish and similar resources are managed in North American society. In the four inside
characterizations the exclusivity and transferability of user rights are satisfied in a practical manner. User
rights in these four inside types are less sharply defined than those in the four corners. The schema may
be viewed to have a soft core with a more sharply defined, hard shell or edge.
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Table 3.1 Institutional or policy mechanisms for managing aquatic ecosystems and for allocating the
use of fish and their habitats. Items at the top are largely administrative while those at the bottom have
a prominent role for the market system. Examples relate to the Great Lakes of North America.
Mechanism
Prohibition
Regulation
Direct government
intervention
Grants and tax
incentives
Buy-back programs
Civil law
Insurance
Effluent charges
License fees
Demand management
Transferable
development rights in
land use planning
Specific property
rights, as with
transferable individual
quotas
Instrument of control
Exclusion of sport fish from
commercial harvests
Specification of zero discharge of
some toxics or contaminants
Specification of low phosphorus
concentrations in sewage effluents
Specification of gear and area, in
fishing
Control nonnative sea lamprey by
lampricide, dams, etc.
Development of islands and
headlands with fill and dredge spoils
Subsidy to industry for antipollution
equipment
Subsidy to commercial fishermen to
harvest relatively undesirable
species
Government purchase and
retirement of excess harvesting
capacity
Losers enabled to sue despoilers in
civil court
Compulsory third party insurance for
claims of damage
Charge for waste disposal, either
direct cost of treatment or indirect
cost of impacts on ecosystem
Tax or charge on harvesters, scaled
to level of use
Rates involve marginal cost pricing
and/or peak responsibility pricing
Limited rights to develop one area
exchanged for broader rights to
develop another
Purchase of pollution loading rights
to predetermined loading levels
Harvest rights to explicit quantities
to be purchased
Purpose or observed consequence
Improve recreational opportunities
for anglers
Reduce exposure of biota and
humans to poisons
Control eutrophication which, if
intense, degrades the aquatic
ecosystem
Reduce fishing intensity to prevent
overfishing
Foster recovery of lake trout and
other preferred species to benefit
fishermen
Provide recreational facilities and
spawning areas to benefit anglers,
boaters. etc.
Lower pollution levels and distribute
costs more widely
Reduce competitive undesirable
species to benefit preferred species
and their users
Reduce excess fishing capacity and
compensate owners of the excess
capacity
Preserve ecosystem amenities for
broader public, recompense
losers
Reduce pollution loadings because
insurance premiums are scaled to
loading levels
Reduce pollution and/or allocate
resources to high-value and/or
profitable uses
Foster efficient use of resource by
discouraging overcapitalization,
recovering fair return for the owners
(populace) of the resource
Improve overall efficiency of use and
foster conservation
Direct the development to areas
preferred by government
Limit pollution and foster efficient
use of resources
Limit effective fishing effort and
allocate resources to high-value
and/ or profitable uses
,
,
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rights enjoyed by a community may be vitiated by
the exercise of the exploitive rights of the
developers.
North American sOCieties have had great
difficulty in dealing with the injustices and
inequities visited on local communities by external
developers. The wrongs have often been rational-
ized with respect to a rather simplistic utilitarian
ethic of the greatest good for the greatest number,
with some abstract logic about the desirability of
Pareto-optimality, if only it could be implemented.
We think of what has been done at federal and
provincial levels with respect to the objective of
maximizing the net value added, with less consider-
ation of how the resulting benefits are distributed
among people. Is value added a good measure of
progress?
Currently, a swing to neoconservatism has
brought with it a preference for the market as an
allocator of rights to use and has brought antipathy
for the administrative function which had come to
be dominant. With respect to Figure 3.11, such a
change in preferences may be interpreted as a shift
in the center of gravity of the whole interactive
complex, now involving both the hard and soft sets.
The shift is toward the lower left of the figure and
away from the upper left and also away from the
central soft set. Green parties, as yet miniscule in
North America, would presumably favor some
dominance by the soft set over the hard set.
Compromise intergrades of various kinds have
been developed within the spectrum of strictly
administrative and strictly market methods on the
left side of Figure 3.11, see Table 3.1. Some of these
could also be adapted to serve as intergrades
between the hard and soft sets. To be most effective
in redevelopment it is crucially important that the
selection of mechanisms be chosen and designed in
a manner that utilizes a constructive feedback loop
to make developers want to manage because it is in
their interests. All else may be futile.
With respect to thinking regionally and acting
locally, in the context of rehabilitative husbandry
for sustainable redevelopment of regional ecosys-
tems, the complex regime of rights should be orga-
nized so that a well-functioning interdependent soft
set of local allocative methods should not be overrid-
den destructively by an interdependent hard set of
allocative methods serving primarily those interests
defined at a regional level.
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Commentary
L. Kairiukstis
The process of depletion of renewable resources
and the degradation of natural ecosystems has
grown steadily in recent decades due to intensive
landscape transformation and increasing indus-
trial-agricultural impacts on the environment. Two
such examples are the Great Lakes and the forests
of New Brunswick, as discussed by Regier and
Baskerville. The authors, using the general
approach suggested by Holling to Think Global, Act
Local [1] have described the historical exploitation
of forest resources and fisheries that led to serious
degradation of both these ecological systems. In
determining the reasons for such negative effects,
the authors have concluded that there has been
much talk about management and, indeed, a certain
amount of planning, but little of this has come to
grips with the fact that to make such plans happen
in the lakes and in the forest, where it really counts,
it is necessary to specify where the local events will
take place in order to achieve a specified regional
effect. The authors also critically appraise and
specify the measures neccessary to redevelop those
areas.
In response, I would like to support the idea of
cross-national comparisons of experiences in link-
ing global perspectives and policies on the interac-
tions of environment and development to the multi-
tude of local actions required to implement real
change [2]. Bearing in mind the experience gained
in the Lithuanian SSR, I also suggest some ideas
and possible ways of maintaining the sustainability
of a forest system, securing the long-term use of
resources for many purposes, without the need for
redevelopment of regional ecosystems. These sug-
gestions concern the following two problems:
(1) Sustainability of forest resources and wood use.
(2) Regional development optimization.
The suggestions are made in accordance with the
main concept of adaptive environmental manage-
ment, developed by Holling and his colleagues
[1,3], and can be helpful in designing rehabilitative
husbandry in a policy of sustainable redevelopment
such as that suggested by Regier and Baskerville.
Sustainability of forest resources and
wood use
The European history of forest depletion in recent
centuries has shown that the sustainability of forest
resources is simultaneously a precondition and a
consequence of the sustainability and continuity of
the use of forest resources. Government laws and
the use of strong regulating forces and programs
for afforestation have been adopted in many coun-
tries. In the Lithuanian SSR, a decrease of forest
area, which had been continuous during the last
eight centuries [4], was halted in the middle of this
century. At that time, the wooded areas in Lithuania
reached a critical level and comprised less than 20%
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of the territory. Now, the forested area is steadily
increasing and already (1984) comprises 27.6% of
the territory. To achieve such results, strong
governmental laws limiting the amount and
methods of clearance, as well as supporting forest
regeneration, protection, and afforestation, were
adopted. Monitoring of forest resources dynamics
was also improved. Modern techniques for forest
inventory were established by the Lithuanian
Research Institute of Forestry [5].
To ensure an increasing continuity and sustain-
ability of wood use, an area method based on rota-
tion and age-class distribution of the management
classes (Betriebsklasse) was developed [6]. These
factors are combined at the level of a forest enter-
prise after the stand inventory has been carried out
and they are characterized by the dominant tree
species, its rotation, and areas of age classes in
ten-year intervals [7].
Regional development optimization
Owing to the increasing level of landscape cultiva-
tion of large territories, natural boundaries of forest
growth are being moved and the partition between
forest, agriculture, urban settlements, and areas of
other land use is being changed. As described by
Regier and Baskerville, this has also occurred in
North America. On the other hand, in recent
decades the socioeconomic value of individual ter-
ritories, including forest areas and water basins, has
been reappraised. Society now needs to use lands
in new ways (e.g., different kinds of business, rec-
reation, reservation, etc.). The year 1955, as pointed
out by Regier and Baskerville, may be taken as the
beginning of growing public cognition that the
Great Lakes Region, as part of a system, was severely
debased. The total binational cost of all the relevant
studies and corrective efforts since 1955 is over $10
billion (1985 US dollars).
In the light of this, the optimization of regional
development, based on physical planning of the
landscape's main functional allocation, including
specialization of forest growth, agriculture, etc., is
of paramount importance. In countries where land
is state owned, e.g., the USSR, these problems have
been more or less solved with the help of the general
planning of land use. Nevertheless, when optimiz-
ing the land use of separate regions, rather intricate
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problems arise in achieving an adequate improve-
ment of living conditions of the local inhabitants,
better development of the social infrastructure of
the region, and development of separate industrial
areas.
Owing to the difficulties of objective coordination
of the interests of sectoral development versus those
of regional development, a number of
socioeconomic development problems remain
insufficiently solved: for instance, the choice of con-
struction sites, the determination of the maximum
capacity of large plants in the chemical and power
industries, and the use of water transport can nega-
tively affect the ecological equilibrium of the
environment of a region. Sometimes, this leads to
a disproportionate overexploitation of natural
resources, which also severely debases a region.
The difficulty in elaborating coordinated
decisions, integrating the needs of separate
branches and the region as a whole, is caused by at
least two factors:
(1) Shortcomings in management.
(2) Lack of a reliable set of tools for simulation
analyses and the selection of variants for
optimum decisions.
The shortcomings in management can, to some
degree, be mitigated by accumulating finances from
the profit funds of enterprises, according to the
degree of negative impact on the region, and direct-
ing them to resource regeneration and environ-
mental restoration. To fill the other gap, a system
of models to evaluate the quality and reproduction
of natural resources that are being exploited and a
system of balanced interbranch models of optimi-
zation on a regional level are being constructed by
the Lithuanian Committee of the UNESCO Pro-
gram Man and Biosphere. Taking the socioeconomic
and environmental development of a region as a
complex economic-ecological system, we are deal-
ing with two kinds of optimization: regional
optimization and sectoral optimization.
For instance, a preliminary analysis of the ter-
ritorial transformation trends in Lithuania condi-
tioned by production output and the ecological and
social consequences of this production enabled an
optimal distribution of the territory according to its
function to be established approximately [8].
Accordingly, agricultural territories must occupy
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55-58% (including 17% of meadows and pastures),
forest areas 30-33%, water and boggy territories
5-6%, and industrial-urban areas 5-7%.
The forest and agricultural territories, apart from
their own forest and agricultural areas, include
areas designated for other functions (recreation,
conservation, etc.). Owing to the contiguity limits
and mutual scale of overlap of these territories,
buffer zones are established with respect to the chief
adjacent economic sectors. The forestry sector, for
example, under the pressure of agricultural, rec-
reational, industrial-urban, etc., sectors in a specific
territory, becomes greatly specialized. Under the
pressure of contiguous economic activities other
sectors are planned rationally: agriculture, water,
etc., which means that the adverse impact of com-
peting functions (production, recreation, conserva-
tion) can be avoided and the territory distribution
more precisely determined.
The forestry sector of a national economy, guided
by a given purposeful function of territorial units
and forestry science and by economic sector
possibilities, specializes in forest growth [9]. At the
same time, the forest sector is primarily responsible
for total wood supply and other forest products to
the national economy. Thus, by optimizing forest
growth, a forester foresees measures for produc-
tivity increments of forest areas. He is directed
toward this by the inherent laws of economic
development. Moreover, this is in conformity with
the main energy accumulative function of the forest
in the biosphere. According to the pattern of the
territorial ecosystem "Lithuania", forest growth is
optimized as follows:
(l) Industrial-exploitative forests, including
plantation forests - 52.7%.
(2) Agricultural-protective forests - 18.5%.
(3) Recreational forests - 11.2%.
(4) Conservation forests - 10.6%.
(5) Sport (recreational) hunting forests - 7.0%.
Optimal standards of forest growth are established
for each specialized sector [10].
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1Chapter 4
P. Crosson
Agricultural development
looking to the future
Editors' Introduction: As shown by Richards in Chapter 2 of this volume, agricultural
activities have been the prime transformers of the Earth's environment throughout most
of human history. In this chapter the future of agricultural development is portrayed as
an interacting system of resources, technologies, institutions, and environments. It is
suggested that for the next 20 years or so, the environmental constraints to agricultural
development will be strongly shaped by the present resource endowments of different
world regions, especially their potential for productivity improvements and for expansion
of arable land. In the long term, however, the determining factor is likely to be the ability
of institutions and technologies to respond flexibly to changing conditions. The use of
"induced innovation" theory to illuminate such sociotechnical responses to environmental
constraints is explored in detail.
Factors external to agriculture
The direction, pace, and character of world agricul-
tural development will be strongly conditioned by
several factors that bear generally on all economic
sectors, not just agriculture. Some discussion of
these external factors provides a necessary perspec-
tive for the subsequent analysis of the internal
dynamics of agricultural development.
Among the most fundamental of these are the
growth and regional distribution of world income
and population, and the world political climate,
especially as it affects international trade. These
hctors are interrelat ,:d. If the political climate
moves the nations of the world toward increasing
protectionism, then world income, if not popula-
tion, grows more slowly than if movement is toward
a more open trading system. If, for reasons apart
from trade, income growth slows significantly,
pressures for more trade protection will likely rise.
Should the political climate induce increasing fric-
tion and military confrontation among nations, the
resulting diversion of resources into armaments
would likely slow income growth as well as promote
protectionism. The impact of nuclear war on world
population, income, and trade needs no elabo-
ration.
In this chapter I assume there will be no nuclear
war and that the world political climate will not
induce either significantly more or less protection-
ism than at present. My guess is that if there is a
change over the next 100 to 200 years it will be
toward more open trade, for which I can provide
no convincing argument. I base it on the belief that
over the long term a more open system promotes
everyone's interests and on the perhaps too
sanguine assumption that people and governments
will, in time, recognize this and act accordingly.
Agricultural development
Energy and other resources
If nuclear war and increased protectionism are
avoided, then world population and income can
continue to grow unless impassable resource bar-
riers are encountered or the processes of growth
impose disastrous environmental stress. The critical
resources are energy and human ingenuity. With
enough of these, other resource constraints are
likely to be overcome and environmental stress con-
tained. Darmstadter (see Chapter 5, this volume)
indicates no insuperable limits to energy supply,
although he expects real energy prices to increase
more or less steadily well into the twenty-first cen-
tury. Experience since the early 1970s provides
strong evidence that societies can adjust to much
sharper energy price increases than Darmstadter
foresees, without seriously jeopardizing income
growth.
Goeller and Zucker [1], on the assumptions of
"reasonably stable political conditions, a continuing
supply of energy, continuing availability of capital,
and, most importantly, vigorous and successful
research in the field of materials [1, p 456]," argue
that the supply of nonenergy material resources will
be adequate to support an ultimate world popula-
tion of 8.5x 109 people, reached in 2100, at a stan-
dard free of squalor and hunger, and with
acceptable environmental consequences.
Goeller and Zucker's stress on capital and
research highlights the importance of human
ingenuity as a resource. I think it fair to say that
this resource is the key to attaining sustainable
development of the biosphere. To raise the question
of sustainability is to ask whether human beings can
devise, in timely fashion, the technical and institu-
tional instruments needed to remove resource and
environmental limits to mankind's aspirations for
a better material standard. By assuming continuous
growth of world population and income, I implicitly
assume that the limits will be continuously extend-
ed. More particularly, I implicitly assume that bar-
riers to world agricultural development will be
pushed back. So important is agriculture, especially
in the developing countries, that a sustained world
economic advance requires successful agricultural
development. There is, therefore, a certain circular-
ity in the argument presented here, but it is more
apparent than real. It disappears if the question is
presented thus: What resource and environmental
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conditions must be met if mankind is to achieve
aspirations for higher and indefinitely sustainable
levels of food and fiber production? In this chapter
we explore those conditions.
Precise projections of population and income
growth are not essential to the exploration. Higher
projections might, but would not necessarily, imply
more pressure on resources and the environment
than lower projections. In particular, high income
does not necessarily generate greater environ-
mental damage, since some of the most severe
environmental stress occurs in the poorest coun-
tries. But within any consensus range of projections
the resource and environmental conditions
necessary for successful agricultural development
will not vary greatly.
Population growth
Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1 give population estimates
for the current developed and developing countries
from 1850, with projections to 2075. Note the
steadily increasing share of the developing coun-
tries since 1940 and into the future. The World
Bank report [2] gives no figures for developing
country populations beyond 2050, but contains
graphics [2, p 75] showing that for those countries
given projections between 1980 and 2100 most
growth will occur by 2050. Thus the Keyfitz et al. [3]
and World Bank projections exhibit the same pattern
of growth for the developing countries. The World
Bank graphics indicate very little population growth
in the developing countries beyond 2100, with esti-
mates for that year ranging from about 7 x 109
to about lOx 109 • The lower estimate assumes a
rapid fall in fertility and a "standard" decline in
mortality, whereas the higher estimate assumes a
"standard" decline in fertility and a rapid fall in
mortality.
The World Bank's projections for the developing
countries bracket those of Keyfitz et al.; it does not
provide projections for developed countries, but it
is safe to assume they would differ from those of
Keyfitz et al. by much less than the differences for
developing countries. Both sets of projections
coincide in indicating that world population growth
will virtually cease by 2100, with relatively little
growth after 2050, and with a final total population
of between 8.5XI09 and 11.5XI09 , 82-87% of
whom will live in the current developing countries.
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Table 4.1 World population (millions).
Percent in
Developed Developing developing
Year countries 8 countries b countries
1850 302 869 74
1900 510 1098 68
1920 605 1255 67
1930 Barrie [4] 677 1391 67
1940 729 1565 68
1950 751 1764 70
1960 854 2144 72
1975] 1092 2844 732000 1274 4619 78
2025 Keyfitz et al. [3] 1380 5984 81
2050 1415 6782 83
2075 1434 7012 83
1982} 1106 3413 76
2000 World Bank [2] 4835
2050 8313
a Developed countries are the USA, Canada, western Europe, USSR, eastern Europe,
Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.
b Developing countries are all those not listed in a.
Income growth
At the present levels of per capital income in
developed countries additional income stimulates
little additional demand for basic food commodities.
In technical terms, the income elasticity of demand
for basic foods, such as grains, oilseeds, and root
crops, in these countries is very low. Any increase
that does occur is primarily in animal products,
which indirectly spurs demand for feed grains and
oil meals. As income in the developed countries
grows further even this source of demand will
diminish as diets reach saturation with animal prod-
ucts. Consequently, whatever the growth of per
capita income of developed countries it will add
little to world demand for basic food commodities.
I venture the judgment that beyond the middle
of the twenty-first century it will add virtually
nothing.
The matter is quite different in the developing
countries. Because per capita income in these coun-
tries is low, additions to income, if widely shared
among the poor, stimulate relatively large increases
in demand for basic foods; that is, income elasticities
of demand for food are high. Thus, in the poorest
countries higher income directly stimulates demand
for food grains and other basic foods. In middle-
income developing countries demand is shifting
toward more animal products, thus also indirectly
increasing demand for feed grains and oil meals.
Since income elasticities of demand for food are
high in developing countries, rates of growth in
food demand in these countries are sensitive to rates
of per capita income growth. Between 1970 and
1982 the real per capita gross national product
(GNP) in the developing countries grew at an
average annual rate of 3.2% [2]. It was 3.0% in the
poorest countries (average per capita GNP 1982 of
$280), 3.6% in middle-income countries (average
per capita GNP in 1982 of $1521), and 5.6% in four
high-income oil-exporting countries with an
average per capita GNP of $14820 (Libya, Saudi
Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates) [2].
Despite the run up of oil prices and associated
balance of payments problems in the 1970s, the
developing countries, apart from the oil exporters,
achieved only a marginally less per capita GNP
growth in that decade than in the 1960s.
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I assume a per capita GNP growth in the develop-
ing countries of not less than 2% annually for the
indefinite future, and that the poorest countries will
share fully in this (Figure 4.2). At this rate, per
capita GNP in the poorest countries will be $1765
in 2075 (1982 prices) and $2900 in 2100. The latter
is about the level of South Africa and Yugoslavia
in 1982 and 15% above that for Argentina in the
same year. Middle-income countries would have per
capita GNPs of $9600 in 2075 and $15700 in 2100,
a little less than that of Switzerland in 1982 [5].
At first glance, since per capita GNP in even the
poorest countries increased at an annual rate of
3.0% from 1960 to 1982, the projection of a sus-
tained 2% growth does not seem unreasonable. The
3.0% figure, however, conceals widely diverging
growth among the poorest countries. According to
the World Bank report [2J China's per capita GNP
grew by 5% annually from 1960 to 1982 [6J, whereas
the average annual growth for all other countries
in the poorest group was 1.4%, with 1.3% in India.
In eight of the poorest countries, seven of them
In Africa, per capita income declined over the
period.
These data indicate that, apart from China, the
poorest countries (with a population of 1258 Xl 06
in 1982) would have to do significantly better in the
future than they did in the past to achieve a sus-
tained 2% per capita GNP growth. What reasons
are there to believe that they can do it?
One is that other countries have done it, starting
from similarly low levels of per capita GNP, as Table
4.2 indicates. Another reason admittedly involves
a leap of faith. If the poorest countries fail to achieve
a sustained per capita GNP growth of at least 2%
annually they will almost surely fall short of meeting
the aspirations of their people for a better life. The
figure 2% carries no special magic and the world
will not end if per capita GNP in the poorest coun-
tries grows by less than that. But over 118 years
(1982 to 2100) the difference between 2% and the
1.4% recently experienced (excluding China) is sub-
stantial. If the latter rate prevails, per capita GNP
in the poorest countries (excluding China) would
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$13160
1982
USA
$2900
$1765'l
$280,I
1982 2075 2100
Low-income countries
$15700
$9600
$1521
~
1982 2075 2100
Middle-income countries
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Figure 4.2 Per capita income in the
USA and developing countries (1982
dollars); the projections assume a 2%
average annual growth [2].
be $1320 (1982 prices)_ in 2100 instead of $2900
that 2% will give. There is no guarantee that the
higher GNP would satisfy the aspirations of the
people of these countries, but it surely would be
more likely to than if GNP is less than half the
amount. I believe the consequences for social stabil-
ity of a difference that large will have a profound
impact on the effort that political leaders of the
poorest countries will devote to economic develop-
ment. They may fall short, hence the leap of faith
required to believe that they will not. However, the
consequences of failure will be severe, and this,
perhaps, is the strongest reason for believing the
leap is justified.
Climatic change
An apparent consensus has emerged that increasing
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide
(C0 2), and perhaps other gases, will result in
significant warming of the Earth's atmosphere, with
the largest increases in the polar regions [7, 8,9, 10).
Most estimates agree that atmospheric CO2 will be
double the present levels sometime between 2050
and 2075, but there is less agreement about the
resultant increase in temperature. Hare [7] cites a
source which indicates a rise in mean global
temperatu re of between 1.5 and 6.0 °C, with the most
likely increase being 3-4 dc. Cooper [11], drawing on
work of others reported in [8], assumes an increase of
2-3 DC, and the National Research Council [9] asserts
that the more sophisticated models of climatic
change indicate an increase of 1.5-4.5 DC. Dickinson
(Chapter 9, this volume) suggests that the warming
effects of increased CO2 concentrations and of cer-
tain other trace gases will more than offset a slight
cooling effect from increased surface albedo and
aerosol concentrations, resulting by 2100 in global
temperatures 6°C higher than those in preindus-
trial times (Dickinson, p 270). However, emphasiz-
ing the high uncertainty attached to such estimates,
Dickinson places the 6°C increase in the range +I
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Table 4.2. Sustained increases in GNP of the
poorer countries [2].a,b
a The list is not exhaustive of countries in the poorest
group that achieved an annual per capita GNP growth of
at least 2% from 1960 to 1982.
b National income accounting systems, from which the
above and all other per capita GNP estimates are derived,
do not include the social and environmental costs of
income growth. If they did, estimates of growth might
be lower. A main objective of this chapter is to emphasize
the importance of environmental costs in considering the
indefinite sustainability of measured income growth.
Social costs are addressed only in connection with equity
aspects of income distribution.
to +10°C. In his judgment, the chances are 95 out
of 100 that the actual increase by 2100 will fall
within these limits.
All analysts who have studied the matter agree
that increasing atmospheric concentrations of CO2
and the associated warming have important implica-
tions for world agriculture, but they agree less about
the nature of the implications. Wittwer [12,13] and
Waggoner [14] argue that larger atmospheric con-
centrations of CO2 would increase the rate of photo-
synthesis, particularly in wheat and other C3 plants,
thus stimulating production. Cooper [11] and
Rosenberg [10,15] are skeptical, arguing that the
supply of nutrients other than CO2 may generally
be the factor that limits plant growth [16].
Cooper [11] states that various climate models
predict that rising CO2 concentrations will increase
rainfall as well as temperatures, but that the models
are weak in predicting which regions will be most
affected (except that polar temperatures will
increase more than the average and equatorial tem-
peratures less). Dickinson (Chapter 9, this volume)
Country
China
Sri Lanka
Pakistan
Thailand
Egypt
Philippines
Republic of
South Korea
Per capita
GNP in 1960
(1982 $)
106
182
207
300
317
447
468
Average annual
growth
1960-1982 (%)
5.0
2.6
2.8
4.5
3.6
2.8
6.6
also emphasizes the difficulty of estimating the
regional impacts of global warming. Waggoner [14]
assumes that CO2-induced warming would be
accompanied by less, not more, precipitation, at
least in western USA. And a model developed by
Manabe and Wetherald, discussed by Cooper [11],
shows that doubling the CO2 concentration would
increase the difference between precipitation and
evaporation between latitudes 15° and 35°, leave
the difference about the same between latitudes 35°
and 40°, decrease it between latitudes 40° and 52°,
and increase it north of 52°.
Cooper [11] argues that present knowledge of
the effects of doubling atmospheric CO2 is too
limited to determine whether world agricultural
production would be increased or decreased.
Rosenberg [15] agrees, as does Schelling [17] in an
appraisal of the main findings reported in [9]. All
three authors, and others as well, emphasize,
however, that while agriculture in some regions will
likely benefit, it may suffer in others. Some regions
now marginal for crop production because of cli-
mate may become even more so. More warming in
northern latitudes should extend crop growing sea-
sons, but this would probably benefit Canada less
than might be expected, and less than the USSR,
because in the more northern latitudes of the
country the thin Canadian soils are more limiting
than the growing season. However, forest produc-
tivity in these latitudes should increase because of
the warmer temperatures [11].
Parry (Chapter 14, this volume) argues that
changes in mean temperatures and other climate
characteristics may be less significant for agriculture
(and perhaps for other activities) than changes in
the magnitude and frequency of extreme events.
An event is extreme only by comparison with some
standard, such as the mean of the distribution of
events. Parry suggests that in organizing their
operations, farmers give little weight to extreme
events, e.g., those with a probability of occurrence
of 0.05 or less. If, after a lengthy period of stability,
mean values (e.g., of temperature) rise, the
frequency of extremely hot periods is likely to
increase, judged by the mean temperature to which
farmers have become adjusted. In time they will
find a new pattern of adjustment to the changed
(warmer) climatic regime; but the interim may
include an unusual number of difficult growing
seasons, i.e., those in which, by historical experience,
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production is unusually suppressed or stimulated
by weather events.
None of the writers cited foresees an overall di-
sasterous agricultural consequence of CO2-induced
warming. They note the time available to make
adjustments and the demonstrated ability of
mankind to develop agricultural systems that are
productive under climatic conditions even more
variable than those portended by a doubling of
atmospheric CO2 • Schelling [17] emphasizes that
through history people have been willing and able
to move from less to more favorable climates.
Rosenberg [15] points out that through adaptive
plant breeding and farm-management improve-
ments the growing area for hard, red winter wheat
in the USA has spread since 1920, both north and
south, across climatic changes wider than those
forecast for CO2-induced warming. All writers
stress the importance of increased research, both
to improve predictions of the likelihood and con-
sequences of warming and to develop plant varieties
adapted to changing climatic conditions. Wittwer
[13] makes the point that because of high uncer-
tainty as to the agricultural consequences of warm-
ing, societies should concentrate on building the
capacity of researchers to respond quickly to unex-
pected change, avoiding commitments to lines of
research which close off this option. •
Clearly, COTinduced climatic change on the scale
expected now may have important consequences
for world agricultural development. However, on
present evidence it appears that the major con-
sequences will be shifts in the regional distribution
of production rather than an increase or decrease
in total production. Given present uncertain-
ties about the regional effects, there is no point
in further speculation along this line. It is clear,
however, that the prospective climatic change com-
pounds the many uncertainties that are already
an integral part of future world agricultural
development.
Increasing urbanization
One of the clearest lessons of human history is that
economic development involves a relative shift of
people and resources out of agriculture into a
widening array of nonagricultural activities.
Because these activities typically require much less
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land per unit of output than agriculture, develop-
ment inevitably results in increasing concentrations
of people, that is to say, in urbanization.
Since urbanization is a response to the increasing
importance of nonagricultural output, it is not sur-
prising that the more strongly industrialized
economies are more heavily urbanized than those
less industrialized. Thus in 1975 about two thirds
of the people in developed countries (those of North
America, Europe, USSR, Japan, and Oceania) lived
in urban areas, compared to 28% of the people in
the developing countries of Latin America, Africa,
and Asia [18].
While data do not enable an accurate dating of
the beginnings of urbanization, it is clear that the
process has been under way for centuries. The
industrialization of Europe in the nineteenth cen-
tury resulted in rapid urbanization of that region,
the population of major cities in Belgium, Den-
mark, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands,
Spain, and the UK rising from 5.8% of the popula-
tion in 1850 to 10.5% in 1900. The urbanization
process continued well into the twentieth century,
but at a slower rate: by 1960, the same set of cities
had 13.5% of the total population of the named
countries [19,20].
Data for Latin America and the USA demonstrate
the relationship between industrialization and the
process of urbanization. In 18508.8% of the USA
population lived in towns of 20000 or more, while
in Latin America the comparable percentage was
only a little less, 6.3. By 1940, 47% of the USA
population lived in such towns, compared to 19.5%
in Latin America. Since 1940 industrialization and
related activities have increased relatively faster in
Latin America than in the USA, and Latin American
urbanization has also occurred at a faster rate (Table
4.3). The developing countries of Asia and Africa
have also experienced a relatively rapid urban-
ization since 1950 (Table 4.4). The projections of
continued growth in population and income in
developing countries imply increasing urbanization
as well, although probably at a slower percentage
rate than in the last several decades. Some addi-
tional urbanization is also likely in the developed
countries. However, since in all of these countries
most people already live in urban areas and pros-
pective population growth is small, urbanization will
proceed much more slowly than in the developing
countries.
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Table 4.3 Percentage of the USA and Latin American populations living
in towns of 20000 or more, various years [21].
1850 1900 1920 1940 1960 1970
Latin America 6.3 10.7 14.7 19.5 29.1 35.2
USA 8.8 25.9 42.0 47.0 58.5 64.0
Table 4.4 Percentage of the population in urban areas, developed
and developing countries, various years [18].
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World
Developed countries
Developing countries
Latin America
Africa
South Asia
China
Other East Asian countries
(except Japan)
1950
29.0
52.5
16.7
41.2
14.5
15.7
11.0
28.6
1960
33.9
58.7
21.9
49.5
18.2
17.8
18.6
36.3
1970
37.5
64.7
25.8
57.4
22.9
20.5
21.6
47.5
1975
39.3
67.5
28.0
61.2
25.7
22.0
23.3
53.4
Urbanization and associated increases in urban
income are essential to successful agricultural
development [22]. Growing urban markets for food
and fiber, and for labor, provide the incentives
farmers need to produce more, and they make
feasible the adoption of technologies which raise
the productivity of farm labor. As this suggests,
urban income growth is likely to provide more
stimulus to agricultural development if it is widely
shared among all urban income classes than if it is
narrowly concentrated. Urbanization also expands
the supply of goods and services - fertilizer,
machinery, credit, etc. - essential to agricultural
development. Experience suggests that this process
is more effective if urban growth is regionally dis-
persed rather than concentrated in a few very large
metropolitan centers.
The point here is that agricultural development
is integrally connected to nonagricultural develop-
ment, and awareness of the connection is essential
to clear thinking about the pace and direction of
agricultural change. In particular, government
policies that emphasize the broad sharing of urban
income gains among all income classes and promote
regionally dispersed urban growth are more likely
to encourage strong agricultural development than
policies of opposite tendencies.
Rising economic value of labor
Sustained increases in per capita income and
urbanization imply a rising economic value of
labor, which does not necessarily mean a less un-
equal distribution of income. Indeed, the relation-
ship is consistent with widening relative differences
between income classes. However, it is unlikely that
the per capita income in any country could rise for
long periods at a rate as low as even the 2% I have
assumed for the developing countries without most
of the working population sharing in the increase.
Real wages rose substantially in all of the presently
developed countries as they made the transition
from agricultural-rural to industrial-urban
economies. A study by the Brookings Institution
[23] indicates that in the developing countries the
poor shared, although often not equally, in the
income gains achieved since the 1950s. Indeed, the
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report asserts that " ... for many of the poor,
income growth has been rapid. General economic
growth and deliberate policy efforts have inter-
acted to produce some development for the
poor [23, p 33]."
The rising economic value of labor is significant
for agriculture because it conditions the technologi-
cal choices that farmers make. Over time they will
shift toward more labor-saving technologies, the
rate of shift depending to a large measure on the
scarcity or abundance of farm labor relative to other
resources and on the rate of increase in urban
employment and income [24]. Where the farm labor
force is large relative to land and capital, as in India,
China, and other Asian countries, the income of
farm workers will likely grow only slowly for several
decades, even with continued agricultural develop-
ment, retarding the shift toward more labor-saving
technologies. Where farm labor is less abundant the
shift should be more rapid, but in a perspective on
agricultural development extending over many
decades the rising economic value of labor should
be taken as a basic factor moving farmers more or
less steadily toward more labor-saving technologies.
Equity as a social objective
Agricultural development is a social process, pro-
foundly affecting and affected by other social pro-
cesses. The notion of equity in income distribution
and, more broadly, in access to emerging oppor-
tunities opened up by the process of development
seems increasingly to focus the attention of large
segments of societies everywhere. It finds increasing
expression even in the utterances of public officials.
To be sure, the notion is usually vaguely defined or
defined in different ways, and the utterances are as
often rhetoric as expressions of serious purpose.
Yet I think if we look back over a period of many
decades, or a century, we observe that many
societies have, in fact, moved toward a more equi-
table treatment of their more disadvantaged mem-
bers, and that in most societies that movement con-
tinues today, halting though it may be. Indeed, in
some the movement is indiscernable and in many,
if not most, it often appears a matter of two steps
forward and one step back. Yet for a long perspec-
tive on the future I expect the notion of equity to
acquire increasing force, if for no other reason than
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that in the long run the welfare of the few cannot
be disentangled from that of the many.
If I am correct in this, the notion of equity will
increasingly affect patterns of agricultural develop-
ment, especially patterns of technological change
in agriculture. Technologies perceived to have
inequitable consequences for income distribution
or to impose inequitably distributed environmental
costs on present or future generations will meet
more resistance than technologies not so perceived.
Such resistance is observable already. The Green
Revolution technology used in developing countries
has come under heavy criticism from many who
perceive it to favor the relatively few more wealthy
farmers and to result in rising rural unemployment
[e.g., 25, 26]. Much evidence disputes this view [e.g.,
27, 28], but its accuracy is not the point here. One
presumes that in the long run truth will prevail, but
meanwhile perceptions of the truth count.
Other examples abound of the role of perceptions
of equity in technological change. Concern about
the unintended consequences of pesticide use stems
from equity considerations, and erosive farm prac-
tices are disapproved because they threaten to
impose inequitable cost increases on future gener-
ations. A striking, recent example of the power of
equity concerns is the legal action taken by a farm
union and others against the University of Califor-
nia for its role in developing a mechanical tomato
harvester [29]. The charge is illegal use of public
funds to benefit private interests, but the driving
force behind the suit is concern about equity: the
harvester displaced thousands of workers formerly
employed in picking tomatoes.
The strengthening commitment to equity in
economic development is not peculiar to agricul-
ture - it cuts across the whole development process.
But that it will condition patterns of agricultural
development all around the world seems increas-
ingly likely.
Induced technical and institutional
change
Agricultural development can be viewed as a
cumulative process of change in technology and
institutions, understanding of which requires some
concept of what drives the technological and institu-
tional change. The induced innovation hypothesis
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of Hayami and Ruttan [30], building on work of
Schultz (31), is such a concept. The hypothesis states
that emerging resource scarcities are signaled by
rising prices, and these provide incentives for
agriculturalists to find substitutes for the increas-
ingly expensive resources. In the short term, substi-
tution occurs within existing technology by simply
using more of the less-expensive resources relative
to the more expensive for a given amount of output.
a given output declines and typically unit produc-
tion costs fall.
Figure 4..3 is a simplified illustration of these pro-
cesses. The figure deals with only two resources,
fertilizer and land, but inclusion of labor and other
resources would not change the principles involved.
The price of fertilizer relative to the price of land
in the initial period is given by the slope of the price
line P. Curve X shows the various combinations of
Quantity of fertilizer
Figure 4.3 Substitution of less ex-
pensive for more expensive resources
in agricultural development.
Quantity of landLL'o
o
F
F"
pi
F'
Unit production costs increase but less than they
would without the substitution. Eventually - the
time period is variable - new technologies are
developed that involve the use of new resources
and permit replacement, on an even larger scale, of
those resources that have become more expensive.
The total quantity of resources required to produce
fertilizer and land that will produce the maximum
amount of some product, say rice, with existing
technology. It is called a production possibility
curve. Given the relative prices of fertilizer and
land, the most economical combination of the two
resources is given by the point of tangency (indi-
cated by a) of price line P with production possibility
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curve X. So efficient farmers will combine OL ha
of land with OF kg of fertilizer to produce the given
amount of rice.
With rising population and income the demand
for rice increases, putting pressure on the supply
of land. Its price rises relative to that of fertilizer,
the new price relationship being described by price
line P'. Farmers respond by substituting some of
the relatively cheaper fertilizer for some of the
relatively more expensive land. To produce the
given amount of rice the most efficient resource
combination now is OL' ha of land and OF' kg of
fertilizer (point b).
The substitution of fertilizer for land makes
farmers and consumers of rice better-off than if the
substitution had not occurred. However, consumers
are less well-off than they were before the price of
land began to rise because the price of rice now is
higher [32]. Moreover, continuing increases in
demand for rice portend even higher costs and
prices unless new technology is developed to reduce
pressure on the land. This is the situation which,
according to the induced innovation hypothesis,
stimulates demand for technological change.
Farmers wishing to acquire land may convey their
distress through extension agents or their political
representatives, and the latter may also fear rising
consumer unrest because of higher food prices.
Scientists and those responsible for management of
agricultural research respond to these pressures by
allocating more resources to development of land-
saving technologies, but they may respond also to
their own direct perception of the increasing scar-
city of land. If the response of the research establish-
ment is judged inadequate by those agitating for
relief from increasing land scarcity, pressure rises
to force the institutional changes needed to obtain
the wanted response. If land tenure or rural credit
systems impede adoption of the new technology
after it has been developed, further pressure is
built-up to remove these obstacles. Thus the
induced innovation hypothesis seeks to explain
institutional change as well as technological
advance.
Referring again to Figure 4.3, X' is the production
possibility curve representing a new technology
developed in response to rising land scarcity. The
shift from X to X' illustrates the shift from tradi-
tional rice varieties to the short stem, high yield,
fertilizer responsive varieties developed at the
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International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) in the
Philippines. In the figure it is assumed that relative
prices of fertilizer and land have not changed since
the initial run up in land prices (price lines P" and
P' have the same slope). With the higher yield rice
varieties the efficient combination of resources is
OL" ha of land and OF" kg of fertilizer. Production
of the given amount of rice now requires far less
land than originally or than after the initial substitu-
tion of fertilizer for land. Total fertilizer consump-
tion has increased substantially.
Since its initial elaboration by Hayami and Ruttan
[30] the induced innovation hypothesis has been
much discussed In agricultural development
literature [33]. Hayami and Ruttan will soon publish
a revision of their book which will incorporate both
extensions and modifications of the theoretical
argument, as well as substantially more empirical
material than in the original book.
In my judgment, the hypothesis provides keen
insights into the processes of technological and insti-
tutional change in agricultural development, but it
is more successful in explaining the demand for
change than in explaining its supply. The
hypothesis was first used to examine agricultural
development in the USA and Japan, where increas-
ing scarcity of labor in the first instance and of land
in the second seemed to generate appropriate tech-
nological and institutional responses. But there are
other areas, e.g., Sub-Saharan Africa, where the
increasing scarcity of agricultural resources is
notorious and has excited much concern in the
international community, as well as in the African
countries themselves. However, appropriate tech-
nological and institutional innovations have been
slow in forthcoming or not forthcoming at all.
Similarly, the increasing scarcity of firewood for
home cooking and heating is well documented in
the developing countries, but so far development
of substitute fuels lags badly.
The induced innovation hypothesis depends on
prices to signal emerging resource scarcity. Con-
sequently, it has difficulty in explaining technologi-
cal and institutional responses to increasing scarcity
of unpriced resources, such as land, water, and air
where these are used as cost-free receptors of
agricultural, industrial, and municipal wastes. For
the same reason the hypothesis, at least in its present
form, is of limited use in accounting for the role
of equity concerns in shaping technological and
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institutional change in agriculture. The social costs
that arouse these concerns are real, but they are not
priced. Finally, the hypothesis seems to have little
relevance to technological change based on scientific
inquiry spurred by nothing more than the questing
human mind. Few would deny that attacks on
scientific ignorance simply "because its there" have
played a role in the history of technological advance.
The induced innovation hypothesis assumes
utilitarian underpinnings of the demand for
knowledge, nota disinterested oreven playful search
for the fun of it.
Despite these limitations the induced innovation
hypothesis provides a useful approach to under-
standing technological and institutional change in
agricultural development. I adopt a broad formula-
tion of the hypothesis, asserting that changes in
agricultural technology and institutions are induced
by perceptions of emerging scarcities of land, water,
labor, and other agricultural resources, of mounting
environmental stress, and by concerns about the
equity impacts of development.
Time horizon
The concern here is with interactions between
agriculture and the biosphere over the long term.
But how long is that? The answer I adopt is: as long
as agricultural pressure on the resource base and
environment is increasing significantly. I believe
most of the increase that will ever occur will occur
in the next 75 to 100 years, for two reasons. One
is that world population growth will have virtually
ceased by then, removing one of the main driving
forces behind rising demand for food. The other
is that by then per capita income in all but the very
poorest countries will have reached a level at which
additional income will generate very little additional
demand for basic foods. Recall the earlier projec-
tions of $1765 per capita income (1982 prices) in
the poorest developing countries by 2075 and of
$2900 by 2100. At present, the income elasticity of
demand for basic foods at these levels of per capita
income is 0.1 to 0.2 for food grains and 0.3 to 0.4
for feed grains, by way of demand for animal prod-
ucts. If these elasticities also hold 100 years from
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now, then a 2% annual growth in per capita income
in the poorest countries in the last quarter of the
twenty-first century would generate 0.2 to 0.4%
and 0.6 to 0.8% annual growths in demand for food
and feed grains, respectively. Increased population
would add to the demand, but not by much. In the
present developed countries (17% of the world
population in 2075, according to Keyfitz et at. [3]),
neither population nor income growth will add any-
thing to the demand for these foods. In the present
middle-income developing countries (26% of the
world population in 1982, but probably less in 2075)
population growth will probably add even less to
the additional food demand than it does in the
poorest countries, and per capita income will be so
high ($9600 in 2075 - see the discussion of income
projections above) that income elasticities of
demand for basic foods will be close to zero.
By this line of argument virtually all the increase
in world demand for basic foods in the last quarter
of the twenty-first century will be in the present
poorest countries. Growth of annual world demand
for feed grains might be 0.6% (0.8% to account for
income in the poorest countries, plus 0.2% for
population growth there times, say, 0.6 for their
fraction of world population). Annual world
demand for food grains would be about half that
for feed grains.
In the decade up to 1982, annual increases in
world demand for rice, wheat, and feed grains were
2.5, 2.3, and 1.9%, respectively. Projections of
population and income growth in the developing
countries indicate that these rates of demand
growth will probably not decline much before about
2050. The drastically lower rates likely by the last
quarter of the twenty-first century thus point to the
earlier stated conclusion that almost all the increase
in demand for basic foods the world will ever see
will be witnessed within the next 75 to 100 years.
Note the emphasis throughout the discussion on
demand for "basic foods", meaning direct con-
sumption of rice, wheat, and other food grains and
both direct and indirect (by way of animal products)
consumption of maize, grain sorghum, and other
feed grains. These commodities, and oilseeds used
as animal feed, occupy most of the world's cropland,
employ most of the world's labor engaged in
agriculture, take virtually all the fertilizers and
pesticides applied by agriculturalists, and account
for almost all the world's use of water for irrigation.
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Moreover, much of the deforestation and resultant
environmental damage that occurs in the world is
due to land clearance for production of these crops.
For these reasons, increasing demand for these
crops is responsible for most of the rising pressure
on the resource base and for the environmental
stress that stems from world agricultural develop-
ment. I suspect, although present data are
inadequate to prove, that in comparison with these
crops the resource and environmental pressures
originating from the production of forest products
are at least an order of magnitude less.
If most of the additional demand growth for
food- and feed-grains (and oilseeds) occurs in the
next 75 to 100 years it is likely that most of any
additional pressure on the world resource base and
environment will also occur in this period. Accord-
ingly, the relevant time horizon for this analysis,
insofar as world food production is concerned, is
the next 75 to 100 years. For forestry the horizon
may be longer because the income elasticity of
demand for lumber and furniture does not decline
with rising income as does the demand elasticity for
basic foods. However, population growth is also an
important component of rising demand for forest
products and the virtual cessation of world popula-
tion growth after 2100 will tend to signifIcantly slow
the growth of demand for these products after that
date.
This line of argument implies that beyond the
next 100 years agriculture's draw on resources for
the production of basic food commodities will be
primarily for maintenance and replacement of
existing production systems, not for expansion. The
level of resource demand will be much higher than
now, but it will not be increasing. The share of land,
water, and ordinary labor in the resource mix will
be less than now and the share of science-based
manufactured resources and human capital will be
greater. Problems of resource management in
agriculture will not disappear and they may be quite
different than at present. My guess is that the cessa-
tion of growth in demand will make the problems
easier to handle, whatever they may be. In any
event, limiting this analysis to the period in which
demand for basic foods and fiber ceases to grow
still leaves plenty of work to do. If we can manage
the problems generated by growth we should be
well positioned to deal with those that arise in the
subsequent period of no growth.
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When growth in demand for basic foods and fiber
ceases in the developing countries, the quantity of
resources used to process, package, and deliver food
and fiber to final consumers will increase relative
to the quantity devoted to production on the farm
and in the forest. This tendency is already far
advanced in the developed countries. (In the USA
the farmer receives less than 40 cents of each dollar
consumers spend on food.) High income promotes
demand for restaurant food and the high value of
labor and leisure spurs demand for time-saving
forms of food preparation in the home. The high
value of labor also stimulates demand for more
processed wood materials used in housing and
building construction. There is every reason to
believe that these tendencies will continue in the
developed countries and will acquire increasing
momentum in the developing countries as their
incomes increase.
Thus the quantity of resources devoted to the
delivery of agricultural commodities beyond the
farm gate and the forest will likely continue to
increase indefinitely beyond the next 100 years,
which may pose mounting resource and environ-
mental problems. But these are problems of
economic development in general. They are not
peculiar to agricultural development and so are not
considered here.
The argument that world demand for agricul-
tural resources will show little growth beyond the
next 75 to 100 years assumes no massive substitution
of biomass for fossil and other sources of energy
over the next 75 to 100 years and beyond. Should
this happen, the declining resource and environ-
mental pressure associated with declining growth
in food demand could be offset by increasing pres-
sure from rising demand for biomass energy. How
likely is this?
No one knows. The answer depends on the long-
term behavior of the economic and environmental
costs of fossil and other energy sources relative to
those of biomass sources. Under present conditions
biomass, unless subsidized, is not competitive with
fossil energy in most uses, as demonstrated by the
currently small share that biomass contributes to
the total world energy supply. However, there is a
consensus that the costs of fossil energy will rise
indefinitely, although there are differences as to the
rate of rise (see Darmstadter, Chapter 5, this
volume). Such an indefinite rise would strengthen
Agricultural development
the competitive position of biomass energy unless
its costs rise proportionately or more, or unless
other non fossil sources (nuclear, photovoltaics, and
other direct solar) become even more competitive.
This is a guessing game, but guess we must until
improved data and analysis permit us to do better.
In his review of the best qualified energy guessers
Darmstadter does not give major attention to the
prospects for biomass. However, he says of a study
at IIASA [34] that in its view"... small scale solar
and other renewable energy sources, while assumed
to playa growing role, are likely to satisfy only a
modest fraction of the total global energy demand
beyond the first quarter of the twenty-first century"
(Darmstadter, Chapter 5, p 158).
This view supports the conclusion that most of
any increased resource and environmental pressure
from world agricultural development will occur
over the next 75 to 100 years. The future of biomass
fuels, however, may contain one or more of those
"surprises" which shock conventional linear think-
ing, and set us into unexpected and poorly under-
stood patterns of resource use. If this happens, the
future course of world agricultural development
will be different from that assumed in this inquiry:
so be it.
Components of agricultural
systems
Nature of the systems
It is useful to think of agricultural systems as consist-
ing of four interdependent components: resources,
technology, environment, and institutions (R-T-E-
I systems). The function of the systems is to produce
food, fiber, and forest products in response to the
effective demand for them. The systems perform
the function by combining land, water, labor, fer-
tilizer, and so on (resources) in specific ways (tech-
nology). The production process always generates
effluents which may have detrimental impacts on
the receiving media (environment). These impacts
often affect income distribution because the people
who bear them cannot exact compensation from
the farmers and foresters who impose them. The
production process also affects the distribution of
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income between workers, landowners, and sup-
pliers of purchased resources. Income distribution,
and particularly changes in distribution, inherently
raise issues of equity which every society must con-
tend with, like it or not. Institutions, the fourth
component of R-T-E-I agricultural systems, are
social creations designed to deal with these issues.
Apart from equity, however, institutions govern the
quantity and kinds of resources that flow into
agriculture and the disposal of the products that
flow out. Institutional performance thus pro-
foundly affects agriculture at any time, as well as
its development over time.
Relation of system components
The quantity, quality, and terms of availability of
resources affect the kinds of technologies agricul-
turalists choose to employ, but these choices also
affect the terms of availability of resources. For
example, the wide adoption of land-using tech-
nologies (say because of rising fertilizer prices) will
likely increase land prices, while the sustained
growth of a land-saving technology, such as irriga-
tion, will, in time, increase the relative scarcity of
water. As noted, these technological choices also
affect the environment, setting up feedback effects
on both resource and technology components of
the system. For example, if the chosen technologies
are highly erosive, the productivity of the land will
eventually be impaired, increasing the relative scar-
city of land. In addition, accelerated sedimentation
of downstream reservoirs diminishes capacity to
provide irrigation, electric power, and flood control.
These impacts in turn will likely trigger public
policies to induce or require agriculturalists to
employ less erosive technologies and management
practices. If the existing institutional structure is
inadequate to accomplish this, pressure for a more
effective structure will rise.
Actors in R-T-E-I systems
The R-T -E-I systems [35] are driven by demand
for food, fiber, and forest products, and by the
,
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decisions of a hierarchy of actors. The prime mover
is the "agriculturalist", defined as whoever decides
how to respond to demand. The agriculturalist
chooses what and how much to produce, on which
specific piece of land, the resources to be employed,
and what particular combination. The agricul-
turalist may be a single individual or family living
on and working the land or a committee in a local,
regional, or national office. What distinguishes the
agriculturalist from other actors in the systems is
that "his" decisions directly set the production pro-
cess in motion.
The empirical evidence is overwhelming that
agriculturalists are rational in the sense that they
will seek to maximize the returns through time of
the resources they control. In market economies
the return is best represented by the net return
from agricultural production. In centrally planned
economies the return may be in higher salaries or
bonuses, opportunity for advancement, enhanced
prestige for a job well done, or the accumulation
of savings for reinvestment in the agricultural enter-
prise.
In either type of economy rational decision mak-
ing requires looking beyond the immediate future.
This is obviously true in forestry or tree crops, but
it is true also for animal production and even for
production of annual crops. In all these cases the
agriculturalist is aware that the decisions taken now
have consequences many months or even years
ahead. To the extent that those consequences affect
the return to the agriculturalist he will try to take
them into account, discounting them implicitly or
explicitly so that alternative decisions can be com-
pared. If the consequences do not affect the dis-
counted net return to the agriculturalist he will
ignore them, even though they may adversely (or
beneficially) affect other parts of the R-T -E-I sys-
tem or the larger society of which it is a part. In
particular, environmental consequences of produc-
tion are likely to be ignored because institutional
structures bring them within the agriculturalist's
decision making purview only imperfectly or not at
all.
Rational decision makers also take account of risk.
Agriculturalists are particularly exposed to risk
because of the relatively long time (at least a single
growing season for annual crops, and years for
managed forestry) between the beginning of pro-
duction and collection of the output. In that time
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the weather is unpredictable, output prices may fall
or input prices rise, credit may become more expen-
sive or not available at all, supplies of crucial inputs
may be interrupted, strikes may occur at harvest
time, and so on. Agriculturalists have differing atti-
tudes toward risk, but all will take it into account,
seeking to reduce their exposure to its adverse con-
sequences.
For poor agriculturalists this may mean continued
reliance on traditional seed varieties and cropping
systems even though exclusive cropping of higher
yield varieties would seem to offer a higher return.
But the new technology is likely to be riskier than
the traditional one. It would involve unfamiliar
practices and the monocultural system may be more
vulnerable to attack from insects and disease than
the traditional system, so there is as great a likeli-
hood of loss as of gain from the new system. But
the poor agriculturalist operates so close to the
margin of subsistence that the consequence of loss
would be disaster. So he weights the probability of
loss more heavily than the probability of gain and
opts for the traditional system.
Of course poor agriculturalists will respond to
new technology, as demonstrated by the spread of
the Green Revolution technology in Asia. Risk may
slow the response, but this does not reflect irrational
behavior. Close analysis of agriculturalists'
responses to new technology usually shows that
when they fail to adopt it is not in their interest to
adopt, with high risk often a major reason.
The nonagriculturalists in the hierarchy of actors
affecting R-T-E-I systems do so indirectly by
influencing the conditions that determine the
return to agriculturalists from the production pro-
cess. These actors include extension agents and
vendors of inputs, managers of irrigation systems,
bank lending officers, ministers of agriculture and
finance, researchers in national and international
agricultural research institutions, officials in
environmental protection agencies, and the collec-
tivity of anonymous individuals whose behavior in
world and national markets affects the prices of
agricultural commodities and inputs.
Nonagriculturalists transmit signals, deliberately
or not, which guide agriculturalists in deciding what
and how much to produce and which technologies
to use. Many of the signals are incidental results of
actions taken with no thought of their agricultural
impact. Oil pricing decisions by OPEC, for example,
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evidently are made with little if any consideration
of their important long-term implications for
resource use in world agriculture. Credit policies
designed to restrain inflation will likely increase
interest rates or result in credit rationing, reducing
the attractiveness of investment in new agricultural
technology. Policies to protect domestic industry
against imports increase the prices of agricultural
inputs.
These unintended signals may drown out others
designed by public officials to induce action by
agriculturalists to improve performance of the
R-T-£-1 systems. In fact, this probably explains
many instances of the failure of agriculturalists to
respond to public policies; they do not get the
message because contrary signals come through
more loudly and clearly. It is unlikely that these
unintended signals can be completely turned off.
Where they exist they will likely constrain, some-
times severely, the ability of policymakers to deliber-
ately change the behavior of R-T -£-1 systems.
Future of R-T-E-I systems
The several external factors, discussed on pp 104-
115, will shape and constrain the behavior of
R-T-£-1 systems everywhere. The prospective
mcrease in energy prices is especially important
because agricultural development inevitably
requires increasing amounts of effectively used
energy per hectare and per unit of labor. Much of
the additional energy will be in the form of nitrogen
fertilizer. It is not certain that more expensive
energy will increase prices of nitrogen fertilizer -
advances in fertilizer production technology may
compensate - but the likelihood surely is greater
than if the outlook were for constant or declining
energy pnces.
Much irrigation now is from pumped ground-
water. In fact most of the additional irrigation in-
stalled during the last 20 years in the USA was from
groundwater and groundwater was of major
importance in the spread of the Green Revolution
in the Punjab region of India and Pakistan. In many
parts of the world groundwater is an important
potential source of future irrigation, but rising
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energy prices render tapping the potential less
economically attractive than it otherwise would
be.
Phosphorus is an essential nutrient for all agricul-
tural production. Concern has been expressed from
time to time about its long-term su pply, but in a
recent assessment Goeller and Zucker [1] concluded
that, with world economic growth similar to that
projected here, current and extended reserves of
phosphorus would be only 28% depleted by 2100.
They do not estimate phosphorus production
costs, but the large reserves estimated to be
available in 2100 suggest that costs would not rise
sharply. Production of phosphate fertilizer is not
nearly as energy intensive as that of nitrogen
fertilizer.
The short-to-medium term
Although all systems will be conditioned by energy
and other external factors, their responses to these
factors will differ according to their specific circum-
stances. Over the short-to-medium term, say two
decades, the key circumstances are the systems'
present endowment of resources and their potential
for productivity gains with currently known agricul-
tural technologies. Over the longer term the current
circumstances become less relevant and the issue
increasingly concerns the capacity of countries to
devise institutions needed to channel resources into
development of appropriate technologies and to
deal with emerging environmental stress and equity
concerns. This distinction between short- and long-
term circumstances does not mean that present
institutional capacities are irrelevant in the short
run or resource endowments in the long run. The
distinction is analytically useful, but like all analyti-
cal constructs it does not pretend to faithfully reflect
reality in all its complexity.
In thinking about the short-to-medium term
behavior of R-T-£-1 systems I find it useful to put
countries or groups of countries into one of the
following four categories (Figure 4.4):
(l) Low productivity potential-high land potential.
(2) Low productivity potential-low land potential.
(3) High productivity potential-high land
potential.
(4) High productivity potential-low land potential.
Low High
POTENTIAL FOR INCREASED PRODUCTIVITY
___-'I ..
EXAMPLES:
Ind ia, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Indonesia, China
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CATEGORY 1
EXAMPLES:
USA, Canada, Australia
ENVI RONMENTAL
PROBLEMS:
erosion
CATEGORY 2
EXAMPLE:
Western Europe
ENVI RONMENTAL
PROBLEMS:
nitrates in groundwater?
i
CATEGORY 3
EXAMPLES:
Argentina, Brazil
ENVI RONMENTAL
PROBLEMS:
erosion, pesticides?
deforestation?
CATEGORY 4
ENVI RONMENTAL
PROBLEMS:
erosion, pesticides,
deforestation, salinity,
and other irrigation-related
problems
I
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Figure 4.4 Potential for increasing
land and technological productivity,
with representative cou ntries and
environmental problems.
Recall that productivity potential is measured
with respect to currently known technologies. This
means technologies currently in wide use as well as
those the use of which is spreading as agricultu ralists
become more aware of their potential. Land poten-
tial refers to the supply of land relative to the supply
of other agricultural resources, particularly labor.
Category 1 countries
The USA is the largest agricultural producer in this
category, to which Canada and Australia probably
also belong. I believe the situation in the USA is
similar enough to that in these other countries that
it can be taken as representative.
Agricultural land is abundant in the USA with
respect to category 2 and 4 countries. USA agricul-
tural productivity is high, but there is reason to
believe that with present technology its potential
for future gain is low relative to the potential 10 or
20 years ago and relative to the potential currently
available in category 3 and 4 countries. The rate of
increase in USA crop output per acre (yields) and
10 total productivity (ratio of total output to total
input) slowed significantly following the run up in
energy prices in 1973 [36, 37]. Other evidence indi-
cates that the marginal productivity of fertilizer
(output increase per unit addition of fertilizer) is
substantially less than it was a decade or two ago [38].
This combination of relatively much land and
relatively limited productivity potential suggests
that, confronted with rising energy prices, USA
agriculturalists will respond to increasing crop
demand by adopting technologies that incorporate
increasing amounts of land. Use of fertilizers
and pesticides will increase also, but not by nearly
as much, relative to land, as in the 1950s and 1960s.
The additional cropland will be converted from
land now in pasture, range, and forest, with pasture
providing the greater part. The amount converted
is not likely to seriously impinge on land needed
for livestock and forestry production, given modest
improvements in productivity of land in these uses.
However, much of the land likely to be converted
is inherently more erosive than land already in crops
and, moreover, land in crops inevitably erodes more
than land in grass or forest. For these reasons, the
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prospective pattern of agricultural expansion in the
USA over the short-to-medium term is likely to
greatly increase erosion [36]. To date, erosion in
the USA appears to have had a small effect on
productivity of the land. (Erosion reduced the
growth of maize and soybean yields by 4% between
1950 and 1980 [39].) And analysis indicates that
continuation of current rates of erosion would
reduce yields by only 5-10% in 100 years if there
were no offsetting advances in technology [40].
Should erosion increase substantially, the yield
impact would no doubt be greater than this.
Off-site damages of erosion originating in USA
agriculture now cost several billion dollars annually,
significantly more than the cost of soil productivity
loss [41]. These damages - siltation of lakes and
reservoirs, costs of dredging of rivers and harbors,
increased flooding, impaired recreational values,
and so on - of course would increase with more
erosion.
Erosion damage, especially off site, now appears
to be the most severe environmental impact of USA
agricultural production. By comparison, damages
imposed by fertilizer, pesticides, and salinity with
irrigation are relatively small, and likely to remain
so [36]. Historically, insecticides have received most
of the attention of those concerned with environ-
mental impacts of agriculture. However, insecticide
use in the USA is decreasing rapidly, primarily
because of the adoption of integrated pest manage-
ment practices in cotton production and a shift in
production from the southeast and Mississippi
Delta, where insect problems are severe, to Texas,
where they are much less so. Moreover, the insecti-
cides of greatest environmental concern, the per-
sistent chlorinated hydrocarbons, e.g., DDT, are
now of minor importance.
Herbicide use is increasing rapidly in USA
agriculture. Present evidence indicates that the most
commonly used herbicides are not particularly
threatening to the environment, but not all the ways
in which herbicides might impact the environment
have been well studied. Should subsequent research
reveal damage not now apparent, the judgment
that erosion will present the major environmental
threat of agriculture may have to be revised.
There are grounds for some confidence that USA
institutions involved with agriculture have enough
flexibility to cope reasonably well with the short-to-
medium term situation depicted here. Farmers gen-
121
erally adapted well to the run up in energy prices
in the 1970s, rapidly adopting conservation tillage,
a less energy-intensive practice than tillage with the
moldboard plow. And in the arid and semiarid west
the increasing energy costs of pumping induced
various practices to increase the efficiency of irriga-
tion water use, e.g., private and public institutions
provided farmers with information about soil mois-
ture and other conditions, enabling them to irrigate
at optimum times and in optimum amounts [42].
The federal Environmental Protection Agency,
although frequently subject to heavy criticism, none-
theless did a creditable job in restricting use of the
most environmentally threatening insecticides. And
the development of integrated pest management
techniques was a direct response of public institu-
tions to perceived threats, both economic and
environmental, posed by the continued heavy reli-
ance on insecticides in cotton production.
The main grounds for concern about the institu-
tional response to emerging environmental stress
concerns off-site erosion damage, arguably the most
important source of stress. Historically, erosion
impacts on soil productivity have been the main
concern of policymakers in the US Department of
Agriculture. Off-site damage now is commanding
more attention, but the habitual view of the erosion
problem still dominates.
Institutional response in dealing with equity con-
cerns also seems to have been reasonably good in
the USA. Real per capita disposable income of farm
people increased twice as much as that of the non-
farm population between 1950-1951 and 1980-
1981, almost achieving parity by the latter date,
Figure 4.5 [43]. Within agriculture, the largest gains
were among the smallest farmers, measured by
annual sales of farm output [44]. Both of these
developments reflected the expansion of job oppor-
tunities in nonagricultural activities after World
War II, which permitted a massive migration of
labor out of agriculture, increasing the earnings of
those who remained. Just as important, if not more
so, expansion of nonfarm activity in villages and
towns throughout much of rural America provided
both full and part-time job opportunities for people
remaining in agriculture.
The principal emerging issue of equity is an
apparent tendency toward a bimodal distribution
of farm income, with the largest and smallest
farmers doing reasonably well (the latter by virtue
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Figure 4.5 Ratio (F / NF) of per
capita income of the farm population
(F) to that of the nonfarm population
(NF) in the USA, 1950-1981.
of off-farm employment), but those of medium size
lagging behind. How deep-seated this tendency is
and what it portends are not clear. Nor is it clear
whether market and other institutions will yield a
satisfactory outcome or whether some form of pub-
lic intervention will come into play.
Category 2 countries
Western Europe is the major region classified in
category 2: low productivity potential with existing
technology-low land potential [45]. Cu rrent tech-
nologies in western Europe are highly land-saving,
befitting the region's resource endowment. Fer-
tilizer use per acre is higher than in the USA and
mechanization is well advanced, labor is more abun-
dant relative to land than in the USA, and insecti-
cide applications, per acre and in total, are much
less. Cotton and maize are the principal recipients
of insecticides in the USA and elsewhere, but cotton
is not grown in western Europe and maize occupies
much less land than in the USA.
The high per acre use of fertilizer in western
Europe suggests that its marginal productivity is
relatively low, probably little if any above its price
[46]. Consequently, if rising energy prices force up
the price of fertilizer, farmers will seek ways to
economize its use. Unlike American farmers,
however, they are not likely to move toward more
land-using technologies because of the already
relatively high value of land. Mixed crop-livestock
farms are more common in western Europe than
in the USA and this may increase the feasibility in
Europe of organic farming as a response, should
nitrogen fertilizer prices rise.
Thinking about likely short- and medium-term
technological responses of western European farm-
ers to rising prices of energy, and possibly of
fertilizer, is complicated by uncertainty about the
future of the European Community's (EC) Com-
mon Agricultural Policy (CAP). There is growing
concern in the Community about the high cost of
CAP and declining real support prices in the early
1980s suggest that the Community is responding to
that concern. One consequence is that less efficient
farmers have been leaving agriculture, permitting
an increase in average farm size and continuing
mechanization. This, and genetic improvements in
crop varieties, have helped to offset the impact of
declining commodity prices and rising energy
prices. If these two tendencies continue, western
European agriculture would eventually be tightly
squeezed. What the institutional response might be
is uncertain. Commodity prices might be raised
despite the high cost of this policy or more research
may be devoted to relieving the land and energy
constraints. The outcome will determine how long
the present expansion of western European agricul-
ture can continue [47].
Environmental impacts of erosion and agricul-
tural chemicals do not now seem to be major prob-
lems in western Europe, although there is growing
concern in some areas about nitrates in ground-
water. By comparison with environmental problems
in category 1, 3, and 4 countries, however, those
in western Europe are and likely will remain
small.
-.
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Category 3 countries
These are countries with high productivity potential
and high land potential. Argentina, Brazil, and most
other Latin American countries appear to fit this
category, as do those in Sub-Saharan Africa. These
countries are much more amply endowed with
unused, or only lightly used, arable land than
western Europe or category 4 countries (the Indian
subcontinent, China, and Indonesia). In Latin
America only about 15% of the arable land is culti-
vated and in Africa less than 25%. By contrast, 77%
of the arable land in densely populated Asia is now
under cultivation [48].
The abundance of arable land in category 3 coun-
tries may be deceiving. In Latin America most of
the 535 X 106 ha of potentially arable land is in the
remote, lightly populated Amazon basin. It is a
gigantic frontier area, and opening it up would
require massive investments in land clearance and
in transpo"rtation to move production supplies into
the area and the resultant output to the principal
Brazilian markets along the southern coast. In
Africa a significant percentage of the 565 x 106 ha
of potentially arable land is unusable because of
tsetse fly infestation.
In addition to these problems, the dominant soils
in tropical Latin America and Africa are the so-
called acid-infertile oxisols and ultisols. These soils
generally have good physical properties (good
structure and water holding capacity), but poor
chemical properties, being both acidic (low pH) and
low in nutrients. Although they support luxuriant
growth, much of the nutrient supply is tied up in
vegetation and ground litter, and most of that
stored in the soil is near the surface. When the land
is cleared for crop production the nutrient supply
is diminished and that stored in the soil is readily
leached or carried by runoff of the heavy rainfall
typical of the humid tropics.
It was long believed, and perhaps still is com-
monly accepted, that these acid-infertile tropical
soils could not economically be kept in continuous
crop production. Recent work gives some promise
that the soil limitations can be overcome with pro-
duction systems that combine skilled management
with the heavy use of fertilizers [49]. But manage-
ment with the requisite skills is generally in short
supply in these regions and, with prospective
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Increases In energy prIces, fertilizer may become
too expensive.
Thus the abundance of land in these countries is
conditional upon the availability of substantial
amounts of capital, human and otherwise, without
which the "high land potential" is more apparent
than real. Nevertheless, even if the real potentially
available arable land in Latin America and Africa
is substantially less than the numbers above indicate,
it almost surely is significantly more in relation to
population than in densely populated Asia. Accord-
ingly, in responding to rising demand and increas-
ing energy prices, agriculturalists in Latin America
and Africa are likely to adopt more land-using tech-
nologies than their counterparts in Asia.
Category 3 countries are also said to have high
productivity potential on the basis that average
yields for crops, animals, and forest products are
low relative to those in developed countries. More
to the point, yields are low relative to those achieved
by a few farmers and foresters in the countries
themselves, using improved technology and
management practices.
Tapping the high productivity potential of these
technologies and practices requires a commitment
of resources to provide the mass of agriculturalists
with the information they need to adopt the
improvements and to assure that the requisite com-
ponents of the technologies - improved seeds, fer-
tilizers, etc. - are available, when, where, and in the
quantities needed at prices the agriculturalists can
afford. This is a tall order. Indeed, meeting the
commitment is one of the principal challenges of
agricultural development. Explaining how the com-
mitment is met, and why it is not in some instances,
is also a major challenge to the induced innovation
hypothesis that I have adopted as a guide to thinking
about the future of R-T -E-I agricultural systems.
It indicates that the existence in category 3 countries
of technologies with high productive potential will,
in time, induce the institutional changes necessary
to exploit the potential. Assuming this happens,
what will be the pattern of technological change
and its environmental consequences?
Per hectare use of fertilizer is much less in
category 3 countries than in the USA and western
Europe, suggesting that the marginal productivity
of fertilizer is relatively high. And, indeed, per
hectare use of fertilizer has been increasing much
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more rapidly in developing countries (including
those in category 3) than in the USA and western
Europe. As long as the marginal productivity of
fertilizer remains relatively high in category 3 coun-
tries, agriculturalists there will have less incentive to
respond to high fertilizer prices by shifting toward
land-using technologies than those in the USA.
It seems that category 3 agriculturalists have more
options than those in category 1, 2, or 4 countries.
The presence of high-potential technologies makes
viable a land-saving response to rising demand even
if fertilizer prices rise. And the relative abundance
of land also opens the possibility of a land-using
response. My guess is that over the short-to-medium
term category 3 countries will follow a middle
course, adopting technologies that involve more
rapid increases in per hectare fertilizer use than in
the USA and other category 1 countries and incor-
porating more land per unit of output growth than
in category 2 or 4 countries.
This pattern of response will mean clearance of
forests for crop and animal production, much of it
in tropical areas, a process that has already aroused
much concern about its possible environmental con-
sequences. Additional clearance will likely add to
the concern.
Clearance of the tropical forests raises two ques-
tions: How much is occurring and what are, or will
be, the consequences? After careful consideration
of the available, inadequate information, Sedjo
and Clawson [50] conclude that the widely held
view that the world's tropical forests are rapidly
disappearing is questionable. They cite recent
studies by the UN Food and Agricultural Organi-
zation and others that coincide in showing that the
annual rate of tropical forest clearance is some 11
to 12 xl 06 ha, about 0.6% of the total. Sedjo and
Clawson note that the rate of clearance in some
areas of Africa and elsewhere is much higher, but
conclude that as a global phenomenon the problem
has been exaggerated.
The rate of tropical deforestation and the severity
of its environmental consequences, of course, are
not independent. Attention has been focused par-
ticularly on four sets of consequences:
(l) Change in local climate.
(2) Contribution to build-up of atmospheric CO2 •
(3) Species loss.
(4) Increased soil erosion.
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Hamilton [51] reviewed the literature concerning
local climatic effects of forest clearance. He found
some work [52] suggesting that the tropical Amazon
forest regenerates some of its own rain, giving rea-
son to believe that large-scale, permanent clearance
in the region could reduce or alter rainfall in parts
of it. On balance, however, Hamilton concludes that
although "there are very many compelling, scientifi-
cally sound, and philosophically rewarding reasons
for trying to preserve a large amount of our remain-
ing primary tropical rainforest ... fear of reduced
rainfall is not one of them [51, pp 3-4]."
The climatic consequences of tropical defores-
tation depend in part on what kind of ground cover
replaces the forest. Dickinson's discussion of the
issue (Chapter 9, this volume) suggests that if the
forest is replaced with well managed silvicultural or
agricultural systems, the climatic consequences
will not be marked. However, if the soil is inhos-
pitable to developed agriculture or silviculture, e.g.,
such as some lateritic soil in the humid tropics, then
the shift from forest to low vegetative cover may
significantly alter the regional climate.
To date forest clearance has contributed sig-
nificantly to the accumulation of atmospheric CO2 ,
but according to the Carbon Dioxide Review: 1982 [8]
this effect will be swamped in the future by the
contribution of fossil fuel combustion.
Loss of species following tropical deforestation
has excited much concern, but as with most issues
of tropical deforestation very little is known about
the rate of species loss or its significance [53]. Sedjo
and Clawson [50] argue that while extreme state-
ments about the rate of species loss have little basis
in historical experience, there nonetheless is cause
for serious concern. They report estimates that 25
to 50% of the world's species are in tropical forests
and view these genetic resources as "an unopened
treasure chest in that their long-term value to
humanity is quite uncertain [50, p 34]." Precisely
because of the great uncertainty, investigation of
the species-loss consequences of tropical defores-
tation should command high priority in t~e world
scientific community. And the consequences should
weigh in assessing the costs of the land-using
mode of response to rising demand for agricultural
output in category 3 countries.
Deforestation has aroused concern also because
of its consequences for increased erosion. Erosion
is an issue in both category 3 and 4 countries, and
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can result from the cropping of any land, not just
that recently deforested. For these reasons I discuss
erosion as a pervasive problem in developing coun-
tries, not as a special consequence of the land-using
mode of response in category 3 countries.
There is much anecdotal evidence that erosion
rates are high in developing countries and its con-
sequences severe [54], but reliable, comprehensive,
quantitative information about the amount of
erosion and the costs it imposes in soil productivity
loss and off-site damage are not available [55,56].
After a review of the available evidence, I concluded
that nothing could be confidently said about the
importance of erosion-induced productivity losses
in developing countries, but that the evidence for
high off-site damage is strong [57].
Unless remedial action is taken, the land-using
mode of response to rising demand is sure to exacer-
bate the erosion problem in category 3 countries
and the problem will remain severe if not worsen
in category 4 countries as well. Because this and
other environmental impacts of agriculture are
common to both categories I discuss institutional
responses to the impacts after considering modes
of response to rising demand in category 4 coun-
tries.
Category 4 countries
As noted above, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
China, and Indonesia are the principal countries in
this category. The ratio of population to arable land
is much higher than in category I and 3 countries,
and about three quarters of all arable land is under
cultivation [48]. The extreme land scarcity makes
it certain that these countries will adopt land-saving
technologies in response to rising demand for
agricultural production. Fortunately, the land-
saving mode offers promise even in the face of rising
energy, and possibly fertilizer, prices. In contrast
to the situation in category I and 2 countries, levels
of fertilizer and energy use in category 4 countries
are low relative to land and labor, which suggests
relatively high marginal productivities of fertilizer
and energy if adequate supplies of high-yield seed
varieties and irrigation water are available. There
are good prospects that these conditions can be met.
The International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)
pioneered the development of high-yield rice
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varieties suitable for Asian conditions and continues
to do so. In the last decade India and Indonesia
have made major strides toward building their own
capacity for this kind of research [58].
Irrigation has long been an integral part of
agriculture in this part of the world. India and
China now have more land under irrigation than
any of the other countries, with plans for additional
expansion. There is much evidence that irrigation
water in these (and other) countries is inefficiently
used and that its distribution is often inequitable
[59]. Nonetheless, the presence in category 4 coun-
tries of large supplies, both existing and potential,
of irrigation water, combined with a continuing
stream of new high-yield varieties of wheat and
rice and the present low per hectare use of fertilizer
and energy suggests that over the short-to-medium
term these countries have the potential for a strong
land-saving response to rising demand for agricul-
tural output.
Concern has been expressed that the develop-
ment of these technologies may expose farmers to
increased risk of yield failure. The reason is that,
at least so far, the technologies have involved the
substitution in a single field or across large regions
of a small number of high-yield crop varieties for
a much larger number of traditional varieties. If an
insect or disease attacks the new variety it may
sweep through the entire area planted to it, which
could not happen in areas planted with the more
genetically diverse traditional varieties. The loss
in 1970 of some 15% of the USA maize crop to
a kind of leaf blight is frequently cited as an
example of the greater vulnerability of high-yield
varieties.
In a careful study of grain yield variability over
time in India and the USA, Hazell [60] found that
variability had increased in both countries, and that
narrowing the crop genetic base contributed some-
thing to this. Other possible contributing factors
were weather, increasing variability in fertilizer
prices, which induced variability in the amounts
farmers applied, and variability in the supply of
electricity (in India).
Taking a quite different approach from Hazell's
statistical analysis, Duvick [61] surveyed 101 plant
breeders in the USA and collected information
about changes in crop genetic diversity over time.
The responses indicated that elite adapted lines of
cotton, soybeans, wheat, sorghum, and maize were
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among the most important sources used for
breeding pest resistance. Duvick writes that this
directly contradicts commonly heard statements to
the effect that gene pools of elite materials have been
so narrowed by successive generations of selection
for yield that they no longer contain the diversity
needed to counter new diseases and insect problems.
The issue of whether the movement toward
higher yield crop varieties has increased yield vari-
ability is important because risk is important to
farmers. If they are forced to trade-off increased
risk of annual yield loss against higher average
yields over time, their rate of adoption of the new
varieties will likely be less than if there were no
additional risk. The apparently conflicting results
of Hazell and Duvick suggest that this is an issue
needing more study.
Whatever the outcome, adoption by category 4
farmers of land-saving technology will increase the
potential for significantly more environmental
damage. As already noted, erosion is now and
promises to remain a problem in these countries,
but the land-saving mode of response suggests that
problems associated with heavier use of fertilizers,
pesticides, and irrigation are likely to become more
severe.
As for erosion damages, evidence for those
due to fertilizers, pesticides, and salinity in develop-
ing countries are anecdotal. That the damage
sometimes is severe is attested by the death of at
least 2000 from gas leaking from a pesticide
manufacturing plant in India in late 1984. Less
dramatic, but more common, are reports of fish
kills from pesticide poisonings; also salinization and
public health problems associated with the spread
of irrigation are frequently noted. Algal blooms in
and accelerated eutrophication of reservoirs and
lakes because of fertilizers in runoffs and sediment
are also widely observed. Reports of nitrate poison-
ing of animals and humans are much less common.
However severe the present environmental
impacts of fertilizers, pesticides, and irrigation may
be in category 4 countries, the land-saving mode of
response that these countries will follow is likely to
exacerbate them over the short-to-medium term.
Much will depend on the ability of these countries
to develop institutions for effective control of the
use of the damaging materials and mitigation of
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their impacts. Whatever is done in this respect will
raise equity issues, as will the income distribution
consequences of the land-saving mode of response.
Because these issues will arise in essentially the same
form in category 3 and 4 countries I discuss them
together.
Institutional responses
As noted earlier, the Green Revolution tech-
nology - the prototype of the land-saving response
that category 3 countries will adopt - has been
severely criticized as inequitable on the grounds
that only larger, more wealthy farmers can afford
it and that it increases landlessness and unemploy-
ment among the rural poor. The charge seems
overdone. Studies by IRRI [27] of the spread of the
Green Revolution technology among rice farmers
in Asia demonstrate that both large and small farm-
ers who adopted it have enjoyed an increased
income. And the World Bank [62] reports that in
the Indian Punjab the Green Revolution in wheat
production was first adopted by large farmers, but
small farmers and tenants soon took it up. Within
only 6 years (1966 to 1972) farm incomes doubled.
The growth of production and income stimulated
nonagricultural activity in the area and many land-
less farm workers moved into nonfarm jobs. Per
capita income in the region has been growing by 3
to 3.5% annually for the last two decades.
The Green Revolution technology is not a
panacea, but income distribution has been moving
most strongly against the rural poor in Asia in places
where the technology was not adopted. Hayami and
Kikuchi [28] found this in their study of population
growth and technological change in Asia. Their
work strongly suggests that under conditions of
high population density and growth, the develop-
ment and spread of land-saving technology is the
only way to prevent increasing inequality of income
distribution among landowners, tenants, and
landless workers. In the absence of such tech-
nologies the relentless growth of population and
food demand forces food prices higher and the
resultant economic rents are captured by land-
owners.
Because it can be used by small as well as large
farmers and favorably affects farm employment,
the Green Revolution promotes "unimodal"
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patterns of agricultural development, i.e., those in
which all farm income classes can share. Mellor and
Johnston [63] have argued persuasively that the
more equal income distribution associated with the
unimodal pattern not only directly benefits the rural
poor, but also ensures rising demand for a wide
range of nonagricultural consumer goods, the pro-
duction of which tends to be labor intensive. Thus,
the unimodal pattern of agricultural development
promotes rising employment and more equal
income distribution in nonagricultural activities as
well as in agriculture.
Hence land-saving technologies of the unimodal
type are appropriate not only for the land-scarce
conditions of category 4 countries, but also for meet-
ing equity criteria for development. The challenge
is to ensure that these technologies are widely avail-
able on terms all agriculturalists can afford. Meeting
the challenge almost surely will require institutional
innovations relating to the development and adop-
tion of new technology. There are no clear guide-
lines of how to do this, but studies of the successful
development and spread of the Green Revolution,
e.g., in Taiwan and the Punjab region, offer clues
[64].
The income distribution issue, of course, arises
in category 3 countries also. Per capita national
income in Latin America is higher than in Asia [2],
and this must mean that per capita agricultural
income is also higher. However, land is distributed
much more unequally in Latin America than in Asia
or Africa, so income of the rural poor in Latin
America may be no greater than that in the other
two regions.
A question arises: Can the relatively land-using
mode of expansion likely to be followed by category
3 countries be shaped to incorporate more equal
distribution of agricultural income? I cannot pursue
the question here in detail, but a line of thought
suggests itself. I stated earlier that the large areas
of presently uncultivated arable land in Latin
America and Africa are frontier regions. On
grounds of economics, climate, and soil type much
of these frontiers appears unpromising for develop-
ment. Yet it is worth recalling that well into the
nineteenth century the frontier region in the USA
between the Mississippi River and California was
called "the Great American Desert". Today, of
course, much of that "desert" blooms, and the
development of it provided rising employment and
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income opportunities for the poor and disadvan-
taged in the eastern states (Figure 4.6 [65]).
One must be cautious about analogies. Yet I sug-
gest it is worth thinking seriously about the possibil-
ity that the frontier areas of Latin America and
Africa today could play the same role in promoting
development and improvement of the lot of the
poor in those regions as did the American frontier
in the nineteenth century. This is not a new idea.
Schemes to colonize the Latin American tropics
have been tried, usually with indifferent success or
outright failure. What I am suggesting is that if the
land-using mode of expansion is appropriate for
these countries and policymakers wish to find a
form that also moves toward more equal income
distribution, then incorporating the large-scale
development of their frontiers as an integral part
of the whole development process deserves serious
consideration. The high capital cost and the poten-
tial environmental damages have already been
touched on. In addition, research on tsetse fly con-
trol in Africa and on how to permit continuous
intensive use of the acid-infertile soils of both Africa
and Latin America will have to be pushed. The
work described by Sanchez el ai. [49] appears to
offer promising leads for the acid-infertile soil prob-
lem. Mobilizing resources for such an undertaking
and protecting against irreparable environmental
damage would surely require important institu-
tional innovations, which mayor may not happen.
But if study shows that, in fact, opening up the
frontiers has high promise, this in itself should spur
the needed institutional change.
Dealing with the environmental impacts of
agricultural development in category 3 and 4 coun-
tries also calls for institutional innovation. In an
important sense these impacts cause problems
because of the absence of institutions requiring or
inducing agriculturalists to take account of both
short- and long-term consequences outside their
immediate purview of the ways in which they
manage the land and other resources. The basic
problem is a lack of well-defined and enforceable
property rights in the resources. Sedjo and Clawson
[50] cite this difficulty as a main cause of tropical
deforestation in areas where deforestation excites
concern. Where the land and forests are owned in
common by a village or tribe, but rules of access do
not limit cutting, or where the resources do not
clearly belong to anyone, or owners for whatever
128 Sustainable development of the biosphere
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reasons cannot limit access, then no individual has
the incentive to limit cutting to preserve future
values, because if he holds back today he has no
assurance that the trees will be there tomorrow.
This is the "commons" problem discussed in the
famous article by Garrett Hardin [66]. The problem
arises also where many people have unlimited access
to groundwater.
Excessive off-site erosion damages also arise from
the absence of well-defined or enforceable property
rights. Where stretches of river are unowned, or
owned but poorly monitored, agriculturalists have
no incentive to avoid dumping soil, animal wastes,
and agricultural chemicals in the water, despite
downstream damages.
If the absence of clearly defined, enforceable
property rights is a major contributor to environ-
mental problems, then in principle the solution is
to correct the property rights deficiency. In some
circumstances this is relatively easy. For example,
the state of Sonora, Mexico, has developed a highly
productive agriculture overwhelmingly dependent
on groundwater irrigation. In the late 1960s and
early 1970s it became apparent that uncontrolled
pumping was threatening the aquifer by permitting
intrusion of seawater. The Mexican government,
which by law owns all groundwater resources in the
nation, used its until then unused authority to limit
the drilling of additional wells and to regulate rates
of pumping. It is too early to say whether the threat
to the aquifer has been contained, but the case
illustrates the importance of unambiguous property
rights to resources as the basis for more socially
efficient management [67].
Usually, however, the property rights deficiency
is not so easily remedied, such as for the problem
of off-site erosion damage. The damaging sediment
usually originates over wide areas, perhaps tens of
thousands of hectares, and results from the land-use
practices of perhaps hundreds of thousands of
farmers and foresters. Property rights in the
sediment-damaged reservoirs, lakes, and harbors
may be as well defined as the Mexican government's
right to groundwater, but enforcement of the right
as a practical matter is impossible.
Even perfectly clear and enforceable property
rights assigned to members of the present gen r-
ation will not necessarily protect the int rest of
future generations in how resources are used. This
is an exceptionally difficult issue because who is to
define the interest of future generations? Nonethe-
less, the issue will not go away, being at the heart
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of concern about erosion-induced losses of soil pro-
ductivity and about species loss resulting from
tropical deforestation. Present owners of the land
and of the forest can be assumed to manage those
resources in a way optimal for them. But what
assurance is there that the result is also optimal
across generations? There is no easy answer. The
issue can be clarified by research to better establish
the facts: just how much are we losing in soil produc-
tivity and through species extinction? But even if
these facts are perfectly known, owners of the
resources still may differ with those who would
speak for future generations in judging whether
the losses are excessive. There is no analytical stan-
dard in economics or ecology for deciding this issue,
which is ultimately a political decision to be made
using political criteria [68].
The long term
In this section I deal only with category 3 and 4
countries. If agricultural development in these
countries proceeds in a way consistent with the
long-term projection of not less than a 2% annual
per capita income growth, then import demand for
food in these countries will begin to decline
sometime in the twenty-first century, probably
sooner rather than later. This will reduce whatever
pressure agricultural production may have added
to the resource base of the USA and other exporting
countries, while growth of domestic demand for
basic foods in these countries will be negligible.
Looking beyond the next couple of decades, tech-
nological responses in category 3 countries are likely
to move increasingly toward the land-saving mode
as increasing population reduces the now relatively
abundant supply of land. This will occur later rather
than sooner if these countries decide to develop
their frontier areas, but that it will occur is likely.
In the present land-scarce category 4 countries,
continuing population increase will strengthen the
already pronounced move toward the land-saving
mode of response.
This will not necessarily increase the environ-
mental impact of agricultural chemicals in category
3 and 4 countries. By sometime in the next century,
probably in the first quarter, we will likely be able
to make better use of the sun's energy in photo-
synthesis and also to have developed plants and
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related microorganisms to extract substantially
more nitrogen from the atmosphere by biological
processes. Escape of nitrogen fertilizer to the
environmental media would be reduced. Similarly,
integrated pest management techniques for dealing
with insects should by then have greatly reduced
the use of chemical insecticides, as they already have
done in the USA.
Environmental impacts of erosion are more likely
to diminish than increase as we move through the
twenty-first century, but I do not count on institu-
tional reforms to accomplish this. The difficulty of
regulating the land-use practices of vast numbers
of people over vast areas seems too indefinitely
intractable to expect this. If improvement comes it
will more likely be because of the development of
such high-yield technologies that crop demand can
be satisfied by a diminishing commitment of land.
Moreover, the development process by then (say
the second or third decade of the twenty-first cen-
tury) combined with slower population growth will
finally begin to reduce the number of people in
agriculture, even in the most densely populated
countries. With fewer people trying to scrabble
together a living on the land, and less land devoted
to crop production, the most erodible land can be
converted to pasture, or forest, or some other less
erodible use.
This suggests that the rate of deforestation will
diminish in category 3 and 4 countries, but much
depends on success in finding alternatives to present
ways of providing fuel for home heating and cook-
ing. Rising prices for fossil energy arouse skepticism
that these fuels will substitute widely for wood,
although improvement in internal transportation
systems would help. Sedjo and Clawson [50] see
great potential for plantation forestry in tropical
areas. It is not beyond imagination that this develop-
ment could go far in substituting for the current
environmentally destructive systems that provide
fuel wood in those areas. Again, however, improve-
ments in internal transportation would be necessary
to make this work, but since economic development
of the sort envisaged implies improvement in these
transportation systems anyway, the plantation for-
estry alternative for fuel wood supply may be worth
serious consideration.
The development process also implies a long-run
movement toward the equity objective, if this is
defined as widely distributed gains in per capita
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income. These gains should increase more rapidly
for rural people in category 3 countries than for
those in category 4, particularly if the former pursue
successful development of their frontiers. The gains
will be slower in the densely populated category 4
countries until that time in the twenty-first century
when slower rural population growth and expand-
ing urban employment opportunities induce an
absolute reduction in the number of people
engaged in agriculture.
But if equity is defined as a more equal income
distribution, movement toward it may be delayed
well into the twenty-first century, particularly in
category 4 countries. Recall that only in the 1970s
did per capita income of farm people in the USA
approach rough equality with that of the nonfarm
population. And among groups of countries the
prospect is for increasing inequality of income dis-
tribution, the poorest developing countries falling
increasingly behind those in the middle-income
group as well as those in developed countries.
Equity is in the eye of the beholder. If the relevant
comparison for the poor is their position "now"
with what it was 5 or 10 years ago, then steady
increases in income over time should go far to satisfy
their sense of equity. But if the relevant comparison
is with the better-off at a point in time, then the
poor's expectations for equity will be disappointed.
This raises issues of social psychology and political
science for which I have no professional com-
petence. I suggest, however, that these issues must
be addressed when thinking about the sustainability
of the development process. Violation of ecological,
or biospheric, imperatives is not the only threat to
the process. Social imperatives also must be
observed, although defining them is probably even
more difficult than defining those imposed by the
biosphere.
As we move further and further into the long
term, present resource endowments and tech-
nologies become less and less relevant, whereas
issues of institutional flexibility in responding to
emerging resource scarcities, environmental stress,
and equity concerns become increasingly relevant.
Institutions must have the capacity to generate both
the technical responses needed to relieve rising
pressures on the natural system and the social
responses that adequately satisfy equity objectives.
Given the great inherent uncertainty about the dis-
tant future, the specific problems most likely to
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challenge the capacity for institutional response
cannot confidently be foreseen. Precisely for this
reason resiliency is a quality of high value in institu-
tional structures. By resiliency I mean the capacity
to absorb and react creatively to unexpected shocks
to the natural and social systems. I cannot specify
all the characteristics that distinguish resilient
from nonresilient institutional structures, but surely
resiliency requires high levels of technical expertise
across the whole range of natural and social sciences,
as well as political structures that promote openness
in the exchange of ideas and in access to the levers
of political power. Beyond this I am not prepared
to go, but I am convinced that just as we seek
agricultural systems that combine resiliency with
high productivity, we must learn to impart these
characteristics to systems of institutions as well [69J.
The veil which shrouds the long-term future of
agricultural R-T-E-I systems is opaque, but not
completely so. In this chapter I have suggested some
lines of inquiry worth pursuing as we consider how
best to prepare ourselves for the shocks and sur-
prises that the future surely holds. I summarize
them in no particular order of priority.
Regional impacts of climatic change
Perhaps emphasis should be given to study of the
question as to whether, in fact, long-term climatic
change is likely, but I am impressed with the
strength of the consensus that has formed on the
question. Given that, the more important issue when
considering the long-term future of agricultural
R-T-E-I systems is the change in regional climates
that are likely to accompany global warming. Until
this is better understood we have little basis for
judging where the impacts are likely to most
severely stress the systems or for considering
alternatives to ease the stress.
Economic, environmental, and social
conditions for the successful opening of the
Latin American and African frontiers
Let it be stressed immediately that any inquiry along
this line would have to be conducted in an atmo-
sphere free of any suggestion of intellectual or any
other kind of imperialism. A fundamental condition
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for this is that political leaders as well as natural
and social scientists in the countries involved be
convinced that the inquiry is in their own personal,
professional, and national interests; and that they
participate fully in it. To this outsider looking in,
it appears that in the long-term perspective opening
these frontiers has great potential for a pattern of
agricultural development that combines rising
production with increasing equity for the rural
poor. However, unless this perception is shared
and welcomed by the people most directly con-
cerned, the suggested inquiry cannot be successfully
pursued.
Several of the issues requiring study can be dis-
cerned. The work cited earlier and reported by
Sanchez et al. [49] suggests that the continuous,
long-term sustainable cropping of the structurally
strong but nutrient-poor acid-infertile soils (oxisols
and ultisols) of Africa and Latin America is possible
with greatly increased use of fertilizers and a high
level of management. Consideration should be
given to further research along these lines to
examine both the scientific basis of the argument
and the conditions necessary for large-scale mobili-
zation of the physical and human capital indicated to
be necessary.
Evidently, control of the tsetse fly is a condition
for opening the African frontier, indicating the
desirability of increased research to achieve this.
But the performance of agricultural R-T -E-I sys-
tems in Africa over the previous several decades
indicates that much more is required than control
of the tsetse fly. Among the developing regions of
the world, only in Africa has per capita food produc-
tion not increased since the end of World War II.
Indeed, it has declined. In an analysis of this perfor-
mance Eicher [70] takes note of the tsetse fly prob-
lem, but leaves no doubt that institutional failure
in the broadest sense is crucial to understanding
why African agriculture has lagged. Distribution of
land does not seem to be part of this. With the
exception of Zambia and Zimbabwe, land distribu-
tion in Sub-Saharan Africa is "remarkably
egalitarian" according to Eicher, most farms being
between 2 and 6 ha [70, p 153]. Nor is lack of
willingness of African farmers to respond to
economic incentive part of the problem. On the
contrary, research has conclusively demonstrated
that African farmers respond as willingly to
economic incentive as farmers in the most agricul-
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turally developed nations [70, p 159]. It is precisely
the lack of incentive that explains a major part of
the poor performance. Governments in Sub-
Saharan Africa have placed major emphasis on
industrial development, neglecting investment in
agricultural research, farm to market roads, and
education of farm people. And they have adopted
pricing policies for farm commodities that sys-
tematically discriminate against domestic producers
in favor of imports. Clearly, close investigation of
African institutional performance should receive
major attention in any inquiry into the prospects
for opening up the African frontier as part of a
strategy for agricultural development.
Opening the African and Latin American fron-
tiers would be a massive undertaking in which
governments would have to take the major initiating
and sustaining role. Finding the right degree and
kind of government intervention would be crucial
to success. The problem would vary from country
to country, but experience suggests that as a general
rule the government's role is best limited to support-
ing the research needed to develop technologies
appropriate to the highly diverse soil and climate
conditions in category 3 and 4 countries and to
providing physical and institutional infrastructures
which give private agriculturalists reasonable se-
curity of expectations about supplies of inputs and
marketing services, credit availability, prices, and
land tenure [71, 72].
Capitalizing on local knowledge of
R- T -E-I systems
There is a common perception that peasant
agriculturalists in category 3 and 4 countries are
unskilled managers of their resources. The
evidence accumulated since T. W. Schultz sharply
questioned this perception in Transforming Tradi-
tional Agriculture [31] leaves no doubt that the per-
ception is inaccurate. It is now clear that as a group
peasant farmers are, in fact, highly skilled within
the constraints imposed on them by natural, tech-
nical, and institutional conditions. The World Bank
[72] provides numerous illustrations of this from
developing countries all around the world.
In thinking about the long-term future of R-T -
E-I systems in category 3 and 4 countries, and about
how to make this future brighter, attention should
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be given to ways of making more use of peasant
farmers' knowledge of local conditions. This
knowledge may be - I think it is - an enormously
valuable form of capital which so far has been little
recognized and greatly underestimated. The world
agricultural research establishment has much to
teach peasant farmers, but it also has much to learn
from them.
Learning about species extinction
The literature cited by Sedjo and Clawson [501
indicates that we presently know too little about
species extinction around the world to accurately
estimate either its rate or its consequences. Yet
Sedjo and Clawson agree that since extinction is
irreversible there is cause for concern even if we
cannot currently demonstrate its importance. Some
may argue that maintaining natural genetic
diversity will become less important over the very
long term as advances in genetic engineering make
possible substitution of genes among species.
However, the time when we might acquire this
capacity for plant species, if we ever do, now seems
to be quite far ahead [73]. To bank on the timely
development of this capacity may prove to be a
costly gamble with the future of world R-T-£-1
agricultural systems.
Yield variability and new crop varieties
Concern was noted earlier about the possibility that
the development of higher yield crop varieties is
narrowing the genetic base on which crop breeders
depend, resulting in greater interannual yield vari-
ability. There are apparently conflicting views
over this (e.g., [601 and [61]). The matter seems of
sufficient importance to justify further investigation
to determine the implications of current plant-
breeding practices for the long-run diversity of the
global plant gene pool.
Erosion-induced loss of soil productivity
Erosion reduces soil productivity by carrying away
soil nutrients and organic matter and by reducing
the water-holding capacity of soil. Farmers can
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replace nutrients and organic matter, although at
a cost, but there seems to be a consensus among
soil scientists that losses in the water-holding
capacity of soil are permanent. Whether this means
permanent in the sense that species extinction is
permanent or "permanent" in the sense of
replaceable only at unreasonably high cost is not
clear. In either case, the threat as a practical matter
is to the long-term sustainability of R-T-E-I
agricultural systems.
The present lack of quantitative knowledge of
the threat in both developed and developing coun-
tries was noted above. Promising work to overcome
this lack has recently been reported in the USA and
other countries [39, 56], but the surface has only
been scratched. Much more needs to be done, par-
ticularly in category 3 and 4 countries, to permit
judgments as to the severity of the long-run threat.
Research capacity to develop new technology
The capacity to develop a continuous stream of
appropriate new technology is a necessary condition
for maintaining sustainable R-T -E-I agricultural
systems. Without this capacity the systems will
eventually be overcome by the mounting pressure
imposed by population and income growth. The
Malthusian specter at last will take harsh command.
That the world community can develop an
impressive capacity to produce new agricultural
technology is not in doubt. It has been done and
institutionalized in the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), and
in national research institutions of both developed
and developing countries [74]. The formation of
CGIAR and related national research agencies must
be regarded as one of the major institutional inno-
vations of modern times. Its positive impact on the
welfare of people involved, both as producers and
consumers of agricultural commodities, has already
been enormous.
This success offers high promise that the research
and development capacity required for long-term
sustainability can be created and maintained, but
more needs to be done to develop the national
capacities in Latin America and Africa [58]. The
lack of this capacity as a factor in the poor perform-
ance of African agriculture has already been noted;
the CGIAR system cannot fill this gap. Developing
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technologies appropriate to the highly diverse soil
and climate conditions of R-T -E-I systems in
developing countries requires a decentralized
research capability. CGIAR can develop tech-
nologies with potential for adaptation across diverse
systems, but the work of adaptation must be per-
formed locally.
The study of institutional change
This, perhaps, is the most challenging line of
inquiry of all. Institutional flexibility and resilience
are as important to the long-term sustainability of
R-T-E-I systems as the capacity to develop new
technology. But we have little understanding of why
some institutional structures have these qualities
and others do not. Nor do we understand well the
processes of institutional change, so we are ill-
equipped to develop institutional flexibility and
resilience where it is lacking.
We greatly need a systematic study of these pro-
cesses if we are to anticipate and act to counter
major emerging pressure points on global R-T-E-I
systems. The induced innovation hypothesis asserts
that increasing pressure on these points will bring
forth appropriate technical and institutional
responses, but no one argues that the hypothesis is
more than a fruitful beginning toward the better
understanding of these processes of change. Under
what circumstances can we expect the appropriate
responses to be forthcoming without special social
intervention and when is intervention essential to
avoid system breakdown?
Perhaps the world needs an equivalent of CGIAR
to study processes of institutional change in R-T-E-
I systems. Or, less ambitiously, perhaps this line of
inquiry could be added to the research CGIAR
institutions now do on the development of new
technology. Whatever the vehicle, I suggest that
investigation of institutional processes should be an
integral part of any study of the long-term sustain-
ability of world R-T -E-I agricultural systems.
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Commentary
c. F. Runge
The theoretical core of Pierre Crosson's analysis is
the induced innovation model originating from Sir
John Hick's Theory of Wages [1] and applied to
technological and institutional change in agri-
culture by Hayami and Ruttan [2]. Because this
somewhat abstract model drives Crosson's analysis,
resulting in conclusions oriented around the tech-
nical and institutional basis of agricultural progress,
it is appropriate to focus this brief commentary on
the model and its relevance. The model's impor-
tance extends to several other chapters in this
volume, notably those of Majone (Chapter 12) and
Darmstadter (Chapter 5). Three issues seem ger-
mane: the induced innovation model itself,
Crosson's interpretation of it, and elaborations of
the model in some recent work.
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The model
The "induced innovation hypothesis" maintains
that both technological and institutional innovations
are driven by resource constraints [3]. These con-
straints establish a demand for changes in both
techniques of production and the rules that co-
ordinate production activity. The supply of new
techniques and new institutions responds to this
demand. The theory can be used to explain differ-
ent historical paths of agricultural development
arising from different resource and factor endow-
ments. In the case of technology, it predicts that
where factors are relatively scarce, technological
innovations are likely to conserve on the scarce
factors and be biased toward use of abundant ones.
The constraints imposed by a relative shortage of
labor in countries such as the USA, Canada, and
Australia, for example, have been offset by technical
advances leading to the substitution of animal and
mechanical power for labor, as well as by techniques
that utilize relatively abundant resources such as
fertilizer or mineral fuels. In Japan and Taiwan, in
contrast, relative shortages of land have led to the
substitution of fertilizer and labor-intensive cultiva-
tion practices for scarce land resources.
On the side of institutions, research and educa-
tion produce relevant examples of induced innova-
tions. Where research and education in agriculture
are relatively scarce, implying an institutional con-
straint, a demand exists for knowledge that can
inform technical and social decisions so that they
are based on more than trial and error [4]. This
information can only be acquired in a systematic
fashion by the development of new institutions,
manifest in innovations such as the Land Grant
University system.
Induced innovation theory also suggests a dialec-
tical relationship between technical and institutional
change. Institutions create constraints to technical
progress, while technological bottlenecks may delay
institutional reforms. Both existing technology and
the institutional setup create constraints for one
another, and define the joint possibilities for
change. While this brief description oversimplifies
the richness of the approach, its thrust is quite
straightforward: scarcity creates constraints and
innovations in technology and institutions are
designed to overcome these constraints.
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Interpretations of the model
Owing in part to the emphasis given by economists
to prices as the principal signals of resource scarcity,
many have perceived the induced innovation
hypothesis to be restricted to the role of perfectly
competitive market prices in economic develop-
ment. It is, in fact, far more general, and does not
rely solely on market prices as signals for emerging
scarcity. This is significant, because market prices,
especially in less developed economies, are seldom
accurate signals. Developed economies, too, face
price distortions, making markets only one, often
unreliable, signaling device. Even so, both in theory
and practice, constraints on factors and other
resources send signals, theoretically defined as
"shadow prices", which reflect underlying resource
scarcity [5]. In a perfectly competitive economy
without distortions, these signals happen to corre-
spond to market prices. But they do not need to do
so for the induced innovation model to be relevant.
The model can still be used to guide second best
choices in which market prices do not reflect mar-
ginal values, as long as relative resource scarcity can
be determined. In the USA, it is not necessary to
have land market price data to recognize the relative
abundance of land as a factor of production and its
role in the technological and institutional develop-
ment of agriculture.
In contrast to Crosson's observation, this makes
the theory even more powerful as an explanation
for technological and institutional responses to
unpriced resources with a public good quality, such
as air, water, and land, where it is obvious that
market prices do not necessarily signal a need to
conserve. The theory suggests that even though
imperfectly reflected by markets, this scarcity can
be discovered. Incentives will then exist to develop
technologies and institutions that conserve scarce
natural resources and utilize abundant factors.
IIASA itself represents the use of abundant infor-
mation-processing technology in order to conserve
scarce public goods, such as land and water.
In short, with or without the price mechanism,
increasing scarcity, if known, creates incentives for
conservation. If a private market for all resources
existed, part of a perfectly functioning set of
markets, then in theory the entire signaling process
would be accomplished through market prices. But
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the fact that a perfectly competitive market does
not exist for most things does not prevent their
scarcity from being known and creating incentives
for change. Of course, new technology or institu-
tions will not always respond to these signals,
especially in light of the problem of discovery men-
tioned above. Indeed, the inability to respond cost-
lessly and with perfect foresight to resource scarcity
by inventing new techniques and new institutions
is part of what makes these resources scarce to begin
with. The problem is to discover which resources
are most scarce and to design techniques and institu-
tions that respond to this scarcity.
Recent elaborations of the theory
The general problem of discovering which resour-
ces are most scarce raises the interesting and sig-
nificant role played in the induced innovation
process by expectations. Many recent debates over
resource scarcity, especially of highly aggregated
global assessments, depend critically on some form
of resource optimism, resource pessimism, or linear
extrapolations of current trends. These are in
essence expectations of the future, rather than facts.
At a more microeconomic level of decision, the
relative capacity of individual agents to anticipate
resource scarcity and to profit from the resource
once its scarcity becomes generally known is based
largely on expectations [6]. This capacity, sometimes
referred to as entrepreneurship, occurs in an
environment of considerable price uncertainty,
relying on other forms of knowledge, insight, and
intuition. As John R. Commons argued, "all value
is expectancy [7]." The supply of both new tech-
nology and new institutions is powerfully affected
by this entrepreneurial capacity [8].
Recent declines in world oil prices are instructive
and relate to some issues raised in Chapter 5 by
Darmstadter. Since these prices are the result of
oligopolistic distortions in the world market, they
are not competitive market prices that reflect the
true scarcity value of oil. Declining world prices
result in large part from declining discipline within
OPEC. However, geological discoveries also inform
both private and public judgments about oil avail-
ability, and knowledge of production constraints
creates incentives for technologies and institutions
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promoting both more efficient oil extraction and
use as well as overall policies of conservation and
substitution. These technical and institutional inno-
vations continue, despite temporarily falling prices,
because they are based on expectations of future
scarcity. By recognizing that falling market prices
are misleading signals of relative scarcity, primarily
reflecting changes in market structure, rational
agents respond according to expectations that cor-
rectly discount short-term price movements.
More generally, evidence in support of the capac-
ity of individuals to recognize longer run inter-
dependence and to innovate institutions and tech-
nologies to overcome common problems, suggests
that the "logic of the commons" to which Crosson
and Darmstadter refer may be overstated [9]. This
is not to suggest that such problems are always
overcome. Often the knowledge, foresight, and
capacity to overcome them may not be at hand.
Nonetheless, the idea of induced innovation helps
us to recognize that the constraints posed by living
in an increasingly interdependent world raise the
rewards to international cooperation discussed by
Majone. All of the chapters in this volume may be
understood as a response to these incentives.
The themes of innovation and expectations also
merge in the issue of institutional innovation and
its relationship to fairness. Perhaps the most funda-
mental issue raised by Crosson's discussion of
induced innovation concerns the role of equity,
because both technological and institutional
changes have distributive as well as efficiency
impacts. I have argued elsewhere that the demand
for change (notably on the institutional side)
is a direct function of distributive concerns [10].
As long as we are willing to admit that economic
efficiency is only one (often rather minor) concern
of rational individuals [11], the theory of induced
innovation is, as before, even stronger in explain-
ing behavior.
Consider, for example, the fundamental issue of
property institutions, including those that are
developed to overcome commons problems.
Property rights are the particular characteristics of
property institutions that channel streams of net
benefits to particular agents in a given situation.
They extend to individual contracts and deeds,
agreements between corporate entities, and even
international agreements between countries. In
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addition to the increases in efficiency that they pro-
vide, property rights grant assurance with respect
to the distribution of benefits over time.
My property right to exclude others (or to be
rightfully included) depends on an established
expectation. Yet, if my claim on land, air, or water
is not perceived to be fair, my entitlement may not
be respected, and its security may be overturned
through institutional innovations that redistribute
entitlements. Changing resource endowments or
technical changes, for example, may create dis-
equilibrium in the structure of expectations estab-
lished according to an older set of institutions. This
disequilibrium will be manifest in judgments that
the current structure of rights is inefficient or
unfair, as when traditional land tenure patterns are
overturned in favor of agrarian reform. Such dis-
equilibria create incentives for technological and
institutional entrepreneurs to propose alternative
arrangements more consistent with a conjectured
structure of both future efficiency and equity. It is
crucial to recognize that because constraints differ
from time to time and place to place, the particular
arrangement of technology and institutions most
responsive to these constraints also will change and
differ across environments. There is no uniquely
optimal arrangment. This finding is broadly con-
sistent with much ecological theory.
In sum, the induced innovation model provides
a logical yet surprisingly flexible framework within
which to interpret both microlevel and maerolevel
innovations in technology and institutions. If these
innovations are demonstrably responsive to the par-
ticular constraints faced by individuals seeking
greater control over the long-term future of the
environment, then the elaborated theory provides
a clear message. Knowledge concerning environ-
mental constraints will be aided by market signals,
but cannot depend on them exclusively: nonprice
information is also key. Moreover, since the con-
straints to which individuals respond differ radically
in various parts of the world, existing patterns of
innovation should be studied carefully. The very
definition of both efficiency and equity is relative
to the constraints that must be faced - locally and
globally. Continued research into similarities and
differences in these constraints is thus fundamental
to the design of new technological and institutional
responses.
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Chapter 5
]. Darmstadter
Energy patterns - in
retrospect and prospect
Editors' Introduction: Energy production and consumption in support of human develop-
ment have increased over the past century to the point where they now exceed even
agriculture as the major transformers of many aspects of the Earth's environment.
In this chapter long-term, large-scale patterns of energy use are reviewed, highlighting
the interplay of changing technology and resource endowments. The successive rises and
declines of energy systems based on animal power, wind and water, wood, and coal that
have led to the present mix of fuels embedded in the global energy economy are
described. The possible relationship of these substitution patterns to "long wave"
Kondratieff cycles is discussed. These historical patterns and the response of the world
energy system to various shocks of the 1970s are drawn on in the discussion of long-term
forecasts of energy use and its environmental impacts.
Introduction
The focus of this chapter is on the broad sweep of
global energy development, with subsidiary atten-
tion paid to its implications for the environment.
The issue that gives rise to this theme is almost
self-evident: how to provide energy in the amounts
and at a cost compatible with sustained economic
progress without inflicting major harm on environ-
mental integrity.
The discussion begins with a review of energy
trends during the last half century, including the
significant demand-supply adaptations that
occurred in the wake of the two major energy
"shocks" during the 1970s. The review of long-term
energy developments provides an opportunity, as
well, to comment on efforts to deduce recurrent
and predictable energy-system cycles. Following this
evaluation, I next turn to energy projections, start-
ing with a section on the difficulty and uncertainty
inherent in such undertakings, but indicating - in
the ensuing discussion of prospective trends to the
year 2000 - that the very adaptation evident in
recent years lends a degree of robustness to such a
mid-term projection. I then review a number of
studies that project alternative energy paths well
into the twenty-first century, singling out those
which focus, in particular, on the CO2 implications
of those trajectories.
While CO2 has been accorded much recent atten-
tion in long-term global energy modeling, it is but
one of a multiplicity of energy-related environ-
mental impacts. In this chapter I suggest that a clue
to countries participating in global environmental
management may emerge from their national com-
mitment. The conceptual thread linking both
dimensions is the "commons" problem, which
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dilutes incentives to make environmental concern
an inherent element in decisions on energy projec-
tion, delivery, and use. Yet the environmental
record - even in some of its transnational manifes-
tations - is perhaps not so flawed as to rule out the
prospects for long-term accommodation between
energy needs and environmental imperatives. A
recent contribution to that issue by Thomas
Schelling, stressing adaptations as much as avoid-
ance, is briefly touched upon.
At various places in the chapter - being largely
an exploratory one - I raise questions for further
research. These are brought together at the end.
There is considerable emphasis throughout the
chapter on the presentation of, and comments on,
different viewpoints about energy development
paths. As part of a volume designed to serve as a
springboard for, rather than the final word on,
research and its implications, the chapter stops short
of hard-and-fast conclusions.
Past energy trends
Whether one's fascination with the story of civiliza-
tion reverts back to prehistory or extends only over
the past several centuries, the role of energy is
crucial. At the beginning, human and animal energy
were the mainstays for accomplishing mechanical
tasks - lifting, pulling, pushing - that helped build
pyramids, dig furrows, and construct the earliest
irrigation works. Wind, water, and firewood -
renewables were in the picture long before they
came back into fashion in the 1970s! - followed,
accommodating more refined needs, both station-
ary and mobile. The emergence and intensification
of the industrial revolution saw fuel wood and
water power give way to coal and coal-based tech-
nology in iron smelting and steam engines. Textiles,
steel, and railroads were among the significant
manifestations of increased and increasingly ver-
satile energy resources. Electrification and the
petroleum age sustained the process into the twen-
tieth century with developments - for example, in
transport, chemicals, and metallurgy - too familiar
to need much recounting here.
As in earlier times, patterns of energy demand
and supply during the present century have evolved
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within the complex interplay of demographic,
economic, and technological phenomena. Given the
difficulty of explaining in any precise fashion the
way in which these forces have driven the pace and
character of past development, it goes without say-
ing that attempts to plot future energy pathways
are an infinitely more formidable challenge. The
wreckage of dozens of energy forecasts - mine
included - that have foundered with the collapse
of their surprise-free assumptions, are gloomy tes-
timony to that state of affairs. Yet, if we are to gain
even an approximate sense of what future energy
trends may look like - and what such trends, in
turn, imply for a variety of environmental condi-
tions - some historical perspective is indispensable.
The 55-year period 1925-1980 would appear to
represent a sufficiently lengthy interval to permit
some broad generalizations about long-term energy
developments. Consider, however, some of the
extraodinary subperiod features of those five and
a half decades: global depression throughout the
1930s, World War II, a prolonged period of postwar
reconstruction, and major readjustments in energy
markets following the 1973-1974 oil shock. In all,
scarcely more than 20 out of those 55 merit the
label "normalcy".
Those observations are worth bearing in mind in
reviewing the statistical highlights presented in
Figures 5.1-5.8 and Table 5.1. What are some of
the more outstanding features of the quantitative
record? Energy consumption growth - total and
per capita - has been a pervasive worldwide
phenomenon during this half century as a whole.
With the caveat that we are referring to aggregate
measures for broad geographic areas, it is clear that
energy growth among developing nations and cen-
trally planned economies (CPEs) has persistently
exceeded that for the highly industrialized market
economies of North America, Western Europe, and
the Far East. That finding is no surprise. The pace
of energy-intensive industrialization was beginning
to abate in the West while, in the centrally planned
group the build-up of heavy industry - reinforced
by political strategy - was still very much under way.
Among developing economies - many of them
barely emergent from a primitive, preindustrial
society - the rudiments of a modern infrastructure
spelled a disproportionately fast growth in demand
for commercially traded fuels and power, which
were beginning to supplant traditional forms of
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Figure 5.1 Average annual percen-
tage growth rates in energy consump-
tion, selected periods, 1925-1980 [1).
Among the developing countries in
the period 1973-1980, oil exporters'
consumption grew at a 7.7% annual
rate while nonoil exporters' consump-
tion grew at a 6.0% annual rate.
Table 5.1 World oil production, 1960-1982 [3,4,5).
1960 1973 19828
Country group (103 barrels/day) (%) (103 barrels/day) (%) (103 barrels/day) (%)
OPEC 5269[4) 20 31351 56 19150 36
USSR 3300[5) 13 8465 15 12000 23
Western Europe 288[5) 1 450 1 3063 6
North America 7553[5] 29 11008 20 9890 19
Mexico 278[5] 1 465 1 2749 5
All other 9549[5] 36 3935 7 6310 12
Total 26237 100 55674 100 53162 100
8 Preliminary.
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energy, such as wood and animal wastes. [The fact
that the data in Figures 5.1-5.8 and Table 5.1
include only commercial energy sources contributes
to the high, measured growth rates for the less-
developed countries (LDCs); Box 5.1 (p 156) con-
tains a discussion of noncommercial energy.]
Differential growth rates aside, it is worth noting
that, in 1980, per capita energy consumptions for
not only the LDCs, but also the CPEs, were substan-
tially below levels achieved by industrial countries
in 1925. Even without the Asian CPEs, which weight
the CPE-wide total substantially downward, the
1925 USA per capita figure was about 25% greater
than recent levels in the USSR and Eastern Europe.
143
Shifts among energy sources during these 55
years mirrored economic, technological, and geo-
logical changes that occurred throughout the world.
Some parallel developments were serendipitous.
Large-scale petroleum discoveries, perfection of the
internal combustion engine, rising incomes in
numerous (though, of course, by no means all)
countries all insured that the automobile age would
be one of the revolutionary fixtures of the century.
Dieselization plus the adequacy of oil led to the
gradual replacement of coal-burning steam\locomo-
tives, with a concurrent enhanced transport
efficiency. Agricultural mechanization was similarly
aided by the joint contribution of technology and
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Figure 5.2 Average annual percen-
tage growth rates in per capita energy
consumption, selected periods, 1925-
1980 [1].
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energy consumption (log scale) 1925-
1980 [1,2]. (Since only selected
benchmark years are plotted, inter-
vening years should not be construed
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those benchmarks.)
liquid fuel upplies. Where incomes and fuel avail-
ability permitted, gaseous and liquid energy became
the fuels of choice in residential energy use. A we
see in Figure 5.6, the long-term I' duction in oal's
relative importance is one of the striking en rgy
trends of the half century we are surveying. An
equally im ortant dev topment has been the p r-
sist ntly fasler growth of electricity than of primary
energy in the aggregate. This long-term trend is
reflected in Figure 5.8, showing the steadily rising
proportion of primary energy supplies being used
at generating stations for el ctric power produ tion.
Along with gaseous and liquid fuels, increas d
availability of the I ctric form of n rgy has be n
of enormous si nificance in the shaping of twentieth
century economic life. It goes without sayin that
what has been highlighted her applies to a different
degree - in some cases markedly so - to different
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Centrally planned
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LJ Industrialifed countries Figure 5.4 Percentage share byregions of worldwide energy
consumption, selected years, 1925-
1980 [1].
parts of the world. The earlier reference to dispa-
rate levels of per capita energy consumption under-
scores thi . point, to which we win need to revert in
pond ring future global en -rgy requirements.
Over most of the 55-year period we are looking
at th developments outlined above were accom-
panied by, and benefited from, declining or at least
stabl r al energy prices. Indeed, in reviewing past
global en rgy developm nts, it has become cu -
tomary to d note 1973 as a watershed year: the
turning point that sep rates a period of energy
abundance, price stability, and relative p Iitical tran-
quility - at least as regard energy - from a period
of perceived scarcity, rising real price, and political
upheaval in major oil-producing regions. Related
to this, 1973 ser es as a benchmark that symbolizes
the emcrg nce of Middle Ea tern oil as an indispen-
sable and major contributor to world energy sup-
plies. Without questioning the usefulness of con-
sidering 1973 as ,a milestone for comparing prior
and ensuing energy trends and developments -
particularly for nalyzing the economic dynamics
of energy demand and supply - I suggest that one
au ht not to push the landmark significance of that
year to an extreme degree.
For one thing, n twithstanding the virtually
instantaneous threefold increase in the OPEC
oil reference price (in real terms), abundance and
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LJ Industrialized countries Figure 5.5 Percentage share by
region of worldwide energy produc-
tion, selected years, 1925-1980 [1).
scarcity could not possibly be demarcated by a
single, overnight event. Indeed, as an economic
purist, one accepts the trivial fact that oil, an
economic good bearing a price, has always been
"scarce" along with other economic goods traded
in the market. Correspondingly, the production
cost of oil - least of all the lifting cost - could
obviously not have skyrocketed overnight. Which is
not to deny that the circumstances of 1973 may, for
the first time, have provided overseas producers
with the market environment for exacting a part of
the opportunity cost (reflecting the value of a
depleting asset) that, in prior years, had been
preempted to a significant degree by the concession-
ary compaOles.
What was that 1973 market environment? Oil
demand in the major industrial countries had, for
a number of years, been rising rapidly. (In the USA,
import controls had channeled most of this demand
onto domestic producers who, as a result, gradually
eroded their spare producing capacity.) The coal
industry was in a state of deterioration. Boom
economic conditions coincided around the globe.
OPEC confronted an inviting state of affairs for
flexing its muscle, but the temptation to see 1973
and what followed exclusively 10 terms of
monopolization of oil supply must be tempered by
keeping in mind the particular conditions prevail-
ing at the time.
Keeping in mind, therefore, the arbitrariness of
interval selection, one may still glean some useful
insights from reviewing major en rgy trends pre-
and post-1973. Note, from Figure 5.1, the virtual
halt to energy consumption growth among the
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Figure 5.6 Regional energy consumption, by source, selected years, 1925-1980 [1]. The source "other"
was dominated by hydroelectricity prior to 1950 and by hydroelectricity and nuclear power thereafter,
(Figures rounded to nearest percent.)
can be ascribed to two major forces:
(1) An unprecedented rise in world oil prices -
averaging 28% annually in real terms between
1973 and 1980 - followed by "sy npathetic"
increases in other energy prices.
(2) The slowdown in economic growth - itself
brought on to a large measure by the energy
shocks of 1973-1974 and 1979-1980. The
International Energy Agency has estimated oil-
induced income loss for the OIeD member
countries from just the second oil shock at over
trillion in current rices [6,! 64].
industrial market economies. Elsewhere, the slow-
down in demand growth was fairly small. In the
case of the LDCs, it was, in fact, the sustained flow
of recycled petroleum dollars that enabled these
countries to reasonably maintain their pace of
economic growth and, concomitantly, their use of
energy throughout most of the post-1973 period.
Of course, the very success of that process con-
tributed significantly to the ensuing LDC debt
management problem which, in the early 1980s,
provoked a rude economic retrenchment in a num-
ber of countries,
The slowdown in energy consumption growth
among industrial market economies (whose weight
is large,>n ugh to shape the agg ('cratt: g'l bal trend)
The World
price effect~on
ank has highlightl.:d the im' me an<1
lergy consumption with two simple
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Figure 5.7 Regional energy production, by source, selected years, 1925-1980 [1]. The source "other" was
dominated by hydroelectricity prior to 1950 and by hydroelectricity and nuclear power thereafter. (Figures
rounded to nearest percent.)
s hematics, reproduced here as Figure 5.9. The
diagram (for industrial and developing countrie )
re t on the proposition that annual increases in
energy use can be represented as a function of
(and statistically largely explained by) changes in
income and prices. The equation expressing this
relationship is:
energy growth =
a x (p rcemage in orne growth)
-b x (percentag price increase or decrease).
a is defined as the income la ticity, the rate at
which energy consumption increases relative to
increases in real CDP; while b is the price lasticit .
the rate at which energy consumption decrea es
(increase) as it bec mes more (less) costly.
Income elasticities are thought to be near 1.0 in
industrialized countries and around 1.3 in LDCs
e, periencing the early stages of industrialization.
Price elasticities - much more flimsy e timates -
ar believed to be around 0.3 or 0.4 for both groups
of countries. An important distinction must be
drawn betw en short- and long-term price elas-
ticities: the longer the adjustment period for
responding to energy price incr ases - that is, the
longer one allow' for replacement of such energy-
associated fixed assets as machinery, buildings, and
transport equipment - the high r the price elas-
ticities tha can be assum d to govern. (For example,
if the vehicle stock requir s a minimum of 10 years
to turn over, the long-run price elasticity of demand
for motor fuel would not be fully reached much
before that interval.)
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Figure 5.8 Worldwide share of
primary energy consumption used to
gl3nerate electricity. 1925-1980,
appruximations derived from [1).
Obtaining the figures involved ascrib-
ing an estimated worldwide generat-
ing efficiency factor to total electricity
generation, and dividing the resultant
estimate of energy inputs at power
stations by primary energy consump-
tion (since only selected benchmark
years are plotted. intervening years or
periods should not be construed as
lying on the lines connecting those
benchmarks).
The World Bank has estimated that, with no price
changes, industrialized countries in 1980 would
have consumed 10 million barrels/day oil equivalent
(MBDOE) more than they did. These price-induced
"savings" are represented by the yellow areas of
Figure 5.9. For the oil-importing LDCs, the income
effect tends to dominate the price effect so that their
savings (an estimated 1.0 MBDOE) were less pro-
nounced. For the world as a whole, energy savings
calculated within this construct were estimated as
13 MBDOE. If this type of analysis is even approxi-
mately correct, it suggests that energy use and
income growth show no evidence of having been
fundamentally "uncoupled", once price change is fac-
tored into the equation. On the other hand, the limited
data base from which this finding is derived under-
scores the importance of gaining greater insight
into developments that could mean significant long-
term structural change with respect to the role of
energy (telecommunications is often cited as one
such energy-saving prospect). We touch on this
point again in our review of projections.
Figures 5.1-5.8 and Table 5.1 show a number of
other interesting pre- and post-1973 comparative
energy trends. Being largely self-evident, they
require little discussion here, other than to empha-
size just a few highlights. In the industrial West,
the precipitous pre-1973 decline in the share of coal
in total energy used appears to have been
arrested; the sharp rise in oil reversed. In contrast
to fairly marked shifts in fuel shares prior to 1973,
these shares have been broadly stable in the years
since for each of the major regions, on both the
consumption and production sides. In the world-
wide distribution of oil output, however, several
striking trends (shown in Table 5.l) emerge:
OPEC's share went from 20 to 56% between 1960
to 1973; that proportion subsequently receded
sharply to 36%. And both Western Europe's and
Mexico's shares are now 5-6 times their 1960 global
proportion of 1%. One may argue about how endur-
ing an impact the events of the 1970s will eventually
have; for now, it is hard to avoid the conclusion
that these upheavals induced significant changes in
world energy patterns.
Order or disorder in long-term
energy trends? Some critical
comments
As noted, the 55-year period on which we are focus-
ing is one characterized by major episodes of global
turmoil, including a period of precipitously higher
energy prices. Arguably, such events dominate any
independent and underlying forces shaping the
energy characteristics of prolonged phases of
economic history that may exist. Yet some noted
analysts demur, insisting that whatever the nature
of upheavals, such as those described, it is possible
to discern pronounced and systematic long-term
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periods of economic change, each bearing the stamp
of distinct energy systems and technologies.
A notable expression of that viewpoint appears
in the IIASA study Energy in a Finite World [8], in
which it is argued that there prevails a predictable,
regular pattern of one primary energy system sub-
stituting for another over time. "(E)vents such as
wars, economic depression, or the recent oil embar-
goes ... produced only small deviations from the
long-term substitution paths [8, p 101 ]." In spite of
acknowledged data gaps of serious proportions, the
model is characterized as robust and capable of
generating "stable estimates of so-called 'takeover
times' that are relatively constant for any given
system and that extend over several decades." A
stylized representation of the process is given in
Figure 5.10 (similar to one in the IIASA book,
except that it includes more recent information and
has a more distant time horizon). The figure shows
global primary energy substitution between the
middle of the nineteenth century and recent years,
and plots a projected path to the year 2100. (We
discuss energy projections in the following section.)
What the figure seeks to convey is the extent to
which one can impose a simple function onto the
actual path of market penetration. (The transfor-
mation on the left is the ratio of a given energy
source's market share to the share of all other
sources. Thus, for example, coal's market share
between 1880 and 1920 increased from about 50
to 60% and the transformation factor increased
from 1.0 to 1.5; the corresponding logarithmic rep-
resentations are 0 and 0.18, respectively. Hence the
1880 and 1920 plots on the left-hand scale are 10°
and 10°·18, respectively.)
If validated, the thrust of the IIASA analysis
would be highly significant. It would mean, for
example, that the peaking of coal in 1920 could
have been predicted many decades earlier;
similarly, the peaking of oil around 1970 (if that
turns out to have been the case) could have been
anticipated. And most important, future waves of
energy innovation and penetration could be pin-
pointed with a fair degree of assurance.
The prime exponent of the applicability of the
substitution model is Cesare Marchetti, whose
specialized work in the area the IIASA authors have
incorporated into their study. Marchetti is not only
confident of the explanatory power of the substitu-
tion model with respect to energy; he generalizes
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its relevance to all kinds of technological change
and product development. On energy, he deems
concepts of prices and resources entirely
unnecessary to describe the system, describing the
logistic representation of the data "snug" for very
long periods of time. "To a physicist's eye, present-
day econometric models still look much like tod-
dling and stuttering. What I think is most dangerous
and misleading is their blind devotion to monetary
concepts [10]."
In turning his attention from energy to an analy-
sis of technological change in general, Marchetti
preserves his repudiation of prices, capital, and
other economic variables. Indeed, all his time series
involve physical quantities, such as number of
objects or tons of coal. Focusing primarily on the
putative bunching of innovations, their penetration
rate, and the ultimate market absorptive capacity
for the various resultant goods and services - and
these can be as disparate as "margarine, vacuum
cleaners, or the theory of relativity" - Marchetti
states that, in this way, he has succeeded in cutting
"the Gordian knot of congested econometric
hypotheses, where the result usually depends on
the investigators' opinions, or more often on those
of the sponsor [9]." The materials introduced in
support of his conclusions are spotty and hard to
unravel. But Marchetti is persuaded that there exists
an overarching time constant that describes the
coincident appearance and ultimate saturation of
products in the marketplace: " ... the time for a
basic innovation to go from 10% to 90% of the
available market is usually 50 years [9]." Curiously,
primary energy - which, one would have thought,
would be one basic economic flow conforming to
the time dimensions of the generalized model - is,
by Marchetti's own admission, empirically some-
what anomolous. The time constant is described as
more like a century; moreover, as Figure 5.10 shows,
market shares for different energy sources turn
down far short of 90%.
The principal agent or agents that cause indus-
tries and products to flourish and recede in the
characteristic pattern adduced in the model are
never clearly articulated, though references to
human population waves as an analog give the
analysis a quasi-anthropological cast. These
ambiguities notwithstanding, Marchetti is able to
state that the "present innovation rush will formally
start in 1984 with 10% of the basic innovations
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Figure 5.10 World primary energy
substitution, Marchetti representa-
tion, 1850-2100 [9, p 335]. Fraction (F)
refers to market shares of given
energy sources; F/(l-F) refers to the
corresponding (logarithmic) transfor-
mation function. "Solfus" means
solar and fusion energy. The yellow
curves are from the data and the black
curves are extrapolations based on
the logistic model. For a discussion,
see text.
introduced and end in 2002 with 90% of the basic
innovations introduced;" and that, "in the field of
energy, electricity consumption will pick up again
in the nineties [9]."
To help put Marchetti's assertions into context,
a brief excursion into long-wave theory may be
instructive. Marchetti is certainly not alone in
reviving interest in long-wave hypotheses of techno-
logical and economic cycles - an interest which, in
any case, was never stilled, either before or after
Kondratieff's work of 50 years ago: witness the work
of Joseph Schumpeter, Simon Kuznets, and - more
recently - W. W. Rostow. Where Marchetti appears
to stand alone is in the utter certainty of his judg-
ment about the unambiguous existence of long
waves and their precise regularity; his emphatic
repudiation of economic factors as an intrinsic
(rather than merely resultant) factor in such cycles;
and his almost unqualified confidence in the fact
and timing of long waves for long-term forecasting
purposes.
A useful reconnaissance article by Rostow depict-
ing the intellectual development of long-wave
hypotheses appeared a decade ago [II]. In his
review, Rostow traces, in particular, those contribu-
tions of Schumpeter and Kuznets involving the
importance, in cycles of economic growth, of
leading sectors and technological innovations.
Rostow's synthe is, focusing on concepts
"cumulatively gen rated from Kondratieff on
forward," revolves around the critical role of:
(I) The sequence of leading, disaggregated growth
sectors - e.g., factory-manufactured textiles,
transport, and major branches of the modern
chemical industry.
(2) The food sector.
(3) Raw material inputs to the industrial system.
(4) Housing and social infrastructure.
However, in contrast to Marchetti (who, to be sure,
cites many of the same technological milestones),
Rostow, and those whose work he reviews, regards
movements in prices, investment profitability, and
production - in other words, monetary phenomena
- as critical elements in whatever dynamic process
gives rise to long-term cyclical patterns.
Another, more critical, contemporary perspective
of long-wave hypotheses is provided by Rosenberg
and Frischtak [12]. Asking "What conditions would
need to be fulfilled in order for technological inno-
vation to generate long cycles of the periodicity
postulated by [Kondratieff] and his disciples?"
Rosenberg and Frischtak focus on four key issues:
(I) Clustering. Proponents of technologically driven
long-wave cycle theories would need to show
why spurts of innovations, giving rise, in turn,
to intensified stages of investment and disinvest-
ment, occu r in the clustered fashion described
by their models.
(2) Timing. "The process of technological innova-
tion involves xtremely complex relations
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among a set of key variables - inventions, inno-
vations, diffusion paths, and investment activity.
A technological theory of long cycles needs to
demonstrate that these variables interact in a
manner that is compatible with the peculiar
timing requirements of such cycles [12]." If
macroeconomic factors could be shown to play
a dominant role in explaining the timing of new
innovations, that could provide one important
and plausible clue to support the theory.
(3) Economy-wide repercussions. To produce the
aggregate quantitative features of long-wave
upswings and downswings, the effect of perva-
sive interindustry flows of materials, equipment,
and technology would need to be demonstrated.
(4) Recurrence. It is not sufficient to demonstrate
causal linkage from innovation through invest-
ment and growth to retardation. Careful to
exclude events explained by historical accident,
one needs to demonstrate regular recurrent
patterns in this schema, including the turning
points inherent in the process. (It would, for
example, be necessary to explain the introduc-
tion and diffusion of nuclear power as a major
energy source as an inevitable and intrinsic ele-
ment in the shaping of a 50-year long wave, and
not - as some might argue - as the fortuitous
purusit of nuclear fission in the course of a
world war.)
Rosenberg and Frischtak are not disdainful of the
fascination with long waves; indeed, they under-
score the importance and value of more research.
But they are skeptical that the four conditions which
would affirm long waves as a distinct phenomenon
have been met.
This brief discussion suggests that we are prob-
ably a long way from having at hand the empirical
and logical underpinnings to substantiate long-wave
hypotheses. Whether, confronted with "uncanny"
hints of cyclical regularity either for energy systems
or clusters of technological innovation generally,
one is nonetheless justified in incorporating such a
presumptive schema into long-range forecasting
seems very questionable. A contrary view, however,
is easy to appreciate. In Isaiah Berlin's words: "One
of the deepest of human desires is to find a unitary
pattern in which the whole of experience, past,
present, and future, actual, possible, and unful-
filled, is symmetrically ordered." And elsewhere in
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the same essay: "The notion that one can discover
large patterns or regularities in the procession of
historical events is naturally attractive to those who
are impressed by the success of the natural sciences
in classifying, correlating, and above all predicting
[13]." Yet, notwithstanding the problematic nature
of theories underlying long-range projections, the
fact remains that such projections are indispensable
for a variety of purposes, a topic taken up in the
following section.
Projection issues
If the preceding section has shown us to be wary
of imposing a generalized model of energy develop-
ment, this does not mean that there is any energy
projection schema that does not pose major hazards
and uncertainties. Yet, projections, once committed
to print, often acquire a sanctity that no caveats can
totally dispel, notwithstanding the fragility of such
exercises - a fragility heightened by the long future
time span and the degree of detail one frequently
seeks to embody in the effort. Projections are
hypothetical forecasts that depict the estimated con-
sequences of specified assumptions. Accept or reject
the assumptions, and you accept or reject what flows
from these assumptions. Assumptions can involve
judgments regarding future policy decisions - for
example, measures governing plutonium repro-
cessing or decisions to impose tightened controls
on fossil-fuel combustion; they can refer to
behavioral factors, such as future trade-offs between
work and leisure or between goods and services
consumed; they can be technological in character,
both as regards manufacturing processes and the
appearance of new goods. Last, but not least, there
must be explicit or implicit assumptions concerning
economic variables, such as income, prices, and
other factors.
To specify assumptions is not to accept the likeli-
hood of the assumed trend or event occuring;
rather, it is to explore what would follow given that
it does happen. (Nor does it mean that a
phenomenon excluded from consideration because
its consideration would be intractable may not, on
the grounds of probability, be seriously deserving
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of attention;- one ignores the chances of worldwide
conflict, in spite of the ominous position of the
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists doomsday clock, an
American magazine's symbol of approaching or -
less frequently - receding nuclear danger.) Thus,
in long-term energy projections, it is routinely
assumed that the per capita income of today's poor
countries will minimally grow at around 2% yearly
over the next several decades. Although a more
dismal course of events can hardly be ruled out, its
likelihood is ignored. Perhaps there is an unwilling-
ness on the part of analysts to contemplate the
consequences, or perhaps it is assumed that the
international community will forestall a lower level
of achievement. In the ambiguous comments of the
International Energy Agency, these countries:
... may continue to suffer from the effects of higher
oil prices and agricultural shortfalls. The projected
[economic] growth rates assume, however, that
improvements will be achieved in domestic policies
with emphasis on increasing exports to DEeD
countries as well as to other developing countries
[6, p 160].
The last several decades have witnessed some
notable instances of faulty projections. In the USA,
for example, the 20-year growth in nuclear power
capacity that had been predicted in the 1960s
turned out to be wildly exaggerated; foreign oil,
rather than being the force expected to moderate
upward energy price pressures, became the source
of this pressure. If one can rationalize those par-
ticular misjudgments -after all, OPEC can be shrug-
ged off as an "exogeneous" unanticipatable
phenomenon and one can excuse the nuclear
optimism for lack of an historic trend line - it is
less easy to explain an inability to spot even those
developments one would have associated with a
strong degree of momentum and continuity. Yet,
within a year or so after the US Bureau of the
Census had projected USA population growth at
the postwar rate of 1.6% yearly, a slide in the birth
rate brought the figure down to 1% or less [14].
Yet, however prone to error and uncertainty,
long-term energy projections are necessary for
investment, research, and policy decisions in both
private and public sectors. The commitment of
scarce resources to, say, a multigigawatt hydro pro-
ject in a developing economy can hardly ignore the
demand for - and alternative ways of producing -
electricity at the time such a facility begins to go on
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stream and over its expected life span. The pursuit
of atmospheric and climatological research must, at
least in part, be guided by prospective demand for
different energy sources. But the need for projec-
tions to assist with these and other questions should
not blind us to the tenuousness of such analyses,
especially the longer the time horizon being con-
sidered. When one thinks about some of the (non-
military) societal and technological developments
in the past half century - in telecommunications,
computerization, urbanization, transportation -
one cannot help but wonder in what degree of detail
it makes sense to speculate for 50-100 years from
now. (As a technical aside, it is not even conceptually
possible to allow for a fundamentally altered GNP
mix. This arises from the "index number problem"
as it relates to weighting schemes.) Perhaps there is
some level of aggregation - say, total household
energy demand or energy use by industry - at
which, because of fortuitous offsets within the
aggregate or because of other reasons, there is
sufficient observable regularity to lend credence to
the bounds which one can reasonably project. A
better handle on this question might help channel
energy modeling efforts in more rewarding direc-
tions than their somewhat obsessive numerological
bent.
A final point about projections takes on particular
relevance to the present project. Most multicountry
or global analyses surveyed in connection with this
chapter appear to make no or only limited allowance
for any "feedback" effects or adaptations
occasioned by the potential environmental per-
turbations or other spillover effects posed by the
projected level of energy use and output. Thus, if
a given projection of fossil fuel use implies an unac-
ceptable degree of environmental damage, without
that fact being fed back (iterated) to yield a revised
(or alternative) projection incorporating a response
to that damage, the outcome is a projection whose
fuzziness as regards important policy issues must
be recognized.
Projections of national, regional, and global
energy-demand abound. Here it is possible to touch
on just a few such efforts, and these only cursorily.
Energy projections vary greatly in their time
horizons, purpose, level of detail, and degree of
methodological sophistication.
Projections of five years or less tend to be predic-
tions; that is, underlying assumptions are expected
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to hold. Those of 10-20 years veer toward the type
of hypothetical forecasts discussed earlier. Projec-
tions many decades into the future may embody
features which also characterize the short- and
medium-term efforts, but that - in the form of
scenarios - frequently have an exploratory or prob-
ing objective.
Projections may have the purpose of delineating
a future that is likely to unfold or - normatively -
a future the analyst would like to see unfold or, at
least, test as to its tenability. (Scenarios examining,
say, a world without nuclear power, or constrained
by limits on CO2 release, or subsisting largely on
renewable forms of energy fall into this category.)
The shorter the time horizon, the greater the
degree of detail the researcher is willing to specify.
Few researchers would be emboldened to project
categories of end use (such as household or com-
mercial energy consumption) forward to the year
2050 for major world regions.
Lastly, one should note the variety of projection
techniques employed. Formal econometric models
have the virtue of positing behavioral and structural
relationships in a disciplined manner and of indicat-
ing the robustness of the estimating equations by
testing them (backcasting) against actual historical
trends. Key assumptions, such as those concerning
price, income, and technological change, must be
explicitly stated. For projections extending many
years into the future, these virtues diminish and
may, indeed, be an impairment. There is no reason
to expect past patterns to endure indefinitely; yet
formal models cannot easily allow for the effects of
speculative events and departures. Not surprisingly,
a recent survey showed that, for the more formal
energy projection models, technological and certain
other qualitative insights tended to take second
place to methodological and computational
manipulation [15]. No wonder: "optimization
modelers" are. most comfortable when they can
specify all critical inputs and relationships in unam-
biguous quantitative terms. (If, instead of his
blanket condemnation of econometrics and
econometricians noted earlier Marchetti had
focused on such specific shortcomings, his points
would have greater force.) Thus, penetration of
synfuels and, more broadly, of backstop tech-
nologies is frequently treated in a disembodied fash-
ion, in which their appearance is tightly governed
by relative supply prices and other variables and
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parameters. Yet, observing, for example, the
chronic roller coaster behavior of synfuels projects
in the USA, might not such technological com-
ponents of a future energy system be treated more
effectively outside, or as an adjunct to, a formal
model?
Other projection efforts embrace a more eclectic
approach, intermingling analytical constructs with
numerous judgmental elements. The lEA's World
Energy Outlook [6] and the World Bank's World
Development Report 1981 [7] fall into this group. An
undertaking by the World Energy Conference
chose to be rather more casual, stating "[p]rice-
elasticity was not introduced, but the general climate
resulting from the ... scenarios is implicitly charac-
terized by a gradual upward trend of prices in the
long n)n ... [16, p xxiv]."
Energy projections to the year
2000
For projections to the end of the century one has
the choice of numerous studies to consult. Here we
cite some findings of the lEA's World Energy Outlook
[6] as fairly typical of other such efforts of the early
1980s. In this work, most of the analysis is directed
to the energy demand-supply prospects for the
24-member OECD group of countries. In the more
formal stages of its procedure, the lEA presents
two alternative projections:
(l) High energy demand. This model is character-
ized by economic growth of about 3% per year
between 1980-2000, falling real oil prices
between 1980-1985, and a stable level
thereafter. For the entire 20 years, energy
demand growth rises at 2.1 % yearly.
(2) Low energy demand. This model assumes
economic growth of around 2.5% and the 1980-
1985 oil price decline to be succeeded by an
annual rise of 3% per year. For the 20 years,
energy demand growth averages 1.5% yearly.
Finding that even the low energy demand alter-
native produces an undesirable level of "excess"
OECD oil demand in the year 2000 of nearly 10
million barre lis per day (MBD) - the high demand
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variant results in an excess of over 20 MBD - the
lEA analysts constructed a "Reference Case"
projection which, though producing total energy
demand levels higher than the low energy demand
case, features marked retrenchment in oil demand.
This preferred variant, in which energy demand
during the 1980-2000 interval rises at 1.9% yearly,
judgmentally incorporates factors that are more
policy- than market-driven to achieve greater oil
demand-supply equilibrium by 2000. Fulfillment
of the "Reference Case" depends on an enormously
increased contribution of coal and nuclear power
to energy demand growth: an incremental 1980-
2000 share of 90% compared to their combined
base-year share of 26%.
For non-OECD regions of the world, the lEA's
projections approach is less refined (necessarily so
for nonmarket economies). The lEA's chapter on
the energy outlook for developing countries reviews
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the factors that are likely to produce sustained
pressure on oil supplies in particular, and energy
in general:
(l) Economic growth targets (of 4-5% yearly)
designed to provide some margin of increased
per capita well-being above continued high rates
of population growth (projected at no less than
2% yearly for some years to come).
(2) The shift from locally traded noncommercial
fuels (such as firewood, crop residues, animal
wastes, and animal draught power) to commer-
cial fuels, notwithstanding the potential for
more rational exploitation of the former fuel
category (Box 5.1).
(3) A relatively high income elasticity of energy
demand characterizing regions that pursue
enhanced agricultural efficiency and mechani-
zation, motorization, expanded manufacturing
Box 5.1 A note on noncommercial energy
This fuel category is dominated by firewood, but comprises also other forms of biomass, animal wastes, and
human and animal power. ("Traditional" would be a more appropriate adjective than "noncommercial",
since at least a portion of such fuel is sold in the marketplace.) Worldwide, noncommercial energy has been
estimated as representing around 5% of total energy consumption in 1980, though for less developed
countries the share may be over 25% and vastly higher still for a number of individual countries. But the
poor efficiency with which such fuels are used lowers their effective relationship to total energy. Data on
such energy forms and their use are fragmentary; hence, quantitative analyses of energy trends tend to
treat them at best in an adjunct fashion. Although careful management in their exploitation and more
efficient utilization can enable these energy forms to perform an important role, historically their use has
also contributed significantly to deforestation, erosion, depletion of soil fertility, siltation, and desertification
of arid and semiarid regions, brought about by the inhabitants' increasingly arduous search for fuel wood.
Pachauri singles out for particular notice 45 developing countries with a fuel-wood problem and a heavy
dependence on oil imports. Their combined population numbers 329 million people [17]. China and India
are excluded because they do not meet the oil-import dependence criterion; but they have major fuel-wood
problems as well. India's rural population has been estimated by Revelle to be dependent on noncommercial
sources for 90% - and on fuel wood alone for 40% - of its total energy use [18].
Future trends in noncommercial energy use and their ecological consequences are hard to project. The
World Bank sees their consumption in LDCs growing by less than I % annually between 1980 and 1990;
this compares to a projected growth of 6% for commercial energy and represents a decline in the former's
share of the total from 26 to 17% [7, pp 36-38]. Like the Bank, Dunkerley, of Resources for the Future,
expects the proportionate importance of noncommercial fuels to fall. But her projection shows the absolute
level of noncommercial fuel demand growing between 2.5 and 3.5% yearly during the period 1980-1995
[19]. The high end of the range is based on the possibility of substituting a limited amount of biomass fuels
for imported oil in electricity generation, transport, and selected industrial activities.
Undoubtedly, the trend that flllally evolves will depend, among other things, on price- or policy-induced
constraints on fuel wood exploitation, enhanced income and education, relative price changes for alternative
energy sources, rural out-migration, and programmatic initiatives of various kinds. (The Brazilian govern-
ment-sponsored ethanol program is an example.)
While forest management in general may arguably have a role to play in dealing with an emerging CO2
problem, it seems unlikely that noncommercial fuel use can, by itself, have much of an effect in that respect.
--------------------------------
-\
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activity, and the establishment of basic infra-
structural facilities.
For LDCs in the aggregate, the lEA projects an
energy consumption growth during 1980-2000 that
ranges between 4.6 and 5.6% annually. This com-
prises both OPEC and non-OPEC countries; and,
for that combined total energy demand-supply bal-
ance appears ensured. The wherewithall to finance
the energy requirements of the non-OPEC LDCs is
the more formidable problem.
Energy consumption growth for the CPEs as a
group is projected by the lEA as ranging between
1.8 and 2.3% for the 1980-2000 period. The prin-
cipal energy challenge facing the CPEs revolves
around the imperative for interfuel substitution as
the USSR's capacity for expanded production and
net export of oil (to both Eastern and Western
Europe) diminishes. The best supply prospects
involve USSR natural gas. China's oil potential is
still problematic. Eastern Europe appears to enjoy
only limited opportunity for energy supply
expansion.
A summary of the lEA's regional energy con-
sumption projections is compared with the long-
term historical record in Table 5.2. Note that even
the high end of the 1980-2000 ranges implies a
deceleration in growth rates. The slowdown is
especially marked for the planned economies.
Aggregating these regional perspectives, the lEA
sees the implications of its exercise as pointing to a
fairly tenuous world energy picture over the next
Table 5.2 Summary of lEA's regional energy
consumption projections [6].
Region Average annual rates of
growth (%)
1925-1980 1980-2000
Developing countries 5.7 4.6-5.6
Industrialized
countries 2.5 1.5-2.1
Centrally planned
countries 5.3 1.8-2.3
Total 3.4 2.1-2.8
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several decades. OPEC maximum oil production in
2000, for example, is estimated at 28 MBD and no
increase in maximum sustainable capacity beyond
something over 30 MBD is foreseen. Then, too, the
robust expectations for coal and nuclear energy, on
which the Agency had pinned such great hopes,
have dimmed. The prospects for quantitatively sig-
ni ficant penetration by synthetic fuels and solar
energy (slighted in the lEA analysis) are poor.
Reemergence of a tight oil market by the end of
the century could be one consequence. In their
worldwide implications, the lEA projections point
to primary energy demand-supply balances in 2000
ranging from an approximate equilibrium,
achieved by modestly higher real prices compared
to levels in the early 1980s, to a supply shortfall as
high as 50 MBDOE (equivalent to about lOOx 10 15
BTU and roughly 20% of worldwide energy con-
sumption that year), implying presumably strong
upward price pressures.
Others may see things less disturbingly. Market
adjustments induced by energy price on both the
demand and supply sides have surprised skeptics
who saw active policy intervention in energy
markets as necessary. In the USA, for example,
conservation has been a pervasive, economy wide
phenomenon. Then, too, the prospects for USA gas
supply expansion look better than the lEA posits
in even its reference case. Non-OPEC developing
countries (other than Mexico) may develop greater
.oil-producing potential than the lEA - conserva-
tively - assumes.
Projections beyond the year 2000
In pondering energy pathways well beyond the turn
of the century, one is well advised to dispense with
fine-tuned estimating refinements and to concen-
trate on some overarching questions: What sort of
a world - economically and socially - is subsumed
by different rates and patterns of energy demand
growth? What do such trends imply for claims on
the energy resource base? What is implied for
worldwide income inequality? What issues are
posed by potential environmental conflicts or
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constraints? What is the prospect for adapting to, or
sidestepping, such barriers?
If the lEA type of exercise provides cautious
reassurance that global energy demand and supply
can be in balance at tolerable prices in 2000, analyses
looking beyond that milestone tend to be far less
sanguine. For example, the World Energy Confer-
ence (WEC), in connection with its triennial 1983
meeting, concluded that the cumulative claims on
global energy resources implied by its demand pro-
jection can be satisfied only if one assumes a
marked shift in demand patterns away from oil (or
conversely, assumes the feasibility of large-scale
conversion into liquids of coal and other synthetic
feedstocks), recourse to renewables, and/or the
exploitation of uranium resources in advanced
reactor technologies [16]. Worldwide, the WEe
projects energy demand growth at a rate which
slows to 2.1 % yearly during the period 2000-2020.
(It calls this projection a normative one, in distinc-
tion to a lower-case projection termed undesirable
in its implications for LDC economic prospects.)
A study of a somewhat different character,
already referred to at some length, was the IIASA
modeling effort released in 1981 [8]. In its own
words, "The study explores the possible features
of global energy systems that are not just post-oil
systems, but post-fossil systems." And it explores
how, realistically, the world might successfully
negotiate the transition to such systems. The IIASA
stJ.1dy implies that the resources and technology are
available to sustain the anticipated increase of the
world's population to a level of 8 billion in the year
2030; but it offers no assurance that the requisite
political, economic, and institutional hurdles toward
that end can be overcome. One reason for the
study's somewhat pessimistic tone is the Marchetti
notion outlined above: that penetration of new
energy systems or resource technologies material-
izes in characteristically ponderous, long-term
swings, which show little historic evidence of being
manipulatable, in part because they occur within
the more general context of recurrent long waves
of global economic expansion and contraction.
Our earlier remarks raised a number of critical
questions about this line of argument. Since we are
now concerned with judgments about the unfolding
of future events, it is particularly important to
reflect on the extent to which we are locked into a
rigid, inevitable process; or face, at worst, consider-
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able uncertainty; or, at best, some measure of flexi-
bility and choice. Even in terms of the IIASA study's
own substantive explorations and discussion, the
last case is the more persuasive one. For example,
worldwide coal reserves are so huge that, if their
use is not environmentally constrained, coal's erod-
ing market share shown in Figure 5.10 might argu-
ably be reversed. Unconventional gas resources are
very likely also large, though not in the coal league.
Breakthroughs in extraction technology, coupled
with improvements in seaborne transport, could
make sustained gas use at least as likely as fusion,
pictured as taking off early in the twenty-first cen-
tury. Even as a stylized representation, Figure 5.10,
by focusing exclusively on energy sources rather
than on the technological facets of their exploita-
tion, rules out the possibility of time profiles that
could be quite different from those plotted. Then,
too, there are sufficient references, in both the
IIASA study and Marchetti's writing (referred to
earlier), of the extent to which policy intervention
can deflect energy-system patterns from preor-
dained paths and cycles. Research and development
(R & D) initiatives, active nuclear energy promotion
or moratoriums, and major infrastructural projects
fall into this category. That France seems to have
made a clear-cut choice for nuclear generation while
Denmark has reverted to coal-based power is
evidence of how decisively policy departures can
attenuate, rather than reinforce, the technological
forces that might have been expected to dominate
electricity production trends.
But it is only fair to point out that the IIASA
authors' judgments are not governed dogmatically
by the schematics of the model, however rigid the
model may itself appear to be. Thus, in its more
pragmatic slant, the study finds that full use of all
available energy resources will be required as we
look ahead to the first several decades of the next
century. Dirtier and more expensive fossil resources
and vast quantities of synfuels will have to be
developed transitionally, along with both nuclear
breeder reactors and large-scale solar plants. In the
view of the IIASA authors, small-scale solar and
other renewable energy sources, while assumed to
play a growing role, are likely to satisfy only a
modest fraction of the total global energy demand
beyond the first quarter of the twenty-first century.
Underlying the concern expressed in reports
such as those of WEC and IIASA are statistical
,
';
Energy patterns - in retrospect and prospect 159
Table 5.3 World recoverable reserves and
resources of conventional mineral fuels, as
estimated in the late 1970s [20].
comparisons between the estimated size of the
resource stock, on the one hand, and the cumulative
consumptive claim on that stock, on the other. For
example, the cumulative energy consumption total
between 1980 and 2030 at, say, a 2% rate of growth
worldwide is 24X 1018 BTU. Yet, as Table 5.3 shows,
the entirety of the existing oil and gas reserves plus
the estimated resources of these fuels that might
become reserves would be absorbed by this con-
sumption stream; while, to be useful, resources in
abundant supply would need to be convertible into
forms suitable to the evolving pattern of end-use
demand.
Fuel
Coal
Oil
Natural gas
Uranium:
without breeders
with breeders
Reserves
(10 18 BTU)
18
4
3
7
443
Resources
(10 '8 BTU)
141
8-12
9-10
17
1003
pared by the Institute for Energy Analysis (IFEA),
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), and
the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). Brief
comments on each follow.
The long-term regionalized energy model
developed at the IFEA, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, tests
the sensitivity of CO2 releases to assumed rates of
growth in total energy consumption and to interfuel
use patterns [21]. In a base-case representation, the
authors project the period growth rates in global
energy consumption and associated CO2/energy
elasticities, see Table 5.4. For most ofthe post-World
War II period, growth in CO2 release relative to
energy growth was about 0.92, with successive
penetration into the fuel mix of oil and gas at the
expense of coal signifying some progressive diminu-
tion in carbon content per unit of aggregate energy.
While the CO2 implications of energy growth are
quite muted for the balance of this century
(influenced, to a considerable extent, by nuclear
energy's gain in market share), the situation will
change in the twenty-first century as heavy reliance
on coal and shale intensify CO2 loadings.
Table 5.4 IFEA projections for CO 2 release and
energy consumption [2'1].
The consequences for atmospheric CO2 con-
centrations depend on what is absorbed by various
sinks (oceans, biomass) and what remains as the
airborne fraction. But the authors suggest that (C02
release)/(energy consumption) coefficients and the
airborne fractions would have to settle at values well
outside what they regard as plausible ranges to
prevent a near doubling of CO2 concentration
occurring by 2050 or soon thereafter. The
600 p.p.m. implied (compared to an estimated
339 p.p.m. in 1975) has become a kind of reference
The historical dynamics of resource develop-
ment, the conceptual dubiousness of physical scar-
city, and the capacity for substitution in resource
use and supply all argue against the running out
idea as a central analytical construct in energy plan-
ning. Technological change induced by rising
resource costs - for example, development of coal
liquefaction processes triggered by rising oil prices
- need not be any less likely to occur in the energy
field than, say, in agriculture. (See the discussion
of induced technical change by Crosson, Chapter 4
of this volume.) Nonetheless, the figures just cited
do serve a useful illustrative purpose insofar as they
prod examination of policy initiatives and processes
- e.g., in the areas of synfuels and solar R&D -
that could help smooth future energy transitions in
a timely fashion.
Three other projection studies were instigated
by, in particular, concern over long-term environ-
mental implications of energy use. These were pre-
Period
1975-2000
2000-2025
2025-2050
Energy
consumption
growth rate
(%)
2.5
2.6
2.4
(IlC02 release)
(ll energy)
consumption)
0.61
0.88
1.30
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point for the likelihood of measurable, global
average surface temperature increase [22].
The IFEA authors conclude their analysis by rec-
ognizing the commons nature of the CO2 problem
- i.e., where the absence of mutual restraint
mechanisms removes any single country's willing-
ness to avoid fouling the global nest (see pp 164-
165). The study probes several alternative control
devices (ignoring, however, the effects of a major
shift to solar energy), ranging from a purely USA
CO2 tax (a naive case, in the IFEA authors' own
characterization) to a global CO2 tax accompanied
by USA coal export curtailment. However, such a
severe restraint measure (which reduces global CO2
emissions by 40% compared to the base case in 2050)
does not forestall a doubling of CO2 concentration
beyond around 2080. And since the perceived
economic sacrifice of such environmental discipline
may be more than many countries, such as China
with its large coal resources, would tolerate, the
prospects for successful collective action are dim.
However, the authors sought primarily to lead the
reader through some quantitative trends and
relationships rather than explore the political
dynamics of achieving environmentally desirable
outcomes.
The MIT study [23] is not wholly independent
of the IFEA effort (indeed, few pairs of energy
analyses are totally free of incest), insofar as its series
of energy scenarios are cast within the IFEA group's
model structure and depend on the latter's
exogenous specification of demographic and
economic variables. But the MIT report explores a
wider array of energy demand-supply paths to the
year 2050 in order to test the feasibility of less
threatening CO2 outcomes. Indisputably, the lower
the evolving ratio of energy use to GNP (where that
lowering is assumed to occur due to inherent, non-
price driven efficiency improvements and other
changes), the lower the degree of environmental
insult of all kinds. The question is whether such
long-term energy/GNP improvement is likely. The
MIT authors argue that it is, citing the historic
decline in the USA energy/GNP ratio during pro-
longed intervals when relative energy prices were
falling. The prospect of that phenomenon occurring
on a worldwide level over the next 65 years cannot
be dismissed, but the presumption would benefit
from some concrete research. Can a declining
energy/GNP ratio be projected into perpetuity,
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implying steadily less attractiveness in energy as an
economic good? Perhaps, if an energy-food analog
holds; beyond some ultimate level of caloric intake,
further consumption, even if not subject to outright
saturation, could rise proportionately less than
income.
At the very least, discrete study of di~erent
country groupings, according to the stage of
economic development, is vital in gaining a better
understandng of the energy-economic growth
relationship and its global implications. If saturation
and the growing role of service industries are, argu-
ably, energy-dampening characteristics of the most
advanced countries, much remains to be under-
stood about the extent to which energy use by LDCs
is amenable to the stages-of-growth paradigm,
however useful a construct this may be in other
connections. (To assume that Chad will display
energy-economy characteristics reminiscent of
industrial countries at a similar stage of develop-
ment is to disregard the fact that numerous tech-
nologies available to Chad - e.g., electrification -
were, at best, in their infancy in the earlier Western
case.)
Aside from the contribution that improved
energy efficiency can make, the MIT study
examines, and finds substantial promise in, several
other low-C02 scenarios. One of these involves the
successful development of solar photovoltaics and
a resurgence of economic nuclear power. The two
sources combined imply an intense degree of elec-
trification and, therefore, the use of electricity in a
much wider range of applications than at present.
Technological progress in economic electric storage
systems is likewise implied by this scenario. In such
a future, the constrained use of fossil fuels signifies
a conspicuous divergence between the energy trend
line and the much more muted rate of change in
CO2 releases.
The NAS-National Research Council report on
climate change includes an analysis by Nordhaus
and Yohe of alternative energy futures and their
CO2 implications [24]. Their technique - probabilis-
tic scenario analysis - involves the specification of
a range of possible values for the major variables
or parameters in a global economic-energy-carbon
cycle model. The outcome of the effort is not only
a best guess trajectory of the critical indicators, but
also a set of alternatives characterized by each one's
likelihood of occurrence. Notwithstanding the sub-
-,
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jective elements in the estimating process, the NAS
authors underscore the importance and utility of
the probabilistic features of the model for various
policymaking options: guidance for deciding on
more research to narrow the uncertainty range;
avoidance of policy-driven paths whose outcome is
judged too risky; or simply a basis for proceeding
with policies governed by an expected value.
The NAS authors' time horizon extends to the
year 2100. They describe their results as generally
pointing to a lesser degree of carbon emissions and
build up than predicted in earlier studies they sur-
veyed, citing two underlying reasons: deceleration
of global economic growth and price-driven substi-
tution away from the fossil fuels as these become
scarcer. At the same time, Nordhaus and Yohe
emphasize how strikingly these two factors con-
tribute to the overall uncertainty about CO2 , Con-
sequently, they express the need for more research
on worldwide economic growth and on interfuel
substitution. They nevertheless pose a 1-in-4 possi-
bility of a doubling in atomospheric CO2 concentra-
tion occurring before 2050 and even odds for it
happening during 2050-2100. Like the authors of
the IFEA study, Nordhaus and Yohe perform simu-
lations to test the sensitivity of long-run (end of the
twenty-first century) CO2 concentration to world-
wide fossil-fuel taxes. They conclude that these
would have to be quite forceful to have a significant
impact. A unilateral national tax would clearly have
to be steeper yet.
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One hesitates to reproduce the most likely set of
outcomes from the Nordhaus-Yohe effort, for their
contribution - however insightful- is more a blend-
ing of conceptualization and statistical techniques
than of empirical investigation or technology assess-
ment. Indeed, there are a number of abstract
qualities and simplifying assumptions in the
Nordhaus-Yohe schema which, without further
development, tend to limit its applicability to the
real world, including issues of environmental per-
turbations that affect the biosphere. For example,
the model is necessarily very aggregated since the
use of probability distributions for even a limited
number of input variables quickly translates into a
major computational task. That is why, in contrast
to the IFEA model, the world is treated as one
region (some attention focused on different regions'
fuels and fuel-using technologies would surely
be required); only two energy sources - fossil
and nonfossil - are consumed; all nonenergy
inputs (capital, labor, other resources) are largely
dealt with in a consolidated fashion; and unitary
income elasticity is assumed indefinitely. (Large-
scale synfuel programs signifying, for
example, rising primary BTUs of coal per BTU
of final energy - would alone render the last
assumption suspect.) And, just as Marchetti
spurns economically determined outcomes, so the
Nordhaus-Yohe model is intimately governed by
production theory and the economics of resource
exhaustion.
Table 5.5 Most likely annual growth rates of critical variables, Nordhaus-Yohe projections, 1975-
2100 (%/year) [24, p 138].
Variable" 1975-2000 2000-2025 2025-2050 2050-2075 2075-2100
GNP 3.7 2.9 1.5 1.5 1.5
Energy consumption 1.4 2.7 1.2 1.1 1.2
Fossil fuel consumption 0.6 2.5 0.9 0.5 0.4
Nonfossil fuel consumption 5.6 3.1 1.8 2.0 2.0
Price of fossil fuel 2.8 0.3 1.2 2.9 1.1
Price of nonfossil fuel 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
CO2 emissions 0.6 2.6 1.2 0.9 0.4
CO2 concentrations 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.8
• Absolute values for 1975 were: GNP, $6.4 x 1012 ; energy consumption, 244.3 x 1015 BTU; fossil fuel, 224.9 x
10 '5 BTU; nonfossil fuel, 19.4 x 1015 BTU; fossil price, $1.26/106 BTU ($2.74); nonfossil price, $4.25/106 BTU
($4.25); CO2 emission, 4.59 x 109 metric tons/year; CO2 concentration, 340 p.p.m. The parenthetical figures are
prices in 1981 expressed in the general 1975 price level. Conversions into BTU were made at the rate of
27.76 x 106 BTU/metric ton coal equivalent.
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Yet one of the Nordhaus-Yohe tables may be
worth including. Having previously narrowed the
trajectories to be considered to a random sample
of 1000 out of a possible 3 10 different trajectories,
and assigned probabilistic factors to each of these
1000 runs, the NAS authors presented the annual
growth rates of the most likely path for the major
projected indicators, as shown in Table 5.5.
Keeping in mind the substantial - and for some
critical indicators, ballooning - uncertainty sur-
rounding these most likely values, what sort of story
emerges from Table 5.5?
(l) That both global economic growth and energy
consumption are expected to decelerate over
the long term - the former more sharply than
the latter.
(2) That doubling of atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tion may occur around 2065.
(3) That the triggering of backstop technology -
making feasible a significant shift toward non-
carbon fuels - is surprisingly long delayed,
gathering momentum, at the earliest, after the
middle of the twenty-first century; a gradually
rising trend in the fossil/non fossil price ratio -
delayed, for a time, by the considerable size of
the fossil resource base - does occur, but this is
deemed insufficient to counteract the assumed
presence of technological barriers that impede
smooth nonfossil for fossil substitution.
Environmental dilemmas
The foregoing review of medium- and long-term
energy projections suggests that:
(1) Global energy demand and supply, composed
predominantly of today's conventional energy
sources and forms, can probably be balanced in
the year 2000 at modestly higher prices com-
pared to prevailing levels.
(2) After the turn of the century, scarcity of conven-
tional oil and gas will necessitate a progressive
shift toward exploitation of more amply avail-
able resources, among which coal and nuclear
power seem major candidates, and oil shale and
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solar energy promising, but somewhat less cer-
tain, contenders.
(3) Energy consumption growth, while decelerat-
ing, will persist well into the twenty-first century
and will be accommodated predominantly by
fossil fuels before the feasibility of backstop
technologies, coupled with rising fossil fuel
prices, induces major reliance on nonfossil
sources.
(4) There is a high probability of a significant rise
in global CO2 concentration by the middle of
the twenty-first century, though some projec-
tions use that finding as a feedback trigger to
explore the feasibility, though not necessarily
the likelihood, of environmentally more benign
energy-growth paths and patterns.
We have focused on the consequences for CO2
emissions and concentrations of long-term energy
growth not because they are in any sense a proxy
for the multiplicity of environmental constraints
and conflicts which such growth may encounter,
but simply because the CO2 problem is the one
which has received the most analytical attention
from a global perspective. Obviously, energy-
environmental conflicts and problems are much
more pervasive. They arise from the facts that:
(l) High levels of economic activity signify high
levels of energy (and material) flows whose con-
centrated state in nature gives way to a dilute
and degraded state in the environment.
(2) Sophisticated measurement tools and scientific
command over cause-and-effect relationships
continue to give us ever greater insight into
potential hazards to health and safety.
Thus, the list of major and minor environmental
perturbations feared from, or actually provoked by,
energy production, transport, and use is wide
ranging:
(l) Combustion products from power plants, trans-
port, and industrial boilers and their damaging
impact on human health, property values, and
(by way of acid rain) water bodies and vege-
tation.
(2) Radioactive substances and fission products
from various stages of the nuclear fuel cycle.
(3) Spills and dumping in maritime oil transport.
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(4) Land disturbance and water contamination
from coal mining and synfuel projects.
(5) Pollution from wood combustion and, as noted
earlier, the deforestation, erosion, and loss of
soil fertility associated with the use of renewable
energy forms throughout numerous parts of
the world.
And that is an incomplete accounting.
It must quickly be noted, however, that these and
other energy-caused environmental problems
involve widely varying degrees of severity. For one
thing, given the absorptive or regenerative capacity
of the atmosphere, water, or soil, numerous abuses
to the environment may be transitory rather than
enduring. Then, too, control and corrective actions
instigated by regulatory or other policies, and
reflected in tens of billions of dollars spent on pollu-
tion abatement, have succeeded in fostering
improved environmental management, probably
with very modest costs in GNP and other
macroeconomic measures [25]. To be sure, such
success is spread unevenly around the globe because
of the motivational differences that arise from dis-
parities in income, from political milieu, and from
cultural tradition, as well as from the extent to which
different countries or regions are dependent on
energy systems posing more or less intractable
environmental dilemmas.
In this light, an analysis of the willingness or
unwillingness of different nations to embrace
environmentally driven energy constraints could
prove illuminating. It could provide some clue,
however suggestive, as to how far one can expect
the world to move as a collective of nations, and in
what time scale, toward strategies that face up to
potential environmental barriers or dangers. These
strategies could countenance modification in energy
associated activities in view of tolerances that risk
being breached. Or they could revolve around
initiatives that seek to make these tolerances less
constricting. (Whether or not liming lakes, some-
times proposed as an alternative to S02 emission
reductions, turns out to be a practical way to avoid
sulfur-causing acidification, the option illustrates
that acceptable outcomes may be achieved by quite
different approaches.)
An effort to appraise individual countries'
records in energy-related environmental improve-
ments and to draw lessons from those records about
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the potential for transnational cooperation would
not be an easy task. One would want to probe a
number of possible explanatory (and interrelated)
factors:
(1) Income. Presumably the higher the level of per
capita income, the greater the financial commit-
ment to environmental improvement. But how
tidy is that relationship? There are countries
that have evolved from a historic ethic of sub-
duing, rather than living with, nature. Does this
fact fault the income hypothesis?
(2) Political system. While one of the flaws in the
conventional market transaction is a failure to
account for use of common-property resources,
such as air, there is no compelling evidence -
ideological claims to the contrary notwithstand-
ing - that CPEs, with their historic emphasis on
production quotas, are any more sensitive to
environmental objectives.
(3) Social discount rates. A factor no doubt closely
related to standards of living. The more a
country is attentive to conditions 50, 100, or
200 years hence, the more it is likely to discount
the future minimally - that is to place a high
value on environmental preservation for
multiple generations into the future.
(4) Ethics, values, biases. Again, factors likely to be
closely related to (1) and (3). But perhaps there
are instances where dedications to environ-
mental objectives can be shown to have a unique
ethical basis.
(5) Amelioration costs. Heavy coal-using nations,
such as the GDR (and, perhaps even more,
low-income ones like India or China), could face
proportionally more burdensome improvement
costs than those on whom natural endowment
(or policy) has conferred a less polluting energy
profile. The fact that, ex post, pollution-control
expenditures might turn out not to have a severe
impact on measured GNP (let alone GNP
adjusted for environmental quality benefits)
may be insufficient inducement to bear the costs
involved.
(6) Risk and benefit perception. Attitudes vary widely,
irrespective of objective evidence. Some coun-
tries may, for whatever reason, be far more
willing than others to subject themselves to some
environmental hazards, while acting decidedly
risk-averse in other cases.
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(7) Intracountry regional conflict. The acid ram
debate in the CSA, pitting the alleged polluter
(the Ohio Valley and Great Lakes region)
against the apparent victim (New England)
illustrates the problem which, in the absence
of negotiation and compromise on behalf of
broader national goals, can be a formula for
paralysis.
Whether factor analysis, or some other organizing
framework, could enable the estimation of a
country's overall propensity toward sound environ-
mental management deserves study. But even short
of such a systematic undertaking, it seems clear
from points (l )-(6) listed above that if some coun-
tries lack incentives to deal with localized or
national, energy-induced environmental impacts,
they will likely be still more deterred to contribute
to transnational efforts. That brings us to the com-
mons problem.
The commons problem
The conceptual thread that links the disincentive
characteristics just discussed is the commons
phenomenon which surrounds many dimensions
of economic activity - both nationally and inter-
n.ationally - but is particularly important in the case
of energy. Energy yields valuable services whose
allocation in the economic system is - like goods
and services in general - effectively handled
through the institutions of the marketplace and
private property rights. (At least, this is what occurs
in a market-oriented society.) At the same time, the
residual mass of these energy resources flows back
into the common-property resources, within or
across countries, that make up much of the environ-
ment - e.g., air sheds [26] and water bodies. When
access to such waste refuges is unimpeded and free,
overuse and degradation is the inevitable result.
Valuable as they are, free commons deter
ameliorative action by individual users since that
would merely confer benefits to nonpaying free
riders. Thus, what the last several decades of
environmental concern has alerted us to is a great
asymmetry in the working of a system of economic
incentives: it works well in promoting the produc-
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tion and distribution of resources but, to date, has
in large measure failed conspicuously in con-
trolling the disposal of residuals to common-
property resources. The insidiousness of this asym-
metry may, however, be registering with growing
numbers of the public, legislative bodies, and
governments. Market-like tools for internaliZing the
external costs of environmental pollution have
begun to be employed, alongside more strictly com-
mand-and-control proscriptions of such activity.
If overuse and degradation of environmental
resources are frequently the inevitable consequence
of the weaknesses of traditional, free-market
regimes, centrally planned economic systems do not
seem to have produced a formula for rational
environmental management either. A picture of the
factory manager, wedded to meeting ambitious pro-
duction targets while subordinating environmental
objectives, may be part of the clue to the puzzle,
but there may also be elements of caricature in that
explanation. After all, as noted above, to date many
environmental protection measures, even in capital-
ist societies, have not - to the chagrin of some, but
not all, economists - relied on the emerging system
of market-like incentives and disincentives to
achieve desirable results. And the standards, regula-
tions, and penalties commonly employed as the
alternative are obviously not absent from the nonen-
vironmental walks of socialist life, where compul-
sion has long been part of the daily scene. So the
question arises: what impels authorities in CPEs to
prescribe, or avoid prescribing, environmental
regulations? There is clearly much to be learned
about the comparative management of environ-
mental and commons issues on different sides of
the world's ideological frontiers.
It may be a long leap from the willingness of a
community or nation - linked by the kinship of
common laws and values - to fashion arrangements
for managing the commons, to assume readiness
on the part of the world as a whole to construct an
incentive or cooperative framework within which
various countries can participate. In spite of limited
successes, as with dumping-at-sea conventions,
Antarctica, communications treaties, fishing
accords, or partial arms control agreements (and
their converse: military pacts), prospects for sig-
nificant global environmental cooperation have still
to prove themselves. On the other hand, merely
being able to list numerous areas showing halting
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movement by nations that recognize a basis for
acting in concert may be a positive sign.
There may be instances, though they are probably
uncommon, where a single nation is willing to bear
the cost of a collective benefit when just its share
of that benefit justifies the price it is paying. As an
example, USA restrictions on - and, thereby, the
loss of sales revenue from - the export of civilian
nuclear materials and technology fall into that
category. Of course, if one country's restraint is
simply offset - in this case, through expanded
nuclear sales by others - the former's initiative, rare
in any event, becomes quite pointless.
Adaptation
As a thought exercise, rather than building a firmly
anchored scenario, one can envisage a multiplicity
of ways to deal or live with energy-induced environ-
mental constraints. Suppose the search for scientific,
technical, and economic breakthrough pays off.
Success with low-risk nuclear reactor systems, in
perception and in fact, solar photovoltaics, hydro-
gen systems, and nuclear fusion could, singly or in
combination, ensure that energy and its environ-
mental impacts need not, in themselves, be a drag
on wealth, leisure, and mobility. Alternatively,
unwillingness to pursue, or disappointing results
from pursuing, such options could mean that
environmental constraints, if adhered to, translate
into the loss of some amount of total real income
as well as the relinquishing of some control over
disposition of that income. If, say, automotive
nitrogen oxide emissions stand incriminated as a
major contributor to acidification, the cost of meet-
ing control strategies could exact, as a penalty, some
forfeiture of economic well-being - at least as con-
ventionally measured - as well as some encroach-
ment on traditional transport patterns. (N ot surpris-
ingly, the 1973-1983 USA record suggests a far
greater willingness, initially, to give up horsepower,
style, and size than attachment to the individual car.
But adaptation clearly occurred even in this short
time span.) Incidentally, the phrase "as conven-
tionally measured" is important; the greater the
amount of gross product surrendered to achieve
enhanced environmental quality (which is often not
reckoned in social accounting schemes), the more
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we will need to worry about the adequacy of our
economic and environmental measurement prac-
tices.
The problem of forestalling, or adapting to, more
distant perturbations - CO2 being the obvious
example - is especially vexing. Effects may creep
up on us; points of irreversibility may be breached.
Thomas Schelling, in his contribution to the NAS
study, reflects on some basic aspects of such longer
term adaptation [27]. Specifically with respect to
CO2 and the threat of global climate change, he
points out that effective defensive strategies need
not be ruled out. (Nor should defensive strategies
be viewed in an exclusively governmental policy con-
text; individual actions may also come into play.)
The Dutch, more than half of whom reside below
sea level, have protected themselves by dikes for
centuries. A 5 m rise in sea level at Boston
could arguably be defended against by dikes costing
less than the value preserved. But, as Schelling
recognizes, such a calm assessment is scarcely applic-
able to, say, Bangladesh, with a wretched level of
income and extensive episodes of coastal flooding.
Thus, the problem of the distributional burden of
a defensive strategy arises immediately.
But, for much of the world, it is also important
to appreciate that, if steady increases in real income
and independent factors that enhance agricultural
productivity, as discussed by Crosson (Chapter 4,
this volume), are reasonable assumptions for the
long-term future, the depressive effect of climate
change on food production might signify no more
than a few percentage points in world gross product
below the levels that otherwise prevail. This per-
spective does not belittle the importance of techno-
logical research programs on long lead-time issues,
such as water conservation and agricultural
development. Nor does the inevitability of adapta-
tion to some degree of warming render efforts at
nonfossil fuel development immaterial, for such
efforts are likely to prove valuable under any cir-
cumstances. But economic growth can surely make
the burden of adaptation easier.
Research suggestions
At various points in this chapter we have identified
subjects worthy of further research. Of course, a
,
.,
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discussion revolving around the future is inherently
full of speculation and uncertainties that research
has limited capacity to overcome. Nonetheless, there
are some topics that a focused research effort
may help to illuminate. Here is a brief, six-part
listing:
(1) The lower the level of energy demand (con-
sistent with broad social and economic goals),
the lower the energy-caused environmental
problems. The last decade has alerted us to
substantial adaptability in energy use in
response to price changes. What we know little
about is the long-term demand for energy as a
function of economic growth in different areas
of the world. The estimates of income elasticity
of energy demand cited earlier in the text are
derived from limited geographic and historical
experience. If, over many decades, energy were
to follow the path which many foresee for food,
its trend might be one tending toward satura-
tion. Alternatively, energy demand tracking
income growth would mean much higher con-
sumption levels. A reasoned analysis of the
various possibilities is needed.
(2) Under the normal course of events, fossil fuel
development is likely to precede a major turn
to the nonfossil option. If a significant rise in
CO2 concentrations is probable, and its con-
sequences unwelcome - e.g., per unit of deliver-
able energy, coal-based synthetics emit roughly
twice the CO2 of conventional oil or gas - could
that prospect heighten support for the acceler-
ated and acceptable development of noncarbon-
based energy sources, such as nuclear breeders,
solar energy, and nuclear fusion?
(3) Even within nations it has been difficult to come
to grips with the fact that access to a free com-
mons deters ameliorative action by polluting
enterprises, since that would merely confer
benefits to nonpaying free riders. Transfrontier
and global environmental management would
be more formidable still. Research should focus
on the propensity of different countries (facing
different population pressures, possessing
different resource endowments, characterized
by different development imperatives, and
having different political systems) to submit to
international environmental management.
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(4) In market economies, market-like incentives or
disincentives are gaining considerable accep-
tance as the instruments of choice in optimal
environmental management of industrial
activity, though such mechanisms coexist with
more tightly framed proscriptive measures of
various kinds. What approaches can yield desir-
able outcomes in centrally planned systems?
(5) International compacts, which impose greater
or lesser constraints on national behavior, exist
in a number of fields: oil spills, law of the sea,
radio frequencies, civil aViation, nuclear
safeguards. The proclivity for cooperation in
these areas no doubt owes much to factors that
may not be applicable to a long-term global
problem, such as CO2 , (Notably, CO2 is associ-
ated with gradual, unobservable damage; the
other items can involve sudden, visible effects.)
Nevertheless, to establish what it is that differ-
entiates impulses in the listed areas from what
is needed in the latter case might make for an
instructive inquiry. A bonus would be a lesson
that might actually be helpful for the long-term
problems discussed in this chapter.
(6) In this chapter I have reviewed sharply diver-
gent approaches to mapping possible future
energy pathways - notably, reliance on the his-
toric long-wave paradigm, at one extreme, and
on the application of econometric techniques,
at the other. Inherently an ungratifyingly risky
undertaking, probing long-term energy trends
remains nonetheless an integral element in
studying the dynamics of the biosphere. There-
fore, there should be efforts to more resolutely
assess the virtues, deficiencies, and mutually
complementary features of different projection
techniques.
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Commentary
T. B. Johansson
This volume clearly shows the multitude of threats
to the biosphere, of which the environmental impact
of energy systems is but one. In fact, energy is
related to many of the other problems that form
the present predicament of man and biosphere.
Sustainable development of the biosphere
The energy system should not only evolve in a way
that is sensitive to the environmental issues, but also
in response to other problems [I]. These other
global issues include, in addition to the environ-
mental issues, development of developing coun-
tries, North-South conflicts, global security and the
risks of nuclear war, and nuclear weapons prolifer-
ation. Each of these global issues must be resolved
and each has strong links with energy. Accordingly,
they have to be included in the search for and
analysis of future energy systems for a sustainable
world; it is not enough just to consider a sustainable
energy system.
In the traditional view of the energy problem,
articulated in studies such as those by IIASA, World
Energy Conference, International Energy Agency,
and others quoted by Darmstadter, global energy
demand will continue to grow, and perhaps double
over the next few decades. But, on analysis, one
finds that such energy system developments would
aggravate the environmental and many other global
problems, because of a continued or increased
dependence on Persian Gulf oil, and a greatly
expanded use of coal and nuclear power.
The energy system is only a means for providing
the desired energy services - space heat, transpor-
tation, light, mechanical drive, etc. Some work to
establish how and for what energy is used has been
done over the last decade: the results provide a new
starting point for the energy debate. In fact, there
are good reasons to be hopeful, because cost-effec-
tive options exist for avoiding global risks and for
providing energy for the needs of developing coun-
tries. The results from our on-going global energy
project [1,2,3] and other work [4,5,6] suggest that
the energy demand/economic growth link is weaker
than was formerly thought and that in the future
the opportunities for decoupling are even larger,
especially for the highly industrialized countries.
There are at least three major components behind
this conclusion.
First, the composition of the economy in indus-
trialized countries is shifting toward more service
industries, which are far less energy intensive than
goods production. For example, the output of the
goods-producing sector - measured by gross prod-
uct originating (GPO), or value added - grew at
only 0.83 and 0.60 times the rate of the gross
national product (GNP) in the period 1970 to 1980
for the USA and Sweden, respectively [1].
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Second, the composition of industrial output is
shifting from production of basic materials to
activities that involve more fabrication and finishing
[2,7]. Relative to total industrial output, basic
materials declined by 10% and fabrication and
finishing increased by 35% in the USA during the
period 1947-1983 [1]. This implies important shifts
in overall intensity of industrial energy. In USA
manufacturing, the basic materials-processing
industries accounted for 87% of final energy use in
1978, but only 32% of value added; for Sweden the
figures were 92% and 51 %, respectively [1]. Thus,
shifts to fabrication and finishing, which typically
require an order of magnitude less energy per unit
of output, can have a profound effect on industrial
energy use. For the USA, such shifts accounted for
an annual rate of decline in industrial energy use
of 1.0% per year during 1973-1982, relative to the
situation with no such shifts [8].
Third, and most important, energy price
increases and technological developments have ren-
dered widely available cost-effective opportunities
for the much more efficient use of energy. Some
examples include space heating requirements for
single family dwellings, where a new construction
is offered by Swedish firms that uses less than 15%
as much energy per square meter per degree day
than the average for the housing stock; new
automobiles are available with fuel economies twice
as high as the average European fleet rate of fuel
consumption; new technology with energy require-
ments reduced by tens of percent are available for
the processing of basic materials. Steel manufactur-
ing in the USA, for example, could cut its energy
use per ton of steel by more than half if new steel-
making processes, such as Plasmasmelt or Elred,
were widely employed. Finally, new products and
new materials are being developed that could
reduce energy demand further. Incidentally, the
impact of technology on the historical development
of societies has been impressive, but it appears that
Darmstadter has not taken into account such tech-
nological developments in his analysis (Figure 5.9)
[9, 10].
The potential future impacts on total energy
demand from structural changes and the use of
more energy-efficient technology, along the lines
discussed here, have been investigated for Sweden
[2] and the USA [3]. The results indicate that even
with increases in per capita consumption of goods
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and services in the range of 50 to 100%, final energy
use per capita could be reduced by approximately
one half due to the net effect of on-going structural
shifts and the exploitation of opportunities for cost-
effective investments in energy efficiency.
Much of what has been learned from the analyses
of the Swedish and USA situations is probably appli-
cable to most other industrialized countries as well
[4,5,6], so that these studies serve as an "existence
proof" of what might be achieved in most industrial-
ized countries.
For developing countries, the role of technology
is even more important. Most commercial energy
is used in the modern sector, and much of what is
relevant for industrialized countries is relevant
here. As Darmstadter points out, they need not
follow the old path of industrialization. Investment
in energy efficiency makes even more sense here
because net capital savings can be achieved [11].
The traditional sector depends on noncommercial
energy - one half of all energy use in developing
countries - which is used at very low efficiency,
primarily for cooking. The potential for energy
efficiency improvement is very large. It has been
shown, for example, that if one assumes that the
best presently available technology or technology
in the advanced stages of development were used
throughout the developing world, along with a shift
to modern energy carriers, and a per capita stan-
dard of living similar to that of Western Europe in
the 1970s, per capita final energy use would be
1 kWyr/yr (kW), only slightly higher than the
present level [1].
Energy availability per se is no constraint on
development, although availability of capital and
other resources needed to bring this technology
into wide use may be limited. These capital require-
ments would be less than if the same energy services
were provided by conventional methods, as has been
illustrated for the Brazilian electricity sector [11].
These observations suggest that it would be fea-
sible for the world to develop an energy system for
continued economic growth using about 11 TW of
primary energy in 2020 [1], compared to 10.3 TW
in 1980, and IIASA's 22-25 TW for 2030, WEC's
19-25 TW for 2020, MIT's 12-18 TW for 2025,
and IEA/ORAU's 19-27 TW for 2025. A low level
of energy demand renders the energy supply
problem far more manageable than it would
otherwise be. Contrary to the assertion quoted by
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Darmstadter, it would not be necessary to make
"full use of all available energy resources" (Darm-
stadter, p 158, emphases added). It becomes pos-
sible to avoid or minimize dependence on the more
costly and troublesome options. This means that
there exist routes of development for the global
energy system that are compatible with, and per-
haps even supportive of, the development of a sus-
tainable world.
While the technical and economic prospects are
good for bringing about major reductions in energy
use via investments in more efficient end-use tech-
nology, the question remains as to the rate at which
these opportunities will or can be seized. In a time
frame of 20 to 40 years there is ample opportunity
to introduce energy-efficient technology at the rate
of introducing new capital. The choice of tech-
nology in an investment situation is determined by
the economics based on present prices, consumer
expectations about future energy prices, the oppor-
tunities for financing, the information available to
the consumer about investment opportunities and
their cost-effectiveness, and other factors.
Some of the opportunities will be realized under
present conditions, but the directed policies of
governments will speed up the process and also
increase the probability that these opportunities will
be seized. One way is to institute policies that cause
investment decisions to focus on the needed energy
services instead of the traditional focus on energy
supply. The available policy instruments include
energy price adjustments, taxes and subsidies for
particular technologies, regulations, and the pro-
vision of information. The most appropriate policy
instruments will probably differ from one cultural
context to another, but must be based on a detailed
understanding of the technical options and local
conditions. This is an area where more work is
needed.
Because cost-effective options exist, we may not
be pushed into taking the chance that nature will
tolerate all abuse or that adaptation, e.g., building
dikes around Boston, will prove feasible and more
attractive than adjusting energy use habits. The
belief that energy use must grow to provide for
peoples' needs leads to defeatist attitudes. These are
dangerous, because the problems are taken less
seriously and the search for ways to cope with the
future becomes muted.
A major challenge for energy planners in the
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decades ahead is to bring about a global energy
system that is compatible with a sustainable world
society. A future of low energy demand is a key
feature of a global energy strategy for the realization
of that goal. Fortunately, this is an achievable goal,
because the future of the energy system in indus-
trialized countries is a matter of choice to a much
larger degree than has hitherto been thought
possible.
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Editors' Introduction: The combustion of fossil fuels for energy production has already
resulted in significant modifications of the Earth's environment, primarily through the
emission of carbon dioxide, sulfur dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and certain heavy metals
(see Chapter 8). Many possible future scenarios of energy development involve even
greater use of fossil fuels, and many depict an environment "dirtier" than today's (see
Chapter 5).
In this chapter one long-term technological strategy that might limit pollutant emissions
sufficiently to permit an ecologically sustainable development of the world's fossil fuel
resources is explored. Many questions of technical and economic feasibility must still be
addressed. The chapter is included here as an illustration of creative strategic thinking
about long-term technological responses to large-scale environmental constraints.
Introduction
The terms of the energy debate have changed
dramatically over the past decade. Whereas the size
of the fossil fuel resource base was the overriding
concern of the 1970s, we are now faced with the
mounting challenge of exploiting these energy
sources in an environmentally benign manner.
The world is not short of energy resources. In
terms of energy content there are at least four
potential Persian Gulfs: the Athabasca region in
Canada, the state of Colorado in the USA, the
Orinoco area in Venezuela, and the Oleneik Siberian
deposits of the USSR. Recent advances in drilling
technologies have led to upwardly revised estimates
of both conventional and unconventional gas
resources [1]. Innovation and technological pro-
gress along the entire chain of energy activities,
from exploration to end-use conversion, are also
easing the problems of energy supply.
I
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It is helpful to consider in such terms the likely
pattern of energy supply and demand over the next
50 years, as revealed by the global scenarios of the
International Institute for Applied Systems Analy-
sis (IIASA) [2]. With the assumptions of an almost
doubling of the world population and a modest rate
of per capita energy consumption, the IIASA study
concludes that by 2030 the global demand for
primary energy would have increased some three-
fold over the current figure of some 6 x 109 tons of
oil equivalent [(Lo.e.); 1 ton of oil equivalent
is equal to 10.7 gigacalories (GC) or 44.76 gigajoules
(GJ)]. As the data in Table 6.1 suggest, over this
period the global energy system will shift to an even
greater reliance on fossil fuels, albeit lower grade
fuels of a predominately solid nature. By 2030, it
is unlikely that the global energy system will have
advanced beyond the initial stage of its (ultimate)
transition to a more sustainable nature, in which
nonfossil energy sources will be the primary inputs
and electricity and (liquid) hydrogen will serve as
clean and complementary secondary energy forms
[4].
Table 6.1 Global primary energy demand, 2030 [3].
Relative Absolute
Source (%) (109 t.o.e./yr)
Oil 20 4
Gas 25 5
CoalB 20 4
Nuclear 25 5
Otherb 10 2
Total 100 20
B Includes other solid primary fuels, such as tar sands
and oil shales. b Includes solar and other renewable
energy sources.
The enhanced use of fossil fuels in the current
energy system is therefore likely to intensify the
already serious environmental problems associated
with the emissions of energy conversion. Essentially,
there are two levels of emissions from fossil fuel
use. The combustion of carbon and hydrogen atoms
results in so-called mainstream emissions of carbon
dioxide (C02) and (environmentally harmless)
water (H20). Accompanying this combustion pro-
cess are side-stream emissions of sulfur dioxide
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(S02), nitrogen oxides (NOx ), and certain heavy
metals.
The salient point for emission control is the time
scale. As the IIASA study indicates, there are some
10 to 20 years remaining in which humankind can
deal effectively with the environmental hazards of
side-stream emissions, and possibly 50 years in
which we can effectively respond to the potential
threat posed to the climate system by high atmo-
spheric levels of CO2, The problems of acid deposi-
tion suggest a more pressing time scale within which
to deal with side-stream emissions. Viewed through
the lens of known ecological damage, solutions
should have been found yesterday. Clearly, the
handling of these emissions is the energy problem.
Conventional approaches to emission control
generally involve abatement measures (e.g., stack
gas cleaning) for the postcombustion process. While
such techniques can limit the level of emissions, they
cannot eliminate emissions completely. Moreover,
there are enormous costs associated with such
measures, particularly when a high level of reduced
emissions is desired. The case of lignite use for
electricity generation in the FRG, following the
establishment of stringent S02 emission standards,
underscores the difficulties one can expect with such
practices [5].
A new energy system is therefore needed, and
in this chapter we analyze conceptually a novel
system that, in principle, can eliminate side-stream
emissions and keep the problem of CO2 emissions
in focus. Moreover, the infrastructure of this new
system would support a more flexible use of fossil
fuels, as well as ensure a smooth transition to a
sustainable energy system. We begin by briefly
explaining the advantages of this new system vis-a-
vis the existing system, and review some of the
technologies required for its introduction.
Thereafter we consider this novel system under
static conditions and then under dynamic condi-
tions, as its introduction proceeds competitively
with the existing system, in response to emission
reduction schemes.
A novel energy system
In order to understand the features desirable in
a new energy system we must first describe the
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Figure 6.1 The current energy system, illustrating inputs and outputs.
eXlstmg one. In the current system, illustrated in
Figure 6.1, crude oil, coal, natural gas, and uranium
form parallel but separate streams of energy. Except
for natural gas, these primary energy sources must
be converted into secondary energy forms before
they can be transported and distributed as final
energy for consumer end uses [6]. Natural gas,
which is transported mainly by pipelines, may be
used directly by the consumer or converted into
electricity in gas turbine power plants.
The chain of activities that connects these primary
energy inputs with end uses is, to some extent,
integrated managerially and optimized, thus far
with remarkable success. The notions of upstream
and downstream applicable to the oil industry indi-
cate this vertical integration. Horizontally, these
energy streams compete with one another in meet-
ing energy requirements - for example, coal and
nuclear energy for electricity. However, vertical
integration and horizontal separation limit the
possibilities of interfuel substitution. It is only in
the case of electricity supply that substitution is
possible prior to the consumer end. In all other
instances, substitution can take place only at the
point of consumption, say, by switching from an oil
burner to a gas or coal burner. The recent energy
crises have demonstrated this major shortcoming
of the current system.
A striking and increasingly alarming feature of
the current system is the emission of pollutants to
the atmosphere and hydrosphere that occurs at
energy conversion or end use, or both. In the case
of oil, there are 502 , NO" and CO2 emissions, first
at the refinery and then as the oil products are used,
say, as motor fuels. The generation of environ-
mentally clean electricity by coal or gas restricts the
responsibility for pollutants to the power station.
In the case of nuclear-generated electricity, fuel
conditioning (i.e., chemical conversion of uranium
ores and isotopic enrichment) takes place before
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Allocating CO, H 2 , and O~ to fit the stoichiometry
where e is the efficiency of electricity conversion.
Normalizing this to one carbon atom and assum-
ing an efficiency of one third for el ctricity g ner-
ation, w obtain
energy as 80% methanol (CHsOH) and 20% elec-
tricity pI' duced, for example, from fossil arbon
primary energy.
In this illustrative case the fictitious molecule
characterizing the final demand for energy (the
so-called demandite [8]) is:
(6.1)
(6.2)
CO" mol 1
0.2 kcal 90- I x-,kca e
CH'\OHmol
0.8 kcal 8'0 I +1 kca
energy conversion, so that th fission products gen-
erated at the power station are largely contained.
On-site generation of heat I' ults in S02' NOx, an
CO2emissions. Side-stream emissions, as well as the
mainstream emissions, externalize costs of the ur-
rent nergy system.
L t us n w consider a novel approach to an
energy system that, in principle, can achieve the
goal of zero emissions and enhan e system flexibility
through horizontal integration. The basic idea
behind such a novel integrated en rgy ystem
(NIES) is to decompo e and purify the primary
fossil energy inputs before combustion, to integrate
these decomposed (clean) products horizonlally, and
to allocate them sloichiometrically in line with the
requirements for final energy (Figure 6.2).
We begin with the system inputs: air, water, coal
(or other solids), and natural gas [7]. The desired
products of d om position are carbon m noxide
(CO), hydrogen (H 2), and oxygen (02), For heuristic
purposes, we identify the stoichiometry of final
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Figure 6.2 A novel integrated energy system: SEP, separation; CON, conversio ; ELY, electrolysis; SCG,
steam coal gasification; MIP, molten iron process; HCG, hydrogen coal gasification; SR, steam reforming;
NPH, nuclear process heat; HTR, high temperature reactor.
1
Novel integrated energy systems: the case of zero emissions
of demandite, we obtain
(6.3)
In this example we avoid the generation of
unnecessary CO2 (hereafter referred to as non-
demandite CO2) and use the carbon atom prudently
at the stage of final energy [9]. Those CO2 emissions
that occur as the fmal energy is consumed can be
attributed, in the case of methanol. to the combus-
tion of its carbon content (some 40%), or, in the
case of electricity, to heat production by means
other than nuclear energy.
We are not suggesting the use of methanol as the
only liquid energy form in NIES. For example, the
Mobil Oil process and the Fischer-Tropsch process
of methanol and gasoline synthesis could provide
other suitable forms of secondary energy for NIES.
Methanol is used here as representative of such
fuels [10]. Similarly, we do not exclude direct uses
of natural gas. However, since gas combustion in
air generates NOx emissions, we pursue herein
more novel ways of burning gas with oxygen that
are in line with the system goal of eliminating side-
stream emissions.
In the sections that follow we seek to elaborate
and analyze a novel integrated energy system as a
concept only. We restrict ourselves, where
appropriate, to considering the use of methanol in
the heat market and of CO2 for electricity gener-
ation. To support this, we first review the candidate
technologies associated with this novel energy
system.
Technologies of decomposition
and synthesis
In reviewing the technologies associated with N IES,
we bear in mind the system objectives of generating
clean intermediary fuels (CO, H 2, 02) that, through
synthesis and conversion, can be allocated
stoichiometrically to meet the final energy demand.
We begin with the decomposition of air. Essen-
tially this involves the separation of nitrogen from
oxygen and hence the elimination of some two
thirds of the NOx emissions associated with today's
open-cycle combustion. Air separation as such is an
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established technology. But in view of the relevance
of this technology for fossil fuel purification, it
would appear worthwhile to explore the feasibility
of higher efficiencies and/or lower capital costs.
Generally speaking, hydrogen is in short supply
in NIES and a second system input - H 20 - can
serve as a rich source of this carrier. The conversion
of H 20 into hydrogen and oxygen by means of CO
(the so-called shift reaction) is also a well-established
technology. It is considered here as a means for
overcoming imbalances at the stage of
stoichiometric allocation, but at the expense of gen-
erating nondemandite CO2 , To obtain hydrogen
without unnecessary emissions we include in the
scheme the technology of electrolysis, whereby elec-
tricity is used to split water. Electrolysis is an estab-
lished technique that likewise suffers from relatively
low efficiencies and high capital costs. Research at
the Nuclear Research Center Jiilich (KFA-Jiilich)
and elsewhere seeks to surmount these problems,
possibly through the application of high tem-
perature process heat [11, 12].
There are a number of suitable technologies for
the decomposition of coal and other solid fossil
resources, such as tar sands and oil shales. A good
example is steam coal gasification, which requires
high temperature process heat [13]. Bergbau For-
schungs GmbH, FRG, has developed this process
as part of the project Prototype Plant Nuclear Pro-
cess Heat [14]. There have been good results from
the process tests conducted since 1976 at a semitech-
nical pilot plant with a carbon throughput of
230 kg/h (equivalent to some 2 MW). The recent
use of catalysts has improved the process, but more
work is needed to bring this technology to the stage
of commercial feasibility.
Alternatively, the molten iron process can be used
to decompose solid fuels. Essentially, the application
of high temperature heat (of about 1400 0c) breaks
down the coal lattice and produces a gaseous mix-
ture of H 2 and CO. The undesired combustion
products (i.e., sulfur and other pollutants, such as
the heavy metal content) form a slag on the surface
of the iron bath, which can be easily removed. The
salient feature of this process is the environmentally
acceptable level of the sulfur content of the product
gas, which is no more than 20 p.p.m. and on average
5 p.p.m. Moreover, the molten iron process does
not require an exogenous supply of high tem-
perature process heat, since the production of CO
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through the partial oxidation of the solid fuel gener-
ates heat. Some of this heat can be recovered by
using the high temperature of the product gas for
other applications. Currently there are two versions
of the molten iron process at the demonstration
stage: the first, developed by Klockner, FRG, oper-
ates at atmospheric pressures [15, 16]; Klockner,
Humboldt-Deutz, FRG, developed the second,
which works at pressures of 30 bar [17].
Hydrogen, as well as oxygen, can be used for
decomposing solid fuels. Rheinische Braunkohlen-
werke AG, FRG, has developed the process of
hydrogen coal gasification as part of the project
Prototype Plant Nuclear Process Heat [18]. A semi-
technical pilot plant with a throughput of 320 kg/h
of dry lignite (equivalent to 160 kg/h of anthracite
and some 1.5 MW) was used to test the process from
1976 to 1982. Good experimental results supported
the development of a scaled-up pilot plant with a
capacity of 10 tons/h of dry lignite (equivalent to
some 50 MW), which began operation in 1983.
Inherently, this process advances the goal of zero
emissions, but currently there are a few side-stream
emissions that need recycling.
In addition to the above coal refinement processes
there are other candidate technologies for decom-
posing solids in line with the reasoning presented
here. One example is the Texaco process of convert-
ing hard coal into fuel gas and methanol [19]. Other
feasible techniques exist for purifying fossil fuels,
particularly crude oils of all American Petroleum
Institute (API) grades. At a later stage of analysis,
we plan to incorporate the results of research on
nonresidual fuel refineries, which is being done at
Shell International in the Hague, Netherlands [20].
De Jacto, such a development would add a dimension
of its own to NIES.
In considering the process of steam reforming
for decomposing natural gas, we recall the tendency
of NIES to be hydrogen deficient and hence the
importance of stoichiometrically engaging the rela-
tively high hydrogen content of natural gas (with a
hydrogen to carbon ratio of 4 to 1). Indeed, in the
illustrative equation (6.2), demandite requires only
1.6 hydrogen atoms per carbon atom. Moreover,
steam reforming operates with high temperature
process heat. For these reasons, we consider
allothermal steam reforming technologies rather
than conventional autothermal processes. Com-
pared with conventional methods, the use of
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allothermal processes would decrease the amount
of gas (or coal) needed to produce a given amount
of fuel by the order of one third to one fourth. As
a consequence, CO2 emissions would also be
reduced to between one third and one fourth the
level associated with autothermal methods.
KFA-Julich, together with industry, has
developed the EVA-ADAM scheme in which such
heat can be applied exogenously. This is an adapta-
tion of an existing technology to the new system
requirements. A IO-MW demonstration plant (the
EVA II) has been operational at KFA-Julich since
1981 [21] and has demonstrated the feasibility of
allothermal steam reforming and its applicability to
the process of raw gas decomposition.
Recall that both steam coal gasification and steam
reforming of natural gas require an exogenous
supply of high temperature heat. Such tem-
peratures (900°C and above) are generally not fea-
sible for conventional nuclear reactors, but in prin-
ciple can be achieved with a high temperature reac-
tor (HTR), operatingMith the coolant helium. For
the past five years the HTR at KFA-JUlich (the
AVR) has operated successfully in a ceramic
environment at temperatures of 950°C or more.
The fuel elements of the AVR are graphite pebbles,
6 cm in diameter.
Difficulties in achieving such helium outlet tem-
peratures in a metallic environment have spurred
efforts to develop higher temperature alloys, as well
as structural design principles. The alloy Inconel
716 is a prime candidate. Test periods of some
25000 h yielded sufficiently good results to permit
extrapolation of up to 75000 h and the identifica-
tion of data for the design of more efficient heat
exchangers and steam reformers [22]. This indi-
cates the feasibility of designing heat exchangers
that would allow helium (at temperatures of 950°C)
to be extracted from the ceramic environment of a
HTR core and then transferred to a metallic
environment.
To demonstrate this, efforts are underway at
KFA-Jiilich to rt'model the existing AVR (50MW'h)
[23], the results of which are expected during the
second half of the 1980s. Once this has been real-
ized, reactors of this type could become an integral
part of NIES, allowing nuclear power to contribute
to the goal of zero emission energy systems.
Admittedly, the decomposed product CO ·could
be recycled as a way of generating high temperature
f
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process heat. However, in line with the conceptual
design of NIES, this would not represent a prudent
use of the carbon atom. Indeed, the consumption
of the carbon atom would increase by a factor of
between two and four, exacerbating the problem
of CO2 emissions.
As for the technologies of synthesis and conver-
sion, the synthesis of CO and H 2 into methanol is
an established industrial process. Nevertheless, as
currently designed these processes generate
emissions, particularly from the combustion of the
purge gases that result from incomplete chemical
processes. Work at KFA-Jiilich seeks to identify
possible schemes for recycling purge gases and
other emissions.
The availability of CO and 0'l as intermediary
fuels in NIES would support the use of CO-turbines
for electricity production. Essentially, these turbines
operate with an isothermal expansion of CO and
02, which supports both thermal efficiencies of the
order of 60% and significant reductions in CO2
emissions. The combustion product CO2 could be
used for industrial purposes, such as tertiary
recovery in oil fields. Moreover, as the introduction
of NIES advances, the need for these secondary
applications of CO2 would diminish. The Energy
Laboratory of the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology (MIT) is engaged in developing such tur-
bines and is cooperating with KFA-Jiilich in explor-
ing their use in NIES [24, 25].
We have refrained from discussing technologies
of energy end use, since this requires a different
set of expertise. However, they are considered
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implicitly in the dynamic analysis of NIES (pp 182-
189). For example, we assume the use of methanol
in automobiles, which could result in a 50% reduc-
tion in NO, emissions in the transport sector alone.
The static case
There are five degrees of freedom in NIES: the
moles of the four system inputs (oxygen from air,
water, coal, and natural gas) and the system output
(nondemandite CO 2 ), Together they constitute one
mole, say, of methanol. If nondemandite CO2 is to
be avoided, there are only four degrees of freedom.
There are also three balances (carbon, hydrogen,
and oxygen), so one can optimize. Table 6.2 lists
the stoichiometric relations (first-order approxima-
tions) of the related system technologies. As the
relations are linear, a linear programming (LP)
approach was used to handle the vast number of
activities and constraints to be accounted for in the
analysis. The system costs (i.e., investment,
operation and maintenance, and fuel) were chosen
as the objective functions to be optimized. In so
doing, we obtained information, such as shadow
prices, that enhanced our understanding of how
the system operates. Rough cost estimates of NIES-
related technologies are given in Table 6.3.
As Figure 6.3 illustrates, there are major differen-
ces in the ratios of hydrogen-to-carbon and
oxygen-to-carbon for the fossil primary energy
inputs, which define the quality of the fuel. For
Table 6.2 Stoichiometric relations of NIES-related technologies.
Technology
Air separation
Electrolysis
Molten iron process
Hydrogen coal gasification b
Steam coal gasification C
Steam reforming d
Conversion
Methanol synthesis
CO-turbine
Reactant B
Air
H20
CH, +0.502
CH x +(1 -0.5x)H 2
CH x +H 20
CH 4 +H 20
CO +H 2 0
CO +2H 2
CO +0.502
Product
O2
H2 +0.502
CO + (0.5x)H 2
0.5CH 4 +0.5C
CO +(1 +0.5x)H 2
3H 2 +CO
H2 +C0 2
CH 30H
CO 2
B CH x represents fossil fuels, particularly coal. b The degree of gasification is 50%. C Product also contains
CH4 and CO2, d Product also contains CO2• CH4 , and H20.
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Table 6.3 Costs and efficiencies of components in NIES.
Technology
Efficiency
(%)
Investment
(DM/kW)
Operation and
maintenance
(% of investment
cost)
Air separation
Electrolysis
Molten iron process
Hydrogen coal gasification
Steam coal gasification
Steam reforming
Conversion
Methanol synthesis
CO-turbine
High temperature reactor (thermal)' (HTR)
Steam cycle for HTR
HTR power plant
80
59 b
90c
n d
95 6
100
87
65
100
42
42
2600 8
350
650
700
530
330
200
250
1250
1200
250
3100
7
6
8
5
12
7
8
10
1.5
15
7
14
a Investment in DM/kW(e) (input). b Excluding O2 production and H2 throughput. C Degree of gasification (in C) is
50% (65% in energy units). d Use of process heat: 0.48 per unit output. 6 Use of process heat: 028 per unit output.
, Includes 0.007 DM/kW fuel cost.
is necessary to identify three types of coal according
to the HIC ratio: hard coal (0.3: 1), imported hard
coal (0.8: 1), and lignite (1.2: 1). A distinction was
also made for coal prices [26].
Based on these assumptions calculations were
made for a stylized final energy demand of
100 GWyrlyr, of which 80% is supplied by methanol
and 20% by electricity. In the static case, end uses
are represented as final energy. We assume the use
of I-ITRs for generating both electricity and high
temperature heat. Obviously, for a more realistic
analysis other types of reactors would have to be
considered for electricity generation. Since the
interplay of nuclear reactors is a well-researched
subject, we sought to avoid du plicating these efforts;
such duplication is not the point of this analysis.
Table 6.4 gives the results of four LP runs that
allow both the use of natural gas and the generation
of nondemandite CO2 , As the data indicate, the
system requirement for natural gas exists only in
Case A (hard coal with HIC ratio of 0.3: 1). In Case
B, the system operates entirely on imported hard
coal (H/C ratio of 0.8: 1) and nuclear energy, as the
hydrogen content of this coal enhances the hydro-
gen balance and constrains the shadow price of gas
to the low level of 0.037 DM/kWh. Indeed, it is only
at this price that the system would be ready to buy
~CH CH3OH?4
3
0 (CH 2)n
+-' tI~ 2
u {]Tec "od,--.I Oil shales WoodI!!. PeatLignite
CO\i
0
0 0.5
O/C ratio
Figure 6.3 Ratios of hydrogen to carbon and of
oxygen to carbon for fossil resources. [Hydrogen
balance includes water content; (CH 2 )n represents
liquid hydrocarbons only.]
example, natural gas has the highest HIC ratio (4: 1),
while that of solids is low, ranging from 2: 1 to
0.1: 1. Thus, in analyzing coal as a system input it
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Table 6.4 The static case: reference cases A_DB.
Cases
Value Dimension A B C D
Coal H/C ratio 1 0.3 0.8 0.8 1.2
Coal price OM/t.c.e. 250 150 250 100
Natural gas price OM/kWh 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Gas; coal as percentage of % 27; 19 0;54 0; 47 0;75
primary energy (rest: nuclear)
CO 2 production 104 mol/kWh 0 1.4 0.8 3.2
Thermal efficiency, e b % 76 73 72 68
Fuel efficiency, CC % 176 135 155 91
Objective function (system costS)d OM/kWyr 634 552 627 501
Investment costs OM/kW 2032 2205 2203 2224
Share of investment costs in system costs % 28 35 31 39
Shadow price of methanol OM/ton 386 313 379 269
Shadow price of gas OM/kWh 0.05 0.037 0.05 0.03
J79
a Final energy demand is 100 GWyr/yr (80 GWyr/yr methanol; 20 GWyr/yr electricity). CO 2 production and natural
gas use are permitted. b Includes nuclear energy in the ratio of demandite to required primary energy inputs. C Excludes
nuclear energy in the ratio of demandite to required energy inputs. d System costs comprise investments, operation
and maintenance. and fuel costs.
a marginal kilowatt hour of gas. Case C represents
an upper limit on the use of hard coal as the sole
fossil input. Since both the shadow price of gas and
its actual price are the same (0.05 DM/kWh), a slight
increase in the price of hard coal would enable gas
to enter the system immediately. The case of lignite
(Case D) is remarkable. Because of the hydrogen
richness of this coal and its low cost vis-a-vis other
coal types, we found that lignite could generate
some 75% of the energy required. Accordingly, in
this case both the shadow price of gas
(0.03 DM/kWh) and the annual system costs
(501 DM/kWh) are the lowest. This implies a
shadow price of methanol of 269 DM/ton
(equivalent to US $108/ton).
The investment costs for all four cases were found
to be in the neighborhood of 2200 DM/ton
(equivalent to US $880/kW), which we consider a
reasonable figure. Likewise, the relative shares of
these capital costs in the total system costs are in
the acceptable range of 28-30%. From the perspec-
tives of thermal efficiency and fossil fuel efficiency,
Cases A and C represent the most prudent uses of
the carbon atom.
The stoichiometries of Cases A to D are given in
Tables 6.5-6.8 and demonstrate the high interfuel
substitutability at the producer side and the adapt-
ability of this novel energy system to demand
requirements. For Case A (Table 6.5), only steam
coal gasification and steam reforming of natural gas
are called into play, in addition to methanol syn-
thesis. The contributions of coal and natural gas to
the CO balance are about equal, with natural gas
supplying the lion's share of hydrogen. The deman-
dite in Case B (Table 6.6) differs from that of
equation (6.1), since the CO-turbine generates only
a part of the electricity required. In this case only
one technology - steam coal gasification - is needed
to supply all of the CO and H 2 . In view of the
composition of the demandite and its CO2 com-
ponent, the hydrogen content of hard coal (0.8: 1)
is sufficient to satisfy the hydrogen requirements of
methanol. The use of the more expensive domestic
hard coal in Case C (Table 6.7) results in a relatively
larger role for nuclear energy in electricity
generation; accordingly, the demandite also dif-
fers from that of equation (6.1) and a conversion
technology is needed. In Case D CTable 6.8), the
relatively large CO2 component of the demandite
and the use of the molten iron process result in
a comparatively lesser role for nuclear-generated
electricity.
j j j
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Table 6.5 Allocation of final energy demand to primary energy demand: Case A.
Chemical reactions
0.54(CHo3 +H 20 =CO +1.15H 2 }
0.46(CH 4 + H20 =CO +3H 2}
Technology
Steam coal gasification
Steam reforming
Methanol synthesis
Balance
H2 CO
0.62 0.54
1.38 0.46
2.00 1.00
-2.00 -1.00
0 0
Table 6.6 Allocation of final energy demand to primary energy demand: Case B.
Chemical reactions
1.00(CO +2H 2 =CH 3 0H}
0.43(CO +0.50 2 =C0 2}
1.43CHo.a + 1.43H20 +0.2150 2 =
CH 30H +0.43C02
Technology
Steam coal gasification
Methanol synthesis
CO-turbine
Balance
H2 CO
2.00 1.43
2.00 1.43
-2.00 -1.00
0 -0.43
-2.00 -1.43
0 0
Table 6.7 Allocation of final energy demand to primary energy demand: Case C.
Chemical reactions
1.25(CHoa + H20 = CO + 1.4H2}
0.25( CO + H20 = CO2 + H2 }
Technology
Steam coal gasification
Conversion
Methanol synthesis
Balance
H2 CO
1.75 1.25
0.25 -0.25
2.00 1.00
-2.00 -1.00
0 0
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Table 6.8 Allocation of final energy demand to primary energy demand: Case D.
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Chemical reactions
1.11 (CH 12 +0.502=CO +0.6H2)
0.84(CH,.2 + H20 = CO +1.6H2)
1.00(CO +2H2=CH 30H)
0.95(CO +0.502=C02)
1.95CH,.2 +0.84H20 +1.3202= CH 30H +0.95C02
Technology
Molten iron process
Steam coal gasification
Methanol synthesis
CO-turbine
Balance
H2 CO
0.66 1.11
1.34 0.84
2.00 1.95
-2.00 -1.00
0 -0.95
-2.00 -1.95
0 0
The interesting results of Case D prompted an
alternative run, Case D', in which the generation
of nondemandite CO2 was not permitted, the
technology of steam coal gasification was assumed
to be nonoperative, and gas use was constrained to
a maximum level of 25% for primary energy. As
the data in Table 6.9 suggest, the system would
operate differently for the two cases. For example,
in Case D' the relatively high shadow price of gas
suggests that the system would like to buy gas, but
is constrained. As a consequence, the contribution
of nuclear energy is higher here than in Case D.
The system costs for Case D', as well as the shadow
price of methanol, are also higher than those of
Case D (some 28 and 63%, respectively).
Table 6.10 is helpful for understanding the
differences between Cases D and D'. In the latter,
the use of hydrogen coal gasification yields coke,
Table 6.9 The static case: reference Case 0 and alternative Case 0'.
Reference Alternative
Value Dimension case DB case D,b
Lignite H/C ratio 1 1.2 1.2
Coal price DM/t.c.e. 100 100
Natural gas price DM/kWh 0.05 0.05
Gas; coal as percentage of primary energy % 0;75 25;22
(rest: nuclear)
CO2 production 104 mol/kWh 3.2 0
Thermal efficiency, e C % 68 72
Fuel efficiency, Cd % 91 152
Objective function e DM/kWyr 501 643
Investment costs DM/kW 2224 2419
Share of investment costs in system costs % 39 33
Shadow price of methanol DM/ton 269 438
Shadow price of gas DM/kWh 0.03 0.085
B CO2 production and natural gas are permitted; steam coal gasification is operative. b CO2 production is not permitted;
natural gas use is limited to 25% of primary energy needs; steam coal gasification is not operative. C Includes nuclear
energy in the ratio of demandite to required primary energy inputs. d Excludes nuclear energy in the ratio of demandite
to required primary energy inputs. e System costs comprise investments, operation and maintenance, and fuel costs.
,
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Table 6.10 Allocation of final energy demand to primary energy demand: Case 0'.
Chemical reactions
0.55(CH 12 +0.4H 2 =0.5CH 4 +0.5C)
0.27( C +0.50 2 = CO)
0.73(CH4 + H2 0 =3H 2 +CO)
0.04(H 20 = H2 +0.502 )
Technology
Hydrogen coal gasification
Molten iron process
Steam reforming
Electrolysis
Methanol synthesis
Balance
H2 CO
-0.22 0
0 0.27
2.18 0.73
0.04 0
2.00 1.00
-2.00 -1.00
0 0
Table 6.11 Estimated costs of side-stream
emission reduction in central conversion facilities
of the existing energy system (in DM/kW; base
year 1980).
escalates. Rough estimates of the costs of such
measures are given in Table 6.11. As the data sug-
gest, costs could rise some thirtyfold as the degree
of emission reduction increases from 50 to 95%.
It is a simple fact that without any required reduc-
tion of emissions the costs of the existing energy
system would be considerably lower than those
associated with NIES. But as observed earlier, side-
stream emissions externalize costs of the current
system.
We therefore analyzed the dynamics of introduc-
ing NIES competitively with the existing energy
system, considering different levels of emission
reduction. The characteristics of the dynamic case
are summarized in Box 6.1. Figure 6.4 provides an
overview of how these systems would compete and
of the associated emissions.
The four cases of emission reduction are
described in Table 6.12 and Figure 6.5. In sum, we
identified a weak level of emission reduction (Case
Relative costs of reduction
which can be used in the molten iron process.
Although natural gas is decomposed, the hydrogen
balance is not met, necessitating the use of electroly-
sis. All electricity is nuclear generated in Case D'.
We repeat: these numerical results are meant to
be suggestive only, and should therefore not be
construed as final or definitive of the system
requirements and associated costs. These results
have been used here only to illustrate the concept
of a novel integrated energy system operating
under static conditions. In the next section we con-
sider NIES under more dynamic conditions, in
which technologies, such as steam coal gasification
and molten iron process, compete and, in fact, N IES
- as a system - competes with the existing energy
system over the 50-year period, 1980-2030.
The dynamic case
Realistically, the novel integrated energy system
described in this chapter must compete with the
existing energy system. As concern for combustion
emissions mounts, so the current system responds
by adopting abatement measures, such as stack gas
cleaning. While such measures can limit the quantity
of atmospheric pollutants, they cannot achieve the
NIES system goal of zero emissions. Moreover, such
measures imply additional costs, which increase sig-
nificantly as the level of desired emission reduction
Emission 50%
60
60
80%
500
500
95%
2000
2000
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Box 6.1. Characteristics of the dynamic case
Time horizon: 1980-2030
Objective function: Sum of discounted costs
Discount rate: 12%/yr (unless otherwise indicated)
Final energy demand: 200 GWyr/yr (see note [27] for data typical for the FRG In
1981 )
motor fuels
(final energy)
specific electricity
(final energy)
heat (useful energy)
42 GWyr/yr (constant over the period)
22 G Wyr/yr increasing to 31 GWyr/yr
60 GWyr/yr (decreasing to 48 GWyr/yr because of
efficiency improvements)
System constraints:
Primary energy demand:
hard coal 2: 57 GWyr/yr
lignite :5 30 GWyr/yr
2: 26 GWyr/yr
Investments for NIES:
500 x 106 DM/yr beginning in the late 1980s and increasing thereafter to a final value of 5 xl 09 DM/yr.
Increases of maximum annual investments, I, were calculated as follows:
1, :5 (1'-1 x 1.02) +5 x 106 DM/yr.
Heat market
Specific electricity
(e.g., for light, power)
} Transport sector
}
}
Costs and efficiencies of components of existing energy system [28]
Costs and efficiencies of components of the NIES [28]
Categories of end use considered:
Methanol cars
Gasoline (or diesel fuel) cars
Electricity
Oil burners
Coal burners
Gas burners
Methanol burners
Electrical boilers
1), a medium level (Case 2), and a strong level (Case
3). Case 0 represents no change in the level of
emissions compared with current conditions.
Strategies for reducing emissions were treated
exogenously in the analysis. The design of such
strategies is a political task, which ideally could be
aided by analyses of this kind.
The quantitative results of this dynamic analysis
are vast and in this chapter we have necessarily been
selective. We begin with examples of the influence
of the four emission reduction cases on the behavior
of the energy market. We then look at Case 2 In
some detail to gain additional insights.
Emission reductions and energy
market dynamics
Figure 6.6 illustrates the levels of coal and nuclear
energy used for generating electricity in the four
cases over the period 1980-2030. In Case 0, nuclear
energy increases its share of the electricity market
slowly, accounting for some one third of the elec-
tricity generated in 2030. Progressing from Case 1
to Case 3, we observe an accelerated and intensified
application of nuclear energy for electricity gener-
ation, at the expense of both hard coal and lignite.
Figure 6.7 suggests that as emission requirements
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Transport
S02 reduction
NOx reduction
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Oil burner
CO 2 NOx
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S02 reduction
NOx reduction
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Figure 6.4 Dynamics of the introduction of NIES alongside the current energy system.
become more stringent, solid resources serve
increasingly as inputs for the three novel tech-
nologies being considered here (i.e., molten iron
process, steam coal gasification, and hydrogen coal
gasification). This is paralled by increases in the
amount of high temperatu re process heat generated
by HTRs. Comparing the results of Figures 6.6 and
6.7, we note that compliance with increasing
emission reductions results in a decrease in the use
of hard coal and lignite for electricity generation
and a concomitant increase in their application in
N IES-related technologies.
The impact of such developments on methanol
production is shown in Figure 6.8. No methanol is
produced in Case O. Methanol production begins
around the year 2000 for weak reductions, in the
early 1990s for medium reduction requirements,
and in the early 1980s when strong emission reduc-
tions are the criterion. In the latter case, production
peaks around 2020 since conditions then necessitate
the substitution of electricity for methanol in the
heat market.
The results of analyzing the interplay of oil prod-
ucts and methanol in the heat market are shown in
Figure 6.9. For Case 0, only oil products are used
for heating purposes. Progressing from Case 1 to
Case 3 we note that the methanol sha re of the
market grows accordingly. However, to meet the
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Table 6.12 The dynamic case: four emission reduction cases.·
Side-stream emissions
Case
185
Mainstream emission
Zero (0)
Weak (1)
Medium (2)
Strong (3)
No reduction
Medium reduction for
central conversion
facilities
Medium reduction for
central conversion and
end-use facilities
Fast reduction for central
conversion and end-use
facilities
No reduction
No reduction
Medium reduction for
central conversion
facilities
Medium reduction for
central conversion
facilities
No reduction
No reduction
Slow reduction for central
conversion plants
Slow reduction for central
conversion facilities
• Relative emissions as a function of time are shown in Figure 6.5.
emission reduction requirements of Cases 2 and 3,
methanol use in the heat market peaks at about
2020 and 2000, respectively, as electricity is used
increasingly for heating purposes.
We also considered the interplay of oil products
and methanol in the transport sector (see Figure
6.10). The features of this situation are qualitatively
similar to those for these fuels in the heat market.
Basically, the difference lies in the timing, with the
introduction of methanol occurring relatively later
in the transport sector and only in C.ases 2 and 3.
We attribute this to the assumption that the substitu-
tion of methanol for oil products in the heat market
is more efficient in terms of reduced side-stream
emissions than in the transport sector. Moreover,
we assumed a greater efficiency for gasoline (60%)
than for methanol (50%), measured in terms of the
motive power produced from the final energy con-
sumed in the transport sector. In so doing, we
implicitly accounted for the structural changes
c
a
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Figure 6.5 Relative emission reduc-
tions (strong, medium, weak, and
zero) as a function oftime, 1980-2030.
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(b) Year (c) energy.
essential to the introduction of methanol in this
sector. Understandably, the greater thermal
efficiency of methanol vis-a.-vis gasoline would have
to be considered in a more detailed analysis of the
use of methanol as a transport fuel. Work along
these lines is underway at KFA-Jillich.
The case of medium-level
emission reductions
To gain further insights on the response of the
energy market to reduced emission requirements,
we considered the case of medium-level emission
2000 2020
Figure 6.7 Emission reductions and
uses of coal and nuclear energy for
novel energy processes, 1980-2030.
(a) Hard coal; (b) lignite; (c) HTR
process heat.
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Figure 6.8 Emission reductions and methanol pro-
duction, 1980-2030.
Figure 6.9 Emission reductions and (a) oil prod-
ucts and (b) methanol in the heat market, 1980-2030.
tially, beginning around the 1990s. By 2030,
methanol holds some 50% of the final energy
market, along with electricity and gaseous fuels.
Methanol's substitution of solids (coal) takes place
relatively early and is complete; its replacement of
oil products begins somewhat later and, while it is
significant, it is not total. The salient point is that
the driving force for change in the energy market
is the requirement of reduced emissions. Thus, in
Case 2, by 2020 side-stream emissions are reduced
by a factor of 20 com pared with 1980 values for
S02 in central conversion and end-use facilities, and
with NO x emissions in central conversion facilities.
It is also a remarkable feature of Case 2 that the
use of nuclear-generated process heat for fuel
refinement reduces CO 2 emissions.
reductions (Case 2) in some detail. When no reduc-
tion is the criterion there is no significant change
in the mix of primary energy sources over the
period. As Figure 6.11 illustrates, however, in com-
pliance with the requirements of Case 2 the primary
market undergoes significant changes: as the share
of oil declines significantly so nuclear energy
gradually becomes the primary souce of energy
supply. As a condition, the shares of hard coal and
lignite were kept relatively constant and natural gas
was assigned the residual supply role. The rise of
nuclear energy in the primary energy market
reflects compliance with the requirements of Case
2 in two ways: first, nuclear energy substitutes for
hard coal and lignite in the electricity market and,
second, nuclear energy is used increasingly for the
refinement processes associated with NIES.
Changes in the final energy market are illustrated
in Figure 6.12. Again, Case 0 implies roughly static
conditions in the market over the period. For Case
2, we observe a changed pattern, with methanol's
share in the final energy market increasing substan-
(b)
1980 2000
Year
2020
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Figure 6.10 Emission reductions and (a) oil prod-
ucts and (b) methanol in the transport sector, 1980-
2030.
Figure 6.13 shows that the shift from hard coal
and lignite to nuclear energy in the electricity
market is complete by around 2010. Gas increases
its share slowly, as both natural gas and syngas are
used for electricity generation.
Forthe heat market (see Figure 6.14), the replace-
ment of oil products and coal by methanol occurs
around 2015 and 2025, respectively. By 2030,
methanol holds the major share in the market, along
with gas and electricity. The increase in electricity's
share of the heat market is explained by the need
to comply with Case 2 emission reduction require-
ments and the resultant substitution of electricity
for methanol.
With the assumption that such changes as those
outlined above occu r, we then considered their
impact on the uses of hard coal and lignite. As a
condition, both primary energy sources were kept
relatively constant. Figure 6.15 shows that these
primary solid fuels are used decreasingly for heat-
ing and electricity purposes and increasingly for
methanol production. The transition to the novel
use of (relatively cheaper) lignite occurs somewhat
earlier than for hard coal.
Finally, we {:onsidered the features of the transi-
tion to the use of coal in three novel technologies
(i.e., molten iron process, steam coal gasification,
and hydrogen coal gasification). Recall that the lat-
ter two processes require HTR process heat. The
results are shown in Figure 6.16. By 2030, some
2020
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2020 Figure 6.11 Emission reduction and
the primary energy market, 1980-
2030: medium (Case 2) reductions.
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Figure 6. 12 Emission reductions and
the final energy market, 1980-2030:
medium (Case 2) reductions.
Gas
Electricity
F/F (%)
j -lL-------~
10
50
90
57 GWyr/yr of hard coal, 26 GWyr/yr of lignite, and
40 GWyr/yr of HTR process heat are used in the
production of some 80 GWyr/yr of methanol. As
the dynamic case is typical for the FRG it is
worthwhile noting that the absolute size of the HTR
application in Case 2 represents some one third of
all nuclear-generated electricity measured in ther-
mal power.
Final remarks
In this chapter we have used the case of zero
emissions to analyze conceptually a novel integrated
energy system. Robust conclusions about the
dynamics of introducing this new system must await
the results of detailed systems analyses to be carried
out collaboratively with members of the energy
community and other research partners. We con-
sider such analyses mandatory.
Still, the present conceptual analysis has revealed
certain criteria and likely changes in the energy
market with respect to the introduction of NIES.
In compliance with the pressing need to reduce
side-stream emissions, it would appear that the
introduction of NIES would result in practically
zero emissions when converting primary energy
GW(e)yr./yr
40
Gas
Nuclear
20
o
1980 2000
Year
2020
Figure 6.13 Emission reductions and
cumulative contributions to the elec-
tricity market, 1980-2030: medium
(Case 2) reductions.
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Figure 6.14 Emission reductions and
cumulative contributions to the heat
market, 1980-2030: medium (Case 2)
reductions.
into secondary energy, a total elimination of S02
emissions at end use, and a substantial reduction in
end-use emissions of NO•. Compared to the present
situation, this would represent a drastic step toward
an environmentally benign energy system. More
specifically, we observe that:
(1) More stringent standards for emission levels
would support the introduction of NIES as a
more economic measure, compared to the
continuous increase in abatement measures for
the existing energy system over the study
period.
(2) The introduction of NIES would result in a
major shift in the use of lignite and, to a lesser
extent, of hard coal away from electricity gener-
ation and toward methanol production. The
relatively low cost and high hydrogen richness
of lignite make it particularly attractive for such
purposes.
Electricity
60
30
GWyr/yr
Heat
Hard coal
Methanol
20
o
GWyr/yr
1980 2000
Year
Lignite
Methanol
2020
Figure 6.15 Emission reductions and
cumulative uses of hard coal and lig-
nite for novel energy processes, 1980-
2030: medium (Case 2) reductions.
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novel energy processes,
medium (Case 2)
(3) A large share of primary energy input could
remain with hard coal, even at relatively high
costs (in the range of 250 DM/ton).
(4) The share of nuclear energy in the electricity
market would increase substantially with the
introduction of NIES; there would be an
increasing need for high temperature process
heat from HTRs, beginning at about the period
1995-2000.
(5) There is a whole set of candidate technologies
that can support the introduction of NIES.
Their development over the next 10 years is
both meaningful and feasible. These are: steam
coal gasification; high temperature reactors for
generating high temperature process heat;
methanol synthesis with zero emissions; hydro-
gen coal gasification; steam reforming of
natural gas with exogenous process heat; the
molten iron process; air separation facilities;
CO-turbines; modern, high-temperature elec-
trolysis.
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Primary Final
Energy form energy energy
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Hard coal 60.5 21.4
Lignite 28.0 0
Natural gas 52.0 39.0
Nuclear 14.1 0
Electricity 0 31.0
Total 275.0 200.0
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[28] Costs and efficiencies of components of the existing
energy system.
Efficience Investment
Technology (%) (DM/kW)
Hard coal power planta 33-40 1200
Lignite power planta 32-38 1660
Gas turbine power
planta 31-42 80D-950
Gas pipelinea 95 642
Refinerya 92 245
Gas heatingb 70 100
Electric heatingb 95 50
Oil heatingb 60 c 130
Coal heatingb 50 200
Methanol heatingb 50 c 130
Operation and
maintenance
Fixed Variable
Technology (DM yr/kW) (DM/kWyr)
Hard coal power planta 80 80
Lignite power planta 83 100
Gas turbine power
planta 40 180
Gas pipelinea 13 0
Refinerya 12.5 9
Gas heatingb 0 3
Electric heatingb 0 2.4
Oil heatingb 0 4
Coal heatingb 0 6
Methanol heatingb 0 2
a Efficiency = secondary/primary energy.
b Efficiency = useful/final energy.
c Differences in efficiency of oil and methanol use
in the heat market (as well as the transport sector)
represent losses in methanol production that have
not been accounted for elsewhere.
Commentary
Y. Kaya
Two types of antipollution measures have been
employed to date. One is technological compensa-
tion, i.e., elimination of emitted pollutants by use
of antipollution facilities. The other is prevention,
i.e., regulation of the use of pollution sources them-
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selves. Desulfurization at electricity power plants is
a typical example of the former, and prohibition of
the use of DDT one of the latter.
From the above viewpoint the idea raised in this
chapter apparently seems close to the former type
of measure, but the concept is much more drastic
than those of conventional antipollution measures.
The essence of the concept lies in building a new
system in which emission of pollutants is restricted
mainly to the stage of final use, so that the total
amount of pollutants may be greatly reduced. In
current energy systems coal, natural gas, and some-
times even crude petroleum are burnt with air and
hence emit SO, and NO" while in the system NIES
proposed here all primary energy resources except
nuclear are first put into conversion processes which
produce CO and H 2 as the main energy carriers.
Some conversion processes may also emit pollutants,
but careful selection of these will give low emission
levels and, furthermore, if a certain amount of pure
O 2 is made available by air separation, zero emission
will be achieved.
Since emission of SO, and NO, has induced a
number of environmental problems, such as photo-
chemical smog and acid rain, the concept proposed
here is highly attractive in the sense that the entire
energy system is designed to be environmen-
tally robust in structure. I am convinced that
NIES is one of the most interesting ideas to have
appeared in the field of energy systems in the last
10-15 years.
The concept is, however, at present rather crude
and should be elaborated in more detail. The fol-
lowing four aspects at least must be investigated at
further stages of the study.
Comparison with the present energy
system
It is implicitly assumed that NIES will become,
sooner or later, economically more attractive than
the present energy system, given the required level
of environmental protection. It is, however, very
uncertain whether this will be so.
In examining the Japanese energy system, for
example, we see that moderate economic growth
,
l
194
has been attained in harmony with proper environ-
mental protection. The concentrations of SO" and
CO in the air have been steadily decreasing since
1973, and the concentration of NO" in the air began
to decline in 1979. The success is mainly due to the
installation of antipollution measures in electricity
power plants, industrial boilers, and automobiles.
Although the cost of these measures is high - in the
case of coal-fired power plants the cost of desulfur-
ization and of denitrogenization are 13 and 3% of
the total system costs, respectively - all utility com-
panies and industries introduced these measures
and produced both a low level of pollutant emission
and the moderate economic growth of the country.
This fact indicates that even the present energy
systems may be harmonized with the environment,
with the necessary antipollution investments, and
with the economic development of society. In other
words, the significance of NIES can be validated
only when its long-term advantages, both in
economic and environmental terms, relative to the
present system become recognized. The discussion
in this chapter is only an introduction to this end.
(The costs of novel conversion processes given in
Tables 6.4 and 6.9 and those on antipollution
facilities given in Table 6.11 are still controversial.)
System robustness in the changing
international situation
The present energy systems depend heavily on
supply conditions, namely resource availability and
their prices. As most developed countries import
much of their energy resources, they are always
keen on reinforcing their energy systems to be
flexible enough to adapt to changes in the energy
supply in the world. NIES seems to have potential
flexibility, since the conversion processes in the sys-
tem can be a good buffer between a varying primary
energy supply and the secondary energy carriers.
Results of the optimization scheme for selection of
the cheapest conversion processes that satisfy
demand constraints are shown in Tables 6.5-6.8 and
6.10, but selected processes are very different from
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case to case. This suggests that other types of
optimum solutions should be sought that are rela-
tively insensitive to changes in supply situations and
yet still sustain reasonable economic feasibility. I
expect that investigation of this will reveal another
interesting (probably attractive) feature of NIES.
Assessment of CO, H 2, and methanol as
energy carriers
We have experienced in the past CO-rich city gas
made from coal. but neither H 2 nor methanol as
energy carriers. Even CO, which may be used as a
single energy carrier in NIES, and methanol are so
toxic that handling of these fluids may induce new
environmental and social problems, and require
additional investment and operation costs. Investi-
gation of this is essential before implementation of
NIES.
Evaluation of dynamic feasibility and
modification of NIES so as to increase
its feasibility
Since the structures of NIES and of the present
energy system differ very much, the key question a
decision maker may raise, even if he or she has a
sympathy with the NIES concept, is how easily can
we move from the present system to NIES? A pre-
liminary study on the dynamic feasibility has been
reported in this chapter, but we know that practice
is far different from the results of calculations of
this sort. We should notice that revolutionary
changes have happened once in a while in many
technological areas, but that the changes we are
seeking here lie in the huge system on which our
daily activities rely. Since the costs of new tech-
nologies in this area are still very uncertain. we will
necessarily be prudent in introducing new facilities
and systems. A number of in-depth studies are
required to fill the gap between the present system
and NIES.
I hope the above comments will be seriously taken
into consideration in further studies of this novel
concept.
PART THREE
THE WORLD
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Chapter 7
M. B. McElroy
Change in the natural
environment of the Earth:
the historical record
Editors' Introduction: An understanding of how the biosphere works, and of how it
responds to human activities, must be based on two facts. The first is the biosphere's
natural variability - the continuously changing patterns of climate, geochemistry, and
ecology that characterize the historical record. The second is the "boundedness" of that
variability - the fact that the Earth's changing environment has remained within the
narrow limits congenial to life for more than 4 billion years.
In this chapter is presented an overview of the nature, origins, and limits of the
biosphere's natural variability. How astronomical factors and ocean dynamics account for
some of this variability is described. Special emphasis, however, is given to elements of
the "Gaia" hypothesis - the fundamental roles played by the Earth's biota in regulating
its environment.
Introduction
We are accustomed to think of the environment for
life on Earth as relatively stable, at least on a global
scale. Change, especially that induced by human
activity, is thus regarded as threatening, and per-
haps it is. It is important, though, to maintain a
sense of perspective. There was a time, not so long
ago, when vast areas of the northern hemisphere
were covered in ice, when the sea level was more
than 100 m lower than it is today; ice ages have
come and gone; the Earth has been both warmer
and colder; ecosystems have evolved and disap-
peared; even the composition of the atmosphere
has varied: change is the norm, not the exception,
for life on Earth. No less than the social scientists,
we physical scientists need a sense of history if we
are to chart a wise course to the future. The chal-
lenge is to develop an understanding of the power-
ful forces that shape our environment. The record
of the past, preserved in terrestrial deposits, in
lakes, in peat bogs, in polar ice, and in deep sea
sediments is an invaluable, perhaps even an essen-
tial, stimulus for a research program designed to
meet this objective.
We focus here on changes to the Earth which
may arise on time scales extending from decades
to hundreds of thousands of years. The emphasis
is on subtleties, on interactions between the physical,
chemical, and biological environments that involve
positive feedbacks, on instances where relatively
small disturbances are suspected to lead to poten-
tially significant large-scale changes in the overall
environment of the planet. The importance of posi-
tive feedback is readily illustrated by considering
the enormous change that has taken place on the
Earth over the past 125 000 years, despite a minimal
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change in the incident flux of solar radiation. It was
warm 125 000 years ago, warmer than today: then,
it began to cool. Ice sheets advanced and, with
occasional reversals, continued to do so for about
110 000 years. The trend reversed abruptly 15 000
years ago: the planet began then to warm and in
less than 10 000 years evolved from a configuration
in which major portions of the land areas were
cov.ered in ice to the present, essentially ice-free
condition. The presence of ice appears to have
promoted further cooling, but there was a limit to
the spread of the ice sheets, and their ultimate
demise was quite dramatic. The sequence has been
repeated approximately eight times over the past
750 000 years [1]. It is obviously important that we
identify the mechanisms responsible for the vast
shifts in climate which characterize the recent past
of our planet. It may be particularly urgent to clarify
the processes responsible for the relatively abrupt
nature of glacial to interglacial transitions, and for
the comparatively brief duration of interglacial
epochs such as the one in which we now live.
There is also evidence of variability in the trans-
port mechanisms that shuffle life-essential elements
back and forth between the biosphere, soil, atmo-
sphere, ocean, and lithosphere, and of changes in
the biogeochemical cycles that mobilize H 20 and
major nutrients, such as carbon, nitrogen, and
phosphorus. The concentration of atmospheric CO2
was relatively low, about 200 p.p.m., during the last
ice age [2,3], jumping abruptly, to about 280 p.p.m.,
at the end of the ice age. There is evidence that the
change in CO2 concentration may have led the
change in climate 1500 years ago, and evidence that
this may not be coincidental, that it may be charac-
teristic of many of the major climatic shifts of the
past [4]. This result is quite unexpected. We are
accustomed to think of the biogeochemical cycles
as steady, being described conventionally in terms
of simple diagrams. Reservoirs (the biosphere, soil,
atmosphere, upper ocean, lower ocean, and sedi-
ments, for example) are indicated by boxes and
numbers define the content of individual reservoirs.
Fluxes between reservoirs are described by numbers
attached to arrows connecting the boxes. The sim-
pliety of the diagrams lulls us readily into a false
sense of security. It is easy to forget that the
diagrams are constructed usually on the basis of
observations of the Earth as it is now. Fluxes are
derived from incomplete data or from imaginative
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extrapolations constrained to force closure, to
ensure a steady state. Observations of the variability
in CO2 levels call this approach into serious doubt,
at least for time scales longer than a few thousand
years. We return to this matter later (pp 204-207)
and argue that the steady-state assumption may be
questioned not only for carbon, but also for
nitrogen and phosphorus. In fact, nutrient cycles
are inextricably linked, with changes in the distribu-
tion of one element possibly leading to important
fluctuations in others. The box and arrow approach
is at best a pedagogical device, useful for purposes
of illustration, but dangerous if used to excess.
We begin with a brief review of the observational
evidence for changes in ancient climate, emphasiz-
ing primarily changes that are relatively persistent,
having endured for periods of centuries or longer.
For the recent past we rely on the historical record,
on pollen that reveals sh.ifts in vegetation patterns,
and on a variety of geomorphological studies that
record changes in alpine and continental glaciers.
Studies of deep sea cores extend the record to the
more distant past but with a somewhat coarser reso-
lution in time. Patterns of change appear more
regular on longer time scales and, indeed, there is
convincing evidence that changes in the orbital ele-
ments of the Earth playa major role in modulating
climate at frequencies of 19 000, 23 000, and 41 000
years. An astronomical control was suggested first
by Adhemar almost 150 years ago [5]. The theoreti-
cal basis was extended significantly by Crolr[6] and
reached a level of maturity some 50 years ago in a
remarkable series of papers by the Yugoslav
mathematician Milankovitch [7].
The elements of Milankovitch's theory, and the
data which support it, are discussed on pp 203-204,
and problems posed by the dominance of the
100 000 year signal in the climate record are treated
on pp 204-207. We argue that changes in CO2
concentration, driven by changes in marine produc-
tivity, provide the most plausible explanation for
this phenomenon. The oceans can also have ali
important influence during shorter time scales, as
discussed on pp 207-208.
On pp 208-209 we briefly indicate important
contemporary changes in the concentrations of
atmospheric CH4 , N20, CO, and 03, discussed in
more detail in Chapter 8, this volume. This com-
pletes our survey, which demonstrates that changes
of the past persist to the present. Indeed, rates of
organisms isolated from cores of sediment drawn
from five distinct regions of the ocean [1]. The data
reflect an average of results from individual cores
and are expected to provide a reasonable estimate
for the mean abundance of oceanic 180. This is
defined by the quantity 8 180, proportional to the
ratio of concentrations 180 to 160. Values of 8 180
are related approximately to changes in sea level as
follows: a shift of I in 8 (expressed in units of per
thousand and written as %'0) denotes a change in sea
level of about 90 m. Larger values of 8 reflect an
isotopically heavier ocean, indicating the presence
of important quantities of ice on land and, presum-
ably, a relatively cold climate. It is immediately clear
from Figure 7.1 that major changes in climate occur
about every 100000 years. Associated fluctuations
in sea level exceed 100 m.
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change may be larger today than at any time in
recent history. Our task, to provide the breadth and
depth of knowledge needed for a comprehensive
assessment of the complex impacts of modern tech-
nology, is urgent, but feasible. It requires a combi-
nation of skills from different disciplines and
nations. It also requires the committment of govern-
ments and the enthusiastic support of our scientific
colleagues. There is a will, indeed an impatience,
to proceed. We can ill afford to delay.
The record of change
As ice sheets accumulate on land they draw water
from the ocean. Light water evaporates more
readily than heavy, so sea water is enriched in
heavier isotopes, such as 180, during climatic cool-
ing. Conversely, the relative abundance of 180 in
sea water is expected to decrease during a period
of climatic warming, as light water is added to the
ocean from the melting of glaciers. Shells growing
in the ocean are composed in part of the mineral
calcite, CaC03 , and the isotopic composition of
these shells reflects the com position of the water
from which they form. A fraction of the shells fall
to the ocean bottom and are preserved in sediments,
providing a record of the climate. Such sediments
have been sampled from large areas of the world's
oceans during the past decade.
Figure 7.1 shows changes in the relative abun-
dance of 180 obtained from shells of planktonic
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Figure 7.2 A power spectral analysis of the data
in Figure 7.1, indicating major peaks in the record
corresponding to periods of 100 000,59 000,41 000,
23 000, and 19 000 years. Adapted from Imbrie [1].
Figure 7.1 Variations of oceanic 8 180 (%'0) over the
past 782 000 years inferred from measurements of
oxygen in the shells of organisms preserved in deep
sea cores. The data reflect an average of measure-
ments from five cores. As noted in the text, a change
in 8 180 of 1%'0 is thought to correspond to a change
in sea level of about 90 m. Adapted from Imbrie [1]
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Figure 7.2 presents a power spectral analysis of
the data in Figure 7.1. In addition to the peak at
100 000 years we see significant peaks at 41 000 and
23000 years and subsidiary peaks at 59000 and
19000 years. The peaks at 41 000, 23000, and
19000 years almost certainly reflect an astronomical
forcing of the climatic system by changes in the
seasonal pattern of insolation. These are driven by
changes in the orbital parameters of the Earth,
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Figure 7.3 Estimates for the variations of
atmospheric temperature at mid latitudes over the
past 20000 years. The data are based on a variety
of primary sources as summarized in note [8]. The
Little Ice Age episode and the Younger Dryas cold
period are indicated by arrows 1 and 2, respectively.
Deep sea cores record a dramatic temperature
Ructuation in the North Atlantic, beginning about
13000 years ago. The boundary marking the transi-
tion from temperate to polar waters shifted north,
from its glacial position to close to that of today. It
stayed there for about 1000 years. It then reversed,
returning to the glacial configuration, where it
remained for several hundred years before finally
moving north to take up the position it has occupied
for most of the Holocene. The fluctuation is evident
also in pollen records from Europe and from the
Maritime Provinces of Canada. As the polar front
shifted north, during the so-called Allerod period,
specifically due to variations in the tilt of the rotation
axis and due to secular precession of the rotation
axis. The tilt of the axis varies by about 1.50 on
either side of its average value of 23.5°, describing
a complete cycle every 41 000 years. The axis
describes a complete precessional cycle in about
26000 years. The effect of precession, combined
with slow rotation of the orbit, leads to a change in
the position of the Earth relative to the sun for any
particular season. At present the Earth is relatively
close to the sun on December 21 during the north-
ern winter. The opposite situation prevailed II 000
years - northern winter occurred when the Earth
was relatively far from the Sun. The position of the
Earth at any given seasonal epoch, say, at the spring
equinox, precesses along the orbit, describing a
complete cycle in about 22000 years. A spectral
analysis of the resultant changes in insolation, at
65 oN in August, for example, indicates significant
power every 23 000 and 19000 years. The power
in the climatic record at frequencies corresponding
to these periods almost certainly reRects the effect
of equinoctial precession. In the same fashion,
power in the climate record at 41 000 and, perhaps,
at 59000 years can be attributed to changes in
seasonal insolation driven by variations in the tilt
of the rotation axis. We return to these matters later
on.
Changes in insolation are expected also over lon-
ger periods, at 100000 and 413000 years, due to
changes in the ellipticity of the Earth's orbit. These
changes are small, however, compared with those
induced by the variations in axial tilt and equinoctial
precession. The dominance of the 100000 year
signal in climate requires a separate explanation,
addressed on pp 204-207.
A summary of climatic data for more recent times
is presented in Figure 7.3 [8]. The ice sheets reached
their maximum extent about 18000 years ago, with
the planet starting to warm up about 15000 years
ago. The ice sheets had essentially disappeared
10000 years later, but the course of climate change
was quite irregular. There is evidence for about five
episodes of significant cooling over the past 10000
years. The first, known as the Younger Dryas
period, is particularly notable and is discussed in
some detail below. The last, referred to as the Little
lee Age, began in the early part of the fourteenth
century and continued until the late 1800s, as illus-
trated in Figure 7.4 [9].
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Little ice age
Figure 7.4 Estimates for the vari-
ation of winter temperatures in
Eastern Europe since the ninth cen-
tury. Data based mainly on
manuscript records discussed by
Lamb [271. Adapted from [9].
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the European climate became milder. The grasses
and sparse vegetation of the glacial period were
replaced by forests, which disappeared rapidly,
however, as cold conditions resumed during the
Younger Dryas. The remarkable nature of these
changes is that they appear to have been relatively
localized, They are evident most clearly in pollen
taken from regions bordering the North Atlantic,
but there is no evidence for the Allerod-Younger
Dryas epoch in the pollen record of the USA [1 OJ.
The significance of the Allerod-Younger Dryas
transition is considered further on pp 207-208. A
strong case can be made that it must involve changes
in the circulation of the North Atlantic, but the
central issue concerns the factors responsible for
this change and the extent to which they might be
involved in the other excursions of climate depicted
in Figure 7.3.
facilitated by the higher reflectivity of a larger area
of snow. Change would feed on itself, an example
of positive feedback. There is little doubt that
Milankovitch's essential hypothesis, that changes in
the seasonal pattern of insolation should lead to
significant variations in climate, is basically correct.
It is equally clear, however, that the mechanism
whereby changes in illumination combine to effect
a change in climate is assuredly more complex than
the simple ice albedo feedback he invoked.
The reality of the astronomical influence on cli-
mate is strongly supported by the presence of peaks
in the climatic spectrum at frequencies directly
related to the astronomical forcing, as shown in
Figure 7.2. The data, at least at the higher frequen-
cies, can be described by a relatively simple linear
model. We assume that the temperature, or ice
volume, response to a forcing function P(t) is given
by
The Milankovitch hypothesis
dT
-=p(t)-aT
dt
(7.1 )
The thesis advanced by Milankovitch was basically
very simple. He had the idea that changes in insola-
tion in summer would playa critical role in deter-
mining whether ice sheets would advance or recede.
He had the view that snows would come no matter
what in winter, with the central issue being the
extent to which the winter snows melted in summer.
In a period of decreasing summer illumination,
the ice line would gradually advance, he suggested,
If the forcing function is sinusoidal with frequency,
the temperature response, T, should also be peri-
odic, and the associated frequency should be iden-
tical to that of P(t). We expect that the response
function, T, should be phase shifted with respect
to p by an amount proportionaJ to the intrinsic time
constant of the climatic system, represented here
bya- l .
An analysis of the climatic data, Figure 7.1, has
been carried out by Imbrie [1J making use of these
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Figure 7.5 Variations in atmospheric CO 2 inferred
from measurements of air trapped in bubbles of
ice at Byrd Station in Antarctica (semi-log scale).
Adapted from Neftel et al. [28].
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Most of the ocean's volume is occupied by cold,
dense water formed at the surface in localized
regions at high latitude, in the Weddel and Nor-
wegian Seas, for example. Cold water reaches the
Biogeochemical processes in the
ocean
ice in Greenland and Antarctica [2,3]. The level of
CO2 was relatively low, about 200 p.p.m., during
the last ice age. It shifted quite abruptly, to about
280 p.p.m., near the end of the ice age, as illustrated
in Figure 7.5. A variation of this magnitude on such
a brief time scale must involve an important change
in the physical, chemical, and biological properties
of the ocean [11].
simple concepts. He assumed that the isotopic sig-
nature in any given frequency band could be
described by a function gP(t - ¢) where P(t) is a
measure of the astronomical forcing, g is a constant
amplitude, and ¢ is a constant phase. He sought to
determine the quantities g and ¢ directly from
analysis of the data given in Figure 7.1. The record
was divided into two intervals, from the present to
400 000 years before present (BP), and from 400 000
years BP to 780 000 years BP. He considered
frequency bands corresponding to changes in
orbital eccentricity, with periods of 123 000, 95 000,
and 59 000 years, changes in axial tilt, with a period
of 41 000 years, and changes associated with
equinoctial precession, with periods of 23 000 and
19 000 years. The analysis revealed a remarkable
pattern. The response to changes in axial tilt and
precession is regular throughout the entire time
domain. Data in each of the relevent frequency
bands can be given an essentially constant amplitude
and phase. The response of climate to change in
axial tilt is shifted in phase with respect to orbital
forcing by about 8500 years. The response with
respect to axial precession is shifted in phase by
about 5500 years at 23 000 years, and by about 3500
years at 19 000 years. The fit is excellent throughout
the time domain. There is no evidence for drift in
either amplitude or phase for the high frequency
response, at periods of 19 000, 23 000, and 41 000
years, over almost 800 000 years. In contrast the
response to forcing associated with changes in ellip-
ticity was less regular. Imbrie's statistical approach
indicated a phase shift of 5000 years for elliptical
forcing at 123 000 years over the most recent
400 000 years. The analysis of the earlier record
implied a phase shift of 14 000 years, of opposite
sign, however.
The statistical analysis strongly supports, there-
fore, the reality of the astronomical influence on
climate, at least for changes associated with vari-
ations in axial tilt and precession. The nature of
the variability on longer time scales is more prob-
lematical. We argue here that changes on the
100 000 year time scale are more likely to reflect
changes in the internal function of the climatic
system, and that they may be induced, at least in
part, by changes in the manner in which nutrients
are cycled through the ocean. The potential impor-
tance of the biogeochemical connection is suggested
by measurements of CO2 in air trapped in ancient
,
r
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surface as part of the general circulation of the
ocean, driven for the most part by the contrast in
temperature and density between the surface and
depth. Deep water is warmed by the sun as it reaches
the surface and distributed globally through a vast
system of wind-driven currents. Residues of the
surface currents reach high latitudes where the
water cools and its salt content increases, reflecting
the combined influence of evaporation and forma-
tion of sea ice. The cycle is completed as water sinks
back from the surface to depth. The overall trip
through the deep sea takes a long time, nearly 1000
years at the present epoch. Regions in which bottom
water forms occupy but a small fraction of the
ocean's surface area, less than 10% of the total. Most
of the ocean is characterized by slow upwelling of
waters from depth.
Upwelling plays an important role in the life cycle
of the sea. Biological productivity is limited, for the
most part, by the availability of nutrients, par-
ticularly nitrogen and phosphorus. These elements
are present mainly at depth, as nitrate and phos-
phate, and are supplied to the surface in conjunc-
tion with the overturning of the ocean - the ther-
mohaline circulation. Alfred Redfield and his
associates recognized, 25 years ago, that organisms
in the sea have a more or less constant appetite for
nitrogen and phosphorus: approximately 105
atoms of carbon are fixed in biological tissue for
every 15 atoms of nitrogen and for every atom of
phosphorous [12]. As organisms grow they draw
carbon from surface waters. The quantity of carbon
thus fixed is controlled for the most part by nitrogen
and phosphorus, the limiting nutrients, in waters
that reach the surface. As organisms die, they fall
and decay at depth releasing their constituent car-
bon, nitrogen, and phosphorus. Oxygen is con-
sumed in the process. Biological activity acts, there-
fore, to lower the carbon content of waters at the
surface and to raise that at depth. Roger Revelle
refers to the process as a biological pump. The
higher the efficiency of the pump, the greater the
discrepancy between the carbon content of waters
at the surface and at depth. The level of atmospheric
CO2 is set primarily by exchange of gas across the
air-sea interface. Release of CO2 by the ocean at
low latitudes is balanced, at least in the steady state,
by uptake at high latitudes. A change in the
efficiency of the biological pump is reflected in a
change in the carbon content of surface waters,
leading to a relatively immediate adjustment in the
rate at which carbon is transferred across the air-sea
interface. If the pumping efficiency were to
increase, carbon would be drawn from the atmo-
sphere to the surface ocean and transferred from
there to the deep. The level of atmospheric CO2
would fall and the system would evolve to a new
steady state, characterized by a higher concentra-
tion of carbon in the deep sea, with lower concentra-
tions in surface waters and in the atmosphere. An
efficient pump reflects a productive ocean. The flux
of organic detritus from surface to depth is large,
and so the demand for dissolved oxygen is corre-
spondingly high. We expect, thus, a direct connec-
tion between CO2 in the air and O 2 in the deep sea.
When CO2 is low, so also is 02; conversely, when
CO2 is high, the marine biota are relatively
ineffective, and the concentration of dissolved O 2
should rise, approaching the limiting value set by
equilibrium with the air.
In its simplest form we can think of the biological
pump as a cycle in which water rich in nutrient
moves from depth to the surface. A fraction of its
dissolved carbon is converted into organic material
and falls back to the deep, leaving nutrient- and
carbon-depleted water at the surface. The upward
flow of water occurs over relatively large areas of
the world's oceans and is balanced by a return flow
from localized regions at high latitudes. The
nutrient content of water in the return flow rep-
resents unutilized biological potential. Redfield
referred to it as preformed nutirent, noting, on the
basis of analysis of the deep sea oxygen budget, that
approximately half of the nutrients at depth are
formed in situ by decomposition of detritus. The
balance is carried down (preformed) with waters in
the descending mode of the overall ocean circula-
tion. The presence of preformed nutrient attests to
an inefficiency in the biological pump. Its signifi-
cance in the context of CO2 was recognized only
recently, by groups at Harvard, Princeton, and
Berne [13,14,15]. A low concentration of prefor-
med nutrient, with a specified total nutrient con-
tent, implies an efficient pump and, consequently,
a low value for the concentration of atmospheric
CO2 , A variation in preformed nutrient over its
theoretically possible range could result, according
to recent calculations, in a swing in CO2 as large as
100 p.p.m. with a large associated change in dissol-
ved 02'
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What processes combine to determine the level
of preformed nutrient? Observations of nitrate and
phosphate in surface waters provide an important
clue. Concentrations of nitrogen and phosphorus
are small in surface waters at latitudes below about
50°, reflecting, presumably, the ease with which
nutrients are taken up by the biota. They climb
rapidly at higher latitudes, where it is clear that
uptake of nutrients must be limited by factors other
than supply. Light is an obvious possibility. The
concentration of nutrients in surface water that
sinks to depth reflects the origin and history of this
water. To the extent that it is supplied by surface
currents from latitudes below 40° the nutrient level
tends to be low. To the extent that it is derived
from upwelling at higher latitudes, where biological
activity is less efficient, the nutrient concentration
could be quite high. The level of preformed
nutrient is set thus, in part, by physical processes
and, in part, by biological influences in the high
latitude ocean. We expect biological activity at
higher latitudes to respond to changes in illumina-
tion, as indeed, also might physical mechanisms. A
higher than average flux of solar radiation favors
enhanced uptake of nutrients and could lead to a
decline in the concentration of preformed nitrogen
and phosphorus, and an associated reduction in the
level of CO2,
There are several mechanisms, therefore,
through which the climate system can respond to
changes in the seasonal pattern of illumination at
high latitude. The Milankovitch process, operating
through variations in snow and ice on land and ice
in the sea, allows a direct effect. Changes in high
latitude illumination could alter the metabolism of
the marine biota, affecting preformed nutrient, thus
CO2, and, consequently, the energy budget of the
atmosphere. Changes in preformed nutrients and
CO2 could arise due to changes in the dynamics of
the atmosphere and ocean, induced, for example,
by variations in snow and ice. Most probably all of
these factors are involved and further work is
required to define their relative importance. We
need a model to describe the ocean and the atmo-
sphere as a coupled system. A great deal of work
remains to be done to refine our understanding of
the processes that regulate the distribution and
utilization of nutrients in the ocean and the manner
in which these processes combine to set the level of
atmospheric CO2,
Susta inable development of the biosphere
The low value for the concentration of CO2 in
the glacial environment suggests that the pumping
mechanism was more effective then than now: a
larger fraction of the carbon that reached the
surface in glacial times appears to have returned to
depth as a component of detrital material. There
are three possible explanations (11). We might sup-
pose that the abundance of nutrients in the glacial
ocean was much larger than today. We might sur-
mise that the ecology of the glacial ocean was differ-
ent, that organisms could fix larger amounts of
carbon for a given supply of nitrogen and phos-
phorus. Or we might argue that a larger fraction
of upwelling nutrients in the glacial ocean was con-
verted into organic material - that the abundance
of preformed nutrient was less than today. The first
two of these suggestions have implications for the
ocean as a whole, while the third involves only
processes occurring at high latitude. We expect
shells of organisms that form at depth to reflect
the isotopic composition of carbon in the deep sea.
Planktonic species, on the other hand, should
record the isotopic composition of the surface
ocean. Carbon in surface water is relatively heavy,
enriched in 13C, reflecting the preferential uptake
of 12C by photosynthesis and the subsequent
removal of 12C by gravitational settling of detritus.
The abundance of 13C relative to 12C is specified by
a quantity, 8 13C, proportional to the ratio of con-
centrations 13C/12C. The difference in 8 13C between
surface and depth should reflect the efficiency of
the pumping mechanisms. A large difference would
imply an efficient pump, consequently a low level
for CO2, and a large demand for dissolved 02'
Measurements of carbon isotopes in deep sea cores
can be used, therefore, as a surrogate for CO2levels.
Shackleton et al. [16] showed that the trends in CO2
content of deep sea cores over the past 60 000 years
are generally consistent with the data obtained from
ice cores. A more extensive analysis of the deep sea
carbon data [4], displayed in Figure 7.6, indicates
significant power in the spectrum at 100 000 years
and suggests that variations in CO2 can play an
important role in regulating the behavior of climate,
particularly on longer time scales [17].
How might these changes arise? The lifetime of
phosphate, defined as the time required to fill the
ocean to its current content at present rates of
supply from the land, is about 100000 years in the
contemporary ocean, curiously similar to the time
Change in the natural environment oj the Earth: the historical record 207
23 kyr
Figure 7.6 A power spectral analysis of the vari-
ability of atmospheric CO 2 inferred from measure-
ments of the difference in the isotopic composition
of carbon in the shells of benthic and planktonic
foraminifera isolated from a deep sea core (V19-30).
The concentration of CO 2 appears to vary on time
scales of 100 000, 41 000, and 23 000 years. The peak
at 100 000 years is particularly significant in light of
the large variation in climate observed at this period
(see text). Adapted from [4].
Role of the ocean on shorter time
scales
- the lifetime of dissolved NOs is only about 10000
years even today. Removal of phosphate could also
accelerate, with high productivity and local anoxia
favoring the delivery of a high concentration of
organic material to sediments and the associated
formation of mineral phosphates, such as apatite.
This would lead to a rapid drop in productivity.
Oxygen would return, CO 2 would be released, the
climate would warm, sea level would rise, and the
sequence could begin anew. The scenario is admit-
tedly speculative. It has elements, however, that
must hold true. There is a limit to the productivity
of the ocean, imposed by the supply of O 2 , A rapid
loss of NOs could account for a drop in productivity
and a rise in CO2 , and could account for the rapidity
of the final glacial to interglacial transition.
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constant associated with major changes in climate.
Suppose that the budget of phosphate in the ocean
is variable, that the ocean gains phosphate from the
land during cold conditions when the stand of sea
level is low. Phosphate could be stored in coastal
sediments when sea level is high and eroded sub-
sequently as sea level falls (11). The level of oceanic
phosphorus, and presumably that of nitrogen,
would rise then during glacial time, the ocean would
become more productive, and the efficiency of the
biological pump would be enhanced. The level of
CO2 would fall and with it the level of dissolved
oxygen. Carbon dioxide and dissolved oxygen
would be modulated by changes in preformed
nutrients driven by changes in climate associated
with changes in the orbital parameters discussed
earlier. Conceivably, changes 10 preformed
nutrients could arise directly as a result of changes
in illumination at high latitudes. Eventually the pro-
ductivity of the ocean would rise to the point where
the supply of O 2 would be inadequate to keep pace
[18]. Aerobic respiration would be inhibited in this
case and denitrification could become prevalent.
We might expect a rapid drop in the level of nitrate
The possible importance of changes in the circula-
tion of the ocean was noted earlier in connection
with the Allerod-Younger Dryas phenomenon.
Broecker et al. [10] suggested that this fluctuation
may have arisen because of changes in the rate at
which deep water is formed in the North Atlantic.
Formation of deep water in this region today in-
volves a flux of approximately 20 Sverdrups (about
2 x 107 m 3!s), supplied by near-surface advection
from a source region characterized by a tem-
peratu re of about 10°C. As the water cools and
sinks it releases an amount of energy equal to
approximately 30% of the total solar energy reach-
ing the su dace of the Atlantic at latitudes north of
35 ON. It is obviously important to define the
mechanisms responsible for deep water formation.
Broecker et al. suggest that they relate ultimately to
the distribution of salinity in the surface ocean [10].
Waters in the North Pacific are relatively fresh,
and even if allowed to cool to 0 °C they could sink
to only intermediate depths. The high salinity of
the North Atlantic is more favorable to deep water
formation. Deep water can form also in localized
regions of the Southern Ocean, where export of
fresh water from semienclosed basins, such as the
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Weddel Sea, can lead to production of relatively
dense surface water.
The suspension of deep water formation in the
North Atlantic during the Younger Dryas, postu-
lated by Broecker et al. [10]. could reflect an in put
of fresh water associated with the melting of con-
tinental ice. It raises, however, a larger question.
At the present time deep water flows south in the
North Atlantic, mixing with waters of Antarctic
origin, before entering the Indian and Pacific
Oceans, where it flows north before eventually
returning to the surface. Is this the only stable mode
for deep water circulation? There is evidence that
deep water did not form in the Atlantic during the
last ice age [19]. Is it possible that the direction of
deep water flow could reverse under some condi-
tions, with the North Pacific providing the dominant
source? The implications for climate, for marine
chemistry, and for the biota are staggering and
point to the need for a much better understanding
of thermohaline circulation in the ocean. The rela-
tive inertia of the deep water circulation (approxi-
mately 1000 years being taken to describe a com-
plete loop at the present epoch) suggests that the
implications of a switch could be relatively long-
lived. It would be interesting to explore the extent
to which the changes in climate depicted in Figure
7.3, other than the Allerod-Younger Dryas, might
relate to possible changes in the circulation of the
ocean; it would also be interesting to search for
evidence of associated fluctuations in rates of bio-
geochemical cycling. Continuing study of the com-
position of trapped gases in ice cores could shed
important light on this issue.
Other evidence for changes In
biogeochemical processes
We have emphasized to this point changes in bio-
geochemical cycles on time scales longer than a few
thousand years. There is evidence, however, for
changes on much shorter time scales. The level of
atmospheric CH 4 has risen from about 0.7 p.p.m.
in AD 1600 to about 1.6 p.p.m. today [20, 21]. Con-
temporary evidence suggests that the increase con-
tinues, at between 1 and 2% per year [22]. The
concentration of atmospheric N20 is increasing, at
about 0.2% per year [23], and there are reports of
changes in CO [24] and 0 3 [25]. in addition to the
well documented rise in CO2 [26]. A selected sum-
mary of data is given in Figures 7.7-7.9. The human
activities contributing to these increases and the
3.5
1750
Figure 7.7 Concentrations of atmo-
spheric CH 4 measured in air trapped
in bubbles of ice in Greenland (circles)
and at the South Pole (triangle). Also
indicated is the range of concentra-
tions observed today (diamonds).
Adapted from [22].
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Figure 7.8 Variations in the concentration of CO in air at Cape Meares, Oregon. Adapted from [23].
chemical processes involved are discussed by Crut-
zen and Graedel (Chapter 8, this volume).
Implications for future work
,,,,' e need a program of research designed to
improve our understanding of the factors respon-
sible for contemporary changes in atmospheric
composition. The rise in CO2 provides a case in
point. The concentration of CO2 was about
280 p.p.m. in the latter half of the nineteenth cen-
tury. It rose to about 315 p.p.m. in 1958 and has
climbed since 1.0 a value near 345 p.p.m. (27,28).
Ice-core data [2,3] suggest that the natural range
is between 200 and 300 p.p.m., with low values
applying during glacial times and high values
appropriate to interglacial conditions. We have
moved, in this century, outside the range of what
might be considered natural variability, Most of the
rise since the industrial revolution can be attributed
to release of CO2 associated with combustion of
fossil fuel.
The fossil source, vented initially to the air, is
taken up eventually by the ocean. Transfer into the
ocean is a slow process, however, limited ultimately
by the sluggish circulation of the sea and by the
need to dissolve sufficient quantities of carbonate
minerals to neutralize acid introduced with CO 2 ,
The ocean is supersaturated with respect to calcite
down to depths of about 4 km. Enhanced uptake
of CO2 is possible only when acid-rich water reaches
this depth. In the meanwhile, approximately 60%
of the carbon released by the burning of fossil fuel
is expected to remain in the air.
The contemporary rise in atmospheric CO2 rep-
resents about half of the source from fossil fuel. Is
there an unidentified sink for carbon over and
above that attributed to the ocean? In particular,
210
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1975 '980 Figure 7.9 Mean monthly concentra-tions of CO 2 at Mauna Loa, Hawaii.
Adapted from [25].
what is the role of the terrestrial biosphere? Are
plants growing faster, stimulated by anthropogenic
sources of nitrogen and phosphorus? What are the
direct and indirect effects of higher levels of CO2?
A higher level of CO2 could induce a stomatal
response, in some plants at least, resulting in the
enhanced conservation of H 20. Are there impEca-
tions here for regional climate or for the growth of
plants? Should we consider the possibility of a sig-
nificant shift in the distribution and variety of
species in specific ecosystems? Careful studies of
selected systems could enhance our ability to
monitor, understand, and eventually predict effects
of environmental change. At a minimum, we need
to document the gross effects of human activity, to
monitor the areas of land cleared annually for
agriculture, and to define the associated changes in
the storage of carbon in both biomass and soils. We
need a better model and better data to desCTibe the
uptake of carbon by the ocean. Models in use now
rely heavily on observations that defined the
infusion of radioisotopes introduced as a con-
sequence of nuclear testing in the 1960s. How rep-
resentative are these data? Is the circulation of the
ocean constant during the time scales of interest
to the assessment of the impact of fossil fuel? We
need, eventually, a prognostic model to treat the
ocean, atmosphere, and biosphere as an interactive
system. This model must incorporate all of the rel-
evant, potentially significant, feedbacks.
The preceeding discussion suggests that interac-
tions are often subtle. Development of models
should proceed hand-in-hand with the design and
im pIementation of observational strategies inten-
ded to elucidate processes, to place them in an
appropriate global context. Studies of the past can
playa valuable role in focusing attention on impor-
tant issues, which might otherwise escape attention.
Our needs are not confined to problems con-
nected with assessment of the effects of
anthropogenic CO2 . Similar issues arise for CH 4 ,
CO, N20, for oxides of nitrogen, and for 0 3 , The
atmosphere gives a clear, early signal of the wide-
spread effects of human activity. Humankind is now
a global factor in the mobilization of life-essential
elements, such as carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus,
and sulfur. A large part of the landscape is under
our influence, either directly or indirectly.
Assessment of the complex effects of human
activity requires a broad perspective. There is a
general, current recognition of the need for an
interdisciplinary approach, and a sense of urgency.
The Global Habitability Program launched by
NASA, IIASA's Program on Sustainable Develop-
ment of the Biosphere, and the Global Change
Program under consideration by ICSU are essential
steps to progress. They must be encouraged and
should proceed without delay.
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Commentary
]. E. Lovelock
In many ways our relationship with the Earth is like
that between the eighteenth century physician and
his patients. We share with him a vast ignorance
illuminated only by an instinct that warns us not to
act precipitately, for such action is potentially as
disastrous as inaction. Wisdom comes slowly and
painfully by trial and error.
Early in the history of medicine, and long before
the sciences of bacteriology and biochemistry had
made their crucial but specific contributions, this
wisdom was enlarged by the science of physiology.
The discovery by Harvey of the circulation of blood
and by Paracelsus that the poison is the dose were
two such enlightenments that gave a scientific basis
to the practice of medicine.
The great physiologist Walter Cannon wrote
"Organisms, composed of material which is charac-
terized by the utmost inconstancy and unsteadyness,
have somehow learned the methods of maintaining
constancy and keeping steady in the presence of
conditions which might reasonably be expected to
prove profoundly disturbing." This wisdom that
later he called "homeostasis" is in various ways a
prime characteristic of life. It is a property of simple
bacteria as well as the largest plants and animals.
The ecologists Eugene Odum and C. S. Holling
both recognized that some of this homeostasis is
also exhibited by ecosystems. These collectives seem
to regulate their environment to the benefit of their
member species. When the constancy of the Earth's
environment during the 3.6 billion years of life is
considered, it seems that homeostasis may also be
a property of that largest collective, the biosphere.
This view of the Earth as a physiological system
is hypothetical and many scientists prefer to believe
that the evolution of life and the evolution of the
physical and chemical environments are separate
and only loosely linked by biogeochemical cycles
and biogeophysical processes. Perhaps they are
right and perhaps they will show us how to live in
harmony with the Earth when their questions have
all been answered. But this may take a long time
and by then we may be in no position to use the
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knowledge. The present condition of the Earth is
like that of a patient whose illness requires a
research program for the development of the cure.
We may not have the time for the leisurely and
exacting progress of academic science. We need, in
addition, the less rigorous and more empirical
approach that characterizes the practice of science
in times of war.
The need for a pragmatic approach in planetary
science is indicated by the choice of titles for many
recent international programs for the study of inter-
linked global systems; for example, Global Habit-
ability, The Geosphere-Biosphere, Global Change,
or Earth Science System. These titles invoke, even
if their authors did not intend it, a down-to-earth
science. A practical science that is global in another
sense, namely, that it is neither expensive to practice
nor cloistered in an academy. A science that can be
practiced and shared with the barefoot scientists of
the third world.
It is often forgotten that in medicine vast
improvements in the length and quality of life came
from practical engineering based on a dubious
empiricism. The Romans thought that malaria was
a consequence of breathing the smelly air of the
swamps. They drained them and the malaria
declined: it hardly mattered that their theory was
wrong. In a similar way the drinking water of
Europe was made clean to drink long before the
microbial theory of disease was established. The
medieval farmer who rotated his crops and kept a
balanced ecosystem within and around his farm did
so without the benefit of theoretical ecology. In the
complex and nonlinear real world, theory is often
the post hoc explanation of a practical success and
time is needed before it bears fruit in the way of
useful predictions.
It takes a war or a great catastrophe to quieten
the chattering from the cloisters. The consequences
of the changing surface and atmosphere of the
Earth seem to loom ominously and in many ways
science is again about to be conscripted. At such
times there can be an enjoyment in the down-to-
earth approach that marks our escape from school
and the beginning of an adult life as practicing
geophysiolo ists.
,Chapter 8
P. ]. Crutzen
T. E. Graedel
The role of atmospheric
chemistry in
environment-development
• •InteractIons
Editors' Introduction: The mobility and relatively low mass of the atmosphere make it
the component of the Earth's environment most susceptible to large-scale transformations
through human activities.
In this chapter is presented a synoptic framework for understanding how chemical
processes link human activities, such as fossil-fuel combustion, agriculture, and industrial
production, to important properties of the atmosphere. The atmospheric properties
included in the framework are absorption of ultraviolet energy, thermal radiation balance
(climate), photochemical smog, global oxidation efficiency, precipitation acidity, visibility,
and corrosivity. A graphical format is developed that displays the net impacts of multiple
sources of disturbance across multiple atmospheric properties. This synoptic approach
could serve as a model for similar impact assessments focused on the biosphere's soils,
waters, and biota.
Introduction
It is now recognized that the activities of mankind
produce detectable and deleterious impacts upon
tpe atmosphere and biosphere. Prudent planning
requires that these impacts be well understood so
that further developments will not perturb the
atmosphere and biosphere beyond their carrying
capacities. At present, these human activities rival
the global natural inputs into the atmosphere of
sulfur, nitrogen, and many other elements. For
example, in the local and regional vicinities of
industrial centers the atmospheric deposition of
many chemical compounds is strongly dominated
by such human activities. Indeed, agricultural fires
in the tropics are an important regional and global
source of air pollution. Furthermore, the synthesis
and release of special products may have surprising
consequences, as is shown by the effects of chloro-
fluorocarbons on the stratosphere.
In this chapter we describe the role of the atmo-
spheric chemical system in biogeochemical cycles.
We then discuss the most prolific emission sources
to the atmosphere, as well as several potential atmo-
spheric impacts related to anthropogenic perturba-
tions. In the final section we assemble the impact
information in tabular form and demonstrate that
only a relatively few types of human activities are
related to most of the potential effects.
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Chemical processes In the lower
atmosphere
The flow of particles and gases through
the atmosphere
The effects of particles and gases emitted into the
atmosphere, naturally or as a result of man's
activities, can be assessed only by following their
chemical pathways. These pathways are illustrated
in Figure 8.1, which deals with both gases and con-
densed-phase (liquid or solid) species. We consider
first a gas emitted by industrial activities with flux
(a). Each gas has five possible fates:
(1) If the gas is unreactive, or nearly so, it spreads
through the troposphere and is transported to
the stratosphere and upper atmosphere [Figure
8.1, (1)]. At these higher altitudes it may func-
tion as an infrared radiation absorber or
"greenhouse gas" or it may influence the ozone
(03 ) layer. The effects of such gases are dis-
cussed later (pp 235-236).
(2) If the gas is water soluble, some portions are
incorporated into cloud water droplets [Figure
8.1, (2A)J, deposited onto wet particle surfaces
[Figure 8.1, (4A)], or deposited onto the ground
[Figure 8.1, (SA)]. As it turns out, few precursor
(original) gases are sufficiently soluble to be
directly affected by these processes.
(3) If the gas is reactive in the atmosphere, it is
oxidized to a variety of products [Figure 8.1,
(3)]. Those with high vapor pressures remain
in the gas phase, but in most cases oxidation
leads to greater solubility and lower vapor
pressure.
(4) Gas-phase reaction products that have low vapor
pressu res and hyd rophilic characteristics can act
as nucleating centers for new atmospheric parti-
cles [Figure 8.1, (4B)]. ("Low vapor pressure"
may be operationally defined as < 10- 10 atmo-
spheres.)
(5) Some of the gas is deposited on surfaces [Figure
8.1, (SA)), particularly if the supply of effective
oxidizing gases is diminished due to low levels
of solar radiation, time of year, time of day, etc.
This deposition is commonly termed "dry depo-
sition", even when it occurs on a wet surface,
such as the ocean, and is a function of the
aqueous solubility of the molecule.
We then consider the fates of the gaseous prod-
ucts resulting from chemical reactions of the pre-
cursor gases. These fates are similar to those of the
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Figure 8.1 Chemical and physical pathways for gases and particles in the atmosphere. The numbers and
Greek letters represent fluxes (mass or number of molecules per unit time and unit area), which are
discussed in the text.
The Tole of atmospheric chemistr) in environment.-development intemcti.ons 215
precursors, but differ in the proportion of gas that
undergoes each process, because the first-stage
products are invariably more highly oxidized than
their precursors. This property frequently renders
them more soluble in water, which favors uptake
both on atmospheric water droplets [Figure 8.1,
(2B)J and on water frequently present on surfaces
[soil, lakes, particles, materials, etc., Figure 8.1,
(5B)J. In addition, oxidized products are usually of
higher molecular weight and lower vapor pressure
than their precursors, which makes them more
likely to act as nucleating centers for new particles
Or to deposit onto existing particles, thus prevent-
ing the oxidized products from diffusing to higher
altitudes. In most cases, therefore, flux (2B) >
flux (2A), flux (4B) > flux (4A), and flux (5B) >
flux (5A) (Figure 8.1).
Atmospheric particles, whether emitted as such
or created by nucleation, occur in a wide range of
sizes. As they interact, coagulation produces a multi-
modal size spectrum, as shown in Figure 8.2. Those
in the "accumulation mode" (i.e., with particle
diameter in the range 0.1 j-Lm::;; D p S 1 j-Lm) have
atmospheric lifetimes of at least several days. Since
they are similar in size to the wavelengths of visible
photons, they are responsible, to a large extent, for
reductions in visibility. Particles in the "coarse
mode" (i.e., with D p » 1 j-Lm) have large gravita-
tional settling velocities and short lifetimes, and
appear to take little part in atmosphereic chemistry.
Accumulation mode particles are eventually
removed from the atmosphere either by nucleation
or incorporation into cloud or rain water [Figure
8.1, (6A)J or by dry deposition [Figure 8.1, (7A)]. It
seems reasonable to suppose that the efficiency of
these processes depends on the degree of hydrophi-
licity of the particle surfaces, but studies are needed
to confirm this supposition.
Atmospheric particles are either injected directly
into the atmosphere or created by the transforma-
tion of gaseous molecules. The injection process
[Figure 8.1, flux ((3)J produces particles of a quite
different chemical nature to those arising from the
gas phase; they include as constituents transition
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Figure 8.2 In situ atmospheric
aerosol particle size distributions
established from measurements at
various sites in California, USA. The
"clean continental background" data
(yellow) are for Fort Collins, Colorado.
F, Fresno; G, Goldstone; HF, Harbor
Freeway; HL, Hunter-Liggett, P,
Pomona, R, Richmond; SFA, San
Francisco Airport; t:. V / t:. log Dp is the
change in aerosol volume per change
in aerosol diameter. From Whitby [1];
reproduced by permission of the New
York Academy of Sciences.
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metal compounds, refractory oxides, soot, and
sulfate particles. The atmospheric lifetimes of these
particulates are limited by water droplet scavenging
[Figure 8.1, (6B)] and dry deposition [Figure 8.1,
(7B)]. In a few cases supersaturated gases may
evaporate from cloud droplets or airborne particles
into the atmosphere, e.g., hydrogen chloride ( HCl),
or nitric acid (HN03 ) from sulfuric acid-containing
aerosol [Figure 8.1, (8)].
Another process is the deposition of impure cloud
water as rain or snow [Figure 8.1, (9)]. This process
is theoretically capable of scavenging particles and
gases during the fall from cloud base to ground,
but to date the evidence indicates that most
impurities are present in the cloud water prior to
the formation of raindrops and snowflakes.
It is important to recognize, particularly when
considering biogeochemical processes on a global
scale, that not all the gases and aerosol particles
entering the atmosphere come from man's
activities. In several cases the natural emission fluxes
of gases (y) and particles (8) (Figure 8.1) exceed
those from anthropogenic sources. A careful assess-
ment of the flux magnitudes is thus important,
although in some cases (e.g., lightning as a source
of nitric oxide, NO) the assessment can be very
difficult.
The difference between rates of production and
loss determines the concentration changes with time
of an atmospheric species. If its production grows,
the concentration of a species in the atmosphere
increases with time. This has definitely been the
case for several important atmospheric gases, such
as carbon dioxide (C02 ) [2], nitrous oxide (N 20)
[3], and methane (CH4 ) [4], whose atmospheric
abundances are currently increasing by 0.3,0.2-0.3,
and 1-1.2% per year, respectively. Large increases
are taking place as well in the abundances of many
industrial chlorofluorocarbons [5]. For CO2 ,
measured volume-mixing ratios increased from 315
p.p.m. in 1958 to 340 p.p.m. in 1982 [2]; analyses
of air trapped in ice cores [6] suggest that the atmo-
spheric CO2 concentration in 1850 may have been
as low as 260 p.p.m. For CH4 , Craig and Chou [7]
have estimated mixing ratios for several hundred
years from the analysis of air trapped in Greenland
ice cores. They find a linear increase in CH4 con-
centrations from 0.7 p.p.m.v. in 1550 to 1.1 p.p.m.v.
at the beginning of the twentieth century, followed
by a much faster increase to 1.6 p.p.m.v. by 1980.
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A different budget situation occurs if rates of
production and loss for a specific atmospheric
species are in balance and so give a stable atmo-
spheric concentration. This situation currently
applies to oxygen (02), for example. Since it is
believed that O 2 concentration evolved during the
early history of the Earth, we are reminded here
that budget assessments apply to specific time peri-
ods, and thus that a balanced budget is always poten-
tially subject to factors that may throw it out of
balance.
Finally, if species production declines or is ter-
minated the species concentration decreases with
time. Examples are artificial radioactivity following
the ban of atmospheric nuclear tests in the early
1960s [8] and stratospheric aerosol following vol-
canic eruption [9].
Tropospheric photochemistry and the
budgets of atmospheric trace gases
Although only about 10% of all atmospheric 0 3 is
located in the troposphere, its presence there is of
fundamental importance for the composition of the
atmosphere. This is because the very reactive
hydroxyl radical (OH") is produced through the
absorption of ultraviolet radiation by 0 3 and the
subsequent reaction of excited oxygen atoms with
water vapor (see Appendix 8.1). The radical OH'
reacts with many gases which would otherwise be
inert in the troposphere, including hydrocarbons
and many organic halogen and sulfur compounds.
Thus OH" initiates the oxidation of these com-
pounds to carbon monoxide (CO) and CO2 and to
inorganic acids that are removed from the atmo-
sphere by deposition on vegetation, on the Earth's
surface, on particulate matter, or by precipitation.
These reactions initiated by 0 3 strongly determine
tropospheric photochemistry, as indicated in Figure
8.3. Without 0 3 in the troposphere, the composition
of the atmosphere and the conditions for life on
Earth would be very different. (The other essential
ecological role of 0 3 occurs mainly in the strato-
sphere, namely to filter out hazardous ultraviolet
solar radiation.) However, as too much 0 3 in the
troposphere is harmful to plants, it may be possible
that tropospheric 0 3 is important in regulating the
proper functioning of the biosphere. Indeed, there
are some indications of substantial increases (several
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Figure 8.4 Tropospheric 0 3 profiles
measured at Hohenpeissenberg, FRG,
during the past 15 years. 1967, dashed
white; 1974, yellow; 1976, full black;
1981, full white; 1982, dashed black.
(Attmannspacher [11 J; reproduced
with permission).
tens of percent) in tropospheric 0 3 concentrations
above the mid-latitude zone of the Northern Hemi-
sphere during the past 20 years (Figure 8.4) [10, II].
Such increases in tropospheric 0 3 are not surprising
if we consider the effects of greatly increased NO,
emissions into the atmosphere from anthropogenic
activities (see Appendix 8.1). It is unfortunate that
few long-term 0 3 records are available from other
parts of the world to confirm the observed trends
in Europe.
On the basis of the photochemistry of 0 3, H 20 cg),
CH 4 , CO, and NO and N02 (nitrogen dioxide), it
is possible to make some rough estimates of the OH'
distribution in the atmosphere. This distribution
can be tested against the observed global distribu-
tion of methylchloroform (CH 3CCI 3), since
CH 3CCI 3 is produced by industrial processes only,
ones that have rather well-known historical produc-
tion rates, and is removed from the atmosphere
only by reaction with OH·. The calculated daytime-
average OH' concentration distributions for the
four seasons, shown In Figure 8.5, indicate
maximum OH' concentrations in the tropics. The
globally and diurnally averaged OH' concentration
equals about 5 Xl 05 molecules/cms [12]. Therefore,
although the Earth's atmosphere contains almost
21 %molecular oxygen, its oxidative power is deter-
mined mainly by the ultraminor constituent OH',
which is 10 13 times less abundant. Questions should,
therefore, be asked as to whether the OH' con-
centrations are stable or whether they could be
changing because of anthropogenic activities. This
is discussed briefly in the next section and in Appen-
dix 8.2, This information, combined with know-
ledge of the global distribution of other trace gases
that react with OH', enables atmospheric budgets
of these gases to be roughly established. For other
gases, source and sink terms may be estimated by
other means; currently estimated atmospheric
transformation rates and sources and sinks at the
Earth's surface for the most important gases are
given in Figure 8.6. The indicated global fluxes are
still quite uncertain, although our knowledge has
clearly improved since 15 years ago, when several
of the estimates were incorrect by more than an
order of magnitude. The sources of the most impor-
tant compounds and estimates of their contribution
are shown in Table 8.1. Despite the uncertainties,
Figure 8.6 and Table 8.1 consolidate important
information and should be onsulted frequently
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Figure 8.5 Calculated meridional daytime distributions of OH' (106 molecules/cm 3 ) for (a) January, (b)
July, (c) April, and (d) October [12].
while reading the following text. They show in
almost all cases the substantial and growing import-
ance of man's activities.
Carbon compounds
The principal components of the atmospheric
carbon cycle are shown in Figure 8.7, which is the
first of several figures designed to help examine the
atmospheric processing of compounds that contain
a specific element. The carbon compounds in the
atmosphere arise largely from combustion of fossil
fuels and from natural emissions.
When carried to chemical completion, the com-
bustion of fossils fuels produces a flux with CO2 as
the carbonaceous product [Figure 8.7, flux (0'1)]'
CO2 is unreactive in the lower atmosphere, where
its chief fates are atmospheric transport and upward
diffusion [Figure 8.7, (I A)] and uptake by plants on
land areas [Figure 8.7, (5)]. Incomplete fossil-fuel
combustion, which inevitably occurs to some
degree, forms CO [Figure 8.7, flux (0'2)] and a very
large family of hydrocarbon compounds [Figure 8. 7,
flux (0'3)]. A few of these gases, chiefly CO and CH 4,
are long lived and are added to the global atmo-
spheric background [Figure 8.7, (IB)], although
slow indirect conversion to CO 2 also occurs [Figure
8.7, (2C)]. The annual budgets of CO and CH 4 ,
determined from their observed global distribu-
tions, as shown in Figures 8.8 and 8.9, and those
calculated for OH' indicate maximum sources and
sinks for these gases in the tropics [12]. This demon-
strates the importance of the tropics in atmospheric
photochemistry. The growth in atmospheric CH 4 ,
currently observed at 1-1.2% per yr [4], may lead
to lower hydroxyl concentrations and a reduction
in the oxidative power of the atmosphere. It is
postulated [13] that global average OR concentra-
tions will decrease, while in the upper troposphere
and at mid-latitudes, continential boundary layer
0 3 concentrations will increase. This is explained
in more detail in Appendix 8.2. In the general case,
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M
0'+02---> 0 3 (2 X )
302 ---> 203
...
2. 0 3---> 0'+02
XO+O'--->X'+02
X' +03 ---> XO+02
203 ---> 302
X = NO, CI, OH (catalysts)
3. Downward flux to troposphere (small difference between
1 and 2).
hv
4. 0 3 ---> 0*+02
0*+H20---> 20H'
HO';+03--->OH'+202
5. RO';+NO---> RO'-t-N02
RO';+02---> RO'+03
R = H, CH3, etc., from CO and hydrocarbon oxidation, e.g.,
CO+OH' ---> H'+C02
M
H'+02 ---> HO';
6. Ozone destruction at the ground: difference between 3, 4,
and 5.
7. Release of CH4 at the ground by a variety of sources with
range 1.3-3.3E 13 moles/yr; 2.5E 13 calculated with average
OH' concentration of 6£5 molecules/cm3.
8. CH4+0H'--->CH~+H20
M
CH~+02---> CH 30';
CH30'; + NO ---> CH 30' + N02
CH 30'+02 ---> HCHO+HO';
hv
HCHO--->CO+H 2
and other oxidation routes.
9. Flux of CH 4 to the stratosphere.
10. Flux of H 20 to the troposphere from CH 4 oxidation.
lla. Release of CO from a variety of sources, mostly man-made.
11 b. Uptake of CO by microbiological processes in soils.
12. CO-t-OH' ---> H·+C02 . Global loss of CO of 4-15E13
moles/yr. 7EI3 calculated with [OH'] = 6E5 molecules/cm3.
15. Isoprene (CS H 8 ) and terpene (C1oH 16) oxidation to CO
following reaction with OH'; oxidation mechanism and CO
yield not well known.
16, 17. Release of N20 to atmosphere by a variety of sources;
no significant sinks of N20 discovered in troposphere;
stratospheric loss estimated by model calculations.
hv
18a. N20---> N2+O'
N20+O*---> N2+02
18b. N20+O*--->2NO
19. Release of NH 3 to atmosphere by a variety of sources;
redeposition at the ground; most NH 3 removed by rain,
but some NO, loss and N20 formation possibly by NH;+
NOx ---> N20 x - 1-t- H 20, while NOx may be formed via
NH';+O,---> NH20·+02·
20. Release of NOx at the ground by a variety of sources;
redeposition at the ground.
h,·
HNO, ---> OH' + N02
HN03 +OH' ---> H 20+ N03
22. NOx produced by lightning.
23. NOx produced by subsonic aircraft.
24. NOx from galactic cosmic rays (GCR).
25. NOx from sporadic solar proton events (SPE), maximum
production recorded in August 1972 event, I E I0 moles.
26. NO production by high-speed photoelectrons in thermo-
sphere and by auroral activity.
27. NO+N'--->N 2+O'
28. Downward flux of NO to stratosphere; small difference
between 26 and 27, may be important.
31,32. COS destruction in stratosphere calculated with model:
uptake of COS in oceans and hydrolysis may imply an
atmospheric lifetime of only a few years and a source of a
few EIO moles/yr. Very little is known about the sources
and sinks of COS and CS2.
hv
33. COS ---> S' + CO
S'+02--->SO'+0'
SO' +02 ---> S02+ 0'
34. Release of H 2S, (CH3)2S, and CH3SH by biological proces-
ses in soils and waters. R = H, CH3, etc.
35. Oxidation of H 2S, (CH')2S, and CH 3SH to S02 after
initial attack by OH·.
36. Industrial release of S02'
37. S02 oxidation to H 2S04on aerosols, in cloud droplets, and
by gas-phase reactions following attack by OH' and H 20 2.
38. Volcanic injection of S02 (average flux over past centuries).
Figure 8.6 Compilation of the most important photochemical processes in the atmosphere, including
estimates of flux rates (expressed in moles per year) between the Earth's surface and the atmosphere, and
within the atmosphere (aEb means a x lOb; CAT is catalysis; PAN is peroxyacetyl nitrate). Numbers in
italics refer to the key above.
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the hydrocarbons are oxidized by photochemical
reactions to form carbon monoxide, peroxides,
aldehydes, and ketones [Figure 8.7, (3)]; some for-
mation of soot and organic aerosol particles also
occurs [Figure 8.7, (4A) and (3)+(4B)]. From a
carbon budget standpoint, biogenic emissions of
hydrocarbons [Figure 8.7, flux (y)] appear to domi-
nate globally. On local and regional scales, however,
anthropogenic activities, such as fossil-fuel combus-
tion, industrial activity, forest cutting, and biomass
burning, may be predominant.
Sustainable development of the biosphere
Although hydrocarbons are rather insoluble in
water, their oxidized derivatives have relatively high
solubility and are thus more readily incorporated
into cloud droplets [Figure 8. 7, (2B)] or on to aerosol
particles [Figure 8.7, (4B)]. (For example, formal-
dehyde, HCHO, is commonly found in atmospheric
droplets [14].)
Combustion of hydrocarbons generally produces
condensed-phase material [Figure 8.7, flux ({3)], as
well as the combustion gases. The former may con-
tain elemental (or graphitic) carbon (i.e., soot) or
Table 8.1 Budgets of carbon, nitrogen, and sulfur species B [29].
Gas
Direct input
(gjyr)
Source type
Secondary input
(g/yr)
Source type Removal byb
Atmospheric
lifetimes b
Transport
distances
tlx, tly, tlz (km)C
Volume mixing
ratios in remote
troposphere d
CO
{
4-16 x 1014 CO
Biomass burning
{ 6.4 x 10
14 CO
Industry
{
0.2-2 x 1014 CO
Vegetation
{
0.3--0.6 x 1014 CH4
Rice paddy fields
{
0.3-2.2 x 1014 CH4
Natural wetlands
{
0.6 x 1014 CH4
Ruminants
{ < 1.5 x 10
14 CH4
Termites
{
0.3-1.1 x 1014 CH4
Biomass burning
{ 0.2 x 10
14 CH4
Gas leakage
C5Ha, ClOH18 8.3 xl 014 C
Trees
{ 3.7-9.3 X 10
14 CO
CH4 oxidation
{
4-13 x 1014 CO
C5Ha, ClOH18
oxidation
{ 30 X 10
14 CO
OH'
{
4.5 x 1014 CO
Uptake by
soils
2 month
7 year
10 hour
4000,2500, 10
50-200 p.p.b.v.
Global
1.5-2.0 p.p.m.v.
400,200,1
0-10 p.p.b.v.
{
12-20xl012 N
Industry
{
10-40 x 1012 N
Biomass burning
{
1-10Xl012 N
Lightning
{
1-15 x 1012 N
Soils
{ 0.15Xl0
12 N
Ocean
{ 0.25.
X l012 N
Jet aircraft
1.0-1.5 X 1012 N
Oxidation of N20
25-85 x 1012 N 1.5 day
OH'
Deposition on
soils and oceans
1500, 400, 1.0
1-100 p.p.t.v.
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Gas
Direct input
(gjyr)
Source type
Secondary input
(gjyr)
Source type Removal byb
Atmospheric
lifetimes b
Transport
distances
~x, ~y, ~z (km)C
Volume mixing
ratios in remote
troposphere d
15-85 X1012 N
N02 +OH'
{ 1.8
X l012 N
Fossil fuel burning
{ 1-2 x 10
12 N
Biomass burning
{ 1-2 x 10
12 N
Oceans, estuaries
{ 1-3
X l012 N
Cultivation of natural soils
{
<3 x 1012 N
Fertilized fields
{ ~atural soils
{ 10-20 x 10
12 N
Domestic animals
{ 2--S
X 1012 N
Wild animals
{ <3
X l012 N
Fertilized fields
{ <30 Xl0
12 N
Natural fields
{ 4-12
X l012 N
Coal burning
{
<60Xl012 N
Biomass burning
Rain
6-11x1012 N
Stratospheric
photolysis
Rain
3 day
ca. 100-
200 yrs
<9 day
3000, 600, 1.5
10-300 p.p.t.v.
Global
ca. 300 p.p.b.v.
<9000, 1000, 3
0-3 p.p.b.v.
H2S,
(CH 3bS,
CH3SH
{ 64Xl0
12 S
Coal burning
{ 26
X l012 S
Petroleum burning
{ 11Xl0
12 S
Nonferrous ores
{ 10-30 x 10
12 S
Volcanoes
{ <4
X lO12 S
Agricultural fields
{ 31-42 x 10
12 S
Open ocean
{ 10
Xl012 S
Coastal waters
{ 16 X 10
12 S(?)
Tropical forests
{ 24 x 10
12 S(?)
Wetlands
40-100x1012 S
Oxidation of H2S,
(CH3bS
OH"
Rain
OH"
5 day
2 day
5000, 700, 2.5
10-200 p.p.t.v.
2000, 500, 1.5
0-100 p.p.t.v.
a COS and CS2 are not listed because too little is known about their sources and sinks. The industrial input of CS2
is about 2 x 1011 g Sjyr. b Lifetimes and removal rates are calculated with [OH] =6 x 105 moleculesjcm3. C ~x, ~y, and
~z are, respectively, east-west, south-north, and vertical diffusion directions over which concentrations in the free
atmosphere are reduced to 30% by chemical reactions. d 1 p.p.m.v. = 10-6 ; 1 p.p.b.v. = 10-9 ; 1 p.p.t.v. = 10-12 .
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Figure 8.7 Atmospheric carbon compounds: the principal species and chemical and physical pathways.
This figure, as well as Figures 8.11-8.14, are versions of Figure 8.1 that are specific to the cycle for a
particular element. Compounds and pathways regarded as minor by the authors have been omitted in the
interest of clarity.
fuel-derived polynuclear aromatic hydrocarbons
(PNAH). The size of most of these particles is
such that they have a significant negative impact on
visibility, enhanced for soot particles by strong
absorption of sunlight. Long-range transport of
soot particles is possible because of their long atmo-
spheric residence times, especially during winter
and at high latitudes. This contributes to the" Arctic
haze" phenomenon, which may itself have climatic
consequences. The combustion-produced particles,
together with organic products formed from gas-
eous reactions and oxidized hydrocarbons, con-
stitute the organic components available for cloud
water chemistry [Figure 8.7, (2B, 6A, 6B)]. The
possibility of coalescence of these components to
form thin surface films on the droplets has been
discussed [15], but defin itive measurements have
not yet been made.
At this point it is useful to comment on the nature
of the aerosol particles. As shown in Figure 8.10,
they generally possess a water shell (except at very
low humidities). The presence of this aqueous
medium effectively excludes reactions between gas-
eous molecules and dry surfaces. At the same time,
to understand the chemistry we must acquire a
deeper understanding of the atmospheric
chemistry of the liquid phase than has yet been
achieved. The potential presence of a surface
organic layer is indicated, and may be common on
aerosol particles; if present, such layers strongly
inhibit gas-liquid transfer and the subsequent
liquid-phase chemistry.
The removal of solid and liquid material by depo-
sition on to the Earth's surface is a complicated
function of particle size, chemical nature, and
boundary layer meteorology [Figure 8. 7, (7 A), (7B),
(8)J. For the solid aerosol particles (generally with
a water shell), typical atmospheric lifetimes are days
to weeks. Reaction times are therefore unlikely to
limit chemical processes on particles, and particles
deposited on surfaces or incorporated into droplets
are often at an advanced stage of chemical aging;
aerosol particles often also serve as condensation
nuclei. Cloud droplets have lifetimes of a few hours
at most; they disappear either by reevaporation or
by coalescence into raindrops; reevaporation is at
least 10 times more likely. Raindrops survive for
only a few minutes before they impact on the Earth's
surface. The time spans as well as the chemical con-
stituents of particles, cloud droplets, and raindrops
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Figure 8.8 The annual CO budget
calculated with the OH' distributions
of Figure 8.5 and observed CO distri-
butions [12],
226
South Latitude North
Sustainable development of the biosphere
Global budget
(g CH4 /yr per 10
0 latitude)
±71 X 1012
87X1012
-322 X 1012
409 X 1012
Process
Transport
CH4 global increase
CH4 + OH· oxidation sink
Tropical sources
Figure 8.9 The annual CH 4 budget
[12].
are thus quite different. It is this complexity that
makes a detailed understanding of condensed-
phase atmosphere chemistry so difficult.
The oxidation of hyd rocarbons in the atmosphere
is a complicated matter and very uncertain. It is
initiated by reaction with OH· or 0 3 , but further
oxidation steps depend on the prevailing concentra-
tions of NO and on reactions that involve aerosol
particles and hydrometeors; these are very difficult
to quantify. As the simplest example, we discuss
CH 4 oxidation in Appendix 8.2.
Nitrogen compounds
Anthropogenic nitrogen-containing gases are prin-
cipally the oxides of nitrogen produced by high-
temperature combustion [Figure 8.11, flux (0:)]. NO
and N02 , the so-called NOx gases, play important
roles in atmospheric chemistry, mostly through
catalytic reactions (Appendix 8.3). NO is an efficient
reducer of peroxyl radicals (HO;; RO;). The reduc-
tion reactions regenerate the highly reactive alkoxy
radicals (OH·, ROO) which propagate many
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Insoluble core Aqueous solution
Figure 8.10 Possible structure of an
aged atmospheric aerosol particle.
Organic surface
layer (may be
incomplete)
Polar part
of organic
molecule
~
,----7 -<~11 \~
Nonpolar part
of organic
molecule
atmospheric reaction sequences. The most impor-
tant role of N02 in atmospheric chemistry is the
absorption of solar ultraviolet radiation, which is
followed by N02 dissociation and subsequent 0 3
production. Net 0 3 production takes place during
hydrocarbon and CO oxidation if sufficient NO is
present. However, at low NO concentrations « 10
p.p.t.v. at ground level) oxidation of CO leads to
0 3 loss. Anthropogenic NOx emissions are probably
at least as large as natural NOx production. Because
of the short lifetime of NOx (only a few days), 0 3
production is especially expected at mid-latitudes
/
/
/
Figure 8.11 Atmospheric nitrogen compounds: principal species and chemical and physical pathways.
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in the northern hemisphere. Most likely this
explains the large growth in 0 3 concentrations over
the entire troposphere observed at some European
stations [10, 11]. The observed global increase in
CH 4 may also have played an important role in this
(see Appendix 8.2).
The catalysts NO and N02are removed from the
atmosphere by the formation of nitric acid (H:--l03 )
through gas-phase reactions or reactions that
involve the deposition of nitrogen trioxide (N03 )
and nitrogen pentoxide (N 20,,) on wetted aerosol
particles or cloud droplets [Figure 8.11, (3,4A)].
The dry deposition of N02 on vegetation [Figun
8.11, (7A)] is also of great importance in the NO,
budget [16]. As a result, transport of NO, from the
troposphere does not occur to any significant
degree. Lightning is the most important natural
source of NO; the amount produced by this source
is still very uncertain. Owing to its short atmospheric
lifetime, background levels of NO, in the tropo-
sphere are often determined by lightning
frequency, which strongly peaks over the tropical
continents. Unfortunately, NO, observations are
still very scarce, especially in the tropics.
Nitric acid is soluble in water droplets [Figure
8.11, (2B)], in which form it greatly contributes to
precipitation acidity and, to some extent at least, to
corrosion near industrial areas. It is also an impor-
tant source of fixed nitrogen for the biosphere. The
organic nitrates, commonly found on aerosol parti-
cles, include potent lacrimating agents and
mutagenic compounds. Anthropogenic nitrogen
compounds are thus sources of compounds impli-
cated in biospheric productivity on the one hand
and photochemical oxidant formation, acid precipi-
tation, public health risks, and materials degrada-
tion on the other.
Biogenic emissions of reactive nitrogen [Figure
8.11, flux (y)] consist largely of ammonia (NH 3 ),
although soils also emit significant quantities of NO.
Even in the case of NH3 , anthropogenic influences
are substantial as a result of coal burning and animal
husbandry. N H 3 emissions to the free troposphere
are weak from soils covered with vegetation, so that
most emission probably occurs in the warm early
spring, before new vegetation has emerged. NH3
is the only common gas potentially capable of partly
neutralizing the acid gases. It dissolves readily in
water droplets and is efficiently sorbed by wetted
surfaces. A minor fraction (about 10%) reacts with
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OH' in the gas phase and its oxidation may lead to
production or destruction of NO" depending on
uncertain reaction paths and the prevailing con-
centrations of NO..
Sulfur compounds
The atmospheric sulfur cycle [17] is presented in
Figure 8.12. A major, though not adequately quan-
tified, portion of atmospheric sulfur compounds is
emitted by natural biological processes [flux (y),
Figure 8. 7, and Figure 8.12]. These compounds tend
to contain sulfur in a reduced valence state, prin-
cipally hydrogen sulfide (H2S) from land and
dimethyl sulfide (CH 3SCH3 ) from marine sources.
In the atmosphere, photochemical oxidation reac-
tions paralleling those of the carbon compounds
produce sulfur dioxide (S02) and various other
products [Figure 8.12, (3) and Appendix 8.4].
Alternatively, the reduced sulfur gases may be
deposited on surfaces [Figure 8.12, (5B)]. These
gases are a major cause of corrosion and degrada-
tion for many metals and alloys [18]. Although
carbonyl sulfide (COS) is emitted at relatively low
rates from a variety of sources, it is removed very
slowly by atmospheric processes, so on a global basis
it is the most abundant atmospheric sulfur gas.
Global sources and sinks of COS have been esti-
mated by Khalil and Rasmussen [19]. A substantial
anthropogenic influence is possible, although there
are large uncertain aspects'about the natural sources
of COS.
The primary anthropogenic source of S02 is the
combustion of sulfur-containing fossil fuels [flux
(0:'), Figure 8.12]. In large industrial regions, input
from this normally exceeds that of natural sources
by a large amount. There are three fates for S02,
all of them important. The first is deposition on
surfaces [Figure 8.12, (SA)], especially on soils, vege-
tation, and waters, but also on construction
materials, a process thought to be primarily respon-
sible for the deterioration of masonry and statuary
[20]. The second is the formation of sulfate aerosol
following atmospheric oxidation to sulfuric acid
[Figure 8.12, (4)]. This aerosol is a major factor in
limiting visibility in the atmosphere [21]. The third
is the absorption and oxidation of S02 in cloud
water [Figure 8.12, (2)], which, together with direct
sulfuric acid aerosol incorporation, constitutes a
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Figure 8.12 Atmospheric sulfur compounds: the principal species and chemical and physical pathways.
primary factor in determining the acidification of
precipitation. These fast photochemical reactions
and rainfall in the troposphere prohibit the trans-
port of all sulfur gases, except COS, to the strato-
sphere. The photochemical conversion of COS into
S02 and H 2S04 explains the persistence of the
stratospheric sulfate layer, even during periods with
no eruptive volcanic activity [22]. In the tropo-
sphere, cloud water evaporation is also a source of
sulfate aerosol [Figure 8.12, (6)].
Halogen compounds
The principal components of the atmospheric
chlorine cycle are shown in Figure 8.13. (Concentra-
tions of compounds containing halogens other than
chlorine are much smaller in the lower atmosphere
and are not considered in detail in this chapter.)
Methyl chloride (CH 3Cl) is emitted primarily from
the ocean, but also from biomass burning [flux ()')
Figure 8.13J; it is destroyed in the atmosphere by
reaction with OH' and yields HCI through a
sequence of atmospheric chemical reactions [Figure
8.13, (3)]. CH 3 C1 is the main natural source of
chlorine in the stratosphere. In addition, and today
more importantly, chlorofluorocarbons (:CL"
CFCI3 , CF2CI2, CH 3CCl 3 , etc.) are emitted from
anthropogenic sou rces [flux (0: 1)' Figure 8.13] and
reach the stratosphere in increasing amounts
[Figure 8.13, (l A)]. There they are photochemically
transformed into active chlorine compounds which
attack 0 3 catalytically. Final removal of these
compounds is through a return flow of HCl to
the troposphere [Figure 8.13, (lB)], followed by
rainfall.
Two other tropospheric sources of HCl are much
larger than those already mentioned. One is direct
emissions from coal-burning power plants [flux (0:2),
Figure 8.13]. The second is volatilization from sea-
salt aerosol, influenced by the uptake of H 2S04 or
HN03 from the atmosphere [Figure 8.13, (8)].
These sources are difficult to study, so the tropo-
spheric sources and sinks of HCl are not well estab-
lished.
HCI is very soluble in water, a property that is
reflected by the high concentration of chloride ion
commonly found in rain. This high solubility pre-
vents tropospheric HCI from reaching the strato-
sphere. The deposition of atmospheric chlorine,
whether in water drops [Figure 8.13, (9)], aerosol
particles [Figure 8.13, (7)], or the gas phase [Figure
8.13, (5)], is also of interest since many metals and
alloys are susceptible to chlorine corrosion [23].
230 Sustainable development of the biosphere
Figure 8.13 Atmospheric halogen compounds: principal species and chemical and physical pathways.
Chemistry in atmospheric water
droplets
The study of chemical reactions in cloud and fog
droplets and in raindrops is in its infancy. At present
it appears that we can identify some of the major
products of these reactions, but the reaction paths
that link the products to their precursors are very
little known [24].
A central concern in aqueous atmospheric
chemistry is the fate of H 2S04 and HNOs. In solu-
tion, each acid is in equilibrium with its ions (see
Appendix 8.5) and the acids are referred to as
"strong" because the equilibria strongly favor the
ionic forms. The generation of the acids in solution
must involve oxidizing species. Hydrogen peroxide
(H 20 2), with an aqueous-phase concentration of a
few micromoles/liter, appears to have a central
chemical role: it serves both as an oxidant and as a
source of solution OHo when it is photolyzed. Os
dissolved in water is also a source of OHo and is
probably a significant radical source when H~O~
concentrations are low.
The initial acidity of atmospheric water droplets
is established by the equilibrium between gaseous
CO2 and solution bicarbonate ions (HC03)· Except
for this function, the presence of the bicarbonate
ion does not appear to affect solution chemistry in
any significant way. Among other common trace
components are the chloride salts. They are rela-
tively unreactive and thus chloride's greatest
influence is likely to be as an electrolyte, that is, as
a contributor to the overall ionic strength of the
solution.
NH s (and the ammonium ion, NH;) and HNOs
(and the nitrate ion, N03") are the most important
inorganic nitrogen compounds in atmospheric
water droplets. Ammonia is the principal species
that neutralizes the strong acid anions, as evidenced
by the large concentrations of ammonium salts
found in aerosols. This leads to a lowering of the
proton concentrations (acidity) of rainfall.
Sulfur compounds are important constituents of
atmospheric aqueous solutions. The most abundant
are the sulfates, including H 2S04, hydrogen
ammonium sulfate (NH 4HS04), and ammonium
sulfate [(NH4hS04]. However, S02 is soluble in
water and chemically active. Its principal reactions
(in the customary bisulfite form, HS03") are prob-
ably with H 20 2 and 0 3 ,
Transition metals are not abundant atmospheric
species, but their ability to function as catalysts in
the oxidation of S02 to give H 2S04 makes them
potentially important [25]. As shown in Figure 8.14,
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Figure 8.14 Atmospheric transition
metal compounds: principal species
and chemical and physical pathways.
they enter the atmosphere in particulate form, gen-
erally through emissions from smelters or coal-
combustion plants [flux (13), Figure 8.14]. In the
latter case, at least, they tend to concentrate at the
particle surfaces [26], so that their effects may be
much more significant than their concentrations
would indicate. The role of soot particles in S02
oxidation reactions is also potentially important
[25], but the mechanism and magnitude of the effect
are still not well-enough known.
Oxidized organic compounds may be important
participants in atmospheric solution chemistry, but
have thus far received relatively little study. What
research has been done indicates that organic acids
are common. Organic hydroperoxides (ROOH) are
readily formed in the gas phase, and may be precur-
sors for acids. Precursors likely to be more impor-
tant are the aldehydes (RCHO), which are hydro-
lyzed in solution to the glycol form [RCH(OHh]'
Oxidation of these precu rsors gives the organic
acids, but the precise mechanisms need to be
defined.
In solution, the organic acids [RC(O)OH] are only
partly ionized and are thereby termed "weak".
Nonetheless, organic acids can be the major acid
constituent of atmospheric water droplets if the
precursors of the strong inorganic acids are present
only at very low concentrations. Such conditions
may exist in the more remote parts of the Earth
that are biologically highly productive, such as
tropical rain-forest atmospheres [27].
Present knowledge does not enable us to say
definitively whether incorporation from the gas
phase or solution oxidation is the most important
for generation of the acids found in clouds and
rain. It is likely that both processes operate in all
situations, one dominating the other under differ-
ent conditions. Current evidence suggests that solu-
tion reactions are often important for the formation
of H 2S04 [25] and less important for HNOs [28].
However, during the nighttime hours NOs and
N20 s are formed in the gas phase, because NOs is
not photolyzed by solar radiation; their uptake by
water droplets and wet aerosol surfaces leads to
the formation of nitric acid. Unfortunately, the
organic acids have been too little studied for a
dominant mechanism to be specified. We repeat
that the primary emitted NOx and hydrocarbon
gases have low water solubilities, so that oxidation
reactions in the atmosphere must occur before most
aqueous-phase chemical reactions become
operative.
Principal sources of atmospheric
trace species
Oceans and estuaries
The marine waters are significant contributors of
chemical species strongly involved in important
atmospheric chemical processes. In most cases,
species emission arises as a consequence of biological
processes, such as for N20, which is a biological
nitrification and denitrification product. The
largest fluxes are from coastal waters and estuaries
232
or from oceanic regimes of high productivity, which
are generally found in upwelling regions. Various
processes on land also contribute significantly to
atmospheric N 20. Estimates of the global source
strength are discussed by Crutzen [29] and are
reproduced in Table 8.1 and Figure 8.6. Reduced
sulfur gases are also emitted from the marine
environment as by-products of biological activity.
The oceanic and estuarine flux of H 2S appears
small, but that of CH 3SCH 3 is substantial [30, 31].
Large emissions of chlorine from the ocean occur
due to the generation of sea-salt 'particles by break-
ing waves; Blanchard and Woodcock [32] summa-
rized the various flux estimates. HCl is thought to
be volatilized as a consequence of the uptake of
H 2S04 and HN03 by sea-salt aerosols, but no flux
estimates appear to have been made.
Biological activity plays an important role in the
production of various halogen organic compounds.
For example, the biological formation of CH3Cl
provided the main source of chlorine to the strato-
sphere prior to the synthesis of CCI4 , CFCI3 , and
CF2Cl 3 by man. The oceans also playa very impor-
tant role in the biogeochemical cycling of CO2 (as
reviewed by McElroy, Chapter 7, this volume).
Vegetation
Vegetation is a source of many organic compounds,
as is immediately obvious when we recall the diver-
sity of floral scents. As with other atmospheric
species, the vegetative emissions are subject to reac-
tion and transformation in the atmosphere.
Although the ultimate product of the oxidation
reactions is CO2 , a large number of intermediate
products play an important role in atmospheric
photochemistry. These compounds, including CO,
aldehydes, ketones, organic peroxides, and various
carboxylic acids, may occur in the gaseous or liquid
phase. Formic and acetic acids have been detected
in precipitation in unpolluted regions [27]. If
anthropogenic NO x is present, gas-phase photo-
chemical oxidant formation is possible. The poten-
tial role of terpenes in aerosol formation and visibil-
ity deterioration has recently been reassessed.
Contrary to previous belief, Altshuller [33] claims
that the terpenes play only a minor role, but the
more recent studies of Hooker et al. [34] emphasize
the opposite.
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Forests are a very large reservoir for carbon and
one effect of forest harvest is to release CO2 to the
atmosphere. Woodwell et al. [35] proposed that
forest clearance in the tropics could be a net source
of CO2 to the atmosphere larger than that arising
from fossil fuel burning. This viewpoint was
strongly contested, especially by Broecker et al. [36],
because measurements had shown that the oceanic
uptake rate could not be larger than about 2 x
1015g C, which is about 40% of the carbon released
by fossil fuel combustion. Additional studies
[37,38] now put the carbon release from tropical
forest clearance in the range 1-3 x 1015g C/yr. This
release rate to the atmosphere may be at least par-
tially balanced by reforestation in other parts of the
world and by production of decay-resistant charcoal
from biomass burning in tropical savannas [37]. The
most recent study on this issue is that of Goudriaan
and Ketner [39], but the issue is far from settled.
Remote sensing from satellites will give important
information in the future. Historical _analyses of
land-use changes may also prove extremely useful,
as indicated by Richards (Chapter 2, this volume).
Estimates of CO2 release from soils and forest cut-
ting are important for the interpretation of the
observed CO2 increase in the atmosphere over the
past century and for extrapolation of the increases
expected because of increased fossil fuel burning.
For more thorough discussions see Clark [40],
McElroy (Chapter 7, this volume), and Liss and
Crane [41].
The animals
The animal kingdom [42] is a source of several
atmospheric trace gases, but apparently not a large
source. CH 4 is produced by enteric fermentation
in ruminants and by the digestion of wood by ter-
mites [29]; although difficult to quantify, these
fluxes from the animal kingdom are probably small
compared with other CH 4 sources. Animals also
produce N H 3 as a volatile product of excrement, a
source that may be relatively important [43]. Esti-
mates of the relative role of animals in the produc-
tion of CH 4 and NH3 are given in Table 8.1, which
shows the substantial role of domestic ruminants in
CH4 production, but a lesser one with regard to
NH 3 . The tendency for these animals to
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gathered together in feedlots and pastu res can cause
substantial local impacts.
The number and mass of wild animals on Earth
has almost certainly decreased because of the steady
expansion of human influence. The effects of this
decrease on emissions to the atmosphere of CH 4
and NH 3 are, however, overwhelmed by the growth
in domestic animal populations and by the concomi-
tant conversion of natural lands, especially forests,
into pasture and agricultural lands under highly
productive cultivation. The domestic animal popu-
lation is related to the human population, for which
the evolution since 1930 is shown in Figure 8.15.
For comparison, that for domestic animals is shown
in Figure 8.16.
Population {billionsl
"Less developed" countries
3
2
"More developed" countries
material, but has received relatively little study. In
the results of one extensive field investigation [45]
emission fluxes of CO2 , CO, NO." N20, CH 4 , and
soot are presented and related to the global budgets
of these species. Much more work is needed to
determine how representative these results may be.
Biomass burning may be natural, as in fires start-
ed by lightning, or it may be anthropogenic, as in
fires started to clear land for agriculture. The latter
is much more common, so the emissions from this
source are largely under human control. An ancil-
lary factor is the extensive efforts made over the
past half century to control natural forest fires. For
example, it is estimated [46J that the acreage burned
annually in the USA decreased by a factor of 10
between 1930 and 1980. More recently, foresters
in mid-latitude regions have recognized the
beneficial effects of natural fires on forests and have
tended to control fires only near populated areas.
The annual acreage burned has thus oscillated sig-
nificantly over the past few decades, but has almost
certainly decreased in the mid-latitude forest
regions. Conversely, the increasing population and
agricultural activity in the tropics suggest an
increase in biomass burning compared with past
times. Agricultural burning was very common dur-
ing the nineteenth century in Europe and North
America, during which period, and for the first
quarter of this century, it was the main source of
air pollution, in these regions at least. No integrated
worldwide historical assessments of biomass burn-
ing have been performed.
Crop production
Biomass burning
The combustion of biomass (trees, brush, vegeta-
tion, grasses, etc.) is a rich source of atmospheric
Figure 8.15 Populations of the developed and
developing world over the past half century. The
population figures and the division of countries into
the two categories are from the United Nations
Population Division [44].
o
1940 1960
Year
1980 Crop production involves changes in land use and
in soil chemistry. As such, it has the potential to
affect the atmosphere. Perhaps the greatest poten-
tial effect is on CO2 , which is released to the atmo-
sphere when soil organic matter is oxidized by tilling.
Until 30 years ago this effect was greater than that
due to the harvesting of forests [38] and was the
main cause of the CO2 increase in the atmosphere,
more important than fossil fuel combustion. It may
also have led to substantial emissions of N20, as
implied by studies in Florida [47J which show that
2.7% of the fixed nitrogen lost in drained, cultivated
soils in South Florida appeared as N20 (see Table
8.1).
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Figure 8.16 Estimated world popula-
tion of cattle over the past half
century.
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Paddy area harvested (1010 rn 2; yr)
Fertilization of cultivated land is a common prac-
tice and results in the emission of N20. Contrary
to early belief, this source of atmospheric N20 is
not the only one, but is one which may grow with
Figure 8.17 Estimated world area of paddy field
lands used for rice cultivation.
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increasing use of fertilizer nitrogen, especially due
to the nitrification of NH 3-containing fertilizer.
Certain crops, especially rice, grow under
anaerobic conditions, thus forming a variety of
reduced gases. CH 4 emission is of the greatest con-
cern because the flux is relatively large [29]. Not
only has the total area in rice production increased
over the past half centu ry (Figure 8.17), but multiple
cropping has increased the total yield per unit area .
As a consequence, rice production has contributed
significantly to the observed atmospheric increase
in CH 4 , an effect offset only slightly by the drainage
of wetlands. More measurements and historical
analyses are needed to better estimate these effects
(see Richards, Chapter 2, this volume).
Fossil fuel combustion
The combustion of petroleum in its various forms
is a very substantial source of atmospheric trace
gases, many of which are potentially detrimental.
The primary gaseous emission is CO2 , whose source
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flux has been estimated most recently by Rotty [48].
Incomplete combustion also produces CO, together
with a wide variety of hydrocarbon compounds.
Flux estimates have been given for CO by Seiler
[49] and Logan et at. [50] and for the non-CH 4
hydrocarbons by Duce [51]. The relative magni-
tudes of these emissions to those of biomass burning
and natural hydrocarbon emissions are shown in
Table B.1 and Figure B.5.
High-temperature combustion inevitably pro-
duces various oxides of nitrogen. NO and N02 are
highly active catalysts in most atmospheric chemical
chains, since they are involved in vital oxidizing
reactions that lead to 0 3 formation in the tropo-
sphere (see Appendix 8.2). Source strengths of NO x
have been estimated by several authors [50,52], and
the anthropogenic contributions are large (see Table
B.1). N20 is inert in the lower atmosphere, but
important in stratospheric chemistry since it releases
NO x after photochemical reactions [3]. This leads
to 0 3 loss above about 25 km in the stratosphere
and 0 3 gain below (see Appendix 8.6). The flux of
N20 from petroleum combustion is quite sig-
nificant.
The sulfur content of petroleum varies widely
and, as a result, so do the emissions of S02 which,
on a global basis, are important [30,53]. Regionally,
they dominate by far the natural emissions and are
a major component of acidic precipitation.
Petroleum burned in inefficient combustors is a
prolific producer of carbon soot, which is involved
in visibility degradation and in condensed-phase
atmospheric chemistry. Carbon soot may also
influence the Earth's radiation budget by absorption
of sunlight, especially during the early spring
period in the Arctic [54].
Coal combustion also results in large and diverse
emissions into the atmosphere. As with petroleum,
coal combustion is a major source of CO2, CO,
hydrocarbons, NO and N02, N20, S02, and soot.
In addition, coal combustion produces HCl [55] and
a variety of transition metals [56]. The importance
of coal combustion will almost certainly increase in
the future, because of the large reserves of coal;
CO2 and S02 emissions are of especial concern.
Industrial processes
The most diverse group of emissions into the atmo-
sphere is due to the wide variety of industrial
processes and subsequent uses of the products
where fuel combustion is not the primary source.
Three classes of emissions can be identified for
special attention. The first is the family of halocar-
bon propellants ("Freons") involved in strato-
spheric 0 3 depletion [57]. A second emission of
concern is S02, which is generally emitted in ore
smelting and a variety of other industrial processes
[53]. The third class is the transition metals, pro-
duced by a wide variety of materials-processing
industries, for which Nriagu [56] has made flux
estimates.
Manifestations of atmospheric
degradation
Modification of the stratosphere
The temperature structure and dynamic processes
in the stratosphere are, to a major degree, deter-
mined by the absorption of solar ultraviolet radi-
ation by 0 3. The total amount of 0 3 in the strato-
sphere is remarkably small; it is equivalent to the
number of air molecules contained in a 3 mm thick
layer in the lower atmosphere. The troposphere
contains only 10% of the atmospheric 03, so most
0 3 is located in the stratosphere (i.e., between 10
and 50 km). Atmospheric 0 3also plays an important
ecological role, since it filters out most ultraviolet
solar radiation between about 210 and 310 nm.
However, penetration of ultraviolet radiation to
ground level starts at wavelengths of about 300 nm
and increases by orders of magnitude up to 320 nm.
It is this radiation that may be biologically harmful:
its intensity at the ground is strongly enhanced by
reduction of the 0 3 column. It has been estimated
that a 1% reduction in total 0 3 would produce a
2-4% increase in biological effects. The effects on
the biosphere have been reviewed [58], but great
uncertainties exist, especially on the ecosystems
level. As we have already noted, the penetration of
ultraviolet radiation at wavelengths near 310 nm to
the troposphere leads to the production of OH·,
which initiates most oxidation processes in the
atmosphere, producing compounds that are
effectively removed from the troposphere. Changes
in the stratospheric 0 3column, therefore, also affect
tropospheric photochemistry.
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Stratospheric 0 3 may be particularly affected by
compounds that are relatively inert in the tropo-
sphere. These compounds (e.g., N 20 and several
chlorocarbon gases, such as natural CH3Cl and
industrially produced CFCI3 , CF2C12' CCI4 , and
CH3CCI3 ) have low solubilities in water, slow pho-
tolysis rates, and slow reaction rates with OH·.
Stratospheric chemistry is also influenced by the
direct injection of material into the upper tropo-
sphere and stratosphere by thunderstorms, volcan-
ic eruptions, solar proton events, auroral activity,
meteoritic impacts, nuclear weapons testing, and
emissions from jet aircraft. The solar proton event
of August 1972 led to large depletions of 0 3 in the
middle stratosphere at high latitudes, which was
observed by satellite instruments [59]. There are
strong indications that the recent eruption of the
EI Chichon volcano in Mexico caused global 0 3
depletions of several percent [60], perhaps as a
result of HCl injection.
The chemistry of the stratosphere is complex (see
Appendix 8.6) and the effects on 0 3 concentration
of different emitted species are difficult to predict
and to monitor. It now appears that the major
causative species are the chlorofluorocarbons used
as propellants and refrigerants. N20, produced
largely from natural sources, is also important in
these processes.
The predicted severity of these effects has varied
substantially as computer models of the atmosphere
have been refined, new transformation reactions
have been discovered, and better rate constants
have become available. Current predictions of total
0 3 depletions at the contaminant input rates of 1978
are about 4%. If other factors, such as CH 4 and
CO2 increases, are also taken into account, predic-
ted total 0 3 depletions become even smaller and a
total 0:1 increase seems possible. This could have
undesired climatic implications, as a large loss of
0 3 above 30 km is compensated for by an 0 3
increase at lower altitudes, enabling the lower
stratosphere to receive more solar heating and to
more efficiently trap outgoing heat radiation. Also,
0 3 depletions may become especially large if the
halocarbon release rates increase so much that
chlorine mixing ratios in the stratosphere become
of the order of 20 p.p.b.v., which requires only
about twice the present manufacturing rates [61].
The chemical and thermal stability of the strato-
sphere remains, therefore, an issue of continuing
and serious concern.
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Modification of the atmospheric
radiation balance
The interaction of radiation and climate is discussed
in detail by Dickinson (Chapter 9, this volume). We
mention it here in passing because of increasing
evidence that atmospheric trace gases play impor-
tant roles in establishing the radiation budget. The
most important of these gases are H 20 and CO2 .
0:\ is an important absorber, especially in the upper
troposphere and stratosphere, while significant
effects are also caused by CFCI3 , CF2CI2, N 20, and
CH4 . The concentrations of these four gases are all
increasing in the Earth's atmosphere because of
anthropogenic activities, and the same is probably
true of tropospheric 0:\. Their combined heating
effect on the Earth's surface approaches that of CO2
[5,40].
Soot produced by inefficient combustion is
another potential cause of radiative modification,
because it absorbs solar radiation efficiently; the
magnitude of its effect has not yet been adequately
assessed. Currently, its impact has been especially
considered with respect to the observed pollution
of the Arctic atmosphere in the spring season [62].
The expanding industrialization of the northern
USSR may have a substantial effect in the future.
The importance of soot for the atmospheric radi-
ation balance has been considered dramatically in
connection with several recent studies on the cli-
matic and ecological effects of a large nuclear war,
because in such an event huge quantities of black
smoke would be produced from fires in industrial
and urban centers [63]. These studies indicate the
possibility of substantial alterations of global
meteorological conditions, with continental surface
temperatures dropping far below 0 °C even during
the summer.
Photochemical oxidant formation
Smog (a combination of smoke and fog) is an undesir-
able mixture of atmospheric trace species produced
in sunlight by high fluxes of anthropogenic
emissions. The severity of smog is most often judged
by the ground-level concentration of 0:1, As already
noted, 0.\ is produced by reactions involving hydro-
carbons and oxides of nitrogen. The chemical pro-
cesses undergone by these precursors are the result
of a complex interplay of the mixture of reactive
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compounds, time of day, season, and meteorologi-
cal conditions.
The trace species (the "photochemical oxidants"),
of which 0:\ is the main representative, also include
peroxides, organic nitrates, aldehydes, and a variety
of other compounds. They are frequently impli-
cated in damage to crops [64], eye irritation [65],
decreased lung function [66], and the degradation
of works of art [67]. Amelioration of smog by regu-
latory measures is complicated by the simultaneous
involvement of many chemical compounds. Regula-
tions may not be universally advisable, though
measures leading to reductions in automotive
emissions are likely to be of substantial benefit.
The appearance of photochemical smog is now
a rather common, regional-scale phenomenon in
many parts of the world, such as Southern Califor-
nia, Western Europe, Mexico City, and Sydney. The
widespread damage to, in 1984, about half of the
German forest trees (an increase from one third in
1983) may be due to the impact of photochemical
oxidants, in combination with a wide range of phys-
iological factors [68]. If this suspicion is confirmed,
the critical role of tropospheric 0 3 in the environ-
ment will be even more strongly emphasized.
Acidic precipitation
The presence of the strong inorganic acids H 2S04
and HNO:J in precipitation is widely recognized as
detrimental, although the effects of acidic precipita-
tion on lake and forest ecosystems, statuary, etc.,
are still subjects of active debate. Deleterious effects
on fish populations in Scandinavian and North
American lakes seem clearly related to an increased
acidity of rainfall [69], but it has proved difficult to
relate forest damage to acid precipitation. In fact,
forest damage seems to be especially pronounced
in central Europe, a region whose alkaline soils
could be expected to provide an effective buffer to
acidic precipitation. This suggests that the damage
results from changes in concentrations of photo-
chemical oxidants (see above) rather than from
changes in the chemistry of precipitation.
The deposition of H 2S04 and HN03 is due
largely to S02 and NO, emissions by industrial
processes and automotive transport. Transbound-
ary transport often occurs, leading to inter-
national, scientific. and legal disputes. A case study
of sulfur transport by a group of Swedish scientists
was undertaken for the United Nations conference
on the human environment, held in Stockholm in
1972 [70]. Recent regulatory actions in the FRG
have concentrated on a reduction of NO, emissions
from motor vehicles with the aim of diminishing
photochemical ovidant formation. There is no cer-
tainty that the proposed measures will rapidly pro-
duce the desired results, since the cause and effect
relationships are not convincingly clear. Drastic
reductions in all emissions from fossil fuel combus-
tion by all nations are probably needed to prevent
major ecological effects.
Visibility degradation
Visibility in the atmosphere decreases when solar
radiation in the visible band (about 0.3-0.7 fLm) is
scattered by particles or gases. The most efficient
scattering particles have sizes similar to those of
visible light. Particles in this size range have an
atmospheric lifetime of tens of days, since the parti-
cles are too large for efficient agglomeration and
too small for rapid gravitational settling and precipi-
tation scavenging. As shown in Figure 8.18, the
reduction in visibility may be quite severe. In the
past few years it has become clear that sulfate aerosol
particles are the predominant scatterers, at least in
regions near or downwind of industrialized areas
[71]. The graphitic soot generated b"j incomplete
combustion also has a significant influence [72]. In
urban areas with large emissions gaseous N02 can
also contribute to visibility degradation. Naturally
emitted hydrocarbons from vegetation, especially
terpenes, were regarded for many years as likely
visibility inhibitors [73], but from recent research
appear to be less important on a continental scale
than the sulfate and soot aerosol particles [33].
Combustion of fossil fuels in power plants is a
major source of light-scattering particles. Another
energy source that has recently become more widely
used than previously, especially in North America,
is wood for home heating. Wood burning is gen-
erally rather inefficient and produces relatively
large fluxes of small particles. Visibility degradation
due to agricultural biomass burning is common and
severe during the dry season in the tropical savanna
regions of the world. It has been estimated [45] that
3-5 x 10 15 g of biomass are now burned annually,
mostly in the tropics, releasing about 2 x 10 14 g of
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Figure 8.18 (a) New York City with
good visibility. The buildings in the
foreground are the towers of the
World Trade Center during construc-
tion (bl New York City with visibility
impaired by high levels of atmo-
spheric particulate matter.
smoke. This practice was previously also very com-
mon at temperate latitudes and is still an important
contribution to visibility deterioration in Southern
Europe.
Atmospheric corrosion of materials
The corrosion of materials exposed to the atmo-
sphere, both indoors and out, is a problem of truly
massive proportions. The cost to society in the USA
alone was estimated in 1975 at over $70 billion per
year [74]. The most common problems include the
chloridiza tion and sulfidization of iron and its alloys,
the chloridization of aluminum, the sulfidization of
copper (Figure 8.19) and its alloys, and the sulfidi-
zation of marble and masonry. The active agents
include the reduced sulfur gases (principally H 2S
and CHsSCHs, and perhaps also COS), S02, HCl,
and the sea-salt aerosol.
The processes of materials degradation that
involve atmospheric trace gases remain obscure,
despite extensive research. It is apparent that water
is needed if corrosion is to proceed vigorously [23],
which implies that electrochemical cells may be set
up on the surface of the corroding matuial [75].
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Figure 8.79 Detail of torch of the
Statue of Liberty, New York Harbor
(reproduced with permission of
Statue of Liberty-Ellis Island Founda-
tion, Inc.).
The corrosive agent may be delivered to the
corroding surface in either of two ways [76]: as a
gas (e.g., S02) or as a component of precipitation
(e.g., SO~- ion), but examination of the corroded
material does not enable us to distinguish between
the two.
Unlike most other effects of atmospheric trace
species, in many regions corrosion is due in large
part to natural processes. Within heavily populated
or industrialized areas, containing most capital
investments and monuments of art, anthropogenic
emissions may be the most important. A synergism
which makes quantitative assessment difficult is the
recent discovery that 0 3 and solar radiation
together can enhance atmospheric corrosion pro-
cesses [77]. Much work remains to be done to deter-
mine the details of these interactions. For the
moment, it may be most expedient to devise protec-
tive techniques for the materials rather than to
attempt to control the atmospheric concentrations
of species involved in corrosion.
Discussion
Atmospheric chemistry has been a recognized
speciality for only a few decades, a very short time
by comparison with many other scientific fields. It
is also complex and interdisciplinary, combining
meteorology and the physics of fluid flow and radi-
ation with a chemical inventory known to contain
more than 2000 distinct compounds [78]. As a
result, discoveries of compounds not previously
known to be present in the atmosphere, or of their
unexpected effects, have been frequent. However,
it now appears likely that the most important atmo-
spheric species and their impacts have been deter-
mined. Source strengths are much less well known
and in many cases atmospheric distributions of gases
and particles are almost totally unstudied, especially
in the tropical and marine environments.
Although our information is admittedly fragmen-
tary in some cases, it is useful to present our best
com parative assessments of atmospheric sou rces
and impacts. In Figure 8.20 the rows represent the
principal sources of atmospheric trace species and
the columns the major consequences of emissions.
The top two sources are totally natural, the middle
two have both natural and anthropogenic com-
ponents, and the bottom three are totally
anthropogenic. At each point in the figure where
any source contribution exists, we indicate both the
relative magnitude of the consequences produced
by emissions from that source and the reliability of
the magnitude assessment. (The assessments are
made for 1985; prospective and retrospective
assessments would also be valuable, but are beyond
the scope of the present chapter.) Figure 8.20 shows
that the sources of most general concern, as indi-
cated by their impact ratings, are almost wholly
anthropogenic in nature: fossil fuel combustion,
biomass combustion, and industrial processes.
Emissions from crop production, especially CH 4
from rice paddies, and from estuaries near heavily
populated areas may have future impacts. Some
sources (the animal kingdom and vegetation) have
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sufficiently small effects on atmospheric processes
that they need not cause much concern, even if
their emissions should increase.
Figure 8.20 also suggests areas in \vhich useful
interdisciplinary studies could be performed. These
are areas that have significant potential impor-
tance, but whose assessment reliability is low to
moderate. The tlVO best candidates for SUdl studies
are biomass burning (thought to have a great signifi-
cance for tropical photochemistry, the atmospheric
radiation balance, and visibility) and vegetative
emissions (potentially linked to photochemical oxi-
dant formation, the radiation balance, and precipi-
t<ttion acidity).
A cause of COil -Tn alllong those who are inter-
ested in the atmospheric ciences, but are not
specialists in them, has been the "phenomenon of
the month": the frequent appearance of new effects
or compounds of concern. Although it is possible
that other major emission sources or new processes
will be identified, it seems more likely that increased
knowledge of the intricacies of the chemistry or of
projected changes in emission rates \\'ill change our
understanding about the relative importance of the
causative species. The way in which this may happen
is illustrated in Figure 8.21, in which the effect
produced by a species is related to its emission flux,
to its rat' of transformation intci an ther species,
and tn the deg-ree of certainty with \vhich the effect
is prediclcrl. The flux assessments are related to
type and degree of anthropogenic acti\ity and to
the technology im·oked. sl!ally assumptions must
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Figure 8.21 Assessment of an
atmospheric effect resulting from
anthropogenic emissions of two
causative species: cP is the emission
flux and T the transformation rate.
be made, particularly if one is attempting to visual-
ize a few decades into the future. Estimates of trans-
formation rates depend on the degree to which the
atmospheric chemical processes are understood,
and evolve in proportion to the intensilY of the
research effort and the extent (0 which new
chemical n __ glmes are considered. Gas-phase
chemistry was not comprehensible until the impor-
tance of OH' was recognized in 1971. A similar
educati\'e process now appears to be happening for
photochemistry in water droplets. The chemistry
and physics of atmospheric aerosol particles are not
,"veil understood, and may involve crucial species
and processes as yet unidentified.
Finally, estimates of effects are difficult to make
even when trends are known, since the interlocking
global processes are so difficult to comprehend. It
seems likely that the present major uncertainties
have to do not with the atmosphere as a separate
regime, but with the processes that link the atmo-
sphere to the biological and non biological systems
on the Earth's surface.
As can be seen from Figure 8.20, the cliversity in
the primary anthropogenic sources of causative
species is surprisingly small, fossil and biofuel com-
bustion and industrial processes being dominant.
There i::. enough nidence to state thal ;:, significant
decrease in the rafl' of fussil fuellumbusti',n would
stabilize the atmospheric radiation balance, improve
\'isibility, hinder moer formation, and minimize
acidic precipitation and its effecls. Stratospheric
modification IS best constrained by devising
alternatives to the use of chloroAuorocarhons as
propellants and refrigerants. The involvement of
transition metal chemistry in droplets and aerosol
particles is not yet understood, but better control
of their emission from combustion and smelting
operations may be desirable to alleviate acidic depo-
sition problems. The problem of corrosion would
have to be handled differently since natural sources
are responsible for a large portion of the corrosive
agents. It might thus be most effective to reduc-.'
corrosion by improved selection and treatment
of materials rather than by control of emission
sources.
Many of the thoughts expressed in this chapter
are not sufficiently quantified and tested by atmo-
spheric observations, especially in the important
tropical regions. It seems useful, therefore, to finish
with a list of recommendations for future research
in atmospheric chemistry:
(1) Many of the analytical techniques in atmo-
spheric chemistry are highly sophisticated and
require the measurement of very low concentra-
tions of highly reactive species. To obtain
reliable clata these techniques need to be verifIed
ancl compared. International programs fulfill a
very important function here by supporting
technology tran.;f;,;r and cross-calibration
experiments [79].
(2) The source- of atmospheric constituents result-
ing from biological proces 'cs ancl related
activities (e.g., biomass burning) must be better
quantified. Biological sources should not be
treated a "I)lack boxes"; it is cssclllial that the
,
I'
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processes responsible for these emissions be
studied so that we can make the step from a
descriptive to a predictive understanding.
Studies are especially important in the tropical
regions, since current evidence suggests that
large biological emissions occur in these
regions.
(3) The fate of trace species injected into the atmo-
sphere should continue to be investigated. The
loss processes include both chemical transfor-
mations in the atmosphere and the physical
processes of transport (especially long-range
transport) and of scavenging and deposition.
Attention must be paid both to homogeneous
(gas-phase) processes and to heterogeneous
processes that involve the interaction of gases,
particles, and cloud droplets.
(4) Models are essential in helping us to understand
complex interactive systems like the chemical
processes in the Earth's atmosphere. We have
to develop models that attempt to represent
the entire physical and chemical system that
regulates the composition of the atmosphere,
comparable to the general circulation models
used in meteorology. Submodels, e.g., those that
describe photochemical reactions in the tropo-
sphere, need to be developed or refined. It is
essential that field experiments be devised to
provide critical tests of these models and that a
continuous exchange of information between
model development and critical experiments be
maintained.
(5) In order to understand global change, we need
to investigate the historical record of atmo-
spheric composition preserved in ice cores, tree
rings, and other media, and to establish
measurement programs to document current
changes in the atmospheric concentrations of
key substances. The explanation of the records
requires the involvement of environmental his-
torians. Richards (Chapter 2, this volume) has
given ample evidence of man's role in changing
the world's ecosystems, a role that has altered
the sources of several important atmospheric
species, such as CO2 , CH 4 , and N20.
(6) Studies of the impacts of changing atmospheric
chemistry on the biosphere are of vital impor-
tance. Problems like the complicated interac-
tions that lead to the dramatic forest losses in
central Europe can only be solved by such
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collaboration. Major breakthroughs in under-
standing cannot be predicted and various
research approaches should be attempted.
Atmospheric chemistry is clearly an international
and strongly interdisciplinary science with substan-
tial economic and political importance, and a science
that deals with an essential common resource for
humanity. As a recent branch of the atmospheric
sciences, its foundations are still being built. Many
questions need to be answered by long-term, dedi-
cated research. A major, international, collaborative
program in global tropospheric chemistry has
recently been proposed by a panel of the US
National Academy of Sciences [79]. The Inter-
national Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) has
taken the initiative for an even broader interdisci-
plinary program on biogeochemical cycles [80]. It
is our hope that programs such as these will con-
tribute not only to a much better understanding of
the interactions between humankind and our world,
but also to greater understanding and collaboration
among nations.
Appendixes:
Atmospheric reaction
sequences
Appendix 8.1. Tropospheric oxidizers
The principal oxidizing species in the lower atmosphere
are 0 3 and OH·. The former is produced in the tropo-
sphere by a reaction sequence initiated by the peroxyl
radical oxidation of NO:
continued by the photolysis of N02 :
(A <420 nm)
and concluded by
The role of atmospheric chemistry in environment-development interactions 243
With little NO present, CH. oxidation may follow the
pathway:
CH 4 +OH' -+ CHj+ H 20
0 3 is, however, also transported downward from the
stratosphere where it is formed through dissociation of
molecular O 2 (see Figure 8.3 and Appendix 8.6). The
contributions from in-situ tropospheric Og formation and
stl-atospheric transport may be comparable, but much
uncertainty exists [29]. Tropospheric destruction of 0 3
also occurs and this constitutes the primary source of OH'
[81 ]:
('\''S3l0nm)
M
CHj + O 2-+ CHgO;
CHgO; + HO; -+ CH 30 2 H + O2
hv
CH30 2 H -+ CH 30' + OH'
CH gO'+02-+ HCHO+HO;
(A < 350 nm)
The HO; radicals give OH' by disproportionation and
photodissociation of the resultant H20 2:
A second OH' source is oxygenated organic compounds.
HCHO, the simplest example, photolyzes to produce
hydroperoxyl radicals (HO;):
CH 30; + HO; -+ CHg0 2H + O 2
CH 30 2H +OH' -+ CHgO;+ H20
However, the photolysis of methyl hydroperoxide
(CH 30 2 H) is slow, resulting in a residence time of one
week. Thus CHg0 2 H may be rained out of the atmo-
sphere or react with the Earth's surface or aerosol parti-
cles. If this is the case, the oxidation of CH4 leads to the
loss of two odd hydrogen radicals (OH' and H02) and
no CO is formed in the atmosphere. An even larger loss
of odd hydrogen in NO-poor environments occurs
because of the fast catalytic subcycle:
(,\. < 335 nm)h"HCHO-+ H'+CHO'
M
H'+02-+ HO;
CHO'+02-+ HO;+CO
(,\. < 350 nm)
net: OH' + HO; -+ 202
and by oxidation of NO:
Depending on the concentrations of NO, the
further oxidation of HCHO to CO and CO2 may
follow one of two routes:
The alkyl peroxyl radicals (RO;), produced by similar
chemical chains from the higher aldehydes and from
ketones, also generate RO' and oxidize NO.
Appendix 8.2. Hydrocarbon oxidation
Oxidation of CH4 is not only a potentially significant
source of CO, but the atmospheric concentrations of OH'
may largely be determined by the particular reaction
paths that are followed during CH 4 oxidation [29,82],
NO plays an important role in determining the
favored reaction sequence. With enough NO present
(>10 p.p.t.v.) the reaction path, leading to HCHO, is as
follows:
CH 4 +OH' -+ CHj+ H20
M
CHj+02-+ CHgO;
CHgO; + NO -+ CHgO' + N02
CHgO'+02-+ HCHO+HO;
HO; + NO -+ OH' + N02
hv
HCHO -+ H' + HCO'
M
H'+02-+ HO;
HCO'+02-+ HO;+CO
CO+OH' -+ H'+C02
M
H'+02-+ HO;
3(HO; + NO -+ OH' + N02)
hv
3(N02 -+ NO+O')
or
hv
HCHO-+ H'+HCO'
H'+02-+ HO;
HCO' + O2-+ CO + HO;
CO+OH' -+ H'+C02
hv
2(N02-+ NO+O') (A <420 nm) M2(H'+02-+ HO;)
3(HO; + 0 3 -+ OH' + 202)
A
A
v
A
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Additional oxidation routes are also possible. However,
the important implications are that in the presence of
enough NO there is a net production of 3.70g molecules
and 0.50H' radicals per CH. molecule oxidized, while
otherwise a net loss of 1.70g and 3.5 hydroxyl radicals
may occur.
More complex hydrocarbons follow analogous but even
more extensive reaction sequences. If we use the symbol
R' to represent any saturated hydrocarbon chain radical
[e,g., the methyl radical (CH;), the ethyl radical
(CHgCH;), etc., also called alkyl radicals], we can write
the reaction between the hydrocarbon molecule and OH'
as
In the Earth's atmosphere, the R' will promptly add
molecular oxygen to form an alkylperoxyl radical, RO;:
RO; radicals are not particularly reactive and the vigor
of the chemistry depends upon the rate at which they
can be recycled to oxidizing species, which can be accom-
plished by disproportionation
RO; + R'O; -> ROOR' + O 2
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emanate from vegetation, and are of the same magnitude
as those for CH., These fluxes are probably decreasing
due to deforestation in the tropics.
Appendix 8.3. Atmospheric nitrogen
oxide chemistry
The reactions of NO and N02 (together denoted N0xl
in the atmosphere are diverse and very important [84],
because NO. molecules play an important catalytic role
in many photochemical reactions. In the troposphere,
NO. enhances the formation of 03; in the stratosphere,
the opposite is the case. HN03 is formed during daytime
according to the reaction
This is an important sink or temporary reservoir for the
catalysts NO and N02, During nighttime, HNOg forms
through a mixture of gas-phase and surface reactions:
A potentially much more effective reaction is that with
NO:
followed by photolysis
hv
ROOR' -> RO' + R'O' (A < 350 nm)
An interesting, and potentially important, interaction
between carbon and nitrogen gases in the atmosphere is
the formation of various organic nitrates during the oxi-
dation of hydrocarbons [29, 84, 85]. The most important
of these are probably the peroxyacyl nitrates, especially
peroxyacetyl nitrate [PAN, CHgC(0)02N02]. PAN ther-
mally decomposes in the atmosphere according to the
reaction:
but this requires the presence of sufficient NO, as in the
CH. oxidation chain. The RO' is rapidly converted into
a carbonyl molecule (a molecule with an oxygen atom
doubly bonded to a carbon atom) by reaction with
molecular oxygen:
Thus, if the initial saturated hydrocarbon is ethane
(CHgCHg), this reaction sequence produces acetaldehyde
(CHgCHO); if propane (CHgCH2 CHg), the product will
be acetone [CHgC(O)CH g] or propionaldehyde
(CH3CH2CHO), depending on the point of initial OH'
attack.
In addition to alkanes (compounds with saturated
hydrocarbon chains), the atmosphere contains olefins
(compounds with unsaturated hydrocarbon chains) and
aromatics (compounds with aromatic ring structures).
These compounds arise from both natural and
anthropogenic sources and have relatively short atmo-
spheric lifetimes, especially during summer, and intricate
chemical reaction sequences [83]. Large natural emissions
of isoprene, terpenes, and other olefinic hydrocarbons
liberating "captured" NO. radicals. PAN is rather stable
against thermal decomposition above about 3 km, so that
long-range transport through the free troposphere may
occur. PAN is often found in substantial concentrations
in polluted atmospheres and is also formed in the oxida-
tion cycle of C2H 6 in the upper troposphere, probably
through the involvement of NO. produced by lightning
[85].
It has been proposed that NO is also generated by a
reaction sequence initiated by OH' attack on NH 3, but
this is probably not very significant. NR, is more impor-
tant as a neutralizing compound in rainwater and as a
nutrient gas for the biosphere.
Appendix 8.4. Atmospheric sulfur
chemistry
The principal naturally emitted atmospheric sulfur com-
pounds, H 25 and CH35CH3, react to produce 502' For
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H~S the proposed reaction sequence is [86]:
M
HS' + O 2 ---+ HSO;
HSO; + O 2 ---+ S02 + H0;
The reaction chain for CH3SCH3 is [87]:
but the equilibria are such that the acids are only partly
ionized.
Once the electroytic properties and the acidity of the
solution are fixed, then the equilibria between the liquid
and gas phases are established and further reactions are
governed by the oxidants present. H20 2, which may be
the most important, serves both as an oxidant and as a
source of solution OH' when it is photolyzed:
0 3 dissolved in water is also a source of OH':
Appendix 8.6. Stratospheric chemistry
Since the beginning of the I970s it has become increas-
ingly clear that a number of human activities can lead to
global changes in the amount of stratospheric 0 3, Initial
attention was directed to pollution of the stratosphere by
direct injections of NO from high-flying aircraft. Earlier,
Crutzen [89] had proposed that NO, (NO+N02) would
catalyze the destruction of 0 3 and limit its stratospheric
abundance by a simple set of photochemical reactions:
In the stratosphere below 40 km this catalytic chain of
reactions largely balances the formation of 0 3, which
occurs through the reaction sequence:
CH3SCH 3+OH' ---+ CH3SCH;+H20
CH3SCH; + O~ ~ CH 3SCH20;
CH3SCH20; + NO ---+ CH3SCH20' + N02
CH 3SCH20' ---+ CH3S' + HCHO
intermediate step"
CH3SO; -------+. CH 3S03H, S02
The most common photochemical sequence for gas-
phase S02 oxidation has been identified [88] as:
M
S02+0H' ---+ HSO;
HSO; + O2 ---+ S03 + HO;
S03 + H 20 ---+ H 2S04
Appendix 8.5. Atmospheric droplet
chemistry
All reactions described in Appendix 8.5 occur in aqueous
solution. Chemical processes in liquid water droplets are
governed in large part by the prevailing acidity. This is
initially established by equilibration of the droplet with
atmospheric CO2:
CO2(g) ~ CO2(aq)
CO2(aq) + H 20 ~ H+ + HCO;;
The addition of strong mineral acids raises the acidity
(i.e., lowers the pH), since the acid equilibria produce
protons and the correspondng anions:
H 2S04 ~ H+ + HSO~
HS04~ W +SO~­
HN03 ~H+ + NO,j
HCI ~ H++CI-
hv
0 3 ---+ 0' +O2
0' + N02 ---+ NO + O2
NO+03 ---+ N02+02
(A < 380 nm)
(A ~ 310 nm)
(A < 900 nm)
(A < 240 nm)
Similar processes occur with the organic acids known
to be present in the droplets:
net:
RC(O)OH ~ W + RC(O)O-
This 10-40 km altitude region contains almost all the
0 3 of the atmosphere. The main source of NO, in the
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stratosphere is probably the oxidation of N20 via
hv
03-+ 0*+02
0* + N20 -+ 2NO
(A""310nm)
efficient than one mole of N02. The abundance of CIO'
radicals in the stratosphere is increasing rapidly with the
release of chlorofluorocarbons. The presence of NO in
the stratosphere makes the CIO· catalytic cycle less effec-
tive, as the reactions
NO is formed as an intermediate in biological nitrogen
transformations (nitrification or denitrification) and is
also produced during various combustion processes (see
Table 8.1). The oxides of nitrogen, NO" playa remark-
able catalytic role in the 0 3 balance of the atmosphere.
Above about 25 km the net effect of NOx additions to the
stratosphere is to lower the 0:1 concentration by the set
of reactions presented already. However, below about
25 km, NOx protects 0 3 from destruction. An important
reason for this is the set of reactions:
HO;+NO-+ OH'+N02
In the lower stratosphere the chain of reactions tends to
counteract the destruction of 0 3 by the catalytic reaction
pair:
OH'+03-+ H02+02
HO;+03-+ OH' +202
by deferring it into the chain:
OH' +03-+ HO;+02
HO;+NO-+ OH'+N02
no net chemical effect.
NOx in the stratosphere also interacts with cr and CIO·.
As with NO" chlorine atoms and chlorine monoxide
molecules participate in an effective catalytic chain of
reactions that converts ozone back to molecular oxygen:
0' +CIO -+ cr +02
cr +03-+ CIO' +02
whereby one mole of CIO' is about three times more
NO+CIO' -+ cr+ N02
cr + CH 4 -+ HCI + CH~
transform the catalysts cr and CIO' into HCl, which does
not react photochemically with 03' Furthermore, since
the titration reaction
M
CIO' + N02-+ ClN03
combines some CIO' and some N02 as nonreactive
CIN03 , it is clear that 0 3 removal by additons of chlorine
to the stratosphere is mitigated by NOx interference in
the chlorine cycle. If additions of chlorine to the strato-
sphere do not override those of NO" the reductions in
total stratospheric 0 3 are calculated to be not too large,
because 0 3 reductions above 30 km are compensated by
increases below. The potentially significant climatic con-
sequences of these processes have been discussed. At high
chlorine concentrations in the stratosphere, severe 0 3
depletions are foreseen [61]. Expansions in the manufac-
turing of chlorocarbons worldwide should, therefore, be
watched with utmost concern.
The photochemistry of the stratosphere is complicated
because the odd chlorine, nitrogen, and hydrogen
radicals react with each other. These reactions are
especially important below about 30 km, and lead to the
formation of HN03, pernitric acid (HN04 ), hypo-
chlorous acid (HClO), and chlorine nitrate (CIN03).
Except for HN03 , none of these compounds has been
detected in the lower stratosphere, so an important test
of stratospheric photochemistry is lacking.
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Commentary
E. Meszaros
The studies carried out during the last two decades
of biogeochemical cycles of different elements (com-
pounds) have produced important scientific
achievements. These studies have partly revealed
the complexity of environmental interactions and
partly demonstrated that nature is an indivisible
Sustainable development of the biosphere
and integral entity. It has become clear that bio-
geochemical cycles not only make life on the Earth
possible by providing nutrients for ecosystems in
various environmental media, but also that this con-
tinuous material flow in nature maintains constant
the composition of the atmosphere. This constant
composition, controlled partly by the biosphere, is
indispensable for the present form of life on our
planet.
The Earth's climate also depends on the chemical
composition of the atmosphere, because the
chemical composition controls short-wave and long-
wave radiation transfers in the air and consequently
the energy balance. In this way atmospheric compo-
sition regulates not only the temperature distribu-
tion, but also the general circulation of the atmo-
sphere caused by differences in energy balance
between different territories.
The stability of atmospheric composition is cur-
rently of crucial importance, since human activities
are now capable of disturbing this natural equi-
librium by releasing different substances into the
atmosphere. It follows that to consider the future
development of our society, possible atmosphere-
development interactions must be accounted for.
Among the examples of atmospheric degrada-
tions enumerated by Crutzen and Graedel I stress
the importance of the modification of ,atmospheric
radiation balance, the climatic consequences of
which are discussed by Dickinson (Chapter 9, this
volume). It seems to me that the increases of CO2
concentration and that of other radiatively active
trace gases in the atmosphere (N20, CH4 , halocar-
bons, etc.) pose the most important threat to the
stability of climate. Unfortunately, the possible
response of the hydrosphere and biosphere to the
increase of atmospheric CO2 is speculative. The
synergism of CO2 effects and other anthropogenic
modifications (e.g., the increase of aerosol con-
centration) is also an open question.
It is evident that anthropogenic pollutants modify
not only the state of the atmosphere. They also
influence considerably the composition of atmo-
spheric depositions and consequently biochemical
processes in aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems.
Since the atmosphere is a mobile dynamic system
these detrimental effects can be observed far from
urban and industrial pollution sources, the distance
being a function of the transformation rate and
residence time of the pollutants considered. The
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formation of acid precipitation is a good example
of this atmospheric action. I believe that the acid
rain problem is the second most important environ-
mental damage due to atmospheric degradations.
It should be mentioned, however, that acid precipi-
tation is only a part of the problem. The dry deposi-
tion of acid-forming gases (S02 and NOx ) and of
acids themselves (e.g., HN03 ) can be as important
as wet deposition caused by acid precipitation. The
dry deposition, due mostly to turbulent transfer
in the air, is particularly strong in the vicinity of
the sources. Thus, in central Europe dry and wet
sulfur and nitrogen depositions are of comparable
magnitudes.
Crutzen and Graedel also discuss photochemical
oxidant formation. I emphasize in this respect that
acid formation is closely related to oxidant forma-
tion in air and precipitation. This indicates that
damage in lakes and forests is related not only to
the sulfur emission rate, but also to the concentra-
tion of free radicals formed by photochemical pro-
cesses. Thus. I think that even in this case synergism
is an important factor. It is also possible, of course,
that photochemical oxidants influence directly the
state of forests, as discussed in this chapter.
At the end of their correct and compact chapter
Crutzen and Graedel note that the number of
primary anthropogenic sources of causative species
is small. Their discussion seems to suggest that for
this reason the solution of the problems is not too
complicated: "There is enough evidence to state
that a significant decrease in the rate of fossil fuel
combustion would stabilize the atmospheric radi-
ation balance, improve visibility, hinder smog for-
mation, and minimize acidic precipitation and its
effects [pp 240-241]." This statement is true in
itself. However, at least at the moment energy pro-
duction by humankind is mainly due to fossil fuel
combustion. Alternative energy sources are needed
to be able to decrease significantly the rate of fossil
fuel burning and consequently the deleterious
effects of atmospheric pollution. The necessity to
find other energy sources is one of the greatest
challenges for the human race.
The aim of air chemistry is to study the atmo-
spheric part of the biogeochemical cycles of sub-
stances in nature. Thus, I agree with Crutzen and
Graedel that atmospheric chemistry should play an
important role in the estimation of environment-
development interactions. For this reason, as dis-
cussed at the end of the chapter, further research
is needed in this important field to understand more
correctly the interrelation between human activity
and our atmospheric environment. Such a deeper
understanding is indispensable for planning the
technological development of our society.
1Chapter 9
R. E. Dickinson
Impact of human
activities on climate
a framework
Editors' Introduction: Climate is one of the most important environmental properties
identified from the general perspectives of Chapters 7 and 8.
In this chapter a detailed framework for assessing the potential overall impacts of human
activities on the world's climate is presented. Continuing a theme introduced in Chapter
7, Dickinson begins with a characterization of the spatial and temporal patterns of climatic
variation that arise from natural processes on time scales of decades to centuries. The
magnitude and extent of human activities that could impose significant additional variation
on these natural patterns are examined next. Alternative methods of assessing the climate's
response to perturbation are critically discussed. The chapter is concluded with a novel,
probabilistic assessment of the net global climatic change that might result from human
activities by the end of the twenty-first century.
Introduction
Sometimes, as I look out of my window at a summer
shower, I recall the bright sun that shone a few
hours previously. Here in Boulder, Colorado, hot
weather in April often precedes snowstorms by a
few days, and our coldest winter weather is some-
times accompanied by summer-like weather in
Seattle.
Climate is the aggregate of such day-to-day
weather patterns. Climatology involves studying the
local microclimate for grass growing under Pon-
derosa pine, the length of the growing season for
Kansas wheat, or the global average of surface tem-
perature observations. It includes establishing the
statistics of extreme and perhaps hazardous events,
such as tornadoes, the seasonal variation of pack
ice around Antarctica, the frequency of cloud occur-
renee over a potential site for solar collectors, or
the wind characteristics at a potential site for wind-
power collection. Warm equatorial oceans and cold
polar oceans, a multiyear drought in Sub-Saharan
Africa, spring flooding in the Rockies - these are
all part of the climatic system.
Those who realize how difficult it is to correctly
decide which day to carry an umbrella will certainly
wonder how it is possible to identify any underlying
patterns and processes in such a complex system as
climate. A careful analysis of the examples of climate
given above, however, suggests a few basic underly-
ing variables and processes, i.e., temperatures,
humidities, winds, and the fluxes of energy and
water. Fluctuations in these parameters occur on
various scales of time and space. For example,
energy converts water from liquid into vapor; this
energy of "latent heat" is released when the water
condenses. Even the kinetic energy released by
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water falling under gravity, although much less in
total than the latent heat energy, can be of consider-
able practical importance.
Research on the climate system over the last few
decades has helped quantify the relationships
between temperatures, humidities, and winds on
the one hand, and fluxes of energy and water on
the other. With increased understanding has come
the realization that many human activities modify
the environment on a sufficient scale to compete
with natural processes. Here I intend to provide a
general framework needed for intelligent assess-
ment of the potential impacts of future human
activities on climate. The orientation of the
framework is primarily global, with time scales of
decades to centuries, and both past and future are
considered.
The basic source of energy for most terrestrial
processes is the absorption of solar radiation. This
is certainly true for the climate system. For climate
to be in equilibrium, the absorbed solar radiation
must be balanced by outgoing thermal radiation.
The partial trapping of this thermal radiation by
radiative absorbers - particles or molecules - within
the atmosphere elevates surface temperatures by
several tens of degrees Centigrade above what they
would be in the absence of an atmosphere [1], as
illustrated in FiguTe 9.1.
Much of the current concern over the impact of
human activities on climate evolves from our
capabilities to alter the amount of absorbed solar
energy or the leakage of thermal radiation. Another
broad class of problems involves the possibility of
significant modifICations of the surface or atmo-
spheric hydrological cycles. From the societal view-
point, threats to the climate system are mainly due
to the human uses of energy or to land-use changes.
Some industrial activities can also change the atmo-
sphere's radiative properties, e.g., by adding radia-
tively active trace gases to the atmosphere.
The climate system has a large degree of natural
variability, which both limits the detectability of
human perturbations and greatly influences any
evaluation of the practical consequences of such
perturbations (see pp 254-263). To understand
where human activities have leverage in the climate
system, I also consider the basic processes that deter-
mine global radiative energy fluxes and the hydro-
logical cycle (pp 263-266).
With such a suitable conceptual framework, we
can consider the magnitudes and scales of human
activities, past, present, and future, in terms of their
disruptions of fluxes of energy and water in the
climate system. Future human activities are, of
course, basically unpredictable. However, we can
simply extrapolate present trends to create
T < Ta 5
R (Ta' < R (Ts)
Solar heating
s""lJ
Figure 9.1 Atmospheric radiative
trapping (greenhouse effect). The
surface at temperature Ts emits
upward infrared radiation, R( Ts ) The
amount of thermal infrared radiation
emitted increases in proportion to the
fourth power of surface temperature
Ts . Some fraction of the surface
emission is absorbed by atmospheric
absorbers, depending on their
absorptivity. These absorbers also
emit thermal radiation R( Tal at a rate
proportional to their absorptivity and
dependent on their temperature To If
their temperature is less than that of
the surface, as is usually the case, they
emit upward less thermal radiation
than they absorb. The surface is, in
turn, warmed by downward thermal radiation and coupled to the overlying atmospheric layers by convection.
If more absorbers are added, the system warms up, thus providing the net thermal radiation flux to space
that is required to balance absorbed solar radiation.
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"surprise-free" scenanos that provide some basis
for attaching relative importance to different future
human activities.
Given the possible future human disruptions of
energy fluxes in the climate system, it is necessary
to assess the effects of these disruptions on climatic
processes. Unfortunately, there are no close labora-
tory analogs to the climate system, and historical
analogs are also of limited use because of the lack
of distinction between internal fluctuations and
external disruptions of energy fluxes. Thus, the
primary tools for studying future climate are mathe-
matical models. On p 268 I introduce the simplest
such model, for global energy balance, which is used
to compare the relative effects of different possible
human disruptions on global fluxes or radiative
energy. The global energy-balance viewpoint is
ineffective for examining possible climatic effects
that involve a disruption of the hydrological cycle
or the internal redistribution of energy in the
climate system (see pp 272-275). On pp 275-277 I
give a brief review of the content, use, and limita-
tions of the most complete computer models of the
climate system to date (l986).
The period we are interested in here as regards
human effects is of the order of 10 to 100 years. A
global spatial scale is primarily considered. Where
I need to be more specific, I consider the possible
climatic change by the year 2100 over areas of at
least I-lOX 106km~ (lOx IObkm2 is 2% of the sur-
face area of the Earth). There is nothing special
about 2100; our current information does not sug-
gest that any major discontinuities would occur in
the climate system between now and then. However,
focusing on the year 2100 helps illuminate a wide
range of possibilities. Possible changes of climate at
more immediate dates can then be considered using
interpolation between the present and 2100.
Besides pursuing the question of future climatic
change of maximum or at least reasonable likeli-
hood, we should also consider what nasty surprises
might be realized. To refrain from too extreme
flights of fancy, I consider primarily those
possibilities that seem to me to have at least a 1%
probability of occurring in the next century or two
(pp 277-279). Such considerations not only suggest
possible aspects of climate system vulnerability, but
also help to identify its especially stable or resilient
characteristics.
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Scales and patterns of natural
atmospheric variability
Time variability
The theme of this chapter is the impact of human
activities on climate. However, the implications of
human-mediated climatic change can only be
properly evaluated and procedures for its detection
be devised in the context of natural climatic vari-
ations. Thus, I intend to provide a conceptual
framework for nonmeteorologists to enable a better
understanding of the large natural variability of
weather and climate. Those who are totally
unfamiliar with concepts of random time series and
nonlinear system dynamics may wish to skip or read
lightly this section.
Natural climatic and meteorological variations
occur over a wide range of time and space scales.
Examining the time variations of one variable, e.g.,
surface temperature, at one location reveals that
the time structure of variations consists of periodic
and stochastic components. The periodic com-
ponents are seasonal and diurnal cycles, largely sine
wave variations with one-year and one-day periods.
There are, in addition, some higher harmonics, e.g.,
twice-a-year and twice-a-day components. The diur-
nal and seasonal cycles are sometimes the largest
contributors to the total time variance of a meteoro-
logical variable [2], although frequently they are
only recognized by data analysts as the piece of a
time series that needs to be removed in order to
look at the more intriguing stochastic components.
Often the time mean and seasonal variations are
lumped together by using the long-time average of
monthly or three-monthly average fields (e.g.,
January means or winter means). Figure 9.2 [3]
illustrates the June-to-August and December-to-
February average surface air temperature, and
Figure 9.3 [4] shows the seasonal range of surface
air temperature.
Global temperature
Global climatic change is often discussed in terms
of global and annual average surface air tem-
perature. This is a good example of a stochastic
climatic time series and is illustrated for the last 100
years or so in Figure 9.4 [5]. The time series starts
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Figure 9.2 Geographical distribution of observed average surface air temperature for (a) June-July-August
and (b) December-January-February (units are degrees Kelvin; subtract 273.15 to convert into degrees
Celsius) [3]. Contours are drawn every 5°C. Note that outside the tropics the mid-continent land temperatures
in summer are typically about 10°C warmer than the ocean temperatures, and in winter 20 °C or more colder
than the ocean temperatures. Figure (a) shows that average temperatures below 210 K (almost -80 OF) are
found in central Antarctica during winter, and above 310 K (about 100 OF) in the Sahara during summer. In
dry continental areas, the daytime high can be 20 OF warmer than the day-night average, and daytime
ground temperatures can be much warmer again.
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Figure 9.3 The geographical distribution of surface air temperature difference (degrees Kelvin) between
August and February: (b) Observed values and (a) values calculated by a general circulation climate model
[4] (see pp 275-277). Note the >40°C (72 OF) range of temperature for some high-latitude regions in the
Northern Hemisphere and the <10°C variations over most ocean areas. The seasonal cycle of solar heating
is perhaps the largest forcing term that the climate system is exposed to. The good agreement between
model and observations indicates that the model responds reasonably to this forcing.
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Figure 9.4 Northern Hemisphere
average annual average surface air
temperatures over the last 120 years.
The curve shows a smoothed version
of the individual annual averages [5J.
<l- ca. 10°C-i>
iV1id-lati tude
air temperature
from the time when temperature records were
maintained at enough stations to allow determina-
tion of this average. Various proxy records, such as
tree ring thickness, pollen counts, and historical
records, are used to estimate earlier climates of the
last few thousand years. Other geological data are
used to estimate climate variations over the last
0.1 x 106 to 500x 106 years.
Spectral peaks and red noise
A large amount of information is available on
climates over geological time. These past climates
are only of interest here in that they help to provide
a frame of reference for present-day climatic vari-
ations. For example. the Cretaceous era, about
100 Xl 06 years ago was much warmer than the pres-
ent-day climate. Tropical temperatures were per-
haps 5°C warmer than present and in high latitudes
temperatures are estimated to have been 10 to 20 °C
warmer than present [6]. From that time, tem-
peratures have gradually declined. Over the last
million years, the climate system has experienced
numerous ice ages, with temperatures as warm as
or warmer than the present ones occurring for only
a small fraction of the time. Figure 9.5 [7] illustrates
the estimated behavior of global temperature over
the last 100 000 years or so. The warmest climate
period in the present "interglacial" occurred from
5000 to 9000 years ago when summer temperatures
in the Northern Hemisphere may have been about
2°C warmer than present [8].
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Figure9.5 Generalized Northern Hemisphere tem-
perature trends over the last 150 000 years [7J.
Warmest temperatures occurred about 125 000
years ago and over the last 8000 years. The most
severe cold (ice age) occurred about 20 000 years
ago. Peaks and dips in temperature occur about
every 20 000 years with a range of about 3°C, and
the largest temperature dips occur about every
40 000 years The total range of temperature vari-
ation over the last 100 000 years has been about
10 °C. Similar patterns have occurred every 100 000
years for the last million years.
A highly prized and much sought-after feature of
the stochastic components of climatic variation is
large amounts of variability in specific frequency
bands. If such spectral peaks were found to rep-
resent a large part of the total variability, they would
provide an effective means for statistical time-series
forecasting. In the geological record, such peaks
are pronounced for periods of approximately
20 000, 40 000, and 100 000 years. These variations
are related to variations in the Earth's orbital pa-
rameters that have similar periods [9]. Both these
very long-period and short-period periodicities
form but a small fraction of the climatic variability
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that occurs over a few hundred years or less. The
most commonly found meteorological example of
a short-period spectral peak is that of quasi-biennial
oscillations [10]. The occurrence of 11- and 22-year
variations in sunspots is one of the most well-known
examples of a large spectral peak in a random
geophysical time series. Much effort has been
applied to relating climatic variations to these sun-
spot variations, but with little success [11].
The time structure of climatic variability is largely
that of "red noise" [12], with time variations and
spectra such as those in Figure 9.6. Red-noise vari-
ability has a power spectrum that is constant at low
frequency (i.e., white noise) and decays monotoni-
cally with increasing frequency at higher frequen-
cies. It can be imagined as consisting of a superposi-
tion of pulses that are turned on at random points
in time with initial amplitudes that are random and
decay with various decay scales [13]. This illustrates
a conceptualization of the internal dynamics of the
atmosphere and its coupling to other elements of
the climate system to which I return later.
A counterintuitive feature of a pulse excitation,
such as shown in Figure 9.6, is the excitation by very
short pulses of disturbances whose spectral power
increases with decreasing frequency, that is, consists
of red noise. For periods long compared to to the
spectral power associated with that time scale
becomes independent of frequency. Hence, short
time-scale weather events cause much of the year-to-
year variations in monthly average climates and
even the year-to-year variations in a given location
[14]. Only by forming global averages and taking
multiyear running means is the variability due to
short-term weather events largely eliminated. Thus,
in considering long-term regional climatic vari-
ations, it is important to establish the contribution
to this variability from short-term weather events.
Conversely, although very long time-scale proces-
ses may cause large variations over the length of
their period, they contribute little to climate trends
at a specific time. This is evident because the magni-
tude of trends is given by the amplitude of the
variation divided by its time scale. The long period
ice-age variations can be characterized by a 4°C
temperature variation on a 20000 year time-scale,
suggesting a trend of 0.02 °C/century. By contrast,
the last 100 years of temperature records indicate
a change of about 0.5 °C or a trend of 0.5 °C/cen-
tury, as inferred from Figure 9.4. Thus, the overall
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temperature variations associated with past ice ages
are too small to affect current climate significantly.
The large natural variability must also be recog-
nized in estimating impacts of climatic change on
human activities. The most deleterious impacts of
weather and climate are frequently a result of
threshold events rather than of means of the diurnal
and seasonal cycles (Parry, Chapter 14, this volume)
[15]. Thus, changes in impacts are likely to result
from shifts in the numbers of threshold events,
either because of changes in climatic means or
changes in variances. The effect of a change in
climatic mean on the frequency of threshold events
is illustrated in Figure 9.7. Changes in climatic vari-
ances are more difficult to recognize than changes
in means. Parry, Chapter 14, this volume, empha-
sizes further the possible importance of changes in
climate variance.
Spatial structures
Before considering further the time structure of
natural variability, it is necessary to consider the
spatial structures of weather systems and climate
processes. Spatial patterns can be associated sepa-
rately with the periodic and with the stochastic
weather-climate time variations. Again, consider-
able spatial variation is associated with the simplest
time structures, i.e., the climatic mean and annual
cycle patterns, as illustrated for surface temperature
in Figures 9.2 and 9.3. Many other meteorological
variables, e.g., rainfall, are also of practical interest,
and their seasonal and longitudinal distributions
are discussed in geography texts on climate [16].
The climatic mean and annual cycle patterns
involve all space scales, with small-scale variability
more pronounced near and at land surfaces because
of the rapid spatial variations in terrain and micro-
climatological environments. At higher levels in the
atmosphere, spatial variations become largely global
[17]. Climatologists study in detail the zonal mean
(that is, longitudinally averaged) and time mean
east-west wind systems as well as the north-south
mean meridional circulation (the Hadley cell in the
tropics). These features have horizontal spatial
scales of at least 10° latitude. The most pronounced
continental-scale systems are the Asiatic winter and
summer monsoons [18]. Distinct dynamical struc-
tures are also ascribed to the planetary waves. These
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Figure 9.6 Examples of (al "red-
noise" stochastic time series and (b)
the corresponding power spectra. The
time scale is arbitrary but can be
imagined to represent years. The time
series are constructed using the
equation
X n + 1=(X n +0.1 t~l Fn )/{l +0.1 t~l)
where Fn is a random number with
equal probability of lying anywhere
between 1.0 and -1.0, such as can be
obtained from the BASIC of most
home computers, X n is the value of
the time series at point n, and X n + 1
its value at point n +1. The points are
assumed to be spaced 0.1 units apart.
The parameter t c gives the damping
time scale of the time series. Two
examples are given: a series for tc =l,
and a series for tc =5.
(b) FI-equency (per yr)
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waves are obtained observationally as the lowest
order components of expansions of monthly mean
climatic fields into longitudinal Fourier series
[ 19].
The spatial patterns of atmospheric variables
with stochastic time variations take on a number of
interesting structures best known to devotees of the
science of weather prediction. These structures can
be divided into mesoscale systems, synoptic scale
systems, and global systems, with typical scales of
10-200 km, 200-2000 km, and >2000 km, respec-
tively.
Mesoscale systems range from frontal systems and
squall lines to individual, large cumulus-cloud sys-
tems. These systems provide much of the world's
violent weather and typically have lifetimes of less
than a day. They occur mainly in the moist tropics
or over continents during summertime [20].
Synoptic systems include especially the
extratropical cyclonic storms and anticyclonic sys-
tems that bring much of the winter weather vari-
ations outside of the tropics. These systems typically
have time scales of about three days [21]. Stochastic
systems on a planetary scale include fluctuations in
the longitudinally averaged and the planetary wave
systems. Some distinct planetary wave spectral peaks
have been identified that correspond to free normal
modes of the global atmosphere [22]. Although of
considerable interest to the dynamic meteorologist,
these peaks are probably of little importance to
questions of climatic change. Except for these peaks,
which have periods of 5 and 16 days, atmospheric
variations on time scales of days to weeks or more
appear to be of the red-noise variety.
Climate variability as the balance
between excitation and decay processes
The red-noise atmospheric variations originate
through the growth of instabilities that release the
potential energy of the atmosphere, which had been
previously created by differential radiative heating.
Convective processes, which dominate on the
mesoscale, are driven either by the upward motion
of air made buoyant by surface heating or by the
release of latent heat during precipitation processes.
Figure 9.7 Deleterious effects of cli-
mate change may be manifested in
terms of a change in the frequency of
threshold events, such as tem-
perature extremes. For example, the
day-to-day variations of temperature
may be summarized in terms of a
probability distribution of given
values. The figure shows two proba-
bility distributions identical except for
a shift in mean. The yellow area
represents the probability of exceed-
ing a hypothetical threshold value for
an original climate and the white
area the increase in the probability
of exceeding that threshold for a
hypothetical change in climate. Note
that a small change in mean condi-
tions can lead to a large increase in
the probability of exceeding the
threshold.
Probability
\
\
0.30
Initial mean \ P"toeb,d moo"
~ \ \(
0.20 \\I
i \ \
j
\ \ The",hold
...
0.10
/
0
-3.0 -2.0 -1.0 0 1.0 2.0
X
Impact of human activities on climate - a framework
The synoptic scale and global systems are, by con-
trast, driven by the pole-to-equator temperature
gradient. Instabilities that develop on the mean
atmospheric state grow to finite amplitude, then are
dissipated by nonlinear dynamic processes, as well
as by frictional and radiative damping and coupling
to the surface. As a simple model, we can think of
the initial unstable growth as instantaneously inject-
ing disturbances.
The nonlinear damping requires about a day or
less to dissipate mesoscale systems, typically 5 days
for synoptic scale and at least 5 days for global scale
disturbances. Frictional damping requires about 10
days [23] and radiative damping about 40 days [24].
Land surfaces have little heat capacity and can
equilibrate to atmospheric conditions without dis-
sipating significantly the atmospheric disturbance
[25]. Over the oceans, on the other hand, rapid
fluxes of sensible and latent heat keep the surface
layers of the ocean in thermal equilibrium with the
atmosphere [26]. This air-sea thermal coupling, in
transferring the disturbance from the atmosphere
to the ocean, largely removes the atmospheric dis-
turbance because of the atmosphere's relatively low
heat capacity. The adjustment time for this process
is about 2 to 10 days, depending on the differences
between air and sea temperatures and water-vapor
mixing ratios. All the above time scales are approxi-
mate and vary with the situation. The nonlinear
damping will normally dominate large-amplitude
disturbances. Friction is especially effective in
damping near-surface winds, and radiative damp-
ing removes temperatu re anomalies that have
already largely lost their associated atmospheric
motions through the faster forms of damping.
Over oceans, the coupling between atmosphere
and ocean does not simply remove a thermal
anomaly, but mixes it into the joint system of the
atmosphere and the mixed layers of the ocean. The
ocean's mixed layers have a heat capacity about 20
times that of the atmosphere alone [27]. The joint
disturbance is then damped further by atmospheric
long-wave radiative dissipation. Consequently, its
lifetime is extended from about 40 days to several
years. This is one of several sources of long-term
memory for the climate system. Other frequently
cited examples are the presence of soil moisture
and snow cover [28]. The effects of both these
factors on the atmosphere can persist for several
months or more.
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There are some additional kinds of random dis-
turbances to the climate system that have intrinsi-
cally long lifetimes. Those most studied are the
radiative perturbations due to stratospheric aerosol
from volcanic eruptions [29]. The aerosol is in the
form of sulfate particles which form from sulfur
dioxide (S02)' The extent of the volcanic perturba-
tion on climate depends on the amount of volcanic
material reaching the stratosphere and on the sulfur
content of its source [30]. Gases and small particles
have a typical residence time in the stratosphere of
about 2 years [31]. The duration of the climatic
perturbation is determined by the finite lifetime of
the stratospheric aerosol plus the additional
memory from oceanic heat storage.
As already suggested, the oceans are the "fly-
wheel" for storing thermal energy in the climate
system. If the oceans, with an average depth of
5 km, were uniformly mixed, they would equilibrate
with the atmosphere on a time scale of about 400
years. In reality, only the near-surface waters are
in rapid contact with the atmosphere; this reservoir
is typically about 70 m in depth, with a thermal time
scale of several years. Thermal perturbations
applied to the ocean over thousands of years would
change ocean temperatures at all depths. External
thermal pertu rbations occu rring over a 10- to 100-
year period, such as that resulting from increasing
concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide (C02),
however, largely transfer energy to the mixed-layer
reservoir and the reservoir of ocean intermediate
water, which together require several decades or
more to equilibrate to thermal perturbations.
Viewing the ocean as vertically stacked reservoirs
is somewhat unsatisfactory, since most of the
exchange to levels below the surface mixed layers
occurs at high latitudes. In essence, the deeper
layers outcrop at the surface in these high-latitude
regions of water mass formation [32]. So far, only
variations in the temperatures of ocean surface
mixed layers have been related to observed climatic
change.
The most well-known example of 1-2 year cli-
matic memory provided by ocean temperature
anomalies is the phenomenon referred to as "EI
Nino" or "Southern Oscillation" [33].
Other memory reservoirs of the climate system
include the polar sea ice, with time scales of a few
years, and continental ice sheets, with time scales
of 103 to 104 years [34]. Figure 9.8 illustrates the
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Figure 9.8 Mechanisms contributing to climatic memory on a time scale of months to decades_ The oceans
gain energy from solar radiation and return this energy to the atmosphere through sensible, latent, and
infrared thermal energy fluxes with a time lag that ranges from a few months to many decades. Snow and
sea ice reflect solar radiation and so promote cooler temperatures; hence their continued presence. Likewise,
moisture in soil lasts for up to several weeks or more before it is lost, and tends through increased
evapotranspiration to promote rainfall and thus maintain itself for a yet longer period.
most commonly discussed mechanisms contributing
to climatic memory on a time scale of months
to decades. Figure 9.9 summarizes the range of
time and space scales of the mechanisms
discussed.
The average surface temperature of the North-
ern Hemisphere, and presumably of the whole
Earth, has varied over a range of about 1 DC since
the first extensive instrument records made in the
1880s, as shown in Figure 9.4. However, hemi-
spheric temperature changes over a time scale of
decades are generally a residual of considerably
larger, up to 5 DC, regional temperature-change
patterns [35 l-
In summary, climate-system variability is the
result of disturbances that randomly originate from
either internal energy sources or transient external
perturbations. The subsequent decay of the original
disturbance with time is governed by various cli-
matic reservoirs and dissipative processes within the
system. It is, however, not yet possible with the
limited historical records of climatic change to
closely associate observed climatic variability with
particular perturbations and reservoirs. It is,
nevertheless, widely recognized that short-term
weather variability resulting from mesoscale and
synoptic scale systems is a major source of noise in
longer term climatic records. Much of the additional
variability, at least of global average temperature,
may be the result of variations in volcanic aerosol.
One further possible complexity, yet only estab-
lished in very simple models for atmospheric winds,
is the presence of "almost intransitive" states [36],
i.e .. there may be an infrequent switching from one
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Figure 9.9 Space-time scales of the
different climatic processes
discussed in the text. The ordinate
indicates representative space scales
and the abscissa gives representative
time scales.
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climate regime to another. A mechanical analog
would be a ball rolling around in a hole (i.e., a
potential well) which, once in a while, is bumped
to some other hole. This possibility of regime switch-
ing has often been suspected by practitioners of
statistical climate prediction, who have found that
statistical relationships established over one time
period become invalid for a later time period.
However, faulty technique and ignorance of slow
system memories may have been the source of many
such difficulties. If regime switching does occur in
the climate system, it could be of major concern for
evaluating the impacts of human activities on cli-
mate, as suggested by the mathematicians' use of
the term "catastrophe" for such switches [37].
Regimes previously not accessible might in the
future be reached by the climate system, or the rates
of occurrence or lifetimes of some regimes might
be altered [38]. Such possibilities are the crux of
the question of resiliency of the climate system to
human activities. Unfortunately, little progress has
been made in studies on this aspect of climate
beyond the provision of mathematical examples.
Hence, most of what can be said of future climate
is in a framework of linear analysis.
Fluxes of energy and water in the
global climate system
Solar fluxes
The flux of solar energy 10 space at the Earth's
average distance from the sun and integrated over
all wavelengths is known as the solar constant. About
2% of this radiation occurs in the ultraviolet band
at wavelengths <0.4 f-Lm and is mostly absorbed in
the stratosphere or above. Nearly half of the solar
energy occurs in the visible part of the solar spec-
trum at wavelengths between 0.4 and 0.7 f-Lm. The
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remaimng solar energy occur' at near-Infrared
wavelengths, mostly frolll 0.7 to 4 fJ-m. The solar
constant has often been estimated during the last
century, but Ivith good accuracy only after the
advent of rocket and satellite platforms. Recent
measurements give a value of l368±7 W/m2 [391-
Because the Earth has four tim s as much area as
a flat disc of equivalent radius, the average solar
flux incident on the top of the atmosphere IS one
fourth the solar constant, i.e., 342 W/rn 2 •
The global average of various vertical energy
fluxes within the climate is dIu trated in Figure 9.10
[40]. As the solar radiation passes through the
atmosphere, some is reflected and some is absorbed.
Reflection includes upward Rayleigh scattering
from atmospheric molecules (about 5%), and scat-
tering from cloud particles (abollt 17%) and from
aerosol parti Is (about 2%). bOllt 24% of the
incident solar radiation is absorbed by atmospheric
constituents; 4% is absorbed in the visible and ultra-
violet bands, mostly by O~l; and 20% IS absorbed in
the near-infrared. by wat r vapor and cloud drop-
lets [41].
Sustamable development of the biosphere
More than half of the solar energy entering the
atmosphere reaches the Earth's surface, where fur-
ther reflection takes place. About 6% of the original
incident solar beam is reflected from the Earth's
surface to space, in approximately equal propor-
tions from the liqwd oceans, from sea ice and snow
cover, and from snow-free land [421- Most of the
flux incident at the surface is absorbed. On average,
about 30% of the incident solar radiation is reflected
from the climate system [431- The fraction of so~ar
radiation reflected into space is called the planetary
albedo. About 240 W/m2 of solar radiation is ab-
sorbed and available to d rive climatic processes.
Thermal infrared emission and vertical
energy transfer
The climate system in equilibrium must not gain or
lose energy. Thus, the absorbed solar radiation is
removed by other processes. On the global average,
removal is by therlllal infrared emission. Ocean,
land, vegetative surfaces, and clouds emit radiation,
SOLAR
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Figure 9.10 Global average of vertical energy fluxes [solar (yellow) and thermal infrared] and atmospheric
absorption [40].
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according to the Stefan-Boltzman law, in propor-
tion to the fourth power of their temperature.
Radiatively active molecules in the atmosphere also
emit thermal radiation at a rate that increases with
increasing temperature, depending on the
wavelengths of their emission spectra. Water vapor,
CO2 , and 0 3 molecules are the dominant emitters.
These, as all emitters of thermal radiation, are also
absorbers. Thus, radiation emitted from the surface
is absorbed in the atmosphere and a lesser amount
reemitted from that same absorber. Some of this is,
in turn, reabsorbed at a higher level and again a
lesser amount reemitted. A fraction of the radiation
emitted from the surface and from all levels in the
atmosphere escapes to space. Indeed, at a high-
enough level, referred to as the top of the atmo-
sphere, there is no more absorption and all radiation
passing through such a level escapes to space. Most
thermal radiation reaching the top of the atmo-
sphere has been emitted from the colder high levels
in the atmosphere. Consequently, the amount of
thermal radiation that leaves the atmosphere is
equal to that which would have been emitted from
a surface at a temperature of -18°C, i.e., 33°C
colder than the global average surface temperature
of 15 0c. A temperature of -18°C corresponds to
the average atmospheric temperature about 6 km
above the Earth's surface.
Since much of the absorption of solar radiation
occurs at the Earth's surface, but thermal emission
is largely from high levels in the atmosphere, some
mechanism for the vertical transfer of energy within
the atmosphere must exist. The required upward
movement of energy is provided, in part, through
radiative absorption and reemission by atmospheric
clouds and molecules. However, the bulk of the
energy is transferred upward by small- and large-
scale atmospheric motions. Some energy is carried
by sensible heat fluxes, that is, upward movement
of warm air. However, most is transferred as latent
energy carried by water vapor. Thus, condensation
of water vapor into rain and snow directly supplies
most of the energy removed from the atmosphere
by thermal infrared radiation.
Energy fluxes at the Earth's surface
Of the 240 W1m 2 of solar radiation absorbed 111
the climate svstem. approximately 150 W1m 2 IS
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absorbed globally at the Earth's surface. This energy
is returned to the atmosphere, abollt RO W/m 2 as
latent heat of water vapor, 20 W1m2 as sensible
heat, and the remainder as the diHerence between
upward and downward thermal-infrared radiative
fluxes [44]. Liquid water is turned into vapor at the
surface through evaporation. The latent heat
released into the atmosphere through rain and
snowfall must balance the energy input to evapo-
ration at the Earth's surface. Equivalently, the net
global rainfall of about 1.0 mlyr is balanced by
1.0 mlyr of water evaporated. However, about one
third of the rain and snowfall on land is not evapo-
rated but instead is carried to the oceans by rivers.
For this reason and because of the large fraction of
land that is arid, the average evaporation from land
per unit area is less than half that from the oceans,
i.e., only about 0.5 mlyr [45]. In vegetated areas
much of the evaporation occurs in the interior of
leaves and the water is lost by transpiration through
leaf stomata. Perhaps about half of the evaporation
from land surfaces occurs in the form of transpi-
ration. Figure 9.lI [46] illustrates the various terms
in the global hydrological cycle. In arid regions,
evaporation generally cannot exceed the amounts
of rainfall, which may be less than 0.3 m/yr. This
relative shortage of evaporation in arid regions is
compensated by excess fluxes of sensible heat, some-
times with daily averages exceeding 100 W1m 2 •
These relatively large amounts of heat added to the
lowest atmospheric layers drive thermal convection
and vigorously stir the daytime atmosphere through
a thickness of at least several kilometers.
The lower atmospheric levels stirred by thermal
convection and friction are known as the planetary
boundary layer. During nighttime or wintertime
conditions over land with no convective heating,
this layer may collapse to a thickness of <0.1 km.
It is the planetary boundary layer that serves as the
immediate reservoir for pollutants put into the
atmosphere from the Earth's surface. Thin or
tightly capped (i.e., inversion layer) planetary
boundary layers are thus responsible for increased
severity of pollution levels.
Spatial and temporal variations
The incidence, absorption, and reflection of solar
radiation and the responding fluxes of sensible and
l
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Figure 9.11 Sketch of global hydrological cycle processes.
latent heat and infrared thermal fluxes, as described
above, vary with latitude, season, and other climatic
conditions. The amount of absorbed solar radiation
varies on an annual average from >300 W/m 2 in
tropical latitudes to < 100 W1m2 in high latitudes,
as illustrated in Figure 9.12 [43]. The net radiative
flux at the top of the atmosphere also varies widely
with longitude, weather and climatic fluctuations,
and seasons.
Global temperature change from
disruptions of radiative energy
fluxes
A framework for ranking potential
global climate modifications
The atmospheric concentration of CO2 has
increased by about 25% since preindustrial times,
largely because of the burning of fossil fuel [47].
Its concentration is expected to be more than double
preindustrial values by the end of the twenty-first
century l48]. But why are these points so remark-
able? There are other trace gases in the atmosphere,
albeit in more minute quantities, whose relative
concentrations have been increased much more by
human activities. Much of the haze over continental
areas is now of human origin. There have been
large decreases in recent years in the extent of
tropical forests. Could these changes be yet more
important for climate? Perhaps the construction of
more highways or the increasingly large number of
solar collectors on roofs could change climate. Some
systematic approaches are obviously needed simply
to compare and establish the relative importance
for climate of all such changes in the environment
caused by human activities. After such a com-
parison, those changes that appear most sig-
nificant for climate can be studied further to
improve quantitative projections of future effects.
The mathematical tools we use both to establish
relative effects and to make detailed projections of
future climate are climate models. The simplest
such model is the zero-dimensional energy balance
model, which is inferred from the global average
balance between the absorbed solar radiation and
the thermal infrared radiation leaving the atmo-
sphere. Many more elaborate climate models have
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versus latitude and time of year [43].
been developed; the physically most complete are
the general circulation models (GCMs), reviewed
on pp 275-277. All such models satisfy in principle
the constraint of global energy balance.
The term "external change" is used for any
changes made outside the climate system that, in
turn, can effect a change in climate [49]. Let f:1Q
be the change in net global radiation at the top of
the atmosphere resulting from some such external
change, e.g., a changed solar constant or a change
in concentration of radiatively active gases. For
equilibrium, the climate system must adjust its loss
of thermal and reRected solar radiation to balance
f:1Q.
The thermal emission changes with changing
temperatures of the Earth's surface, of atmospheric
molecules, and of clouds. As discussed in the pre-
vious section, large-scale winds and ocean currents
redistribute thermal energy horizontally within the
climate system, and small-scale convective processes
move energy vertically. To some extent, then, the
temperature at any point in the climate system is
linked to the global average surface temperature.
In simple climate models, the net thermal emission
leaving the atmosphere is taken to be directly pro-
portional to surface temperature. Examples of pos-
sible failures of this assumption are discussed in
the next section.
Changes in reRected solar radiation resulting
from internal climate dynamics would largely be
the result of changes in the extent and reRective
properties of clouds or of large-scale fields of ice
and snow. Sea ice in the Arctic Ocean and around
Antarctica is especially significant because of its
relatively large area in the spring and summer,
seasons of greatest local incident solar Rux [50]. The
area of snow and ice is closely related to the extent
of average air temperatures below O°C. Thus,
many simple climate models have used local surface
temperature to define the margin of high albedos
due to snow and ice. To the extent that local surface
temperature varies with global temperature, the
contribution to global albedo by ice and snow is also
proportional to global temperature [51].
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Global feedback model
Climate system with
feedback parameter A
and for A. However, if changes occur on a time scale
of less than 100 years or so, it is necessary to consider
an additional "thermal inertia" term in equation
(9.\) that represents the fraction of tlQ required to
provide heat to the oceans. In this section, I am
largely concerned with the various human contribu-
tions to tlQ. However, some comments on a likely
range of values for A and ocean thermal inertia
modification are necessary for perspective, though
neither are well-established quantities.
The feedback term A can be represented by the
sum of individual contributions to clirr:ate feedback.
Especially large and uncertain are the feedbacks
associated with changes in atmospheric water vapor
concentrations and in various radiative properties
of cloudiness and the ice-snow albedo feedback;
that is, the change of reRected solar radiation with
changes in the cover of snow and sea ice resulting
from temperature change (see pp 277-279).
I have developed elsewhere a detailed analysis of
the most likely values of these individual contribu-
tions to the global feedback parameters and their
uncertainties [52]. The most remarkable new inputs
into such an analysis are the results of recent model-
ing studies [3,53]. The first of these studies [53J
indicates the possibility of a much larger cloud feed-
back than previously thought likely, whereas the
second indicates the possibility of a large ice-albedo
feedback. Together, these studies suggest that past
estimates of the most likely values of A may have
been somewhat too large and that its precise value
is considerably more uncertain than previously
believed. For the purposes of this chapter, I take
A = \.5 W/m2 °C [54].
Ocean thermal inertia generally reduces the
global temperature change from that implied by
equation (9.\). For time scales too short for ocean
surface waters to warm, i.e., a few weeks or less, the
temperature change over land in response to small
global radiation perturbations is only about 10% of
the response implied by equation (9.\) [55]. For
time scales of a few years or less, the oceanic heat
uptake involves primarily the surface mixed layers.
On time scales of decades, the thermal capacity of
deeper layers must also be included and the transfer
of energy to these layers may still reduce the global
warming to not much more than half of that implied
by equation (9.1).
Equation (9.1) can only be safely used without
regard for ocean thermal inertia on a century time
(9.1 )AtlT=tlQ
Global temperature change
for .6.0 determined by
climate system feedbacks
(temperature, water vapor,
snow albedo, lapse rate, etc.)
More CO2 adds heat .6.0
to global dimate system
Figure 9.73 Calculation of global average surface
temperature change from an energy balance cli-
mate model requires a prescription of the changed
heating of the climate system tlQ for present tem-
peratures and the climate system feedback pa-
rameter A.
Here, tl T is the change in global average surface
temperature and A is the global "feedback param-
eter", to be discussed later.
Equation (9.1) indicates that changes in the global
fluxes of thermal or solar radiation due to human
activities change global temperature in proportion
to the magnitude of the flux change (Figure 9.13).
Application of equation (9.1) to estimate long-
term climatic change simply requires values for tlQ
It is useful to quantify the discussion of potential
changes of global radiation balance through the use
of a very simple model. Global radiation balance is
assumed to be approximated by
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scale. However, it still provides qualitative guidance
for shorter time scales.
Comparison of natural and human
contributions to variations in global
radiation balances
One measure of the significance of changes in global
energy balance mediated by human activities is their
magnitudes relative to natural variations. Long-
period natural variations are, however, still poorly
characterized. Solar fluxes have been observed to
vary around mean values by about 0.1 % on a day-to-
day basis [56]. Measured global temperatures over
the last 100 years are not inconsistent with hypothe-
sized solar output oscillations of the same magni-
tude with periods of 76,22, and 12 years [57].
Volcanic aerosols in the past may have reduced
absorbed global solar radiation by up to about 1%,
averaged over a year [58]. However, these perturba-
tions generally decay with the 2-year residence time
of the stratospheric aerosol, so that long-term effects
depend on the occurrence of multiple volcanic
eruptions.
Global radiation balance may also vary with
natural fluctuations in the climate system, e.g., year-
to-year variations in cloud cover or snow cover.
However, previous satellite measurements of global
outgoing infrared radiation and reflected solar radi-
ation have been too inaccurate to detect natural
year-to-year variations at the expected levels of less
than 1% of the absorbed solar radiation.
In summary, natural fluctuations in global ab-
sorbed solar radiation lie between 0.1 and 1% of
the mean value of 240 W/m2. On time scales of
decades or longer, these variations are unlikely to
exceed 0.4% or to be less than 0.1 % of the absorbed
solar radiation. Thus, external changes in global
radiative fluxes as small as 0.1 % are only of serious
concern for future global climate, according to the
above analysis, provided that many such changes of
the same sign are added together.
For example, at current rates, enough additional
CO2 is added every 3 years to the atmosphere to
reduce the thermal radiation leaving the tropo-
sphere by about 0.1 %. Thus, the amount of CO2
added to the atmosphere in anyone year is of little
concern, but the cumulative effect of a half-
century's worth of additional CO2 added to the
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atmosphere could easily exceed the 1% level of
global radiation disru ption.
Trace gases
There are several atmospheric trace species other
than CO2 whose concentrations are now increasing
in the atmosphere (e.g., Crutzen and Graedel, Chap-
ter 8, this volume) and whose potential effects on
climate are known to be large and to add to the
warming effect of CO2 [59]. Gases in minute con-
centrations may be radiatively important if they
have strong absorption bands in the 8 to 12/-Lm
window of atmospheric thermal radiation, which
contains about 30% of the upward infrared radi-
ation emitted by the Earth's surface. At other
wavelengths, strong absorption by atmospheric
water vapor and CO2 greatly weakens the effects of
any other radiative absorbers. Gases in very minute
concentrations absorb primarily in line cores and,
thus, their effects are linear in relation to concentra-
tion, in contrast, e.g., to CO2whose effect varies with
the logarithm of its concentration. Concentration
of a trace gas must reach the order of 1 p.p.b. or
larger for it to be important, given that it has
strong absorption in the 8 to 12 /-Lm window.
Extensive examination of all known atmospheric
trace gases has revealed only a few that have large
enough concentrations and strong enough absorp-
tion bands in the correct window to contribute sig-
nificantly to future climate change. However, pres-
ent indications are that practically all these gases
are increasing in the troposphere and that their
total future effect may be comparable to that of
increasing CO2 content.
Perhaps the most important trace gases from the
viewpoint of future climate effects are the chloro-
fluorocarbons F-11 and F-12 (CFCI 3 and CF2C12'
respectively). These compounds are analogous to
CO2 in that their current accumulation in the atmo-
sphere is not only unambiguously known to result
from human economic activities, but also emissions
from the known sources of these compounds agree
well with the measured global atmospheric
increases. The compounds F-11 and F-12 are almost
entirely inert in the troposphere and are only
destroyed by hard ultraviolet radiation in the
stratosphere. They thus have a lifetime in the cli-
mate system of 50 to 100 years [60]. Excess CO2 has
270
an even longer lifetime, being removed only by
mixing into deep ocean waters and eventual incor-
poration into ocean sediments [61].
Another long-lived species of importance is
nitrous oxide (N 20), which also has a lifetime of
about 150 years. Its primary natural sources are the
soil and oceanic nitrogen cycles as mediated by
microorganisms, but these are not well-quantified.
The reasons for the current increase of 0.3% N20
per year are not known [62], but this increase is
thought to be more likely the result of fossil fuel
combustion than of disruption of the soil nitrogen
cycles. The implication is that any potential climatic
effect due to changes in amounts of long-lived
atmospheric compounds would last for at least a
century, even after the sources of the additional
concentrations have been removed.
Other important species for climate are methane
(CH4 ) [63] and tropospheric [64] and stratospheric
[65] 03' These compounds have relatively short
lifetimes, but future changes in their concentrations
may be the result of changes in long-lived trace
atmospheric species or other, but slowly reversible,
environmental changes. Thus, the climatic effects
of changes in CH 4 or 0 3 could be persistent. Atmo-
spheric CH 4 , the result of environmental microbio-
logical processes, is now increasing for unknown
reasons. The chemical cycles of tropospheric and
stratospheric 0 3 are known to be affected by other
trace atmospheric gases, including those mentioned
above. No significant trends in total global 0 3 con-
centrations have yet been unambiguously detected,
in part because of the relatively large natural vari-
ability of 0 3 concentrations. However, 0 3 in the
lower troposphere above Europe and North
America has increased by roughly 2% per year since
the late 1960s [66].
Albedo changes from aerosol and land
surface changes
Human activities can change the albedo of land
surfaces or the radiative properties of the atmo-
sphere through the introduction of aerosols. These
factors are considered here only with regard to their
effects on global radiation balance. Their regional
climatic effects, likely to be larger, are discussed
later. Past conversions of forests into agricultural
lands may have increased the reflection of solar
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radiation by as much as 1 W1m2 over human history,
but probably by no more than 0.2 W1m2 over the
last 30 years [67]. The largest contributors to
planetary albedo increase are removal of tropical
forests and increasing the area of deserts. Changes
likely over the next 100 years would increase
planetary reflection by less than 1 W/m 2 [68] and
probably not more than 0.3 W/m 2 .
Humans introduce aerosols into the atmosphere
through industrial activities, fossil fuel and biomass
burning, and agricultural practices. Important com-
ponents of these aerosols are carbon particles, sul-
fate particles, and natural soil particles. These aero-
sols have short, about 10 days, residence times in
the atmosphere and their sources are localized, so
their atmospheric concentrations are highly variable
[69]. For this reason, and because of the wide range
of radiative properties, the impact of anthropogenic
aerosols on net radiative fluxes at the top of the
atmosphere cannot be readily characterized, but is
possibly small. The climatic effects of natural aero-
sols are somewhat better estimated.
The expected large increases in solar collectors
by the year 2100 would decrease albedo over the
area covered by the collectors, especially in desert
regions, by as much as 0.1 to 0.3, but probably would
decrease the global average absorbed solar radiation
by less than 0.1 W/m2 • For example, an albedo
decrease of 0.3 applied over I % of the total land
area would decrease the global average reflected
radiation by about 0.1 W1m2 [68]. Likewise, even a
large amount of direct energy release would have
only a small effect, e.g., 50 terawatts of energy
release, five times the current usage, is equivalent
to 0.1 W/m2 averaged over the globe [70]. Thus,
any possible global energy change due to surface
albedo thanges, aerosols, or direct energy release
in the next 100 years is likely to be quite small
compared to the expected radiative effects of trace
gases by 2100, and perhaps even to natural vari-
ability.
Synthesis in terms of a surprise-free
scenario for global warming
The predominant effect of future human activities
on global climate is likely to be one of warming.
Only modifications of surface albedo and perhaps
increases in aerosol concentrations are expected to
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counter this tendency, and even then not by a large
amount; a likely upper limit is 1 W/m~. Table 9.1
suggests the likely range of trace-gas warming
effects by the year 2100. The value and uncertainty
indicated for CO2are from the Monte Carlo analysis
by Nordhaus and Yohe for future energy use given
in the recent NAS publication Changing Climate
[71]. Darmstadter, Chapter 5, this volume, discusses
these and other energy projections and emphasizes
the fragility of such projections, their great uncer-
tainty, and strong dependence on modeling
assumptions.
The concentrations of CFCl3 and CF2C12' indi-
cated in Table 9.1, correspond approximately to
steady-state values assuming double the current
emission rates. Doubling of N20, CH4 , and tropo-
spheric 0 3 concentrations from current concentra-
tions has been suggested by a number of authors
[72], but this is largely an educated guess inferred
from current trends and concepts as to likely causes.
The last four entries in Table 9.1 are even wilder
guesses [73]. They mainly illustrate the point that
"all other" trace gases beyond the first seven entries
in Table 9.1 can probably be neglected in consider-
ing future radiative effects. All the 95% uncertainty
limits, except that for CO2, are my own estimates.
On the basis of the expected warming of 9 W/m2,
i1Q in Table 9.1, I suggest that by the year 2100
the expected net effect of human activities since
preindustrial times will be to increase global tem-
perature by about 6 ac. According to the uncer-
tainty range of the figures in Table 9.1, if there
were no drastic changes from the expected levels
of the world economy and development, the actual
change in i1Q would probably lie between 3
and 15 W/m2. According to equation (9.1), with
Table 9.1 Trace gas radiative effect scenario for the year 2100
CFCI 3 0.20 p.p.b. Anthropogenic
release
CF2CI 2 0.33 p.p.b. Anthropogenic
release
CCI. 0.14 p.p.b. Anthropogenic
release
CH 3CCI 3 0.15 p.p.b. Anthropogenic
release
CH 3 CI 0.6 p.p.b.
All other 0.1 p.p.b.
chlorocarbons
CH. 1.7 p.p.m.
N2 0 0.3 p.p.m.
CO 2 345 p.p.m.
Linear1.2xO.7 to x5x2
3% total column 1% column gain 0.2 Not known
loss but 50% to 20% column
loss at 40 km, loss
5% increase
in lower
stratosphere
2.0 p.p.b. 1 to 5 p.p.b. 0.5 Linear
4.0 p.p.b. 2 to 10 p.p.b. 1.1 Linear
1.0p.p.b. 0.1 to 10 p.p.b. 0.2 Linear
3.0 p.p.b. 0.5 to 3 p.p.b. 0.1 Linear
1.0 p.p.b. 0.1 to 10 p.p.b. 0.01 Linear
1.0 p.p.b. 0.2 Linear
Total (rounded) 9±6
Expected .10
Expected at top of Dependence
concen tra tions Range of (95%) troposphere of.10 on
in year 2100 likely values (W/m 2) concentration
720 p.p.m. 500 to 1200 p.p.m. 4.5 Logarithm
3 p.p.m. 1 to 10 p.p.m. 0.5 Square root
0.5 p.p.m. 0.3 to 0.8 p.p.m. 0.5 Square root
Likely cause of
increase
Fossil fuel, soil.
and biomass
carbon
Changes in OH
or sources
Changes in
nitrification and
denitrification.
fossil fuel
Anthropogen ic
change in
tropospheric
chemistry
CI•. NO.
Current
concentrations
0 3 (stratosphere) Profile
Species
0 3 (troposphere) Profile
1
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A= 1.5 W/m~, the consequence of this I1Q change
would be a global temperature increase of between
2 and 10°C over past historical values. These
results, of course, involve considerable subjective
judgment [74] and are made without a thorough
study of all the questions involved, ranging from
those of future human economic development
through biogeochemical cycles to the complex pro-
cesses in the climate system. However, I believe my
confidence limits and most likely estimates are
defensible and could be much more thoroughly
quantified without being drastically revised, pro-
vided we can assume that trace gas emissions will
not be constrained to ameliorate their environ-
mental effects. Thus, the estimates provide a useful
basis for discussion of some aspects of future global
climate. It is unlikely that temperatures will increase
uniformly ~t all latitudes. However, it is not yet
possible to estimate regional changes with any
confidence [75].
Internal redistributions of
energy in the climate system
including disruptions of the
hydrological cycle
In the previous section I discussed global climatic
change resulting from changes in the absorption of
solar radiation or in the emission of infrared radia-
tion as viewed from the top of the atmosphere.
Changes in the concentrations of atmospheric trace
gases are the most likely cause of such a disruption
of the global radiative budget. These gases, with
the exception of tropospheric 0 3 , are long-lived
compared to atmospheric-transport time scales of
a few years or less, and so changes in their con-
centrations would occur nearly uniformly in all
parts of the troposphere. Their radiative effects,
likewise, vary but little with latitude.
In this section, by contrast, I consider possible
future environment perturbations whose primary
effect is that of redistribution of energy within the
climate system rather than of changing energy
fluxes at the top of the atmosphere. Significant
redistribution effects may result in three ways:
(l) From relatively intense modifications of net
incident energy fluxes.
Sustainable development of the biosphere
(2) From changes in atmospheric or oceanic trans-
port processes on a less than global scale.
(3) From a change in internal conversions between
different forms of energy.
This last category involves primarily changes in the
hydrological cycle. Because human activities are
largely confined to land surfaces, redistribution
effects are most likely to be found over land.
Intensive modifications of net incident
energy flux
The most important intense modifications of net
incident energy flux over large areas involve modifi-
cations of surface albedo by extensive changes in
land use. The basic response of the atmosphere to
concentrated changes in energy input is to redis-
tribute that change over a broader area. The
detailed climatic effects of this energy redistribution
are thus a subject of inquiry, as well as the more
local effect of the changed energy input. Activities
of a potentially large-enough scale include: large-
scale tropical deforestation, desertification of arid
lands, large areal changes in land devoted to irri-
gated agriculture; large increases in continental
aerosol; possible vast arrays of solar collectors. The
first two of these activities could reduce the albedo
at the top of the atmosphere over large areas, e.g.,
0.1 % to I % of global land area by between 0.02 and
0.1 or so [76]. The last two activities could decrease
surface albedos by comparable amounts [77]. Thus,
net radiative heating of the surface-atmosphere
system could be changed by as much as 5 to 25 W1m 2
over large areas with land-surface heating increased
by up to twice as much. The actual size of areas and
time spans involved depend on the nature and pace
of future human development, which is not projec-
ted here.
A specific example that has been studied is the
effect of albedo change on drought over the Sahel
region of Africa. This region, on the southern mar-
gin of the Sahara Desert, has a width of about 5°
latitude and extends across Africa, about 20° longi-
tude (about 106 km 2 or 0.7% of total global land
area). Analytic and numerical studies initiated by
Charney et al. [78] support the following hypothesis.
An increase of albedo over this region by 0.2 would
promote a large (e.g., about 40%) decrease in
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rainfall during the summer rainy season directly
over the modified area. Thus, if the albedo increase
were due to removal of vegetation, the resultant
climatic change would tend to maintain itself.
A decrease in net incident energy in an atmo-
spheric column is necessarily compensated by an
import of energy from elsewhere. The hydrody-
namic response to this energy deficit is sinking
motions over the region of energy deficit. These
sinking motions warm the atmospheric column and
suppress rainfall, increasing further the energy
deficit. Cloudiness is also decreased. With less
clouds, both the absorption of solar radiation and
the loss to space of infrared radiation in the surface-
atmosphere system are increased. The temperature
at the ground may either increase or decrease
depending on changes in net radiation received at
the ground and changes in evapotranspiration. It
is likely that these changes would be accompanied
by changes in atmospheric climate of opposite sign
outside the region of surface albedo modification.
Teleconnections to remote regions cannot be
excluded [79]. A qualitatively similar atmospheric
response would be expected to occur with large
surface albedo changes elsewhere; details would
depend on the existing climate of the perturbed
regIOn.
Modifications of internal energy fluxes
Generation of electricity by transfer of colder, deep
ocean water to the surface [80] is an example of
modifications. of internal energy fluxes in the
climate system. The impact of such an activity on
climate depends on its extent. Possible impacts of
such modifications can be estimated by comparing
their horizontal scale and the magnitude of their
energy flux disruptions with that of natural fluxes.
Ocean temperature anomalies of a degree or larger
produce large local changes in the fluxes of sensible
and latent heat to the atmosphere. In the tropics,
these changes are primarily compensated by
changes in convective rainfall. The heat released by
convective rainfall drives local vertical motions.
Through teleconnections, these motions can change
climate elsewhere, even at great distances [81].
Rivers flowing into the Arctic Ocean help main-
tain the low salinity of near-surface water and hence
the stable stratification of the Arctic Ocean [82].
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Thus, the proposed large-scale diversion of rivers
into the Caspian and possibly Azov Seas would
increase vertical mixing in the Arctic Ocean and
perhaps destabilize the Arctic ice pack. However,
studies to date suggest that this climate change prob-
lem may not be serious [83].
The most catastrophic climate change that could
be brought on by disruption of internal energy
fluxes is that which would accompany a large-scale
nuclear war. Large fires following a nuclear
exchange could readily produce enough smoke to
prevent sunlight from reaching the surface over
much of the Northern Hemisphere for a period of
several weeks [84]. Since the smoke would probably
decrease planetary albedo, the analysis of the pre-
vious section would predict a net increase of tem-
peratures. However, more detailed study [85] sug-
gests that large surface cooling is by far the most
likely possibility. The atmosphere near the top of
the smoke layer would be strongly heated and its
temperature increased by at least several tens of
degrees. This change in the atmospheric tem-
perature profile would greatly reduce convective
energy exchange between atmosphere and surface.
This reduced convective energy exchange, together
with a large reduction of net radiation incident at
the surface, could produce temperature decreases
over land in the Northern Hemisphere summer of
more than 10°C. The temperature changes over
land would require only a few days to be established
because of the low heat capacity of land surfaces.
Temperatures over oceans, on the other hand,
would decrease but little in the presence of smoke
clouds of only a few weeks' duration because of the
large oceanic heat capacity, but oceanic changes that
did occur could persist for several years or more.
The short-term climatic effects expected from a
nuclear war are illustrated in Figure 9.14.
Over longer periods, the dominant climatic
effects of nuclear war could be due to changes in
trace gas concentrations in the atmosphere and in
land surface properties resulting directly from the
large fires and indirectly from the impact of
reduced sunlight on the biosphere [84].
Disruptions of the hydrological cycle
The climatic effects of nuclear war that occur for
the duration of the smoke clouds would include
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large disruptions in atmospheric and surface hydro-
logical processes. More benign future human
activities may also change various aspects of the
hydrological cycle and in this way modify climate
over large areas of the Earth. The important
climatic change questions include what changes of
rainfall will there be, if any, in terms of, e.g., total
amounts, time, and space distributions? What
. changes will there be in the moisture carried in the
sOli and in soil erosion? What changes will there be
in stream flow, either as it affects water su pplies or
threats of flooding?
Changes in net incidence of energy at the top of
the atmosphere have feedbacks with the hydrologi-
cal cycle, as previously discussed. Changes in net
radiative energy absorbed at the surface are bal-
anced by changes in sensible and latent fluxes from
the surface. Likewise, changes in rainfall imply
modified surface evapotranspiration.
Direct changes in surface hydrology over large
areas may occur as a result of changes in vegetative
cover.or in the area covered by irrigated agriculture.
Tropical deforestation, in particular, implies sig-
nificant modifications of surface hydrology,
depending on the properties of the subsequent
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vegetative cover. Disruptions of the land part of the
hydrological cycle, per se, are likely to place more
stress on the global biosphere than are the con-
sequent effects on the atmosphere. Of considerable
importance are the effects of disruptions in vegeta-
tion cover on water-storage systems. Crosson, Chap-
ter 4, this volume, emphasizes the large economic
damage of silt loading. Changes in water supply
resulting either from changes in vegetative cover
or future climatic cha'1ge are also of serious
concern.
The micrometeorological effects of tall vegetation
differ considerably from those of short vegetation.
Because of greater surface roughness, interception,
i.e., reevaporation from leaves, usually removes a
larger fraction of incident rainfall from tall than
from short vegetation and makes the evapotranspi-
ration more dependent on atmospheric humidity
and leaf temperature and less dependent on net
incident radiation [86].
To the extent that runoff is increased, evapotrans-
piration is decreased. A change in the rate of
evapotranspiration relative to that of sensible heat
fluxes could modify the time and spatial characteris-
tics of rainfall. Larger sensible heat fluxes would
Figure 9.14 Climatic
nuclear war.
effects of
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likely promote more intense, more local, and more
sporadic convective rainfall. Such a change in the
rainfall is also a likely consequence of a warmer
climate, such as would result from increased con-
centrations of atmospheric trace gases. More intense
and local rainfall would produce more soil erosion
damage, more runoff, and more drought-like con-
ditions, even if the total average rainfall remained
the same.
Conversion of forest or semiarid grasslands into
irrigated agriculture [87] replaces a surface that
may have had considerable resistance to evapotrans-
piration with a surface that both freely transpires
and freely evaporates water vapor. Increases of
water flux to the atmosphere with a change to irriga-
tion would thus be largest in arid lands. Detailed
studies of the possible climatic consequences of
large-scale conversion into irrigated agriculture
have not yet been made and would require realistic
descriptions of the future extent of such a con-
verSiOn.
Models for simulating the
climate system
Processes modeled
The climatic processes described in previous sec-
tions can be quantitatively treated only through the
use of complex computer models [88]. This section
is intended as a brief introduction to such models.
The most comprehensive models of the atmo-
spheric part of the climate system are called general
circulation models (GCMs) [89J. These models have
been developed over the last 30 years in conjunction
with the development of numerical weather-predic-
tion models [90J. The atmosphere is represented
by a three-dimensional mesh of points, typically
separated by about 5° latitutude or longitude and
by about 1 km in the vertical dimension. The lower
boundary for this system is the Earth's continents
and oceans with topography smoothed to the model
resolution. The models solve for atmospheric winds,
on an hour-by-hour basis, using the fluid form of
Newton's equations of motion. These winds are
driven by pressure differences that are generated
by spatial variations in temperature. Temperatures
are calculated by application of the laws of thermal
energy conservation at each model grid point.
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Clouds are formed in the models with properties
that determine their effects on solar and thermal
radiation.
Thus, GCMs in simulating atmospheric climate
also necessarily simulate all the day-to-day weather
variations whose statistics make up climate. Tem-
peratures are changed by atmospheric motions,
latent heat release, absorption of solar radiation,
absorption and emission of thermal radiation, and
by transfers of sensible heat from the surface. The
GCMs also solve an equation for conservation of
water vapor at each grid point. Water vapor is
supplied to the atmosphere by the surface through
evaporation. It is moved around in the atmosphere
by winds and removed from the atmosphere by
condensation into rainfall.
A GCM becomes a complete climate model with
the addition of submodels for processes at the
Earth's surface which maintain conservation of
energy and water for the total climate system. These
submodels include an ocean model, a model for sea
ice, and models for land surface processes, includ-
ing soil moisture and snow cover. With these
ingredients, a GCM responds to the constraints of
global energy balance as discussed on pp 263-266.
The ingredients of a climate model are illustrated
in Figure 9.15.
Some current limitations
The GCMs have tended to use submodels that are
considerably oversimplified compared to state of
the art descriptions for surface processes. Oceans,
for example, are in reality as complex a dynamical
system as the atmosphere and their surface tem-
peratures, the condition needed for the atmo-
spheric model, can only be properly obtained using
ocean GCMs coupled to the atmosphere. However,
it has not been practical to use ocean GCMs in most
climatic change studies. Instead, the horizontal
transport of heat by the oceans has been neglected
and their temperature calculated assuming the
ocean at each grid point to be a uniformly mixed
reservoir for heat. Sea ice has, likewise, been rep-
resented by a one-dimensional slab controlled only
by thermodynamic processes. The important effects
of sea-ice movement have been ignored.
Oversimplified ocean and sea-ice models,
together with questionable descriptions for ice and
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snow albedos, suggest that the ice albedo radiative
feedbacks in GCMs are of doubtful accuracy [91].
Likewise, the models used for land surface water,
snow budgets, and evapotranspiration have been
too simple to allow quantitative evaluation of the
effects of realistic changes in land surface processes
on climate. Modelers have instead concentrated on
large arbitrary changes in surface albedo or in wet-
ness to help demonstrate the hypothesis that such
changes could be of major importance for climate.
It is likely that much more sophisticated and realistic
descriptions of oceans, sea ice, and land surfaces
will be incorporated into GCMs in the next few
years [92]. One practical constraint of any global
model, including GCMs, is their relatively coarse
horizontal spatial resolution, i.e., a few hundred
kilometers or more. This limitation is a result, in
part, of lack of input data on finer scales, but more
especially of the rapid increase of computational
cost with higher resolution. Many of the land pro-
cesses, both natural and human mediated, that
interact with the climate system occur as much finer
scale mosaics than can be represented in the models.
Techniques for averaging over this fine structure
Ocean~ -
Figure 9.15 Components of three-
dimensional climate models.
to obtain inputs at the model resolution are still
poorly developed. These difficulties limit the degree
of confidence that can be placed in model-calculated
responses to changes at the Earth's surface that have
a detailed spatial structure. Presumably, the
development and application of procedures for
coupling global scale to mesoscale models could
alleviate some of the resolution difficulties.
Model variability
The day-to-day weather variations that GeMs gen-
erate in the processes of simulating climate provide
both an opportunity and a limitation. As discussed
on pp 254-263, impacts from future climatic change
will not only depend on shifts in climatic mean
terms but also on both the present weather variabil-
ity and possible changes in it. The questions of
whether and how much weather variability would
change with climatic change can be considered only
with GCMs. The existence of model variability,
however, implies that exact estimates of mean cli-
matic changes would only be possible for an infinite
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ensemble of climate simulations. Anyone simula-
tion consists of a climatic signal with superimposed
model "noise". Climatic change must be obtained
from the difference between a noisy control simula-
tion and a noisy perturbation simulation [93]. The
practical effect of this limitation is that only climatic
changes large compared to natural variability can
be quantitatively obtained. Calculating the collective
average and variances about this average of several
control and several perturbation simulations allows
estimates of the variability of model averages, that
is, estimates of the model noise level. Such estimates
can also be made by sampling over several time
intervals sufficiently far apart in the simulations to
be uncorrelated.
Usefulness of climate models for
estimating future climatic change and
its impacts
Climate models, in particular GCMs, are our only
means for determining bounds for possible future
climatic changes. Details as to future global changes
are still rather uncertain, and possible regional vari-
ations from global changes are still largely specula-
tive. However, even with this present state of the
art, GCM climate models do produce physically
consistent scenarios for future climates that can be
obtained by no other means and that include
regional and temporal variability. This variability,
though not likely to be correct in detail, should,
nevertheless, still be quite useful for developing
impact study methodologies sophisticated enough
to recognize the importance of such variability.
Not entirely improbable climatic
changes that might result from
human activities
The most extreme climatic changes that have been
discussed theoretically are the ice-covered Earth
and runaway greenhouse instabilities. These
examples are mentioned here, first to dismiss them
as too improbable to be of serious concern, even
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though either of them would annihilate the terres-
trial biosphere. They are mentioned, second. to
suggest possible paths of exploration for less cata-
strophic, but more probable future extreme climate
changes.
On p 268, I introduced equation (9.1), A!1T=
= !1Q, to compare possible perturbations to global
radiative balances. Evidently, for a given !1Q the
feedback parameter A determines the equilibrium
response of global temperature. The global feed-
backs that may contribute most significantly to A
are water vapor, ice albedo, and cloud radiative
feedbacks. The most extreme possible future global
climatic change is thus defined by combining the
upper limits to possible !1Q with a lower limit to A.
Thus, it is appropriate to discuss the processes con-
tributing to A and their possible ranges.
Water vapor feedback
Water vapor feedback acts to increase climatic
change. That is, with a warmer climate the con-
centrations of atmospheric water vapor increase.
Water vapor is, at present, the largest contributor
to the trapping of outgoing infrared fluxes, so
increased water vapor would enhance considerably
an initial warming. This positive feedback is esti-
mated to reduce A by roughly 1.5 W/m~ °C for pres-
ent conditions [94]. The precise value depends on
possible changes in the vertical and latitudinal distri-
butions of water vapor with climatic change [53].
The action of positive water vapor feedback
depends on increases in atmospheric and surface
temperatures. Could water vapor feedback be
increased enough to make A negative? Any climatic
state with a negative value of A would be unstable
and change to some other state [95]. In the present
context, temperatures might then increase to a
much hotter value, reaching or exceeding the boil-
ing point of water. This "runaway greenhouse"
effect would only be possible, if at all, for a climate
many tens of degrees warmer than today's. Whether
such an instability is theoretically realizable appears
to depend on concomitant changes in the vertical
distribution of water vapor and in the vertical tem-
perature profile [96]. The more immediate question
is whether or not less drastic and more likely warm-
ing situations would be modified by smaller
increases in water vapor feedback.
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Ice albedo feedbacks
Ice albedo feedback refers to change in the cover
of ice and snow with changing surface tem-
peratures. More ice and snow are expected with
colder temperatures and would reflect more solar
radiation and hence further reduce temperatures.
Currently, ice albedo feedback is believed to
decrease A by about 0.5 W/m 2 °C, with various
studies providing estimates between about 0.0 and
0.9 W/m2 °C [97]. This positive feedback increases
with colder temperatures and may have been much
larger during past ice age climates. If ice albedo
feedback were large enough to make A negative,
the climate system would drop to another equi-
librium configuration with complete global cover of
ice and snow. Climate modeling estimates of the
negative AQ required to give this instability range
between 2 and 10% of the absorbed solar radiation
[98].
Recent studies with seasonal models have sug-
gested that ice albedo feedback is dominated by the
effects of changing cover of sea ice [99]. With
increasing temperatures, a maximum possible
change in planetary albedo from decreased snow
and ice can be estimated from the albedo decrease
resulting from the removal of all sea ice and seasonal
snow cover. The Antarctic and Greenland continen-
tal ice sheets are presumed to be unable to change
much in the next 100 years [34]. For a rough esti-
mate, we consider only sea ice, taken to cover 5%
of the globe and reflecting a seasonal average of
about 60 W/m 2 more than would an ocean surface.
These figures imply an upper limit of about 3 W/m2
for the maxim um possible increase in absorbed solar
radiation from a decrease in sea ice due to a warmer
climate.
Cloud radiative feedbacks
Cloudiness influences both the planetary albedo
and the trapping of infrared radiation. Clouds with
low-level tops are important primarily for their
reflection of solar radiation, which depends on the
area of cloud coverage, the amount of liquid water
in the cloud, and the size of the cloud droplets.
Clouds modify infrared fluxes by emitting radiation
at colder temperatures, that is in lesser amounts
than the radiation emitted from lower levels and
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from the surface, which is absorbed in part by the
cloud bottoms [1001.
High, thin cirrus clouds may be largely trans-
parent to solar radiation, but are still important for
trapping infrared radiation. Since tropospheric
temperatures generally decrease upward, increases
in the altitude of cloud tops reduces emission of
infrared radiation to space and warms the climate
system [101].
The existence and radiative properties of clouds
depend on local dynamical and convectional proces-
ses and on the nature and distribution of cloud
condensation nuclei. There are few obvious connec-
tions between cloudiness and global climatic
changes. A warmer climate would be expected to
have higher rainfall rates, thus more intense storm
systems, and probably more convective cloud sys-
tems. Cloud radiative properties might conceivably
provide a large positive feedback on global climatic
change, but this feedback is sufficiently uncertain
that even its sign is doubtful [53, 102]. Present cloud
properties and possible changes over sea-ice mar-
gins are of special concern for evaluating the
magnitude of ice albedo feedbacks.
Limits to potential climatic changes due
to disruption of global radiative fluxes
One conclusion from the above discussion is that
the precise value of the global feedback parameter
A is rather uncertain even for present conditions,
but especially for large changes from present condi-
tions. A probable lower limit to A, excluding ice
albedo feedback but otherwise for present condi-
tions, is about 1.2 W/m2 °C which would only be
realized with a large positive cloud feedback. If we
take 15 W/m 2 (Table 9.1) as the maximum likely
increased global heating by the year 2100, add to
this 3 W/m2 for ice albedo feedback, and neglect
possible effects of ocean thermal inertia, we infer a
maximum possible global temperature increase of
about 15°C. Since the upper limit to heating and
the inverse to A are estimated to be reached or
exceeded with a probability of 2.5%, a global tem-
perature increase equal to or greater than 15°C
formally has a probability of 0.06%. However, a
warming by 9 °C or more by the end of the twenty-
first century has a 1% probability according to my
analysis. Thus, it is not totally improbable that the
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climate system could achieve in the next 100 years
conditions as warm as the Cretaceous era of 100
million years ago when polar temperatures were 10
to 20°C warmer and tropical temperatures were
perhaps 5°C warmer than present. With such dras-
tic temperature increases, sea levels would rise by
more than 1 m as a result of ocean thermal
expansion. Another 6 m of sea-level rise would be
possible, if the West Antarctic ice sheet began to
disintegrate rapidly [103]. A year-round ice-free
Arctic Ocean would itself greatly change climatic
conditions in high northern latitudes.
It is also not entirely improbable, on the other
hand, that global temperatures in the next 100 years
would change little from their present values.
However, the chance of an occurrence of ice-age-
like conditions in the next 100 years is extremely
improbable, less than one chance in a million, in
my opinion. Drastic climatic change resulting from
the impact of a large meteorite, as believed respon-
sible for global extinctions at the Cretaceous-
Tertiary boundary, is even less likely [104].
Extreme regional changes
On the basis of the current large rates of defor-
estation, it is plausible that natural tropical forests
will largely disappear over the next 100 years [105].
The most sensible replacement would be managed
silviculture and agricultural systems of comparable
or greater productivity. However, conversion into
vast expanses of wastelands with little vegetative
cover of economic value is not entirely improbable.
Such a change would imply large changes in
regional and perhaps global climate.
Also, whereas deserts are most likely to stay
approximately where they are over the next 100
years, it is not totally impossible that human misuse
and overuse of arid lands could accelerate natural
processes of desertification to the point where most
arid lands would be converted into deserts over the
next 100 years. Extensive desertification would also
imply quite significant modifications in regional and
global climate.
As a possible trend in the other direction, the
extent of irrigated agriculture in arid lands could
greatly increase with concomitant implications for
the climate system [106].
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None of these extreme possibilities of large-scale
land changes has yet been studied by climate
modelers with any degree of realism. However,
likely bounds on possible climatic change could be
established through consideration of past modeling
studies of the effects of large hypothetical changes
in land surface hydrology or albedo [107].
Concluding discussion
Summary of the analytical framework
for climate change
Some related themes are emphasized in this chap-
ter. First, it is very important to recognize that the
climate system cannot be simply represented by
average conditions, but involves a wide range of
spatial and temporal variability.
Second, human activities may change climate on
a global scale through large-scale disruptions of
energy fluxes. The possible disruptions are of two
kinds. The first consists of global changes in the net
radiative-energy absorption of the climate system.
Such a change is likely to modify global temperature
and produce other accompanying climatic vari-
ations. The second kind of disruption has as a
primary impact a redistribution of energy within
the climate system. Energy redistributions may be
forced by less-than-global changes in net radiative
absorption, or by disruptions in internal energy
fluxes within the climate system, or by modifications
of hydrological processes, especially at the surface.
The most powerful tools for quantitative evalu-
ation of the climatic consequences of energy flux
disruptions are climate models, especially GCMs as
described on pp 275-277. However, in most cases
considerable improvements in the models are
necessary before adequate confidence can be placed
in the results.
Characterizing extreme climatic change
Research into the extreme possibilities of future
climatic change might be both different from and
more useful than research devoted to most likely
possibilities. From a rational decision-making,
economic viewpoint, reducing the extreme boundaries
of 95 or 99% probable climatic change may be much
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more valuable than attempting to refme the state-
ment of the mas/likely climate change. Past modeling
studies have helped to elucidate ranges of possible
climatic change, but on an accidental and nonsys-
tematic basis. That is, much of the modeling work
has not yet reached a state of maturity where there
are consistent and accepted treatments for cloud
radiation and ice-snow albedo feedback processes
and, even for the same formulations, these pro-
cesses may give rather different results in different
GCM models. Thus, the Hansen GCM [53] has a
large positive cloud feedback unlike that found in
any other model, and the Washington and Meehl
[3] seasonal cycle GCM simulations have indicated
a larger ice albedo feedback than found in any other
model. With an excessive insistence on a scientific
consensus, such "outlier" results are likely to disap-
pear; modelers are generally quite good at tuning
model parameters within the range of possible
values so that their model provides what are
regarded as acceptable results. Modelers could
be encouraged to examine the possibilities of pro-
moting simulations of extreme possibility by
suitable selections of parameter values within their
acceptable range. For example, what would result
from combining Hansen's large cloud feedback
with Washington and Meehl's large ice albedo
feedback?
In principle, important model parameters can
be identified, their values assigned a probability
distribution, and these parameters varied according
to Monte Carlo simulation techniques. However,
besides extreme computational expense, such an
approach would fIrst require much more under-
standing and agreement than at present as to what
are the most important model parameterizations,
what are optimum formulations, and how uncertain
they are. For example, in spite of intensive effort
over the last decade to solve the cloud radiation
problem, no solution is yet in sight.
Another approach to characterizing extreme
possibilities of climatic change is through study of
the past observational record. To the extent that
past radiation balance changes can be identified,
past climatic variations help put bounds on the
sensitivity of climate models to future perturbations
in radiative forcing.
Current monitoring systems, extended into the
future, should attempt to detect not only shifts in
mean conditions, but also shifts in the occurrence
Sustainable development oj the biosphere
of extreme events and the occurrence of previously
unrecorded extreme events.
Closer interaction between climate
modeling and impact studies
Modelers sometimes marvel at the (seeming to
them) relatively large efforts devoted to the study
of climatic impacts. They may fail to recognize the
extent of effort needed simply to develop effective
methodologies in the impact area. Impact experts
and other scientists whose studies relate to questions
of climatic change may, on the one hand, have
unrealistic expectations of the level of information
that might be available from climate models while,
on the other hand, actually consider in their studies
much less information than could be available from
climate models. Third world countries may lack the
scientific expertise to evaluate their own situations
in light of the conclusions provided by climate
modeling and impact studies.
Closer communications between the different
interests mentioned above are clearly desirable. Yet
many disciplinary experts already feel resentful of
the amount of their time they must devote to partici-
pation in interdisciplinary workshops and writing
for interdisciplinary or nonexpert audiences. How
can interdisciplinary communications be better pro-
moted in the area of climate studies? More meetings
and papers or international programs are probably
not the answer. I think the solution must lie in a
closer integration between the research programs
of modeling centers and the research activities of
the users of climate studies. This objective might
be achieved, in part, through more extensive pro-
grams of visiting scientists. Perhaps electronic com-
munication systems can be used to maintain contacts
between already acquainted colleagues in cross-
disciplinary areas.
A specific example of modeling information that
should be (but has not yet been) exploited for impact
studies is the wide range of natural weather and
climate variations that are simulated by GCMs. Most
of this information is lost in the process of condens-
ing model output into a form suitable for publica-
tion. Climatic impacts that depend on frequencies
of threshold events might, for example, be most
effectively studied by evaluating the changes in
frequencies of threshold events directly within the
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models rather than by using model estimates of
mean changes to evaluate threshold events. Such a
study would require making the desired informa-
tion one of the quantities that is saved and analyzed
from the ephemeral streams of millions of numbers
that are spewed forth during any given model simu-
lation.
Directions of climate model
improvements
Substantial improvements in climate modeling
capabilities occur on a 10-year time scale and are
now actively being promoted by the World Climate
Research Program. With emphasis on a continu-
ation of current research, the climate modelers
should, in a decade, be able to include, with some
confidence, simulations of cloud radiative proper-
ties. The inclusion of realistic ocean models will
probably still be in its infancy, but perhaps be done
well enough to allow sea-ice albedo feedbacks to be
predicted with some degree of confidence. These
improvements may allow predictions of future
global temperature change for given scenarios of
radiative absorbers with confidence limits of, e.g.,
±30%.
To these improvements perhaps will be added
refined parameterizations of land surface processes
and an improved understanding of the atmospheric
and surface hydrological cycle and its interactions
with internal atmospheric dynamics. The modeling
advances should be sufficient to allow model predic-
tions on the scale of a thousand kilometers or so,
and for monthly averages to be made with some
degree of correspondence to expected future cli-
matic change. Besides simple climatic mean change,
such quantities as possible changes in stochastic
variability, diurnal amplitudes, etc., could be useful.
A decade from now, limitations of global model
resolution may still preclude reliable information
on a scale of a few hundred kilometers or less. This
defect might be alleviated, in part, over selected
areas if the technology of coupling limited-area
mesoscale models to global models is adequately
developed. In any case, models will never provide
precise predictions. The necessary existence of
natural variability in models and in reality and of
remaining model limitations imply that the
maximum available information on future climatic
281
change must necessarily be a probability distribu-
tion of outcomes. Thus, the improvement of
methodologies for establishing uncertainty ranges
and, ideally, probability distributions for model
projections should be emphasized.
Understanding climatic change as part
of a system for sustainable development
of the biosphere
If the modeling improvements discussed above are
realized, the resultant tools should allow an evalu-
ation of potential climatic change and its impacts
to be an important aspect of rational decision mak-
ing regarding the directions of future human
development. Furthermore, increased capabilities
for monitoring climate, as discussed by Izrael and
Munn, Chapter 13, this volume, may be able to
suggest mid-course corrections in developmental
activities when model predictions stray from reality.
Such possibilities are but part of the likely further
large improvements in modeling and monitoring
all the aspects of global environment as we plunge
further into the present "information age" [108].
If the anticipated progress in climate modeling
and monitoring occurs, serious constraints would
still remain in the creation of "usable knowledge".
Many of the modifications of the climate system
now occurring as a result of human activity require
hundreds of years to be reversed, and it is question-
able whether human institutions can halt these
modifications. Thus, adaptation may be the only
feasible response to large-scale climatic change. A
strategy of adaptation would result in the least dis-
ruption of social systems, especially with the benefit
of early warning from modeling studies and
monitoring systems [109].
Climate models can project future climate only
with considerable uncertainties. Although there is
and must be the uncertainty resulting from inac-
curacies in the models themselves, greater uncer-
tainty lies in the projection of future changes in the
model inputs, e.g., the future concentrations of
atmospheric CO2 and other trace gases. Under-
standing better the likely changes in such inputs
requires, on the one hand, an improved under-
standing of the natural biogeophysical system as
proposed in the IGBP program (McElroy, Chapter
7, this volume) and, on the other hand, a better
j j
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understanding of the human systems that may pro-
duce stress on the climate system.
Sustainability in fragile climate areas
The most significant future climatic change may
occur globally. However, any such change will vary
from region to region in both its manifestation and
impact. Developing future sustainable biospheric
systems may require that special attention be given
to relatively undeveloped but ecologically fragile
lands. Such lands occur in the Arctic [110] and
South American tropics (e.g., as reviewed by
Crosson, Chapter 4, this volume). The climate sys-
tem may be especially sensitive to changes in these
regions [Ill]. Furthermore, both the Arctic and
the humid tropics are likely to be greatly affected
by climatic change over the next 50 years. By then,
summer Arctic sea ice may have largely disappeared
and the tropics may be under increasingly severe
stresses from increased flooding, soil erosion, sea-
sonal aridity, and, for some crops, heat stress. These
changes may have considerable implications for the
role of these regions in the atmospheric chemical
system. Thus, some emphasis in research programs
involving biospheric sustainability should be given
to better understanding of the human, biotic, and
climatic interactions in these two regions.
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Commentary
T. M. L. Wigley
Dickinson has provided an excellent (and somewhat
alarming) analysis of probable and possible future
climatic changes. The picture he paints, which is in
290
accord with the majority of current scientific
opinion, shows the world at a climatic watershed,
between a past climate dominated by natural fluctu-
ations and a future climate dominated by the uncon-
trolled effects of man. The changes in store may
well be much larger and much more rapid than
anything we have yet experienced. If so, they will
have to become an integral part of future agricul-
tural, hydrological, and economic planning. But to
integrate climatic change into the socioeconomic
fabric of our lives requires better information than
just global mean temperature; scenarios (or, better
still, predictions) of the regional details of future
climates are required.
General circulation models are the best available
tool for constructing such scenarios of future cli-
mate. But are they, as Dickinson states, the only
tool available? In a decade or so, GCMs may well
be sufficiently well-developed for us to place some
confidence in their predictions on spatial scales
down to 1000 km. At present, however, these
models are extremely limited in their ability to pro-
ject regional climatic change, as evidenced by the
lack of regional consistency between three of the
most recent GCM studies of the effects of elevated
CO2 (Dickinson, note [81)). Given this inconsistency
and the other limitations that Dickinson summarizes
with, at times, embarrassing honesty, is it reasonable
to assert that GCMs "do produce physically con-
sistent scenarios for future climates that can be
obtained by no other means" (p 277, my emphasis)?
In what sense are GCM results physically consistent?
And what other methods are available? Are they so
inferior to the GCM approach?
The model differences noted above can be traced
to differences in the ways that some of the complex
physical processes are parameterized. The results
produced by all models must, of course, be con-
sistent with their own internal sim plifications of
real-world physical processes; in that sense they are
all "physically consistent". But they are clearly
inconsistent with the real world. Internal con-
sistency is an obvious prerequisite of any method
of scenario development; that a method produces
a good approximation to the real-world response
is, however, the final test of its value. GCMs can be
heavily criticized as far as their performance in the
latter area is concerned. As Dickinson rightly
emphasizes, the marked differences between model
simulations of present-day climate and real-world
SU.ltainable development of the biosphere
data, as well as the noted inconsistencies in their
predictions of the response to elevated CO2 con-
centrations, demonstrates their current strictly
limited (arguably negligible) value as far as regional
studies are concerned.
Of course, models will be improved and, perhaps,
they will produce regionally consistent results in
ten years' time. But even then, will we be able to
rely on their predictions? The model studies to
which Dickinson refers are all concerned with the
steady-state response of the climatic system to
imposed external forcings, such as a doubling of
atmospheric CO2 concentration. He notes, however,
that the regional details of the transient response
to a time-dependent forcing (i.e., the real-world
case) may differ considerably from the steady-state
regional details. To predict the transient response
we need three things: a properly validated model,
the right initial conditions, and a prediction of
future forcing. Can we hope to have these in ten
years' time? How does one validate a time-depen-
dent model? The signal-to-noise problems of
validating steady-state results are difficult enough;
for the transient response case they may be well
nigh insurmountable. Will the oceanic and atmo-
spheric observational network be good enough to
be able to specify the initial conditions? The World
Ocean Circulation Experiment offers some hope in
this direction, but there is much yet to be learned
regarding the monitoring requirements for the
ocean. And how can we predict future forcing by,
for example, such important factors as volcanic
eruptions? At present, we do not even know the
past forcing record with any confidence.
GCMs are not the only way to produce physically
consistent scenarios of future climate. Blanket asser-
tions, as they are, can only harm the credibility
of the modeling community. We are not considering
means of providing definite predictions (although it
was once claimed that this was the role of GCMs);
we are considering the estimation of the possible, of
plausible responses of the climate system to external
forcing. And the range of possible responses can
be derived in a number of ways. The past climatic
record contains a wealth of information that can
be used (and has been used) to generate future
climatic scevarios. This information can usefully
complement model-generated data, either to
fill in gaps where there is large uncertainty in
model output or, perhaps, to provide subgrid scale
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detail. And, of course, as a means of validating
model performance, the use of observational
evidence is a fundamental aspect of modeling
work.
There can be little doubt that data from the real
world are physically realistic, and that recent instru-
mental data do not reflect any idealized steady state
of the climate system, but actually follow its transient
response. But are these data relevant? Future cli-
matic forcing will probably be due largely to the
effects of radiatively active gases, such as CO2 ,
CFMs, CH4 , etc., whereas past forcing is thought
to be due to changes in CO2 , volcanic activity, and
(possibly) the output of the Sun. Will the climate
system respond in a similar way to dominantly radia-
tive gas forcings, as it has responded to past forc-
ings? Is the response critically dependent on the
initial state, a state that is currently much warmer
than it was, say, 100 years ago? The answers to these
questions, probably respectively "no" and "yes",
simply mean that the past cannot be used to predict
the future. But past data can be used to produce
physically realistic future scenarios. We now
apparently expect no more than this from GCMs.
Each method has its strengths and weaknesses.
The most detailed data-based scenarios have been
those produced using the instrumental records
from the twentieth century. The basic method is to
compare periods when the world as a whole was
warm with periods when cooler conditions
prevailed, and to extrapolate the differences. In
other words, a past, globally-warm period is used
as an analog for the future. Three early works
[1] used composites of data from individual warm
or cold years, but this method has been criticized
because the processes that cause interannual cli-
matic variations may well be very different from
those involved in secular climatic change. As an
alternative, Lough et al. and Palutikof et al. [2] have
compared data from the warmest and coldest 20-
year periods (viz. 1934-1953 and 1901-1920) in the
period since 1900. These authors also compared
scenarios produced using different analog periods.
They found both similarities and differences, a
result which should remind us of the current state
of the GCM art, where different methods (i.e.,
models) also produce different scenarios.
The telling distinction between data- and model-
based scenarios is that we cannot hope to improve
the former to the same extent that models will be
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improved. Perhaps the only way forward with
purely data-based scenarios is to develop them as
model-guided and selective extrapolative tools. The
scenarios mentioned above have capitalized on the
early twentieth century warming, essentially using
this "as an analog for future warming (as opposed
to warmth). A renewed global warming began
around the mid-1960s, since which time global
mean temperature has increased by about 0.3°C.
We could, therefore, use this most recent warming
episode and, guided by model results and other
physical insights into the possible causes of climatic
change, cautiously and selectively extrapolate
trends into the future. Alternatively, it may be pos-
sible to synthesize model results with past data, to
take those features of model output that we have
most confidence in, and to use these to choose
appropriate data from the past record with which
to fill in the details.
As the years go by and CO2 and other trace gas
concentrations increase, we may well be exploring
uncharted territory further and further, entering
climatic conditions that we have no experience of.
As this happens, what is now the recent past may
become increasingly less relevant. In terms of its
relevance, the carpet of past climates is rolling up
behind us; but, at the same time, new carpet rolls
out under our feet. As climate models are improved,
new and relevant data that can be used for scenario
development will be continually generated. Let us
not lose sight of the potential value of these data.
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Chapter 10
c. S. Holling
The resilience of terrestrial
ecosystems: local surprise
and global change
Editors' Introduction: Adequate explanations of long-term global changes in the biosphere
often require an understanding of how ecological systems function and of how they
respond to human activities at local levels.
Outlined in this chapter is one possible approach to the essential task of linking physical,
biological, and social phenomena across a wide range of spatial and temporal scales. It
focuses on the dynamics of ecological systems, including processes responsible for both
increasing organization and for occasional disruption. Special attention is given to the
prevalence of discontinuous change in ecological systems, and to its origins in specific
nonlinear processes interacting on multiple time and space scales. This ecological scale of
analysis is linked "upward" to the global scale of biogeochemical relationships and the
"Gaia" hypothesis (see Chapters 7, 8, and 9), and "downward" to the local scale of human
activities and institutions (see Chapters 3, 11, and 14).
Introduction
Considerable understanding has been accumulated
during the last decade of the way the world "ticks"
in its various parts, and progress has been made in
recognizing what those parts are and the need to
interrelate them. Only after such developments,
and therefore only recently, could we begin to
address global ecological questions effectively.
There are four key questions. How do the Earth's
land, sea, and atmosphere interact through biologi-
cal, chemical, and physical processes? How do
ecosystems function and behave to absorb, buffer,
or generate change? How does the development of
man's economic activities, particularly in industry
and agriculture, perturb the global system? How
do people - as individuals, institutions, and
societies - adapt to change at different scales? In
this chapter I respond to the second question by
exploring the way ecosystems function and behave,
but with the other three problems in mind.
During much of this century global change has
been slow, although some important cumulative
effects have occurred. The gradual expansion, on
a global scale, of economic and agricultural
development is well represented by regular
increases in atmospheric carbon dioxide (C02 ) of
approximately one part per million per year [IJ.
This increase is attributable to a 2-4% annual
increase in burning fossil fuels and, in part, to
deforestation. The climate during this century has
been benign relative to other periods. Marine fish-
eries stocks, although typically variable, were largely
steady during the period 1920-1970, at least in
relation to the apparent sharp shifts that occur
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among such species as Pacific sardine or Atlantic
herring every 50 to 100 years [2]. Problems of
environmental pollution have increased in geo-
graphical scale from the highly local to the size of
air basins or watersheds, but slowly enough that the
effects have been largely ameliorated [3]. The
deterioration of Lake Baikal in the USSR has been
slowed and that of Lake Erie in North America has
been stopped. Fish have returned to the River
Thames and the extreme smogs of London are now
only memories. Atmosphere, oceans, and land, cou-
pled through biological, chemical, and physical
forces, have apparently been able to absorb the
global changes of this century.
But now qualitative change [4], as distinct from
gradual quantitative change, seems possible. Man's
industrial and agricultural activities have speeded
up many terrestrial and atmospheric processes,
expanded them globally, and homogenized them.
Four qualitative changes are suggested. First, such
changes are being considered as ecological, not
simply environmental. For example, pollution can
no longer be viewed as inertly burdening the atmo-
sphere. Rather, its impacts on vegetation can accel-
erate the consequences by impairing the regulatory
processes that are mediated by vegetation. Second,
the intensity of the impact of man's activities and
their acceleration of the time dynamics of natural
processes can influence the coupling of long-term
regulatory phenomena that link atmosphere,
oceans, and land. Third, some of these qualitative
changes are likely to be irreversible in principle. So
long as the change is local, it can be reversed because
there are alternative sources both of genetic vari-
ability and species and for the renewal of air and
water. But this becomes less and less an option as
the change becomes more homogeneous with
increasing scale, from local to continental to hemi-
spheric, and then to global. Finally, with the option
of reversibility reduced, increasing emphasis will be
placed on adapting to the inevitable. But individual,
institutional, and social adaptation each have their
own time dynamics and histories. There has been
little experience in translating the remarkable adap-
tive responses of individuals to local changes [5]
into responses to international and global ones.
In order to analyze ecosystem function and
behavior in such a way that global changes can be
related to local events and action, I consider
four topics. The first is a conceptual framework that
can help focus treatment of the contrasts between
global and local behavior and between continuous
and discontinuous behavior. Since the framework
describes different perceptions of regulation and
stability, it provides the necessary background for
the second topic: the particular causal relations and
processes within ecosystems, the influence of exter-
nal variation on them, and their behavior in time
and space. The third topic synthesizes our present
understanding of the structure and behavior of
ecosystems in a way that has considerable generality,
and organizational power. The fourth connects
that understanding to our knowledge of global
phenomena and of local perception and action.
The conceptual framework:
Gaia and surprise
In this chapter I discuss ecosystems, but first the
relationships between ecosystems and two other key
aspects of the global puzzle must be established;
namely, with global biogeophysical events, and with
societal perception and management. In the former
case, some image is needed of the way the global
systems in the atmosphere, oceans, and land inter-
act. That image is provided by the Gaia hypothesis
[6]. And to relate our understanding of the behavior
of local ecosystems to the way societies perceive and
manage those systems the concept of surprise is
needed: Gaia and surprise are dealt with in turn.
Gaia
Gaia is the "global biochemical homeostasis"
hypothesis, proposed by Lovelock and Margulis
[6, 7], that life on Earth controls atmospheric condi-
tions optimal for the contemporary biosphere. The
Gaia hypothesis presumes homeostatic regulation
at a global level. An example is the maintenance of
21 % oxygen in the air, a composition representing
the highest possible level to maximize aerobic
metabolism, but just short of the level that would
make Earth's vegetation inflammable. The resi-
dence time of atmospheric oxygen is of the order
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of thousands of years, a time scale that renders
methane (CH 4 ) production by anaerobic organisms
an important regulator of oxygen concentration.
The mechanism proposed includes the burying of a
small amount of the carbonaceous material of living
matter each year and the production of CH 4 , which
reacts with oxygen, thereby providing a negative
feedback loop in the system of oxygen control.
Similarly, linked biological and geological feedback
mechanisms have been proposed for the regulation
of global temperature. The.regulation is mediated
by control of CO2 in the atmosphere at concentra-
tions that have compensated for increasing solar
radiation over geological time [8).
Even though the Gaia hypothesis is speculative,
at least there is more and more evidence for the
dynamic role of living systems in determining the
composition of many chemicals in the air, soil, and
water [9). And at a smaller geographical scale, as
discussed later, there are many ecosystem processes
that cybernetically regulate conditions for life.
There are three reasons why I use the Gaia
hypothesis as one of my two organizing themes.
First, by being rooted in questions of regulation
and stability through identifiable biological,
chemical, and physical processes, it gives a direction
for relevant scientific research - for disproof of the
hypothesis if nothing else. Second, this is the only
concept I know that can, in principle, provide a
global rationale for giving priority to rehabilitation,
protection of ecosystems, and land use manage-
ment. If CH 4 production, for example, provides
an essential negative feedback control for ozone
(03) concentration, then the recent 1-2% annual
increase in CH 4 content is important and priority
should be given to considering major changes in its
primary sources - i.e., wetlands, biomass burning,
and ecosystems containing ruminants and termites
[10]. Finally, an examination of global change con-
cerns not only science but policy and politics. In a
polarized society where certitude is lacking, Gaia
has some potential for bridging extremes by provid-
ing a framework for understanding and action.
Surprise
Just as Gaia is global, the second organizing theme
of surprise is, necessarily, local. Surprise concerns
both the natural system and the people who seek
to understand causes, to expect behaviors, and to
achieve some defined purpose by action. Surprises
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occur when causes turn out to be sharply different
than was conceived, when behaviors are profoundly
unexpected, and when action produces a result
opposite to that intended - in short, when perceived
reality departs quaLitativeLy from expectation.
Expectations develop from two interacting
sources: from the metaphors and concepts we
evolve to provide order and understanding and
from the events we perceive and remember.
Experience shapes concepts; concepts, being incom-
plete, eventually produce surprise; and surprise
accumulates to force the development of those con-
cepts. This sequence is qualitative and discon-
tinuous. The longer one view is held beyond its
time, the greater the surprise and the resultant
adjustment. Just such a sequence of three distinct
viewpoints, metaphors, or myths has dominated
perceptions of ecological causation, behavior, and
management [II).
Equilibrium-centered view: nature constant
This viewpoint emphasizes not only constancy in
time, but also spatial homogeneity and linear causa-
tion. A familiar image is that of a landscape with a
bowl-shaped valley within which a ball moves in a
way determined by its own acceleration and direc-
tion and by the forces exerted by the bowl and
gravity. If the bowl was infinitely large, or events
beyond its rim meaningless, this would be an
example of global stability. Such a viewpoint directs
attention to the equilibrium and near-equilibrium
conditions. It leads to equilibrium theories and to
empirical measures of constancy that emphasize
averaging variability in time and "graininess" in
space. It represents the policy world of a benign
nature where trials and mistakes of any scale can
be made with recovery assured once the disturbance
is removed. Since there are no penalties of size,
only benefits to increasing scale, this viewpoint leads
to notions of large and homogeneous economic
developments that affect other biophysical systems,
but are not affected by them.
Multiple equilibria states: nature engineered
and nature resilient
This second viewpoint is a dynamic one that empha-
sizes the existence of more than one stable state. In
one variant the instability is seen as maintaining the
resilience of ecological systems [12). It emphasizes
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variability, spatial heterogeneity, and nonlinear
causation. A useful image is that of a landscape of
hills and valleys with the ball journeying among
them, in part because of internal processes and in
part because exogenous events can flip the ball from
one stability domain to another. This viewpoint
emphasizes the qualitative properties of important
ecological processes that determine the existence of
stable regions and of boundaries separating them.
Continuous behavior is expected over defined
periods that end with sharp changes induced by
internal dynamics or by exogenous events, at times
large, at times small.
The length of the period of continuous behavior
often determines the magnitude of the subsequent
change and affects policy recommendations. For
example, one would argue from an equilibrium-
centered viewpoint that climate warming due to the
accumulation of "greenhouse" gases will proceed
slowly enough for ecological and social processes to
adapt of their own accord. Efforts to facilitate
adjustment are unnecessary because existing crop
types, for example, are likely to develop and be well
adapted to prevailing conditions. However, the
second viewpoint of dynamic, nonlinear nature
suggests just the opposite: that slow changes of the
type expected might be so successfully absorbed
and ignored that a sharp, discontinuous change
becomes inevitable.
Similarly, spatial graininess, which is small rela-
tive to the range of movement of an organism, is
presumed to be averaged out in the equilibrium-
centered approach [13]. The nonlinear viewpoint,
however, presents the possibility that small-scale
events cascade upward, as has been described for
climatic behavior [14]. But for ecological systems,
Steele [15, 16] notes that widely ranging animals
feed on small-scale spatial variability. For example,
if fish could not discover and remain in plankton
patches they could not exist.
This second viewpoint can produce two variants
of policy. One assumes that the landscape is fixed
or that sufficient knowledge is available to keep it
fixed. It is a view of nature engineered to keep
variables (the ball) away from dangerous neighbor-
ing domains. It occurs in the responsible tradition
of engineering for safety, of fixed environmental
and health standards, and of nuclear safeguards.
The alternative variant sees that key features of
the landscape are maintained by the journeys of
the ball, by variability itself testing and maintaining
the configuration. This is resilient nature in which
the experience of instability is used to maintain the
structure and general patterns of behavior. It is
assumed in the design that there is insufficient
knowledge to control the landscape and hence one
attempts to retain variability while producing
economic and social benefit [12,17]. In such cases
variables are allowed to exceed flexible limits so
long as natural and designed recovery mechanisms
are encouraged. Designs have been proposed, for
example, for dealing with pollution [18], environ-
mental hazards [5], water resources [19], and pest
management [20].
Organizational change: nature evolving
The final viewpoint is one of evolutionary change.
Later a number of examples are presented to
demonstrate that successful efforts to constrain
natural variability lead to self-simplification and so
to fragility of the ecosystem. A variety of genetic,
competitive, and behavioral processes maintain the
values of parameters that define the system. If the
natural variability changes, the values shift: the
landscape of hills and valleys begins to alter. Stability
domains shrink, key variables become more
homogeneous (e.g., species composition, age struc-
ture, spatial distribution), and perturbations that
previously could be absorbed no longer can be.
The resultant surprises can be pathological if
continuing control requires ever-increasing vigi-
lance and cost. But if control is internal and
self-regulated, i.e., homeostatic, then the possibility
opens for organizational change because the
benefits of being embedded in a larger ecological
or social system significantly exceed the costs of local
control.
An example from biological evolution is the
remarkably constant internal temperature
maintained by endothermic (warm-blooded)
animals in the presence of large changes in external
temperature. A large metabolic load is required to
maintain a constant temperature. As expected, the
range of internal temperatures that sustains life
becomes narrower than for (cold-blooded)
ectotherms. Moreover, the typical endotherm body
temperature of around 37°C is close to the upper
lethal temperature for most living protoplasm. It
does not represent a "policy" of keeping well away
from a dangerous threshold.
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The evolutionary significance of this internal
temperature regulation is that maintenance of the
highest body temperature, short of death, allows
the greatest range of external activity for an animal
[21]. Speed and stamina increase and activity can
be maintained at high and low external tem-
peratures, rather than forcing aestivation or
hibernation. There is hence an enhanced capability
to explore environments and conditions that other-
wise would preclude life. The evolutionary con-
sequence of such temperature regulation was the
suddenly available opportunity for dramatic
organizational change and explosive radiation of
adaptive life forms. Hence the reduction of internal
resilience as a consequence of effective self-regula-
tion was more than offset by the opportunities
offered by other external settings.
Hence the study of evolution requires not only
concepts of function, but also concepts of organi-
zation - of the way elements are connected within
subsystems and the way subsystems are embedded
in larger systems. Food webs and the trophic rela-
tions that represent them are an example and have
long been a part of ecology. Recently some revealing
empirical analyses have demonstrated remarkable
regularities in such ecosystem structures [22], with
food webs of communities in fluctuating environ-
ments having a more constrained trophic structure
than those in constant environments [23].
These and related developments, connected in
turn to hierarchy theory [24] on the one hand,
and the stability and resilience concepts described
earlier, on the other, are starting to provide the
framework required for comprehending organi-
zational evolution [25]. Although not as well
developed as equilibrium, engineering, and
resilience concepts, such developments are an
essential part of any effort to understand, guide, or
adapt to global change.
These views of nature represent the different
concepts people have of the way natural systems
behave, are regulated, and should be managed.
Surprise can occur when the real world is found to
behave in a sharply different way from that con-
ceived. The perception can be ignored, resisted, or
acknowledged depending on how extreme the
departure is and depending on how flexible and
adaptable the observer is. Although observer and
system are interlinked, I do not explore the psychol-
ogy and dynamics of individual, institutional, and
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social adaptation in this chapter, though this is ulti-
mately necessary if we want to understand and
design sustainable systems. But in the next section
I examine a number of ecological systems to deter-
mine which of the views of nature most closely
matches reality.
Dynamics of ecosystems
Resilience and stability
This chapter relies heavily on the distinction
between resilience and stability. Since that distinc-
tion was first emphasized [12] a significant literature
has developed to test its reality in nature, to expand
the theory, and to apply this to management and
design. Much of what follows is drawn from the
literature. The distinction relies on definitions that
recognize the existence of different stability struc-
tures of the kind described in the previous section.
There are four main points. First, there can be more
than one stability region or domain, i.e., multiequi-
librium structures are possible. Second, the
behavior is discontinuous when variables (i.e., ele-
ments of an ecosystem) move from one domain to
another because they become attracted to a differ-
ent equilibrium condition. Third, the precise kind
of equilibrium - steady state or stable oscillation - is
less important than the fact of equilibrium. Finally,
parameters of the system that define the existence,
shape, and size of stability domains depend on a
balance of forces that may shift if variability patterns
in space and time change. In particular, reduced
variability through management or other activities
is likely to lead to smaller stability regions whose
contraction can lead to sharp changes because the
stability boundary crosses the variables, rather than
the reverse.
This leads to the following definitions. Stability
(sensu stricto) is the propensity of a system to attain
or retain an equilibrium condition of steady state
or stable oscillation. Systems of high stability resist
any departure from that condition and, if per-
turbed, return rapidly to it with the least fluctuation.
It is a classic equilibrium-centered definition.
Resilience, on the other hand, is the ability of a
system to maintain its structure and patterns of
behavior in the face of disturbance. The size of the
,
I
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stability domain of residence. the st rength of the
repulsivc forces at the boundary, and the resistancc
of the domain to contraction are all distinct
measures of resilience.
Stability. as here defined, emphasizes equilib-
rium, low variability, and resistance to and absorp-
t ion of change. In sharp contrast. resilience em pha-
sizes the boundary of a stability domain and events
far from equilibrium, high variability, and adapta-
tion to cha nge.
However, one school of ecology so strongly
emphasizes linear interactions and steady state
properties [26, 27, 28] that resilience is treated in
the opposite way to that described above. It is
defined as "how fast the variables return towards
their equilibrium following a perturbation [28]"
and is measured by the characteristic return times.
In terms of the definitions used in this chapter, this
concerns only one facet of stability and has nothing to
do with t he qualitative distinctions that 1 believe are
important.
In addition to the growing number of tests and
demonstrations of the key features of resilience,
there have been two major expansions of theory
and exam pie. One is Levin's excellent analysis and
review of patterns in ecological communities [29].
Levin first placed experimental, functional, and
behavioral descriptions within a formal mathemati-
cal frame. More important, he made two qualitative
additions. One was to explore spatial patterns of
multistable systems by analyzing the consequences
of diffusion. The second was to make a sharp dis-
tinction between variables associated with ddlerent
speeds or rates of activity, partly to facilitate analysis
but more to stress the consequences of u?upling
subsystems whose cycles arc of different lengths.
The second major expansion was that of Allen and
Starr who extended the analyses of ecosystem pat-
terns for a wide range of examples [25]. Most sig-
nificantly. they embedded theory, measurement,
and modeling relevalll to resilience and stability
into a hierarchical framework. More than any
recent development, this lramework pnwides a
means of studying community structure ,md of
treating evolution or organizational change.
Ecosystem scale
These three dnTlopments m analysis - of lIIulti-
stable systems 112 J, of spati,Il diff usiou [:!<J]. and of
hierarchies [:!5] - concern the coupling of nonlinear
subsystems of different scales in time and space.
They are fundamental to understanding how pre-
dictable change is, whether or not historical
accidents are important, and how to achieve a bal-
ance between anticipatory design and adaptive
design. Cia rk [:30] has provided a nseful classifica-
tion of the relevant scales for a wide range of
geophysical, ecological, and social phenomena. The
scales range from square centimeters to global and
from minutes to thousands of years. In the present
analysis I concentrate on ecological systems cover-
ing scales from a few sqnare meters to a few
thousand square kilometers and frol1l a few years
to a few hundred years.
These scales represent ecosystems, which are
defined here as communities of organisms in which
internal interactions between the organisms deter-
mine beha\'ior more than do external biological
events. External abiotic events do have a major
im pact on ecosystems, but are mediated through
strong biological interactions within the ecosystems.
It is through such external links that ecosystems
become part of the global system. Hence, the spatial
scale is determined by the dIspersal distance of the
most mobile of the key biological variables. The
structure of eastern North American spruce-fir
forests, for example, is profoundly affected by the
spruce budworm, which penodically kills large
areas of balsam fir. The modal distance of dispersal
of adult budworms is of the order of 50 km [20],
but movements are known to extend up to 200 km.
[he relevant spatial area O\·er which internal events
dominate can therefore cover a good part of east-
central North America. And the minimum area for
analysis has to be of the order of 70 000 km~.
Similarly. the time span of up to a few hundred
years is set by the longest-lived (slowest-acting) key
biological variables. In the case of t he spruce-fir
forests the trees are the slowest variables with a
rotation age of about 70 years. Any effective analysis
therefore must consider a time span that is a small
multiple of that - of the order of 2()0 years.
Eugene Odum [31]. more than anyone else, has
emphasizcd that such ecosystems are legitimate
units of investigation. having properties of produc-
tion, respiration. and exchange that are regubted by
biological, chemical, and physical processes. Hence
they represent distinct subsystems of the bio-
geochemiG11 cycles of the Earth. They are open,
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e e
l
.
.
.
.
e
.
.
f
298
since they receive energy from the sun and material
and energy from larger cycles. In regulating and
cycling this material through biotic and abiotic pro-
cesses, outputs are discharged to larger cycles.
Ecosystems hence are Gaia writ small.
Succession
One dominant theme of ecosystem study has been
succession - the way complexes of plants develop
after a disturbance. Clements' scheme of succession
has played an important role in guiding study and
theory [32]. He emphasized that succession leads to
a climax community of a self-replicating assemblage
of plants. The species comprising the assemblage
are determined by precipitation and temperature.
Plant colonization and growth are seen as proceed-
ing to the stable climax. Initial colonization is by
pioneer species that can grow rapidly and withstand
physical extremes. They so ameliorate these condi-
tions as to allow entry of less robust but more com-
petitive species. These species in turn inhibit the
pioneers but set the stage for their own replacement
by still more effective competitors. Throughout this
process, biomass accumulates, regulation of biologi-
cal, chemical, and physical processes becomes
tighter, and variability is reduced until the stable
climax condition is reached and maintained. This
scheme represents a powerful equilibrium-centered
view in which disturbances by fire, storm, or pest
are treated as exogenous (and somehow inappropri-
ate) intrusions into a natural order. Clements gave
an analogy to an organism and its ability to repair
damage [32].
During the past 15 years this view has been sig-
nificantly modified by a wide range of studies of
ecosystems - some dominated by disturbance, some
not - and by experimental manipulation of defined
ecosystem units such as the classic Hubbard Brook
Watershed Study [33]. Before describing those
developments, however, it is useful to relate this
view of succession to another powerful equilibrium-
centered notion: that of rand K strategies.
MacArthur and Wilson [34] proposed this classifi-
cation to distinguish between organisms selected
for efficiency of food harvest in crowded environ-
ments (K-selected) and those selected simply to
maximize returns without constraint (r-selected).
The designations come from the terms of the logistic
equation, where K defines the saturation density
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(stable equilibrium population) and r the instan-
taneous rate of increase. MacArthur [35] pointed
out the contrast between "opportunist" species in
unpredictable environments (r-strategists) and
"equilibrium" species in predictable ones (K-strat-
egists). Pianka [36] and Southwood et al. [37] have
emphasized that these represent extremes of a con-
tinuum, but that a variety of life histories and bio-
logical and behavioral features correlate with the
two strategies. Briefly, r-strategists have a high
reproductive potential, short life, high dispersal
properties, small size, and resistance to extremes.
They are the pioneers of newly disturbed areas or
the fugutive species that ever occupy transient habi-
tats. K-strategists have lower reproductive poten-
tial, longer life, lower dispersal rates, large size, and
effective competitive abilities. They represent,
therefore, the climax species of Clements or those
that occupy stable, long-lasting habitats.
There clearly are communities that have
developed a climax maintained through plant-by-
plant replacement in the manner proposed by
Clements. Lorimer [38], for example, examined the
history of presettlement forests in northeastern
Maine, USA, and found that the time interval
between severe disturbances was much longer than
that needed to obtain a climax, all-age structure.
Other examples are presented in an extensive
review of forest succession edited by West et al. [39].
But the Clementsian view of succession as analogous
to the recovery of an organism from injury, with
an ordered and obligatory sequence of replace-
ments of one species by another, is oversimplified
and limiting for several reasons.
First, many communities are subjected to regular
or irregular disturbances severe enough to kill
established plants over areas of a few square meters
(the size of a tree) to several thousand square
kilometers. Traditionally these disturbances - fires,
landslides, storms, floods, disease, insect pests, and
herbivore grazing - have usually been viewed as
external to the system. But when they occur at a
frequency related to the life span of the longest-
lived species, the plants themselves can become
increasingly adapted to the disturbance and so make
the event an internally triggered and maintained
phenomenon. This is particularly well recognized
for fire. Mutch [40], for example, demonstrated
that vegetation of fire-adapted species was sig-
nificantly more combustible than that of related
-,
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species In communities not subject to fires.
Similarly, Biswell [41] describes the twig develop-
ment and proliferation of chaparral species that
significantly increase the inflammability of plants
that are 15 years and older. This coincides with a
typical burn cycle of similar duration. Such
"accidents designed to happen" are more common
than is usually recognized and further examples
involving agents other than fire are described
later.
As a consequence, there are many examples of
what I imagine consistent Clementsian ecologists
would be forced to see as self-inflicted wounds to
the ecosystem "organism". Such disturbances have
a wide range of periodicities set by the dynamics of
the slowest variable [42]. Fire frequency in the
Pacific Northwest of North America, for example,
occurs every 400-500 years, and this period is
related to the potential 1OO-year life span of Douglas
fir [43]. Eastern white pine forests experience a fire
periodicity of 100-300 years in presettlement times
[44,45], while cyclic changes of 200-year periodicity
are proposed for elephant populations; this period
is due to the recovery time required for the tasty
(to elephants) and long-lived baobab trees of East
Africa [46]. The fire controlled period throughout
much of the boreal forest of northern North
America was between 51 and 120 years [47,48].
Chaparral in California [49] is adapted to a more
frequent cycle of 10-50 years.
The second significant departure from Clements'
notions is even more fundamental. Some distur-
bances can carry the ecosystem into a different sta-
bility configuration or domain. At times this hap-
pens after a long period of exploitation has
apparently reduced the resilience of the ecosystem.
For example, fishing in the Great Lakes has been
argued to have set the stage for a radical change in
fish communities from a system dominated by a
large species to one of smaller species [50], the
overall biomass remaining constant. The resilience
was reduced to a level where small stresses from
the physical environment, from man, or from bio-
logical invasion triggered the new configuration. In
a similar way, shifts of savannas from mixed grass-
shrub systems to ones dominated by shrubs are
often triggered by a modest drought after being
conditioned by an extended period of cattle grazing
[51]. In other instances, the magnitude of the trig-
gering event is so great or the resilience of the
ecosystem so naturally low that new configurations
emerge quite independent of previous manage-
ment. Bormann and Likens [33, p 189] present one
such example of a burn in a spruce-hardwood forest
on thin soils that transformed part of the ecosystem
into a bare-rock-shrub system. Hence there is not
just one climax state; there can be more than one.
Third, species that are important late in the
sequence can be present together with pioneer
species at the initiation of old field succession [52]
or forest succession [43,48]. The resultant suc-
cessional sequence is hence much more in the form
of a competitive hierarchy as described by Horn
[42]. Early in a sequence, the opportunist species
grow rapidly, dominate for a short time, but ulti-
mately cannot withstand crowding and competition
from other more persistent species. Marks [53] pre-
sents a particularly clear demonstration of this
sequence and of the opportunist role of pin cherry
in reestablishing disturbed hardwood systems in
New Hampshire, USA. Late in the sequence pin
cherry trees are almost totally absent, having been
squeezed out by more competitive trees like beech
and red maple. After disturbance, however, seeds
long dormant in the soil germinate, pin cherry trees
flourish, and begin to be eliminated again after about
20 years.
Finally, invasion of species after disturbance as
well as during succession is highly probable, par-
ticularly in tropical lowlands [54]. This, combined
with the competitive hierarchical relations mentioned
above, make the tropical forest highly individual in
character and very diverse. So many species are
capable of filling a particular niche that succession
is better described by life history traits and tree
geometry. There is, moreover, considerable advantage
in dealing with succession in terms of such properties,
since they determine successional status [55] -
whether in tropical, temperate, or arctic regions.
That is why the idea of r-selected and K-selected
species was introduced earlier. Each strategy is associ-
ated with distinctive traits that, in exaggerated form,
contrast the exploitative and opportunistic species
that dominate early in the succession with the consoli-
dating or conservative species that dominate later
through competition. Moreover, the terms can be used
to refer to two principal ecosystem functions: exploi-
tation and conservation. Early in succession biotic
and abiotic exploitative processes dominate. These
lead to the organization and binding of nutrients,
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rapid accumulation of biomass, and modification of
the environment. Eventually, conservative forces
begin to dominate, with competition being the most
important aspect. This leads to increased organization
through trophic and competitive connections, to
reduced variability, and, ifnot interrupted, to reduced
diversity.
Ecosystems, however, are also systems of discon-
tinuous change. In addition to the successional pro-
cess leading to increasing order there are periods of
disorganization. The examples mentioned earlier
were of large-scale disruption that affect extensive
areas. But change of this kind also occurs in the
ecosystems that most closely achieve a climax condi-
tion. Individual trees senesce, creating local gaps. The
only difference is that the spatial scale is small and
the disruptions are not necessarily synchronous. A
complete picture of the dynamics of ecosystems there-
fore requires additional functions to those of exploita-
tion and conservation. Such functions relate more to
the generation of change and the introduction of
disorder.
Forces of change
To identify these functions and their effects. I
initially analyze a slOall number of examples of
ecosystems that demonstrate pronounced change
and that have been examined in detail. They can
be classified as follows: forest insect pests, forest
fires, grazing of semiarid savannas, hsheries, and
human disease. Many of the examples also rep-
resent systems that have been subjected to manage-
ment. In a sense, the management activities can be
viewed as diagnostic, for they introduced external
changes that helped expose some of the internal
workings of the natural, unmanaged system. In
addition, a nUlllber of the management approaches
were very much dominated by the goal of achieving
constancy through externally imposed regulations.
Hence the implicit hypothesis was an equilibrium-
centered one and the ex periences in managing
forests, fish, and other organisms can be viewed as
weak tests of that hypothesis.
To give an impression of the consequences I
consider the following examples:
(I) Successful suppression of spruce budworm
populations in eastern Canada using insecti-
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cides certainly preserved the pulp and paper
industry and employment in the short term by
partially protecting the forest. But this policy
has left the forest and the economy more
vulnerable to an outbreak over a larger area
and of an intensity not experienced before
[2°1·
(2) Suppression of forest fire has been remarkably
successful in reducing the probability of fire in
the national parks of the USA. But the con-
sequence has been the acculllulation of fuel to
produce fires of an extent and cost never
experienced before [56].
(3) Semiarid savanna ecosystems have been turned
into productive cattle-grazing systems in the
Sahel zone of Africa, southern and east Africa,
the southern USA, northern India, and
Australia. But because of changes in grass com-
position, an irreversible switch to woody vegeta-
tion is common and the systems become highly
susceptible to collapse, often triggered by
drought [5IJ.
(4) Effective protection and enhancement of
salmon spawning on the west coast of North
America are leading to a more predictable suc-
cess. But because this triggers increased fishing
and investment pressure, less productive stocks
become extinct, leaving the fishing industry
precariously dependent on a few enhanced
stocks that are vulnerable to colla pse [57 j.
(5) Malaria eradication programs in Brazil, Egypt,
Italy, and Greece have been brilliant examples
of sophisticated understanding combined with
a style of implementation that has all the charac-
ter of a military campaign. But in other areas
of the world, where malaria was neither mar-
ginal nor at low endemic levels, transient success
has led to human populations with little
immunity, and mosquito vectors resistant to
DDL As a consequence, during the past five
years some countries have reported a 30- to
40-fo\d increase in malaria cases compared with
1969-1970, signaling a danger not only to the
health of the population, but also to overall
socioeconomic development.
In each of these examples, the policy successfully
reduced the probability of an event that was
perceived as socially or economically undesirable.
Each was successful in its immediate objective. Each
ll
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produced a system with qualitatively different
properties. All of these example~, and others that
fall into the five classes, represent "natural" systems
that are cou pled to management institutions and to
the society that experiences the success or endures
the failure of management. Here I focus principally
on the natural svstem.
Despite the large number of variables in each
example, the essential causal structure and behavior
can be represented by interaction among three sets
of variable~. These represent three qualitatively
different speeds, or rates of activity, corresponding
to rates of growth, generation times, and life spans
(Table 10.1). It becomes possible, as a consequence,
to proceed in two directions: to achieve a qualitative
understanding of the natural system and to achieve
a detailed policy design. The first objective draws
upon the theory of differential equations [58]. The
second draws upon more recent developments in
simulation modeling and optimization [20]. Both
are very much connected to hierarchy theory
[251·
In many of the examples, both objectives have
been pursued. Here I concentrate more on the
efforts to achieve a qualitative understanding ill
order to define research agendas. The other objec-
tive, concentrating on detail, is also useful but more
in terms of defining operational management agen-
das. Since distinctively different speeds can be iden-
tified for the \'ariables, four steps of analysis are
possible [58]:
(I) Analyze the long-term behavior of the fast vari-
able, while holding the slow variables constant.
(2) Define the response of the slow variables when
the fast ones are held fixed.
(3) Analyze the long-term behavior of the slow vari-
ables, with the fast variables held at their corre-
sponding equilibria.
(4) Combine the preceding steps to identify needs
for extra coupling, so that, when added, the
behavior of the full system is described.
now summarize the procedure, emphasizing the
main conclusions. The "fast" dynamics are deter-
mined by the way key processes affect change in
the fast variable at different fixed values of the slow
variables. An example is shown in Figure 10.1. The
important point is that a long history of experi-
mental analysis of ecological processes has led to
generalization of the qualitative form of system
response. the condition for each distinct form, and
the features that determine where impact is greatest
(see Holling and Buckingham [63J for predation
and competition and Peters [64J for a variety of
ecological processes related to body size). Hence,
this knowledge can be applied to understanding
behavior at a more aggregate level of the hierarchy.
Equally important, it frees the analysis from the
need for detailed quantification, setting the stage
for research designs that are both more economical
and more appropriate.
In continuing this qualitative emphasis, attention
is then focused on conditions for increase and con-
ditions for decrease of the fast variable. The bound-
ary between the two represents either transient or
potentially stable equilibria. The conditions for
these equilibria can be organized to show the set of
all equilibria, i.e., the zero isoclines for the fast
variable. Four examples are shown in Figure 10.2:
for spruce budworm (a), jack-pine sawfly (b), forest
fire (c), and savanna grazing (d).
Table 10.1 Key variables and speeds in five classes of ecosystems.
The variables
Key
The system Fast Intermediate Slow references
Forest insect pest Insect Foliage Trees [58, 59]
Forest fire Intensity Fuel Trees [60]
Savanna Grasses Shrubs Herbivores [51]
Fishery Phytoplankton Zooplankton Fish [16]
Human disease Disease organism Vector and susceptibles Human population [61,62]
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curve for jack-pine sawfly at a fixed
level of slow and driving variables,
showing the contributions of three of
the key processes. The horizontal line
represents the conditions where the
population density of the next gener-
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These equilibrium structures show that there are
a number of stability states controlled by the slow
variable. There are many other examples given in
the literature: for 15 other forest insect pests [59],
for other grazing systems [62,65], for fish [17,66],
and for human host-parasite systems [62].
Two main points emerge at this stage of the
analysis. First, discontinuous change occurs because
there are multiple stable states. As the slow variables
change (tree growth, fuel accumulation, herbivore
population increase), different equilibria suddenly
appear, and when other equilibria disappear, the
system is suddenly impelled into rapid change after
periods of gradual change. The basic timing of these
events is set by the dynamics of the slow variable.
Second, external stochastic events can lead to
highly repetitive consequences. All of the surfaces
shown in Figure 10.2 would be better represented
as fuzzy probability bands to reflect "white noise"
variability in weather conditions. But this modifica-
tion typically changes the precise timing of events
by a trivial amount. For long periods the systems
are in a refractory state and the triggering event is
totally or strongly inhibited.
In the insect pest cases [Figures 10.2(a) and (b)],
for example, a variety of predators, chiefly birds,
introduce such a strong "predator pit:' that insect
populations are either becoming extinct or being
kept at very low densities. Similarly, the reflexively
folded set of unstable equilibria for fire [Figure
10.2(c)] can turn stochastic ignition events, such as
lightning strikes, into highly predictable outbreaks
of fire. If the surface is low [dotted line in Figure
10.2(c)], then the average ignition intensity of B
triggers a fire at C which consumes the fuel and
hence extinguishes itself at A. This is similar to the
cycles of ground fires experienced prior to fire
management in the mixed-conifier forests of the
Sierra Nevada in western USA [56,60]. In several
areas they occurred. with a remarkably consistent
interval of seven to eight years, and helped main-
tain conditions for tree regeneration and nutrient
cycling. In addition, these light fires killed only
some of the young white fir, thereby introducing
and maintaining gaps in the forest canopy and, in
essence, producing natural fire breaks. However, if
the undersurface is raised because of increased
moisture or effective fire control practices [broken
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Figure 10.2 Zero-isocline surfaces
showing the equilibrium values of the
fast variable at different fixed levels
of the slow variables. The full lines
represent stable surfaces and the'
broken lines unstable ones. Typical
trajectories are shown by the arrows.
(a) Spruce budworm and balsam fir;
(b) jack-pine and sawfly; (e) forest
fire and fuel; (d) savanna grass and
herbivore grazing.
line in Figure 10.2(c)], more fuel must accumulate
before an average ignition event triggers a fire
[point E, Figure 10,2(c)l This results in a longer
period before a fire, but also in a more intense fire,
corresponding to a natural long-period fire cycle
of the kind mentioned earlier or to the unexpected
failure of a fire control policy,
Because of these properties, pulses of disturbance
should not be seen as exogenous events, Insect
outbreaks, forest fires, overgrazing, sudden changes
in fish populations, and outbreaks of disease are
determined by identifiable processes affecting the
fast variable, whose impacts are modified by the
magnitudes of the slow variables, As a consequence,
changes in the slow variables eventually result in a
condition where a sharp disturbance is inevitable.
A fuller definition of those properties requires
two more steps. First, the equilibrium structure set
by the fast variable is affected by both intermediate-
speed and slow variables. A three-dimensional
representation of the zero isocline can then be
shown. An example for spruce budworm is shown
in Figure 10.3. Finally, zero-isocline surfaces are
constructed for both the intermediate and slow vari-
ables in order to explore the intersections between
them. A more formal and rigorous treatment can
be found in Ludwig et al. [58]. Figure 10.4 shows,
as an example, the isocline surface for tree crown
volume laid over that for budworm. Where these
two surfaces intersect (line AB) represent the only
places where a stable equilibrium for both bud worm
and trees might be possible. But this can only be
realized if the stable portion of the zero isocline for
foliage, the intermediate-speed variable, also inter-
sected the line AB. The surface for foliage is folded
something like that of the budworm, with a stable
surface and an unstable reflexed one. For values of
foliage area below this unstable surface, foliage pro-
duction cannot match natural foliage depletion, so
that the foliage eventually disappears. Although it
cannot be clearly shown in Figure 10.4, it happens
that the foliage zero-isocline surface lies under the
major portion of the budworm surface. As a con-
sequence, there is no stable intersection.
Thus the unmanaged bud worm system is in a
state of continuous and fundamental disequilib-
rium. If one variable is on a stable zero isocline, the
others are usually not on theirs. If two of the vari-
ables happen to be simultaneously on their stable
isoclines, the third one is never on its stable isocline.
It is a system under continual dynamic change,
always chasing ever-receding equilibria. But control
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is never completely lost because of the existence of
the independent single- or two-variable equilibrium
states.
Only an analysis involving three variables would
expose this behavior. In such cases, equilibrium-
centered concepts, definitions, and measurements
that require the existence of at least one non-zero
equilibrium (termed here a system equilibrium) are
simply irrelevant. There is no system equilibrium.
With these examples I can now add to the review
of the main conclusions by summarizing the role of
the three distinct speeds of variables in producing
cyclic variations of different periods. Under
different conditions each of these speeds can
dominate the dynamics.
In the spruce-budworm system the period is set
by the slowest variable, the tree, and the other
variables interact with it. The same is true of
unmanaged savanna-grazing systems, where inten-
sive periods of overgrazing lead to depletion of
above-ground vegetation. This is followed by
emigration or high mortality of ungulates allowing
early recovery of perennial grasses with under-
ground storage. Sometime later, annual grassI's
begin to dominate through competition with the
former. Many forest fire systems are similarly con-
trolled, in that the slowest variable sets the cycle
and the fast and intermediate variables follow.
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Figure 10.3 Zero-isocline surface for
budworm as a function of foliage and
tree crown volume. The trajectory
shows a typical unmanaged outbreak
sequence.
In all these examples the variability produces
diversity as a consequence of a cyclic shifting of the
competitive advantage between species. Balsam fir
can outgrow spruce, and would do so except that
budworm preferentially attacks balsam and sud-
denly shifts the balance [67]. The high photosyn-
thetic efficiency of annual grasses places them at an
advantage over those perennial grasses that invest
a considerable part of their biomass in underground
storage. But intense overgrazing tips the balance
the other way, so that both types are refused [51].
And Loucks' analysis of long-period forest fire
cycles makes a similar point regarding maintenance
of species diversity [44). In all these cases the cycle
length is set by the slowest variables and other
variables are driven according to that cycle. In every
example, the high variability encourages species
diversity and spatial heterogeneity.
In a second class of cases the basic timing is set
by the intermediate-speed variable. The slowest
variable is larg~ly disengaged because a stable
oscillation develops around a single system
equilibrium in which this variable persists. An
example is the ground fire cycle described earlier
for the mixed-conifer forests of the Sierra Nevada
[Figure ID.2(c), cycle C-A). A number of forest
insect systems show this pattern [59]. For example,
the European larch-budmoth system in Alpine
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Figure 10.4 Overlay of the zero-
isocli ne surface for tree crown vol ume
(a measure of forest age) against the
budworm surface of Figure 10.2. The
line AB is where the two surfaces
intersect.
regions of Switzerland [68J shows a remarkably
persistent cycle with an 8- to 10-year period that
has persisted for centuries. Both insect and foliage
follow this cycle but there is little tree mortality.
Finally, there are patterns in which the fast vari-
able dominates and the intermediate and slow vari-
ables are little affected. A particularly interesting
example is the jack-pine-sawfly system, [69J and
Figure lO.2(b). At intermediate tree ages, predation
by small mammals establishes a "predator pit" at
moderate population densities of sawfly. At these
densities, the small-mammal predation causes
enough mortality to allow the sawfly and its parasites
to establish a high-speed stable limit cycle of 3-4
years. Foliage is little affected and, asa consequence,
neither is tree mortality. Such oscillations can persist
for some years, but eventually the system is shifted
to a different pattern by a change in climate or
forest stand. Other forest insect systems show this
pattern, as does endemic malaria where vectoral
capacity is high [61J.
In summary, the key features of this analysis of
the forces of change leads to the following observa-
tions:
(I) There can be a number of locally stable equi-
libria and stability domains around these
equilibria.
(2) Jumps between the stability domains can be
triggered by exogenous events, and the size of
these domains is a measure of the sensitivity to
such events.
(3) The stability domains themselves expand,
contract, and disappear in response to changes
in slow variables. These changes are inter-
nally determined by processes that link vari-
ables and, quite independently of exogenous
events, force the system to move between
domains.
(4) Besides exogenous stochastic events, different
classes of variability and of temporal and spatial
behavior emerge from the form of equilibrium
surfaces and the manner in which they interact.
There can be conditions of low equilibrium with
little variability. There can be stable-I imit cyclic
oscillations of various amplitudes and periods.
And there can be dynamic disequilibrium in
which there is no global equilibrium condition
and the system moves in a catastrophic manner
between stability domains, occasionally residing
in extinction regions. There also exists the possi-
bility of "chaotic" behavior.
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The one overall conclusion is that discontinuous
change is an internal property of each system. For
long periods change is gradual and discontinuous
behavior is inhibited. Conditions are eventually
reached, however, when a jump event becomes
increasingly likely and ultimately inevitable.
Synthesis of ecosystem dynamics
Ecosystem functions
It was mentioned in an earlier section that there
are two aggregate functions that determine ecosys-
tem succession: an exploitation function (related to
the notion of r-strategies) that dominates early and
a conservation function (related to K-strategies) that
dominates late in the succession. The conclusion of
the preceding analysis of forces of change is that
there is a third major ecosystem function. The
increasing strength of connection between
variables in the maturing ecosystem eventually leads
to an abrupt change. In a sense, key structural
parts of the system become "accidents waiting to
happen".
When the timing is set by the slowest variable,
the forces of change can lead to intense, widespread
mortality. When the timing is set by the faster vari-
ables the changes are less intense and the spatial
impact, while synchronous over large areas, is more
patchy. But even in those instances, individuals con-
stituting the slow variables eventually senesce and
die. The difference is that the impact is local and
is not synchronous over space.
There is both a destructive feature to such
changes and a creative one. Organisms are
destroyed, but this is because of their very success
in competing with other organisms and in
appropriating and accumulating the prime re-
sources of energy, space, and nutrients. The
accumulated resources, normally bound tightly and
unavailable, are suddenly released by the forces of
change. Such forces therefore permit creative re-
newal of the system. I call this third ecosystem
function "creative destruction", a term borrowed
from Schum peter's economic theory [70].
Although the change is triggered by such a func-
tion, the bound energy, nutrients, and biomass that
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accumulated during the succession are not immedi-
ately available. There is therefore a fourth and final
ecosystem function. One facet of that function is
the mobilization of this stored capital through pro-
cesses of decomposition that lead to mineralization
of nutrients and release of energy into the soil. The
other facet includes biological, chemical, and phys-
ical processes that retain these released nutrients,
minimizing losses from leaching. This fourth func-
tion is one of ecosystem renewal.
These processes result in a pulse of available
nutrients after disturbance. In many instances sur-
prisingly little is lost from the ecosystem through
leaching. In other instances so much is lost that algal
blooms may be triggered in receiving waters
[33, 7 I]. The kinds of retention mechanisms are not
well understood because of the difficulty of studying
soil dynamics at an ecosystem scale. But experi-
mental manipulation of whole watersheds through
harvesting, removal of structural organic material
from the soil surface, and herbicidal inhibition of
vegetative regrowth has begun to allow some of the
mechanisms to be identified [33, 72]. They include
colloidal behavior of soil, rapid uptake by the
remaining vegetation whose growth is accelerated
by the disturbance, and low rates of nitrification
that keep inorganic nitrogen in ammonia pools
rather than as the more soluble nitrates [73]. In
addition a recent experiment demonstrated that
rapid uptake of nutrients by microbes during
decomposition is a major process preventing
nitrogen losses from areas of harvested forests
[72].
Such processes of release and retention after dis-
turbance define the renewal function. Hill [74]
emphasizes their importance in reestablishing the
cycle of change and hence in determining the
resilience of ecosystems. Of particular importance
are the processes of retention. When savannas
become dominated by woody shrubs, it is because
of the loss of water retention capacity of perennial
plants and soil. Similarly, intensified burning of
upland vegetation in Great Britain has caused the
vegetation to shift irreversibly from forest cover to
extensive blanket bogs [75]. On sites where soils are
poor, rainfall is high, and temperatures are low,
the result has been loss of nutrients and reduced
transpiration and rainfall interception, leading to
waterlogged soils, reduced microbial decomposi-
tion, and the development of peat. The original
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tree species, such as oak, cannot regenerate because
of wetness, acidity, and nutrient deficiency. In a
similar vein, tropical rain forests may have a low
resilience to large-scale disturbance. Many of the
tree species have large seeds with short dormancy
periods. These features facilitate rapid germination
and regrowth of vegetation in small disturbed areas,
but make it impossible to recolonize extensive areas
of cleared land [76]. Partly as a result, extensive
land clearance in the Amazon basin has led to
permanent transformation of tropical forest areas
into scrub savanna [77].
The full dynamic behavior of ecosystems at an
aggregate level can therefore be represented by the
sequential interaction of four ecosystem functions:
exploitation, conservation, creative destruction, and
renewal (Figure 10.5). The progression of events is
such that these functions dominate at different
times: from exploitation, 1, slowly to conservation,
2, rapidly to creative destruction, 3, rapidly to re-
newal4, arid rapidly back to exploitation. Moreover,
this is a process of slowly increasing organization
or connectedness (1 to 2) accompanied by gradual
accumulation of capital. Stability initially increases,
but the system becomes so overconnected that rapid
change is triggered (3 to 4). The stored capital is
then released and the degree of resilience is deter-
mined by the balance between the processes of
mobilization and of retention. Two properties are
being controlled: the degree of organization and
the amount of capital accumulation and retention.
The speed and amplitude of this cycle, as indica-
ted earlier, are determined by whether the fast,
intermediate, or slow variable dominates the
timing.
These patterns in time have consequences for
patterns in space. Rapidly cycling systems generate
ecosystems that are patchy. Tropical ecosystems are
an example. Slowly cycling systems produce higher
amplitude, discontinuous change that tends to occur
as a wave moving across space. In the case of uncon-
trolled budworm outbreaks, for example, the wave
Figure 10.5 The four ecosystem
functions and their relationship to the
amount of stored capital and the
degree of connectedness. The arrow-
heads show an ecosystem cycle. The
interval between arrowheads indi-
cates speed, i.e., a short interval
means slow change, a long interval
rapid change.
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takes about 10 years to sweep across the province
of New Brunswick, Canada.
The factors determining the size distribution of
the areas of disturbance, however, are not well
understood. If the considerable understanding of
time dynamics could be connected to an equal
understanding of spatial patch dynamics, then ques-
tions of global change could be better anticipated
and better dealt with by local policies.
Levin [29, 78] has developed an effective
framework for analysis and description of patches.
There are two parts:
(I) Patch size and age distributions as related to
birth and death rates of patches.
(2) The response of species to the regeneration
opportunities existing in patches of different
sizes and ages.
The "fast" and "slow" designations are part of
the analysis, as well as diffusion and extinction rates.
It is, therefore, mmpletely compatible with the
analysis presented here, and has begun to be
applied to forest systems [79] together with
Mandelbrot's theory of fractals to relate extinction
laws and relative patchiness [80]. As a consequence
Mandelbrot proposes a descriptive measure of
patchiness and succession that is scale independent
and has considerable value for any effort to measure
patch dynamics and disturbance.
Complexity, resilience, and stability
This synthesis helps clarify the relationship between
complexity and stability. It was long argued that
more species and more interactions in communities
conferred more stability. the intuitive notion being
that the more pathways that were available for
movement of energy and nutrients, the less would
be the effeet of removal of one. However, May's
analysis of randomly connected networks showed
that increased diversity, in general, lowered stability
[81 ]. This means that ecosystems are not randomly
connected. The issue has been significantly clarified
by Allen and Starr [25] and the treatment here
provides further support of May's observation.
First, measures of stability referred to typically
did not distinguish between stability and
resilience - systems with low stability can often
Silstainahip del.plopwfTll of/lip In as/liLa/,
demonstrate high resilience. Second, ecosystems
have a hierarchical structure, and for this reason it
has been possible to captu re the essential discon-
tinuous behaviors with three sets of variables operat-
ing at different speeds. Other species and variables
are dramatically affected by that structure and the
resultant behavior, but do not directly contribute
to it. Hence the relevant measures of species diver-
sity, which is one measure of complexity, should
not involve all species, but only those contributing
to the physical structure and dynamics.
The significant measure of complexity, therefore,
concerns the degree of connectedness within
ecosystems. As Allen and Starr demonstrate, the
higher the connectedness, i.e., the complexity, the
lower the probability of stability. They present
examples both from theory and from the empirical
literature to demonstrate the point. A system can
also become so underconnectecl that critical parts
go their own way independent of each other -
resilience disappears. Tropical farming based upon
monocultures and extensive land clearance is highly
overconnected, particularly through pest loads [82].
Hence stability and ultimately resilience are lost.
Introduction of patches through traditi?nal shifting
of agriculture or through the breaking of connec-
tions by interplanting different cultivars produces
a farming pattern more akin to the highly patchy,
less connected natural system.
Third, the pattern of connectedness and the
resultant balance between stability and resilience
are a consequence of the pattern of external vari-
ability that the system has experienced. Systems
such as those in the tropics, which have developed
in conditions of constant temperature and precipi-
tation, therefore demonstrate high stability but low
resilience. They are very sensitive to disturbances
induced by man. On the other hand, temperate
systems exposed to high climatic variability typically
show low stability and high resilience, and are robust
to disturbance by man.
The present analysis adds an important fourth
ingredient. Hierarchies are not static in the kinds
or strengths of connections. The degree of con-
nectedness changes as the ecosystem is driven by
the four ecosystem functions. Succession introduces
more connectedness, and hence increasing likeli-
hood of instability. An overconnected condition
develops, triggering a discontinuous change. The
connectedness is sharply reduced thereby, to be
,
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follO\\ed by reorgani/ation and renewal. The de-
stabIlizing- cHeet produced by overconne(!edness
generates \'ariability, \\'hich in lU rn encou rages the
development and maintenance of processes confer-
ring resilience, particularly during the period of
low connectedness and recovery. Collapse of
resilience, or escape to a different stability domain,
can occur, howcver. if the system becomes too
underconnected during the destabilized phase of
this cyde. rhis can happen if processes of mobili-
ze\li/lIl are not halanced by processes of retention.
Since those processes occur dominantly in soil, any
exploration of global change must place a high
priority on developing a better ami more etensive
understanding of soil dynamics in relation to the
cycles driven by the four ecosystem functions.
Conne~tions
The previous section addressed the question posed
1I1 the introduction concerning the capacity of
ecosystems to absol b, buffer. or generate change.
It Loncentrated on the prllLesses and functions that
lead to cycles of ecosystem growth, disruption, and
renewal. The rinds and amplitud s of those cycles
are delll\ed b} 4ualitati\e1y disrinn ~pe cis of a small
number of key \ariables. I"heir ability to maintain
structure and patterns of b~ha\"i()r In lhc face of
disturbanLe, i.e., their resilience, IS determined by
the renewal function whose properties ar ,in part.
maintained b pulse, of disturbance.
The ti1l1in~ and spatial extent of the pulses
emerge 1rom the interaction between external
events and an internally genenlled rh ,thm of stabil-
ity/instability, Induslrial societies ale cbang-ing tbe
spatial and temporal patterns of those external
cvents. Spatial impacts arc mor~ homogeneous;
temporal patterns an.' accelerated. An under ·tand-
ing of impacts of global change therefore requires
a f1"anH.'\\ ark to connecl the unclerstandin~
developeJ here for ecosystem dynamics to that
developed lor global biogeochemical hanges on
the one hand and societal d '\'elopm l1lS on the
ot Iwr hane!. I'here arc transfers of energy, material,
and informatIon among all three, as '>uggesled in
Figure 1(J.n. Biosphere studies now concentrate on
changes in the amount. speed. and scale of those
translers dnd \\ hat should or should not be done
about them. The (,aid hypothesi, as indicated
~arlier, pro\'ides a locus fnr disclIssing (he interac-
tion bel\\{.'en ecosystems and global biog-eochemilal
cycles. Surprise provides a focus (or discussing the
interaction b~t\\'een ecosystems and sOCIety.
SOCIETY
GAIA SURPRISE
Figure 10.6 Connections
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The spatial and temporal patterns generated by the
four ecosystem functions form the qualitative struc-
ture of ecosystems. A small number of variables and
species are fundamental to determining that struc-
ture. And the resultant architecture of an ecosystem
offers a variety of niches which are occupied by
different species that are affected by the ecosystem
structure, but contribute little to it. But while con-
tributing little to the structure, they could con-
tribute significantly to exogenous biogeochemical
cycles. This could be determined by drawipg on the
extensive literature that identifies the major com-
ponents of geochemical exchange and regulation
in plants, animals, and soils. The scheme presented
here can provide a way to organize this knowledge
so that the interactions of specific ecosystems with
external biogeochemical cycles and their possible
regulatory roles can be better understood.
Moreover, if the key processes of homeostatic
regulation in atmospheric cycles could be demon-
strated, such an approach could also provide a way
to identify the ecosystems that contribute most to
the feedback control. In order to do so, the qualita-
tive analysis outlined here for a few systems could
be expanded into a comparative study of the struc-
ture of ecosystem dynamics in each of the life zones
defined by Holdridge [83] or by Soviet geographers
(as reviewed in Grigor'yev [84]) on the basis of
climate data.
Such a study would provide a descriptive classifi-
cation for determining ecosystem responses to
global environmental changes. The responses that
are most critical are the qualitative patterns of
behavior. These patterns are determined by the
fast, intermediate, and slow variables during ecosys-
tem growth and disruption and by the mobili-
zation/retention processes during renewal. They
also emerge from the way the resultant internal
dynamics modify climatic variability. The latter is
determined by global atmospheric and oceanic pro-
cesses, which in turn set the variability in the
physical environment.
Steele has reviewed the temporal behavior of
physical variables in the ocean and atmosphere [85].
If the well defined periods of days and seasons are
removed, the underlying trend for physical condi-
tions in the oceans is for variance to increase as a
function of period. The increase is close to the
Sustainable development of the biosphere
square of the period and occurs at all time (and
space) scales. This "red noise" is in contrast to
"white" noise where variance is independent of
scale (see Dickinson, Chapter 9, pp 257-260, this
volume).
For periods up to about 50 years, physical vari-
ation in the atmosphere, unlike in the oceans, is
close to being white noise. Thereafter variation
seems to follow a red spectrum, suggesting a
coupling of atmospheric and oceanic processes. As
described earlier, many terrestrial ecosystem cycles
have a period from a few decades to one or two
hundred years, driven by the slowest variables. Even
if this similarity in cycle periods is a coincidence
rather than due to adaptation, changes in the ex-
ternal forcing frequency induced by man's activities
could be transmitted and transformed by the exist-
ing response times of ecosystems in unexpected
ways. Now that the qualitative dynamics of a number
of ecosystems are beginning to be better under-
stood, a fruitful area of research can be developed
to demonstrate, by example, how changes in the
frequency pattern of external forcing can affect
ecosystem stability and resilience.
Surprise
Man's efforts to manage ecosystems can be viewed
as weak experiments testing a general hypothesis
of stability/resilience. In many of the examples dis-
cussed earlier, the management goal was to reduce
the variability of a target variable by applying exter-
nal controls. Crudely, it represented· an equilib-
rium-centered view of constant nature. All the cases
examined were successful in achieving their short-
term objectives, but as a consequence of that success,
each system evolved into a qualitatively different
one.
The evolution took place in three areas. First, the
social and economic environment changed. More
pulp mills were built to exploit the protected
spruce-balsam forests; more recreational demand
was developed in the parks protected from fire;
more efficient and extensive fisheries were
developed to exploit salmon; more land was used
for cattle ranches on the savannas; and more
development was possible in those areas protected
from malaria.
Second, the management agencies began to
evolve. Effective agencies were formed to spray
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insects, fight fires, operate fish hatcheries,
encourage cattle ranching, and reduce mosquito
populations. And the objective of these agencies
naturally shifted from the original socioeconomic
objective to one that emphasized opecrational
efficiency: better and better aircraft, navigation, and
delivery systems to distribute insecticide; better and
better ways to detect fires and control them
promptly.
These changes in the socioeconomic environ-
ments and in the management institutions were
generally perceived and were rightly applauded.
But evolution occurred in a third area - the bio-
physical - whose consequences were not generally
perceived.
Because of the initial success in reducing the
variability of the target variable, features of the
biophysical environment which were implicitly
viewed as constants began to change to produce a
system that was structurally different and more
fragile. Reduction of budworm populations to sus-
tained moderate levels led to accumulation and
persistence of foliage over larger and larger areas.
Any relaxation of vigilance could then lead to an
outbreak in a place where it could spread over
enormous areas. Reduction of fire frequency led to
accumulation of fuel and the closing of forest
crowns so that what were once modest ground fires
affecting limited areas and causing minor tree mor-
tality became catastrophic fires covering large areas
and causing massive tree mortality. And similarly,
increased numbers of salmon led to increases in size
and efficiency of fishing fleets and extinction of
many native stocks; maintenance of moderate num-
bers of cattle led to changes in grass composition
toward species more vulnerable to drought and
errors of management; persistent reduction in mos-
quitoes led to gradual increases in the number of
people susceptible to malaria, and to mosquitoes
resistant to insecticide.
In short, t~e biophysical environment became
more fragile and more dependent on vigilance and
error-free management at a time when greater
dependencies had developed in the socioeconomic
and institutional environment. The ecosystems sim-
plified into less resilient ones as a consequence of
man's success in reducing variability. In these cases,
connectedness increased because of spatial
homogenization of key variables: foliage for bud-
worm, fuel and canopy structure for fires, efficient
but vulnerable grasses for savannas, numbers of
stocks and ages of fish, and the number of people
susceptible to malaria.
The hypothesis of constant nature encountered
the surprising reality of resilient nature. If control
falters, the magnitude and extent of the resultant
disruptive phase can be great enough to overwhelm
the renewal process.
Just as ecosystems have their own inherent
response times, so do societal, economic, and insti-
tutional systems. How long an inappropriate policy
is successful depends on how slowly the ecosystem
evolves to the point when the increasing fragility is
perceived as a surprise and potential crisis.
The response to such surprises is alarm, denial,
or adaptation and is similarly related to the response
times of different groups in society and of the
management institutions. For example, forest fire
policy in the national parks of the western USA has
recently changed radically to reinstate fire as the
natural "manager" of the forests. This rather dra-
matic adaptation was not made easily and rested
upon the existence of an alternative policy and of
technologies to implement it, on a climate of under-
standing, and on costs that were relatively modest
compared with my other examples. But it might be
equally important that the critical variables of fuel
and forest tree composition changed at the slowest
rate of all the examples. It was some sixty years
before the change became critical. I argue that the
relevant time unit of change for a management
institution is of the order of 20 to 30 years, the
turnover rate of employees. As a consequence, by
the time the problem became critical there was a
new generation of experts and policy advisors who
would be more willing to recognize failures of their
predecessors than of their own. In addition, the
slowness of change allowed the accumulation of
knowledge of the processes involved and the com-
munication of that growing understanding to a wide
range of actors.
In contrast, the changes in the budworm/forest
systems proceeded faster. Insecticide spraying
began on a large scale in the mid-1950s with condi-
tions of vulnerability building to a critical point by
the early 1970s. In this case, the 15-20 year period
was insufficient to accumulate and, most important,
disseminate an understanding of the problem.
Alternative policies or technologies were not
developed and the parents of the original policies
:II:!
were still central actors and defenders of the past.
Adaptive change has been an agonizing process and
is only now showing signs of occurring [86].
There are insufficient examples to make these
remarks anything more than speculation: but they
do identify a research priority to determine the time
dynamics that lead to increasing dependencies of
societies on policies that have succeeded in the past,
to examine increasing rigidities of management
institutions, and to increase sensitivity to surprise.
The research effort should be based on case studies
that cover as wide a spectrum of man's activities as
possible - economic, technological, and behavioral.
Such a comparative study requires collaboration
among a number of disciplines. But it is essential
to involve practical experience in business, govern-
ment, and international organizations as well. It is
only possible now because so many place priority
on understa n ding change. Equally im portant,
frameworks for understanding change can be
found 111 economics, technology, institutional
behavior, and psychology that provide some pos-
sible connections to the framework presented here
for ecosystems. Examples are suggested in Table
10.2.
The analogies suggested by Table 10.2 might
simply represent common ways for people to order
their ignorance. But there are strong hints, at least
SIl.111I1,WiJlf di'llflopmmt O!thf biosphert
from analysis of institutional organizations from the
perspectives of cultural anthropology [88,89] and
of technological developments [87], that functions
similar to the four ecosystem functions operate in
societal settings, although the results can be very
different. Some comparative studies already exist
that have both predictive and descriptive power.
An example is Thompson's analysis of the very
different decisions that were made in the UK and
California concerning the siting of liquefied gas
plants [89J. And regarding technological develop-
ment, consider Brooks' argument (Chapter 11, this
volume) and this quote [87, p 253]:
One reason for this situation is that, as a particular
technology matures, it tends to become more hOllJO-
geneOlls and less innovative and adaptive. Its very
success ten ds to freeze it into a mould dictated by
the fear of depaning from a successful formula, and
by massive commitment to capital investments,
marketing strucures and supporting bureaucracies.
During the early stages of a new technology many
options and choices are possible, and there are typi-
cally many small competing units, each supporting
a different variation of the basic technology, and each
striving to dominate the field. Gradually one vari-
ation begins to win, and the economies of scale in
marketing and production then begin to give it a
greater and greater competitive edge over rival
options. The technical options wonh considering
become narrower and narrower; research tends to
Table 10.2 Possible analogies between ecosystem function and functions or typologies proposed for other
systems.
Subject
Ecosystem
Economics
[e.g., 70]
Function or typology
Exploitation (r)
Innovation,
Market,
Entrepreneur
Conservation (K)
Monopolism,
Hierarchy,
Saturation,
Social rigidity
Creative destruction
Creative destruction
Renewal
Invention
Technology
[e.g., Brooks 87]
Institutions
[e.g., 88, 89]
Psychology
[e.g., Jung as in 90]
Innovation
Entrepreneurial
market
Sensation
Technological
monoculture,
Technological
stalemate
Caste,
Bureaucracy
Thinking
Participatory
paralysis
Sect
Intuition
Expert knowledge
Ineffectua I
Feeling
phn
rt
"
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be directed increasingly at marginal product
improvements or product differentiation, and the
broader consequences of application tend to be taken
more and more for granted. Elsewhere I have spoken
of this as a "technological monoculture". What hap-
pens is that through its very success a new technology
and its supporting systems constitute a more and
more self-contained social system, unable to adapt
to the changes necessitated by its success.
He later adds [87, p 256]:
The paralysis of the decision process by excessive
participation will eventually result in a movement to
hand the process back to elites with only broad
accountability for results according to then current
social values. Eventually effects on certain social
expectations will become sufficiently serious so that
distrust of the experts will revive and there will be
a new wave of demands for participation until the
frustration of more diffuse social interests will again
result in reversion to experts.
This analysis and speculation is completely in
harmony with the cyclic processes described here
for ecosystems.
Such analogues at the least suggest that a formal
comparative study of different cases could help pro-
vide an empirical basis to classify the timing of key
phases of societal response to the unexpected: in
detecting surprise, in understanding the source and
cause of surprise, in communicating that under-
standing, and in responding to surprise. Such a
classification can help introduce a better balance
between prediction, anticipation, and adaptation to
the known, the uncertain. and the unknown
features of our changing world.
Recommendations
Ecosystems have a natural rhythm of change the
amplitude and frequency of which is determined
by the development of internal processes and struc-
tu res in a response to past external variabilities.
These rhythms alternate periods of increasing
organization and stasis with periods of reorgani-
zation and renewal. They determine the degree
of productivity and resilience of ecosystems.
Modern technological man affects these patterns
and their causes in two ways. First, traditional
resource-management institutions constrain the
rhythms by restricting them temporally and
homogenizing them spatially. Internal biophysical
relationships then change, leading to systems of
increasing fragility, i.e., to a reduced resilience.
Moreover, modern man and his institutions operate
with a different historical rhythm that can mask
indications of slowly increasing fragility and can
inhibit effective adaptive responses, resulting in the
increased likelihood of internally generated sur-
prises, i.e., crises. Second, the increasing extent and
intensity of modern industrial and agricultural
activities have modified and accelerated many
global atmospheric processes, thereby changing
the external variability experienced by ecosystems.
This imposes another set of adaptive pressures on
ecosystems when they are already subject to
local ones. As a consequence, locally generated
surprises can be more frequently affected by global
phenomena, and in turn can affect these global
phenomena in a web of global ecological inter-
dependencies.
We now have detailed examples and analyses of
ecological patterns, largely from northern temper-
ate regions, that demonstrate the role of variables
of different rates of action and reveal the impor-
tance of functions that trigger change and renewal
in maintaining resilience. The resultant synthesis
indicates that there is now less of a priority to
develop predictive tools than to design systems
with enough flexibility to allow recovery and renew-
al in the face of unexpected events - in short,
there needs to be a better balance established
between anticipation, monitoring, and adaptation
[91 ].
The design effort would be facilitated by research
to test and expand the conclusions in three ways.
First, the ecosystem synthesis should be extended
to further examples of four critical ecosystems: arc-
tic. ariel, humid tropical, and marine, since each has
patterns and structures different from northern
temperate ecosystems. Second, the analyses of time
responses and rhythms of change described here
should be extended more explicitly to the links
between natural/societal systems, particularly
regarding the history of economic. technolog-
ical, and resource development. Third, there is
a need and opportunity to develop a set of \vell
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replicated mesoscale experiments in order to
reduce the ambiguity of problems occurring be-
cause of local surprise and global interconnection.
These are given more specifically in the following
sections.
A comparative study of resilience and
ecosystem recovery
Purpose: to define early warning signals of
pathologically destructive change and to design self-
renewing resource systems.
Data are required to extend the description of
time patterns to allow comparison between north-
ern temperate, arctic, arid, humid tropical, and
marine systems. Processes that trigger change and
facilitate renewal should be identified and classified
in terms of their effects on stability, productivity,
and resilience. The former requires information as
to the role of slow variables in triggering pulses of
disturbance. The latter particularly requires a study
of soil processes, the balance between nutrient
mobilization and retention, their sensitivity to dis-
turbance, and their rates of recovery after small- to
large-scale disturbances (e.g., from natural patch
formations to man-made land clearance and
drainage).
A comparative study of sources and
responses to surprise in natural-social
systems, particularly economic
technological, and resource
development
Purpose: to define conditions that determine how
much to invest in action (decide policy and act now),
anticipation (delay and find out more), or adapta-
tion (forget the immediate problem and invest in
innovation).
The generation of sharp change, its detection,
and adaptation of policy responses depend on the
interaction between the response times of the
managed (natural) system, of the institutions
managing the systems, and of the economic and
social dependencies that develop.
It now seems possible to classify resource, ecologi-
cal, and environmental problems not only in terms
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of uncertainty of their consequences, but also in
terms of uncertainty of societal response. Those
requiring priority attention are not necessarily those
that have the greatest impact, but those likely to
generate a pathological policy response. The analy-
sis presented here for ecosystems could be usefully
applied to interactions between three components.
One of these components concerns the organi-
zation and time dynamics of management institu-
tions. Focus and direction can be given by combin-
ing the analysis of surprise with the experience and
orientation that has matured in hazards research
studies [5] and in institutional analyses from the
perspective of cultural anthropology [88,89]. The
second component concerns the geophysico-
chemistry of the atmosphere and oceans that
increasingly connects regional economic develop-
ment with global ecological interdependency
through the ecosystems. Focus and direction can be
given by the Gaia hypothesis of Lovelock [6] and
the system dynamic studies of Steele [16] which view
the atmosphere, oceans, and living systems as an
interacting, self-regulated whole. The third and
final component is society itself, particularly the
historical patterns of economic and technological
development that reveal how attitudes are formed,
technological monocultures developed, and innova-
tions either inhibited or enhanced. Focus and direc-
tion can be given by combining an understanding
of ecosystem surprise with historical analyses of
change, such as those of McNeill [92].
International mesoscale experiments
Purpose: to develop a set of internationally repli-
cated experiments involving areas from a few
square kilometers to a few thousand that can test
alternative hypotheses developed to explain par-
ticular impacts of man's activities and to determine
remedial policies.
Our understanding of the structure and behavior
of ecosystems, and of how exploitation and pollution
affect them, comes from a synthesis of knowledge
of ecological, behavioral, physiological, and genetic
processes. Much of that knowledge has been
developed from the solid tradition of experimental,
quantitative, and reductionist science which can
now be generalized and synthesized to propose
quantitative structures, qualitative behaviors, and
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qualitative consequences of impacts. Although syn-
thetic, they essentially represent hypotheses because
the arguments are based on studies that could be
accommodated in the laboratory or in a few hec-
tares. Ecosystems (as well as people's responses to
them) operate on scales of a few square kilometers
to several thousand square kilometers. That is
where our knowledge and experience is the
weakest.
The experiments would be designed to clarify
alternative explanations of and policies for prob-
lems that emerge from the extension and intensifi-
cation of industrial and agricultural development.
Rather than discussing or investigating these end-
lessly, it should now be possible to design experi-
ments that distinguish between alternatives. It is
essential to concentrate on experiments in which
the tests are qualitative in nature, the duration short
(less than 5 years by drawing on fast/slow definitions
of variables), the spatial scale in the "meso" range,
and the policy consequences international. Inter-
national replication and collaboration then becomes
part of the design, which could ultimately con-
tribute to institutional solutions as well as to scien-
tific and policy understanding [93].
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Commentary
F. di Castri
From my own perception, the chief aim of Holling's
chapter is to provide from the start a kind of concep-
tual framework for the proposed program, the Sus-
tainable Development of the Biosphere. There have
been and will be other international endeavors such
as this: worth mentioning are UNESCO's Man and
the Biosphere Programme (MAB), which started in
1971 and is ongoing, and ICSU's International
Geosphere-Biosphere Programme (IGBP) - also called
Global Change - for which a feasibility study is being
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undertaken. For none of these has an essay of
conceptualization - comparable to this chapter -
been attempted; probably there were good reasons
for disregarding this aspect, not the least being
consideration of the difficulties involved in achiev-
ing a sensible agreement on such conceptual issues,
especially when large and heterogeneous groups of
countries and scientists have to work together.
In addition, the MAB Program has almost
unavoidably shifted toward a loose coordination of
very heterogeneous packages of national projects;
a number of which certainly provide enlightening
empirical insights for a theorization of some man-
ecosystem interactions. Nevertheless, the local and
specifically problem-oriented nature of the best
MAB field projects prevents an approach - through
MAB - to global concerns.
On the other hand, IGBP initially had almost
exclusively global views. It is now increasingly rec-
ognized within IGBP that a large number of expla-
nations for the functioning of the biosphere should
come from local and regional studies - chiefly of a
biological nature - and that the notion of spatial
and temporal scale is the key for the success of the
overall program. However, it is unlikely that a pro-
gram of fundamental science, like IGBP, can
become really involved in local societal issues.
There is, therefore, a niche for the kind of con-
cerns addressed in Holling's chapter, where a con-
ciliation is proposed between two outcomes, local
surprise (of a biological but mostly societal type)
and global change (considered chiefly from a bio-
geochemical point of view). There would be merit
if Holling's views were also discussed within MAB
and IGBP, as these two programs are seeking new
avenues of research and a better definition of their
framework.
Concerning specifically Holling's chapter, one
can be tempted to react in two opposing ways: either
to accept everything by intuition and sympathy -
being attracted by the cohesion of the argument
and the stimulating challenge of the ideas - or to
block reject these speculations. In fact, several state-
ments are not supported by scientific evidence (but
this is to be expected in such an article), some
hypotheses are not testable in an experimental and
quantitative way (as the author recognizes), and one
cannot easily visualize how they could be proved or
disproved; there is also much use (and perhaps
some abuse) of analogical reasoning (with all the
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charm and the risk involved in analogies). I suspect
that whichever position one is inclined to - accep-
tance or rejection - is a matter of personal feeling
and behavior rather than of a difference in scientific
background. From my viewpoint, I will try to estab-
lish which are topics where a consensus might
emerge, as well as which are the most controversial
aspects. I focus my comments on the three pillars
of Holling's conceptual building: local surprise, the
four ecosystem functions, and the Gaia hypothesis.
As regards local surprise in relation to societal
and institutional behavior, while admittedly similar
concepts might be put forward using different terms
- e.g., perception - I believe that Holling's presenta-
tion has definite advantages, even from a pedagogi-
cal viewpoint vis-a-vis both scientists and policy-
makers. I cannot agree more that in the contem-
porary context - both socioeconomic and scientific
- management institutions (and political establish-
ments) should not desperately seek prediction and
control, but rather should settle their organization
and their policy on the acceptance of, and the
adaptation to, surprise effects. Flexibility should be
the sine qua non condition for their decisions. By
the way, little prediction can be provided at present
by the key science of ecology, and I suspect that the
same is true for the key disciplines of economy and
sociology.
In relation to the Gaia hypothesis, it seems to be
at present one of the few workable concepts when
addressing research on global biospheric problems,
even if the end result be the disproof of it. I imagine
that Gaia is also the underlying hypothesis of IGBP.
In addition, the use of Gaia and of local surprise
to enlighten the interfaces between biospheric and
more traditional ecological issues, on the one hand,
and between ecological and societal issues on the
other, has the advantage of focusing on processes of
a scientific and decision-making nature rather than
on ill-defined interdisciplinary linkages. Interdis-
ciplinarity, when it is considered and implemented
as an end in itself - and not as a tool for addressing
new complex problems - leads too often to sterile
research and to verbose descriptions and nonex-
planatory results.
Almost paradoxically, in view of Holling's back-
ground, the most controversial points may well
refer to the ecosystem concept as defined by
Holling's four functions - exploitation, conserva-
tion, creative destruction, and renewal. To be kindly
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sarcastic, and admittedly somewhat unfair, one
would be tempted to think that Holling's conceptual
construction is too harmonious and too beautiful to
accurately equate with reality. The supporting
examples given by Holling are well presented, but
I am doubtful whether they should be generalized
to such an extent, and anyway they may lead to
different interpretations. Furthermore, I wonder
whether these views on ecosystem functions can
convince anyone who is not already converted or
preadapted to such ideas. From my viewpoint, I
believe that Holling's views on this matter represent
a very stimulating framework for discussion, but I
am somewhat skeptical of the possibility of his
hypotheses being proved (or disproved). In fact,
too many elements evoked to support these four
ecosystem functions are either nonmeasurable or
interpreted at present in ways too controversial for
good scientific communication. No one is more
aware than Holling of the many (and sometimes
opposite) interpretations of the terms stability and
resilience [1]; but also the adaptive strategies of
species represent more a reference concept than a
quantifiable parameter (and the place of so-called
r- and K-species in an ecological succession is not
so clearly defined or so fixed as Figure 10.5 may
suggest).
As a matter of fact, I believe that the whole
ecosystem concept is in crisis at present, at least if
the ecosystem is taken as a kind of well-defined
supraorganism, and not as a useful methodological
tool to study problems of interactions and of system
behavior as regards different ecological multispecies
units. A too extreme and exclusive view of ecosys-
tem properties can alienate from ecology some of
the disciplines, such as ecophysiology, population
biology, and genetics, that are essential for the
explanation of most of the ecological processes (and
this is already happening in a number of countries
[2]).
The other key aspect of the theoretical framework
proposed by Holling deals with connections, as
exemplified in Figure 10.6. Ecosystems clearly
represent the crossroads of all the systems, being
intermediate between biosphere and society. Some
geographers and economists could again object to
the use of ecosystems; they may argue that the
exchanges of energy and products exceed the
boundaries of any given ecosystem, and may prefer
other units such as "human use systems" or
"resource systems". Nevertheless, even if these sys-
tems help to establish interfaces with societies, they
cannot facilitate linkages with global biospheric
issues; furthermore, as regards ecosystems, these
possible objections may imply simply a different
interpretation of the definition and hierarchical
scale of ecosystems. I am personally more worried,
as regards connections, about the excessive use of
analogies. I need evidence to be convinced that
ecosystems are just "Gaia writ small"; changing of
scale implies usually the emerging (and the disap-
pearing) of new functions and properties. On the
other hand, analogies, such as those presented in
Table 10.2 between ecosystems and other systems
of a societal nature sensu lato, can perhaps improve
the understanding between disciplines and their
different approaches, but do not serve operational
purposes for research and may be dangerous and
misleading if they are taken too strictly.
After all, it is amazing to see to what extent a
science in crisis, such as ecology - in crisis for several
reasons, not least the confusion between ecological
and environmental problems [2] - is capable of
"exporting" so many concepts, through an analogi-
cal process, to other sciences that probably face a
comparable crisis, such as geography, economics,
or sociology. I wonder whether ecology itself is not
shifting at present from a biological science to a
sociological one, with all the epistemological and
methodological implications involved in this move.
Finally, in relation to Holling's recommenda-
tions, they all represent essential avenues for
research. However, on the basis of previous
experience in international programs, such as the
International Biological Programme and the Man and
the Biosphere Programme [3], I suspect that it is sel-
dom realized how high are the costs, the manpower
involvement, and the intrinsic difficulties represen-
ted by these proposals. Another obstacle, which
must be overcome for the development of ecology,
is our lack of a theoretical basis for the comparison
of ecosystems. We do not know yet how to evaluate
the degree of extrapolatability and predictability of
our research from one to another ecosystem, or
from one to another period of time. This is true
even within the same ecosystem type, e.g., com-
parisons between temperate forests of the northern
and southern hemispheres; the difficulties in com-
paring more complex and less studied ecosystems,
such as those of the humid tropics, or of more
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heterogeneous systems, such as the Mediterranean-
type ones, increase exponentially. When different
types of ecosystems are compared, for instance ter-
restrial and aquatic ones, or forests and grasslands,
it becomes almost impossible to escape from the
pitfall of overgeneralization, with little regard for
reality.
This remark is not intended to underestimate the
importance of a comparative ecology or to dis-
courage students from undertaking this kind of
research. On the contrary, 1 feel that these com-
parisons represent now the main challenge for
ecology. It is, nevertheless, essential to fully under-
stand the limits and the methodological background
for such comparisons. If they are placed in the
framework of strictly climatic and old-fashioned
classifications of life zones, such as those of
Holdridge and Grigor'yev, as suggested here, I do
not hesitate in predicting many "surprise effects"
when the results are compared; and these surprises
may well derive from the lack of understanding or
knowledge of the diverse origins of these ecosys-
tems, on the weight of the past, including both
geological and historical factors (and man's impact
in fashioning ecosystem patterns is much older than
usually considered). A strong injection into such
research of evolutionary ecology (1 mean evolution
in the strict sense of biological evolution) and of
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explanatory biogeography - with special emphasis
on the invasion of alien species - would be likely to
reduce considerably these surprises.
1 regret that, because of space limitations, I cannot
refer to many other enlightening points of this
chapter, such as continuity and discontinuity in
ecological processes, linear and nonlinear interac-
tions, etc. As with most of Holling's work one is
captured by the argument and - in agreement or
disagreement - cannot resist the temptation of
being involved in the discussion; and this is precisely
the goal that a chapter of this nature should achieve.
Notes and references (Comm.)
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Chapter 11
H. Brooks
The typology of surprises
in technology, institutions,
and development
Editors' Introduction: Most studies of the future are dominated by smooth projections
that are free of significant discontinuities, random events or, more generally, of surprises.
Social learning to cope with surprise is also neglected. The IIASA Biosphere Project
seeks to understand the role of surprise in shaping interactions between human activities
and the environment, and to design methods that can accommodate both surprise and
social responses to it in assessments of future prospects for sustainable development.
Addressed in this chapter are the nature and origins of surprise in interactions among
technology, institutions, and society, thus complementing the analysis in Chapter 10 of
surprise in the management of ecological systems. Proposed is a typology of surprises that
affect these interactions, with special attention to the ways in which certain long-term
trends and scale-effects increasingly predispose systems to discontinuous and often
unexpected change.
Introduction
That the world is in a state of transition toward a
single interdependent system is by now conven-
tional wisdom, but the nature and extent of this
interdependence varies greatly between different
parts of the system. Economic interdependence
among nqtions has been institutionalized in many
specialized agencies and forums. While this
institutionalization is far from complete, especially
with respect to the management of technological
developments, it has progressed much further than
the institutionalization of ecological interdepen-
dence. The two themes of ecological and economic
interdependence are strongly linked through a
third theme - the development and diffusion of
technology. The most dramatic development of the
last 30 years has been the growth of the technologi-
cal capacity of the industrialized countries, as well
as of many of the developing countries. The world
population of scientists and engineers, like the
volume of international trade, has grown at thrice
the rate of the population and at about twice that
of world GNP, and this population is generally
expected to increase further. In addition, the
decline in the cost of transportation, and especially
of communications, relative to other economic fac-
tors has dramatically enhanced the mobility of both
capital and technology, creating an acceleration of
structural change in the world economy, and
expanding the spatial and temporal extent of the
ecological consequences of economic and techno-
logical development.
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The expansion of economic, technological, and
ecological interdependence has stimulated a grow-
ing volume of research on its implications and con-
sequences. The International Institute for Applied
Systems Analysis (IIASA) itself is one institutional
manifestation of this expansion. Much of the work
to date has been based, implicitly or explicitly, on
an evolutionary paradigm - the gradual, incre-
mental unfolding of the world system in a manner
that can be described by surprise-free models, with
parameters derived from a combination of time
series and cross-sectional analyses of the existing
system. This is also true of work with econometric
models, of energy models, and of models of the
global environment [1].
The focus on surprise-free models and projec-
tions is not the result of ignorance or reductionism
so much as of the lack of practically usable
methodologies to deal with discontinuities and ran-
dom events. The multiplicity of conceivable sur-
prises is so large and heterogeneous that the analyst
despairs of deciding where to begin, and instead
proceeds in the hope that in the longer sweep of
history surprises and discontinuities will average
out, leaving smoother long-term trends that can be
identified in retrospect and can provide a basis for
reasonable approximations to the future. The
underlying assumption is that surprises can be iso-
lated from the underlying trends so that their inter-
actions can be neglected in the first approximation,
or at least approximated through the parameter-
ization of smooth models, much as the phenomena
of turbulence can be parameterized in the equations
of motion for fluids.
One of the purposes of the Biosphere Project at
IIASA is to understand how far we can and what
is required to depart from this zero-order approxi-
mation, and to establish if it is even a legitimate
approximation to the real world. In this chapter I
hope to deal with the issue of surprise in relation
to the interaction between technology, human insti-
tutions, and social systems. Other chapters deal with
surprise more specifically in terms of the biosphere
itself. I fear, however, that our understanding of
discontinuities and surprises in this broader
sociotechnical framework is more rudimentary and
poorly formulated than it is in the biosphere-
development interactions analyzed so elegant-
ly (for example) by Holling (Chapter 10, this
volume).
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A typology of surprise
We can divide the surprises dealt with in this chapter
into three general types:
(I) Unexpected discrete events, such as the oil
shocks of 1973 and 1979, the Three Mile Island
(TMI) reactor accident, political coups or revo-
lutions, major natural catastrophes, accidental
wars.
(2) Discontinuities in long-term trends, such as the
acceleration of USA oil imports between 1966
and 1973, the onset of the stagflation
phenomenon in OECD countries in the 1970s,
the decline in the ratio of energy consumption
growth to GNP growth in the OECD countries
after 1973.
(3) The sudden emergence into political conscious-
ness of new information, such as the relation
between fluorocarbon production and strato-
spheric ozone (03 ), the deterioration of central
European forests apparently due to air pollu-
tion, the discovery of the recombinant DNA
technique, the discovery of asbestos-related
cancer of industrial workers.
These three types of surprises are, of course,
interrelated. Discrete events may be the trigger for
a permanent change in long-term trends. New
information may be the result of discontinuities in
long-term trends that had been latent but took a
long time to become apparent. Much new informa-
tion is such that we realize we should have known
about it if we had only had the sense to look for it.
Some implicit assumptions
In order to keep the discussion of this chapter within
finite bounds we make some assumptions that
implicitly rule out certain types of surprises. In
particular, we assume continued growth of inter-
dependence and associated linkages in time and
space, as well as among different types and classes
of problems which previously appeared unrelated.
Second, we rule out discussion of the possible con-
sequences of a major resurgence of protectionism
and economic nationalism, of general war, or of a
sudden major shift in power alignments among
nations. It is not that such events are improbable.
1
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but including them is beyond the scope of a single
chapter.
Our discussion is also mainly restricted to tech-
nology and to technology-society interactions. We
do not deal with the biosphere as such, since that
is adequately covered in the other chapters.
Alternatives to surprise-free
thinking
As hinted at above, it would be a mistake to reject
surprise-free thinking out of hand. It is not,
however, my contention that we must accept a
fundamental paradigm change that sweeps away all
that has gone before. Rather it is a question of
understanding the limits of current projections and
models, and especially of how long-term changes
in both environmental and social parameters inter-
act with short-term changes and random events,
much as the concepts of eddy diffusion and momen-
tum transfer are used to explain average flows in
large-scale atmospheric and oceanic phenomena.
On the other hand, because we are interested in
the impact on human beings and their institutions,
we must also gain an understanding of how long-
term trends predispose systems toward certain
kinds of surprises and discontinuities or toward
greatly amplified responses to small, random
events. Unfortunately, knowing that a system is
becoming more predisposed to certain catastrophic
events does not tell us when these events will occur.
We might have continued for another 20 years
without a TMI incident, for example, which might
have produced very different outcomes in terms of
worldwide energy developments.
By making nonlinearities and surprises a center
of methodological concern, we do not intend to
denigrate the possibility of elucidating trends of
longer term. We must recognize, however, that
from the viewpoint of individuals, organizations,
and nations, smooth development is the exception
rather than the rule. Nonlinearities, perception
thresholds, and effects of scale are particularly
important in determining human perceptions and
reactions, and hence the feedback from external
events to changes in behavior that affect the impact
of environmental, technological, or economic
trends on society.
In what follows I give several examples by way
of illustration.
Alternation of perceptions of resource
scarcity and abundance
For most of twentieth century, and indeed prior to
that, there has been a regular cycle of alternating
concerns about the scarcity of key natural resources
followed by complacency about their abundance.
The swings in these perceptions seem to lean far
beyond objective reality in both directions. Often
the alternations have been triggered by dramatic
short-term events which raise intense public con-
cern for a brief period, but not for long enough to
alter the direction of policy permanently. What is
more remarkable, however, is the degree to which
generalized public concerns influence expert
appraisals of the situation in anyone period.
The most dramatic example of recent times is
probably those events immediately surrounding the
Arab oil embargo in 1973, but pessimism regarding
resources, especially energy resources, had been
growing for several years prior to this, after a peak
of optimism in the 1960s [2]. In fact, the famous
"limits-to-growth" debate had preceded the event
by a year or two [3]. The environmental movement
of the late 1960s had as part of its agenda a strong
element of concern over the depletion of nonrenew-
able resources. The oil embargo was followed within
a year by a worldwide shortfall in cereal grain har-
vests and by an explosion in raw material prices
which drove the first inflationary burst of the 1970s
[4]. All this contributed to a widespread perception
of dwindling resources, both by the general public
and by a significant proportion of experts. It was
then strongly reinforced by the second oil shock of
1979.
Yet, looking at these events in retrospect, it can
be argued that both the public and many experts
confused short-term, "fast-cycle" incidents with
more gradual long-term trends. To be sure,
although the events that triggered the crisis occur-
red with random timing, their probability of occur-
rence had been greatly increased by the more
gradual underlying changes in world energy trade.
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For example, the peaking of the USA domestic oil
and gas production in about 1970 had triggered a
very rapid acceleration of USA demands on the
world oil market, and this set the stage for the
unexpected success of the OPEC cartel in raising
oil prices. These trends, which were apparent in
retrospect [5J, had been slowly but surely raising
the vulnerability of the world oil system to small
disturbances, even though the particular events
which precipitated the 1973 and 1979 crises were
unpredictable as to their timing, and perhaps not
even inevitable. These events also sensitized the
whole international trading system to potential
commodity shortages and doubtless amplified the
grain and commodity price explosions that occur-
red in 1974. Moreover, the policy response of the
USA to the sudden rise in the price of imported oil
had the perverse effect of further stimulating the
rise of USA oil imports, thus enabling the second
oil shock of 1979, in which a far smaller supply
shortfall than in 1973 caused a much more serious
market disruption, in part due to self-protective
inventory building. The 1979 crisis, triggered by
the Iranian revolution, was itself related to the
politically destabilizing effect of the dramatic rise
in the inflow of oil revenues to the Persian Gulf
region. What we see here is a whole series of interre-
lated surprises, and yet it is not clear that anything
more than an increased probability of such surprises
could have been predicted from the context. The
exact course of the crisis appears to have been highly
dependent on the exact timing of events, which was
essentially random. We can also see in retrospect
Quantity (~.jlBTU/1980$)
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that many actions designed to cope with short-term
problems, such as USA domestic price controls and
the crude oil allocation system, had the effect of
greatly exacerbating the impact of these events on
a time scale of 5-10 years [6]. .
We can also see, however, that effects lasting for
decades and triggered by crisis-generated condi-
tions - namely dramatic, price-induced energy con-
servation [7J - tend to drastically mitigate the prob-
lem of apparent shortages on this time scale, and
indeed sow seeds of doubt on the widespread per-
ception of a true physical resource shortage. Today
we see a fundamental split developing among the
experts regarding the prospects on a 30-50 year
time horizon. The events of the 1970s have gener-
ated a sharp, almost discontinuous downward trend
in energy/output ratios for both industry and con-
sumer services throughout the industrialized world,
as shown in Figure 11.1 [7J for the USA. It now
seems apparent that the full effects on out-
put/energy ratios of the oil price shocks of the 1970s
will not work themselves through the system for
another decade [7.8]. According to Hogan [7J,
more than three quarters of the oil conservation
effect has been due to improved end-use efficiency
rather than to slower economic growth in the indus-
trialized countries. The combination of increasing
diversification of oil supply sources with the
improved energy efficiency of durable goods has
evidently reduced the sensitivity of the system, both
to cartel activity and to unforeseen political events,
such as the Iran-Iraq war, which has hardly affected
world oil markets so far.
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1975 1980 Figure 11.1 Aggregate energy
indexes per $GNP for the USA.
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Despite the current relaxation of the CflSIS,
however, experts are sharply divided about trends
beyond the next ten years. Many believe that the
present oil glut is temporary [8], and that prices
will begin their upward trend again in the late 1980s
or early 1990s with the system becoming once again
vulnerable to random political events in the Middle
East or elsewhere. There are others who believe
that the two oil shocks have set world oil con-
sumption on a new trajectory relative to economic
growth, and that the discovery of oil and gas resour-
ces outside OPEC will continue to place down-
ward pressures on the real price level of oil, and
hence of all competing energy forms, as far into
the future as can be foreseen [9]. Some even fear
that many present marginal, high cost sources of
energy, such as Alaskan and North Sea oil and gas,
may become subeconomic before they are depleted,
so that they will have to be either shut down or
receive massive government support, either
through direct subsidies or cartel-like arrangements
between consumers and low-cost producers so as to
limit production from the lowest cost sources [9].
Thresholds and nonlinearities
The benefits of technology often increase in propor-
tion to its scale of application, whereas many
environmental and social phenomena resulting
from the application of technology increase highly
nonlinearly with increasing scale [10]. Thus a tech-
nological activity may become strongly established
with influential vested interests during the linear
regime, before the disbenefits that increase non-
linearly with scale begin to manifest themselves or
become apparent to a wider public. The situation
is illustrated in Figure 11.2, which is intended to
suggest how the benefits and disbenefits of a tech-
nology might vary with its scale of application. The
two solid black and yellow curves show the benefits
(linear) and the disbenefits (nonlinear), respec-
tively, while the broken curve shows the net mar-
ginal benefit as a function of scale (essentially the
derivative of the difference between the benefit and
the disbenefit curves). As the scale increases the
marginal benefit of further increments in scale may
become negative, as indicated. This could be viewed
as a form of the "tragedy of the commons [11 ]," in
which the result of a participant acting for his or
her own benefit becomes a disaster for all. One of
the classic examples is that of traffic, e.g., automobile
traffic, where, particularly in urban areas at peak
traffic hours, the disbenefits set in quite abruptly at
a critical traffic density. The threshold density for
the onset of disbenefits can be raised by increasing
the peak capacity of the roads, but this requires a
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Figure 11.2 Variation of benefits and
disbenefits of a technology with scale
of application.
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very high capital cost per additional vehicle
accommodated [12]. Furthermore, the additional
capacity concentrates vehicles even more in peak
periods and on peak routes, with the result that
there is relatively more unused capacity at other
times, thus further adding to the incremental invest-
ment per vehicle accommodated. Moreover, this
leaves out such additional social costs as the preemp-
tion for highway construction of socially valuable
urban land and the displacement or disruption of
neighborhoods.
Another example of such a threshold effect aris-
ing from nonlinearities also occurs in connection
with automobiles, namely the smog resulting from
auto emissions. Smog is an indirect product of
photochemical reactions among several pollutants;
these reactions are known to vary nonlinearly with
pollutant concentrations. Thus smog problems
appear permanent at some critical traffic density or
automobile population per unit area [13]. This is
illustrated, again schematically, in Figure 11.3,
Nonmethane hydrocarbons (1l9Ym3 )
190 370
NO)1l9Ym3)
Figure 11.3 Maximum oxidant level as a function
of total emission concentrations (relative scale)
[13].
which shows oxidant level as a function of total
emISSions.
An example of a perceptual threshold occurs in
connection with airport noise. It is well known from
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surveys of residents near airports that the complaint
rate increases much more rapidly than in propor-
tion to the noise intensity or noise perception index
(NPI), when this index rises above some threshold
level [14J. Similarly, the public reaction to the siting
of large industrial facilities, especially power plants,
seems to be more than proportional to the size or
capacity of the facility. Moreover, there are band-
wagon effects such that successful opposition to the
siting of facilities in one community encourages
opposition in other communities, so that public
opposition to specific types of facilities (such as
hazardous waste dumps or processing facilities) is
contagious and somewhat like an epidemic, with
the result that the probability of opposition to any
one facility increases with the number of previous
attempts to site such facilities within a given time
period.
Another interesting example of a political thresh-
old effect occurs in the displacement of labor. When
a large company, such as Chrysler, Lockheed, or
British Leyland, is threatened with bankruptcy due
to foreign competition or other causes, political
sensitivities are very high, and some form of govern-
ment rescue operation is frequently forthcoming,
even though many more people may be losing their
jobs in the same geographical area due to bank-
ruptcies of small businesses in a comparable period
of time [15]. In other words, the size and geo-
graphical concentration of institutions changes pub-
lic perceptions about their importance and their
relation to the political process in a way that is not
simply proportional to the number of individuals
affected. Similarly, many simultaneous fatalities in
an air crash attracts much more public attention
and political action than the steady attrition of
automobile accidents.
Another example is those fears of worker dis-
placement resulting from the introduction of robot
and other computer-based technologies 10
manufacturing. The metalworking occupations,
which appear to be most amenable to displacement
by computerized manfacturing technologies, are
highly concentrated in particular geographical
areas, such as the five states in the US Great Lakes
region [16]. This geographical and sectoral con-
centration is likely to lower the threshold for politi-
cal intervention in the process of conversion to
computerized manufacturing. Effects that are quan-
titatively larger, but more dispersed either in space
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or over time, are likely to attract less political atten-
tion and consequent policy response than smaller
effects that are more concentrated and exceed some
sort of local "critical mass". This situation appears
characteristic of many different kinds of "negative
externalities" of technical or economic-structural
changes, ranging from air pollution to employment
displacement. It may generate a bias in political
attention that reduces the effectiveness of social
responses to external trends.
Latent surprises
A source of surprise that has come to attention with
great force only recently, but is likely to grow in
importance, is the appearance of evidence for
delayed effects of technological activities that occur-
red in the relatively distant past. One example is
the appearance of cancers resulting from exposure
of relatively large populations to very low con-
centrations of carcinogenic chemicals or low levels
of ionizing radiation. The most dramatic example
is probably that of asbestos [17]. In many instances
the latency period can extend over most of a human
life span. The nightmare scenario associated with
this is the appearance of a cancer "epidemic" many
decades after the exposure of a large population
over a long period of time with no apparent ill
effects. The most well-documented and quantita-
tively important case of this is probably that of
smoking and lung cancer [18]. Otherwise most of
the nightmare scenarios have occurred only in
limited, occupationally exposed populations, such
as asbestos workers or coal miners with black lung.
Another example of the nightmare scenario that
has attracted attention is the rapid introduction of
artificial sweeteners into diet soft drinks - first sac-
charin, and now aspartane [19]. The problem is the
exposure of large and youthful populations to non-
natural substances within a time period that is short
compared with the possible latency period for the
appearance of secondary effects. An even more
speculative, and possibly more dramatic, case might
be the spread into the human population of bacteria
resistant to antibiotics, which develop from feeding
antibiotics to cattle or poultry [20]. The appearance
of widespread forest damage as a result of air pollu-
tion in both Central Europe and North America
[21] may be a similar latency phenomenon, in which
the effects observed arise from causes that accumu-
late over long periods of time.
The potential importance of the latency
phenomenon is underlined by evidence that the
incidence of cancer in large populations is highly
variable geographically, implying that most cancers
are of environmental origin [22], though not
necessarily associated with industrial products, as
sometimes asserted. Indeed, the consensus among
experts seems to be that these geographical vari-
ations are primarily associated with diet and life-
style [22]. While the relative incidence of different
types of cancer has been changing over time, there
is no evidence to suggest the existence or prospect
of a cancer epidemic associated with industrial
activity or economic development, apart from the
well-documented case of smoking. Because of the
latency phenomenon, however, the absence of a
contemporary cancer epidemic is not as strong an
argument as might be desired against the possibility
that such an epidemic might appear some time in
the future as a result of apparently innocuous
activities taking place now. The continual exposure
of large numbers of people to substances not com-
mon in nature is a potential source of future sur-
prise, which is likely to decline only gradually as
our scientific understanding of the. specific biologi-
cal mechanisms of carcinogenesis and mutagenesis
slowly improves.
Moreover, the asbestos story, the Love Canal case,
and the Agent Orange affair show that large num-
bers of people do not have to suffer latency effects
to create large societal feedbacks. The inherent
surprise element in the phenomenon itself tends to
be amplified by public and political responses to
what would have been considered isolated events a
generation ago. Increased scientific knowledge is
itself a source of public reaction, enhanced by
improved communication and media reporting,
and by the continual refinement of epidemiological
and other techniques for establishing small, but
statistically significant, associations between
exposures and disease incidence. While these effects
are not necessarily nonlinear in the sense described
earlier (although they can be nonlinear also), their
appearance occurs in a way that is quite analogous
to nonlinear effects; that is, an apparently beneficial
activity is introduced and widely diffused long
before any indication of possible disbenefits or social
costs becomes apparent.
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The carcinogenesis case is typical of a wide class
of phenomena of latency. For example, the present
acute concern over the consequences of past dis-
posal of toxic chemical wastes is very similar in
character. The social costs of activities undertaken
several decades ago, largely in ignorance of poten-
tial consequences, suddenly became apparent and
the source of great public anxiety and demands for
action, including the search for scapegoats. The
slow spread of toxic wastes in the aquifer provides
the latency mechanism here. Until very recently,
the planning horizon for the safe disposal of
chemical wastes was quite short - a matter of decades
- in contrast to that for radioactive wastes, where
millenia have always been at issue. Yet, particularly
in the case of toxic heavy metals, chemical wastes
can be thought of as having an infinite half-life, and
ought to be subject to time horizons as long as, say,
the long-lived actinides in radioactive wastes [23].
The entry of wastes into groundwater is the
mechanism of latent surprise for a host of industrial
activities, and provides an illustration of how focus-
ing societal planning on short-range phenomena
while ignoring underlying trends in the slow vari-
ables may generate the seeds for future surprise
and crisis (see Holling, Chapter 10, this volume).
A slightly different aspect of the latency
phenomenon is illustrated by the use of chemical
pesticides, particularly the more persistent ones.
Here, the development of resistant pests or
pathogens is a gradual phenomenon resulting from
cumulative use, which at any point in time can be
countered by increasing the intensity of application.
However, the end result is the gradual oversim-
plification of the agricultu ral ecosystem, decreasing
its natural resilience, and making it more vulnerable
to large perturbations. The declining gains in
agricultural productivity from the use of pesticides
are illustrated in Table 11.1 [24].
A somewhat different class of latency phenomena
to have received public attention recently is typified
by carbon dioxide (C02 ) build-up and stratospheric
0:\ depletion. In the case of toxic waste disposal the
latency aspect really arose out of ignorance; if we
had known more about groundwater transport of
toxic chemicals we might have developed a safer
disposal method earlier. In the CO2 and strato-
spheric 0:\ cases, by contrast, scientific understand-
ing has enabled us to foresee the future effects of
current activities long before any actual damage has
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Table 11.1 Pesticide usage and agricultural yields
in selected world areas [24].
Pesticide
Area or use Yield
nation (g/ha) Rank (kg/ha) Rank
Japan 10790 1 5480 1
Europe 1870 2 3430 2
USA 1490 3 2600 3
Latin America 220 4 1970 4
Oceania 198 5 1570 5
India 149 6 820 7
Africa 127 7 1210 6
occurred. The discovery itself, however, came as a
surprise long after the industrial activities which
would ultimately give rise to the effect had become
well established and the subject of strong vested
interests. Moreover, in the CO2 case the human
adaptations required may be considerable [25] and
no less difficult by virtue of the fact that the need
for them was discovered so far in advance. On the
other hand, the slowness in the development of the
problem compared to the time scale for the
mtroduction of innovations in human societies
provides an opportunity for adaptation which is
absent in the other examples of latency described
here.
Positive versus negative surprises
In the examples discussed so far we have been
dealing with surprises and nonlinear effects
described as disbenefits - adverse effects that
became manifest after an apparently beneficial
activity had become well established. In discussing
projections of the future to accommodate surprise,
however, it is important not to overlook positive
surprises, which are equally possible, and could be
more important for planning in the long run.
One of the most important sources of positive
surprise is human ingenuity, which almost always
tends to be underestimated. In his classic paper,
The Principle of ihe Hiding Hand, Hirschman [26]t
Ii
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has codified this notion for development projects
in developing countries, but it is equally applicable
to technological undertakings or even to the over-
coming of environmental threats. Hirschman points
out that many highly successful projects would not
have been undertaken at all if their inventors or
developers had foreseen all the difficulties. These
difficulties are frequently surmounted as a result of
unexpected innovations, which were sought only
because the prior commitment to a project had
become so deep that its proponents and managers
were unwilling to be deterred by setbacks. Indeed,
reliance on this hiding hand is probably the most
distinctive characteristic of successful entre-
preneurs, who frequently announce what they are
going to accomplish and then challenge the
engineers and managers to prevent them becoming
liars [27]. One of the less fortunate characteristics
of large, bureaucratic organizations is that they are
more likely to know what cannot be done, since
they have better access to experts thoroughly con-
versant with the difficulties and histories of past
failures. Probably this is one of the principal reasons
why small entrepreneurial businesses are frequently
more successful innovators than larger organi-
zations with superior technical resources.
One example of positive surprise can be found
in environmental, health, and safety regulation.
Regulations when first propounded are often tech-
nically unrealistic, but frequently technology has
been more successful in finding a way to meet them
than the experts in the affected industries believed
possible. In the early days of automobile emission
regulations in the USA, the conflict between fuel
efficiency and pollution control objectives was
thought to constitute an inexorable technical trade-
off. Yet within a few years most of the conflict had
been eliminated as a result of new technological
developments, such as the three-way catalyst and
microprocessor combustion controls. The average
fuel efficiency of USA automobiles of models of
recent years has more than doubled since 1973, and
the prospects for further improvements in fuel con-
sumption are brighter than for the much less
efficient cars of the early 1970s; in other words, the
more that has been achieved, the lower the apparent
barriers to further achievement [28]. At the time
of the first oil crisis the world automobile industry
was widely described as mature, with a highly
refined technology and little prospect for funda-
mental innovation. It was predicted that competi-
tion would be mostly in styling and accessories, with
a gradual and marginal improvement in manufac-
turing costs. Yet now the technology of the industry
has become much more intensive, in many respects
beginning to be once again a "high tech" industry,
with competition more on the basis of technology
than at any time since the early days of the century
[28]. In addition, through a series of dramatic inno-
vations in management practices, the Japanese
automobile industry has set entirely new production
standards for passenger cars and light trucks, both
for product quality and reliability and for cost per
vehicle [28]. While it is true that innovation in the
industry is still incremental and cumulative rather
than revolutionary or epochal, the cumulative
impact of a succession of small innovations will be
much greater than anything foreseen a few years
ago. The many who saw the modern automobile as
a technological troglodyte [29] about to go the way
of the dinosaurs, the interurban trolley, or the trans-
atlantic ocean liner, have been proved wrong.
One can cite many other examples of possible or
likely positive surprises that were barely conceivable
at the time of the "Iimits-to-growth" debate of the
early 1970s:
(I) The potential application of genetic engineer-
ing to food production and the detoxification
of organic wastes [30].
(2) Developments in medium-scale, combined-
cycle electric power generators fueled by
natural gas or low BTU gas from an integral
coal gasifier [31].
(3) Sophisticated applications of microelectronics
to the control and monitoring of energy con-
sumption, with a dramatic potential for pro-
viding energy services using less primary
energy.
(4) The discovery of much greater resources of
deep natural gas [32].
(5) Developments in ceramics, composites, and
fiber-reinforced plastics with the possibility of
substitution for metals and alloys used cur-
rently [33].
(6) Low-polluting, closed-cycle food production
and industrial processes [34].
(7) Development of cost-competitive solar energy
systems.
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Figure 11.4 Shifts in manufacturing investment by
equipment type 1958-1982 [37) and see Table 11.2.
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about the widespread adoption of the original inno-
vation [36, p 17]." Examples are the microchip,
which so improved the performance of many con-
sumer durables that people could not afford to be
without the new models, and many innovations in
materials which enabled radical improvements in
productivity or performance across a wide range of
industries. The basic point is that "innovations flow-
ing from a few industries may be responsible for
generating a vastly disproportionate amount of
technological change, productivity improvement,
and output growth in the economy [36, p 18]." The
development of these interindustry linkages
frequently involves long latency periods before the
cross-industry benefits can be realized, and at the
same time the rapid market expansion generated by
these linkages drives learning cu rves and economies
of scale, which further accelerate the adoption of
the triggering innovation. Even when the rate of
technological progress appears to be more or less
uniform and steady, its economic impact may be
nonlinear and tend to exhibit a kind of threshold
effect as the linkages act synergistically. Figure 11.4
and Table 11.2 illustrate how in the last decade the
(8) The wide adoption of waste water recycling
and purification systems.
(9) The discovery of natural or synthetic chemical
compounds that provide protection against
cancer.
(10) Development and widespread deployment of
an inexpensive and reliable system of radio
communication for technology transfer to
people in remote areas [35].
Also, within the last few decades we have seen the
discovery of North Sea, Mexican, and Arctic oil and
gas fields; the development of optical communica-
tions and signal processing systems; and the use of
remote-sensing satellites for resource and environ-
mental assessment. Many of these technologies have
advanced to, or close to, operational status faster
than most people predicted when the first
possibilities were announced.
One example of a positive nonlinearity is the
effects of the learning curve and of economies of
scale on the competitiveness of new technologies.
As Rosenberg and Frischtak [36, pp 11-12] have
emphasized, there can be highly nonlinear relation-
ships between the rate of improvement of a new
technology and its rate of adoption and diffusion.
In its earliest stages the costs of new technology
tend to exceed those of existing technologies that
fulfil the same function, so that the rate of adoption
is slow, often disappointing the expectations of
enthusiastic proponents. As incremental improve-
ments continue, however, and learning cu rve effects
and economies of scale in production are realized,
the competitive advantage of the new technology
reaches a take-off point, after which it penetrates
the market with unexpected rapidity.
Another source of positive nonlinearity in the
adoption and diffusion of technological innovations
can be described as the strength of the backward
and forward linkages of a particular innovation
within the economy as a whole [36, pp 16-17].
Backward linkages may occur through the new
demand for expenditures on manufacturing equip-
ment or facilities, or for input components required
to implement an innovation in the economy. For-
ward linkages can occur either through "reduction
of the price of the products into which the innova-
tion enters as an input" or through innovation
inducing "the creation and diffusion of new prod-
ucts and processes that, in their turn, would bring
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Table 11.2 Shifts in manufacturing investment by equipment type (%).
Equipment 1958-1962 1963-1967 1968-1972 1973-1977 1978-1982
High-Tech, total 26.5 27.6 29.9 34.0 45.4
Office machinery 8.4 8.7 9.2 11.2 19.2
Communications machinery, photo, 18.1 18.9 20.7 22.8 26.2
and electronic equipment
Traditional, total 73.5 72.4 70.1 66.0 54.6
Agricultural equipment 7.2 6.9 5.6 6.0 4.1
Construction equipment 4.7 5.1 4.6 4.5 3.3
Industrial machinery 25.4 24.8 22.5 20.5 17.4
Transportation equipment 25.7 26.4 27.6 26.5 22.3
autos, trucks, and buses 18.6 18.7 20.0 21.0 17.2
airplanes, ships, and 7.1 7.7 7.6 5.4 5.0
railroad equipment
Other: engines, service 10.5 9.1 9.8 8.6 7.5
machinery, and household equipment
capital investment in equipment embodying infor-
mation technologies has accelerated due to these
linkages with the whole economy [37]. One may
also speculate that the increasingly global inter-
dependencies in the world economy make such
linkages more significant than in the past because
markets can now be generated in a short time on
the world scale.
Of course, it is somewhat misleading to describe
the nonlinearities in the adoption and spread of
new technologies as exclusively positive or benign.
The acceleration of the adoption of a new tech-
nology frequently implies acceleration of the aban-
donment of an old one, or the displacement of a
part of the labor force. Two recent examples are
the newspaper publishing industry in the 1970s [38]
and the mechanical watch industry somewhat ear-
lier. The prospect of disruption of metal fabricating
industries, mentioned earlier, or the office automa-
tion revolution [39] offer examples of possible nega-
tive effects that are still speculative. Moreover, the
often sudden acceleration of adoption rates beyond
a certain threshold leaves less time for assessment
of longer term social costs and for planning the
necessary social adaptations, such as retraining the
work force, managing new types of effluents or
wastes, or changing international trade relations.
In other words, the sharp separation we have
drawn in order to compare negative and positive
nonlinearities in technological progress may be a
somewhat artificial one. On the one hand negative
surprises, such as automobile emissions or the
energy crisis, can give rise to a new wave of innova-
tion, as it did in the automobile industry. The inno-
vation wave, initially directed at a narrow problem,
stimulates exploration of related innovations that
would not have been thought of but for the initial
stimulus of the negative externality. On the other
hand positive nonlinearities increase adjustment
stresses for the work force and management.
The question of cross-industry and cross-national
linkages among innovations and their effect on
economic performance has been little researched.
There is, for example, little or no information on
the quantitative importance of such linkages in rela-
tion to rates of economic growth, investment, or
foreign trade.
Technological monocultures
In the early stages of the emergence of a new
industry built around a fundamental innovation,
such as the automobile, the airplane, the semicon-
ductor, or the computer, the structure of the
,336
industry is very fluid, characterized by a high degree
of diversity and experimentation. Frequently there
are many small firms, each exploring a somewhat
different technological approach. Competition
among firms tends to be focused on technological
innovation aimed primarily at product perfor-
mance rather than price, or even on such qualities
as reliability, compatibility with other products of
the same genre, or service and maintenance. As
competition continues one particular technological
approach begins to emerge as the dominant tech-
nology [40]. Competition begins to center more on
successive incremental improvements in this
dominant technology and on small, cumulative
manufacturing and managerial innovations that
bring down production costs and improve reliability
and standardization [4)]. As the dominant tech-
nology emerges, its competitive position increas-
ingly benefits from the cost advantages due to
higher volume production than its competitors, in
terms of both direct economies of scale and progress
along the learning curve in the refinement of
manufacturing, service, and marketing.
However, the very snowballing success of the
dominant technology tends to steadily narrow the
technical basis of competition. The search for cumu-
lative improvements covers a smaller and smaller
domain of technical possibilities, even as it becomes
more intensive within that domain. In the process
many technical possibilities which were deemed
very promising in the early experimental stage
receive declining attention from designers. In par-
ticular, options that might have been inherently
superior either in cost or performance or both, but
that require more development or depend upon
more numerous or more problematic ancillary
innovations, may simply fall by the wayside because
of the growing cost advantage of the dominant
technology, an advantage that arises from its head
start in the market. Moreover, in a technical race
becoming gradually more focused on cost reduc-
tion, technical factors that might affect higher order
social impacts or risks of the technology also receive
declining attention. Nevertheless, as the technology
and the industry mature and the scale of application
increases, they enter the regime in which the non-
linear appearance of disbenefits begins. In other
words, new problems resulting from the scale of
application become important just when the broad
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type of R&D program that might have helped
anticipate such problems has been phased out,
because it is no longer in the main line of develop-
ment necessary to the commercial success of the
dominant technology. Yet it is often just at this point
of initial commercial success that the dominant tech-
nology can become vulnerable to unexpected side
effects which can generate a societal reaction against
it. This emergence of dominant technologies that
develop unexpected side effects at a critical scale of
application is what I have referred to as the problem
of "technological monocultu res [42]." The term
derives from the obvious analogy with agricultural
or forest monocultures which, because of their
density, become vulnerable to insect pests,
pathogens, environmental stresses, or the absence
of ancillary inputs, such as water or fertilizer. Like
agricultural monocultures, technological monocul-
tures are highly successful in a stable and predict-
able environment (or market). Though more
efficient than alternatives they are less robust when
the environment becomes less predictable.
In the case of technological monocultures the
problem may go even further than in the agricul-
tural metaphor, because the organizations that have
successfully commercialized the dominant tech-
nology acquire some power to influence the external
environment or market in which they operate. They
may thus be tempted to direct their energies toward
increasing the predictability of this environment
through ever more sophisticated marketing tech-
niques, or by lobbying for protection against
environmental regulations or foreign competition.
J. K. Galbraith has, indeed, popularized the idea
of technology controlling its own political and
market environment in his book, The New Industrial
State [43]. This book was written at a time when
American corporations were at the zenith of their
competitive strength and appeared invulnerable to
foreign competition or societal regulation, as
typified by the monolithic USA automobile
industry. The decade of the 1970s, however,
showed clearly the limitations of the power of USA
corporations to control their environment in their
own interest. In fact, any success in controlling their
environment in the short term may actually be
inimical to the long-range interests of corporations,
because it delays the adaptive measures that they
will eventually be forced to take anyway.
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The automobile industry
The evolution of automobile technology, especially
in the USA, where it had its first large successes,
provides a good example of a technological
monoculture. The USA automobile became a highly
standardized product, which experienced only very
slow technological evolution once the dominant
technology of the gasoline internal combustion
engine with electric self-starter had been established
against rival technologies, such as the Stanley
Steamer, the electric car, or even the diesel. The
period of exuberant experimentation, with
numerous firms competing with many innovations,
extended through the early 1920s but gave way to
the period of rationalization and standardization
typified by Alfred P. Sloan's managerial and pro-
duction systems at General Motors. The resultant
reductions in cost and improvements in reliability
of the dominant technology guaranteed that more
radical competing innovations could not hope to
catch up. For such technical change as continued,
the locus of engineering innovation gradually
shifted to Europe, which by the 1960s had already
become the source of most of the more important
automotive innovations. From this point of view the
smaller and more highly differentiated markets in
Europe were a positive advantage in stimulating
bolder technological innovation. The technical
issues that were about to explode in the 1970s -
safety design, emissions reduction, fuel efficiency,
durability - were given low priority in the USA, if
not totally ignored. A new wave of innovations in
these areas, when it finally came, was largely the
result of a political "technology forcing" process
imposed on the technology establishment of the
industry from outside, first by regulation and later
by foreign competition. All these issues were exter-
nalities that became significant as the scale of the
industry and the automobile population grew; they
were thus by-products of its commercial success,
and they appeared first in the USA exactly because
that was where the highest degree of market
penetration of the automobile had occurred. Yet it
~as precisely this success that had caused these
issues to be excluded from the technical search
process in the industry. The same process as had
raised the importance of these issues from a societal
standpoint resulted in their exclusion from the tech-
nical agenda of the industry's technological estab-
lishment. It took a series of external shocks to
enlarge this technological agenda - the political
activism of the environmental movement which
chose the automobile as its first focus; competition
from newly emerged foreign competitors, prin-
cipally Japan; two successive oil price shocks; and
the worst economic recession since the Great
Depression. It is not yet clear even today whether
these shocks were sufficient to reestablish the USA
technology on a long-term, viable, self-sustaining
path.
Chemical technology
A somewhat analogous account can be given of USA
chemical technology, another of the great techno-
logical success stories of the twentieth century. Here
the slowdown in technological innovation did not
occur to the same extent as in the automobile
industry. Nevertheless, the scope of the innovation
agenda of the chemical industry tended to narrow
as its scale expanded, and the externalities of the
industry were excluded from its agenda, much as
for the automobile industry. Issues such as waste
disposal and the management of residuals were not
perceived as significant technical barriers to further
market expansion or profitability. Here, again, we
see the phenomenon of the innovation agenda nar-
rowing at the very time when past technological and
market successes of the industry really required that
it be enlarged, not only in the broader public inter-
est, but also in the ultimate interest of the further
spread and adoption of the industry's products and
technologies.
Other examples
A similar account could be given for phar-
maceuticals, pesticides and herbicides, electric
power generation, commercial air transport, indus-
trialized agriculture, and many other areas in which
successful innovation over an extended period has
become self-limiting because of the failure to
enlarge the innovation agenda sufficiently quickly,
particularly in relation to the externalities of the
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industry, either with respect to its production pro-
cesses or to its products, or to both. To be sure, in
all these examples there were factors other than
externalities that slowed the industry's growth. In
the chemical industry, for example, the cost of
energy and raw materials and the consequent price
increases led to a slowing of demand growth and
to a worldwide overcapacity, especially in com-
modity-type chemical products. Energy costs were
also an important factor in slowing the growth of
commercial air transport and in altering the
economics of industrialized agriculture. Neverthe-
less, rising public awareness of the externalities of
all these industries, leading to increased regulation,
were also important.
Nuclear power
Civilian nuclear power is another case in point.
Reactor safety and radioactive waste management
were quite prominent on the research agenda in
the early days, but did not expand commensurately
as the industry began to experience commercial
success. In the minds of many of the proponents
of nuclear technology, too much emphasis on
research in these areas was seen as a public
admission of negative aspects of the technology,
rather than as a challenge to be overcome in the
interests of its long-term viability and growth.
Innovative effort became focused on those aspects
that most immediately related to the technology's
market penetration in competition with other utility
fuels, chiefly inexpensive Middle East oil prior to
1973. This resulted in a concentration on the real-
ization of scale economies through the design of
larger plants, the extension of the burn-up life of
the fuel, improving neutronic efficiency, and reduc-
ing operating costs through better fuel
management.
In the early days of nuclear power research, many
reactor types competed for R&D funding by both
government and industry. Today many experts
would argue that several of these candidate types,
such as the Canadian heavy water (CANDli) reactor
or the high temperature, gas-cooled reactor
(HTGR), had greater long-term promise in terms
of efficient use of uranium, reliability, and intrinsic
safety than the light water reactor (LWR) design
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that has become the dominant American, and even-
tually world, technology. But, once the LWR design
began to benefit from economies of scale and des-
cent of the learning curve through successive gener-
ations of reactors, the alternative design concepts
were eliminated as they became relatively more
costly and were perceived to pose more difficult
technical problems that had to be overcome in the
short term. The greater the market penetration of
the LWR the greater its cost advantage became, and
hence the less incentive for continued exploration
of alternative design concepts. Effort was concen-
trated on incremental improvement of the LWR.
Thus, a temporarily satisfactory technological
alternative gradually became an insurmountable
barrier to the development and assessment of
designs that might have been superior in the longer
run. It may even be that this premature termination
of the exploration of other alternatives will prove
fatal to the survival of the industry, at least in the
USA where preemption by the LWR came earliest
and was most complete. The continued focus on
scale economies and large reactor sizes can also be
regarded as an instance of the technological
monoculture syndrome described earlier.
The history of nuclear power development can
thus be described in terms of the emergence of a
technological monoculture, the LWR, which
became fatally vulnerable to a number of
unforeseen shocks and surprises, ranging from the
emergence of the environmental movement
through the TMI episode to the drastic reduction
in projected demand growth for electricity. It
remains to be seen whether we will eventually face
the consequences of another short-term response
running counter to long-term trends. It is quite
possible that the present perception, particularly in
the USA, that nuclear power is not really necessary
for a viable energy-supply system in the twenty-first
century, is also excessively influenced by short-term
considerations that arise from the current leveling-
off of the demand growth for all energy and from
the great excess of electrical generating capacity
that was created because of the long lead times of
electricity generation planning. Electricity demand
appears to be much more closely related to
economIC growth than nonelectrical energy
demand, so that if economic growth continues at
current rates a shortage of electrical capacity could
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begin to develop a decade hence, as it did just prior
to the oil embargo in 1973. If this happens it will
be another example of the overpreoccupation of
policy with the fast variables; that is, with temporary
gluts and shortages in world fuel markets.
Unfortunately, all the preceding remarks are
speculative and highly subjective. The adoption of
the LWR was so complete that the hypothesis that
alternative design concepts might have been
superior cannot really be tested. The excellent
experience of the Canadians with the CANDU
design is not conclusive, because of different
economic operating rules and because other coun-
tries have also had better operating experience with
the USA LWR designs than has the USA itself [44].
Technological diversity
The principal lesson of the preceding account of
how technological monocultures develop is that
there may be an inherent value in the maintenance
of technological diversity that is analogous to the
value of the maintenance of genetic diversity in
natural and man-made ecosystems. The existence
of and the considerable depth of knowledge about
many alternative technological options is a potential
source of systemic self-renewal and adjustment to
new circumstances. Such technological diversity has
a social value which is not captured by the usual
considerations of efficiency, market share, or
organizational growth, which tend to drive the evo-
lution of technological systems in industrial
societies. An overall system that is less efficient or
more costly because it requires the infrastructure
for a diversity of technologies may nevertheless have
greater viability or survival potential in an environ-
ment subject to shocks, surprises, or discontinuities
in long-term trends. Yet there are few apparent
rewards to organizations, or even nations, in direct-
ing efforts toward such diversity. In a competitive
system they may incur loss before the advantages
of diversity have a chance to be tested by events.
Fortunately, international competition may supply
some of this diversity. In the nuclear power field,
for example, the USA may be in a position to revive
its capabilities by importing technology from abroad
if future necessity so dictates [45]. The Germans,
for example, have maintained a viable HTGR pro-
gram, while several other nations have maintained
a viable program of liquid-metal cooled reactors -
sufficient, at least, to provide a foundation for future
growth in the next century should circumstances
make this attractive.
Fast and slow variables
In part, the problem of monocultures arises from
the tendency of sociotechnical systems to respond
preferentially to "fast variables" in the environ-
ment, as compared to "slow variables," especially
when the latter are less familiar or predictable.
There is a close analogy between the fast and slow
variable effects discussed by Holling (Chapter 10,
this volume) and by Timmerman (Chapter 16, this
volume) on natural ecosystems and such effects on
the phenomena discussed in this chapter. In fact,
Clark [46] has explicitly extended the Holling
concept to include social systems.
The policy question is: Where are the driving
forces for expansion of the innovation agenda to
come from? In the examples I have cited these
forces derived mostly from the political process, but
usually belatedly and with what often appeared to
be unnecessary conflict and organizational trauma.
In many cases, notably that of oil price controls in
the USA in the early 1970s, the political response
exacerbated rather than alleviated the problem.
Low and declining real gasoline prices after 1973,
for example, provided positive disincentives to the
USA automobile industry to innovate in fuel
efficiency, and made it more vulnerable to competi-
tion from a country (Japan) that allowed the price
mechanism to drive innovation.
A possible argument is that the technological
diversity necessary to assure greater robustness of
systems, such as energy supply and demand, in the
face of uncertainty and surprise represents a posi-
tive externality that justifies some form of collective
or public subsidy. But there is a problem of who
chooses the technologies. Investment in technologi-
cal diversity has an aspect of insurance, which in
turn implies risk sharing, but it is difficult to see
how to make this work in practice. The incentives
that operate in governmental systems are usually
of no longer term, and frequently of shorter term,
than those that operate in the market system.
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Adaptation and adjustment of
individuals, groups, and
communities
The adaptation and adjustment of individuals,
groups, nations, and whole societies to changes in
their environment or in their own internal relation-
ships can be viewed as a group problem. In a recent
paper Breznitz [47], in dealing with the psychology
of individual adjustment and adaptation, puts for-
ward several concepts that seem equally applicable
to the problem-solving behavior of larger groups
and communities, and have their counterpart in
some of the literature of organizational behavior
[48]. In what follows I make fairly extensive use of
his ideas, but in a context very different from his.
Transition to more inclusive
cooperation
An important idea that does not have a counterpart
in individual adjustment is that successful problem
solving in communities frequently requires a transi-
tion to higher degrees of cooperation among groups
that previously looked upon themselves as in conflict
with each other over access to the same resources.
This transition to higher levels of integration among
groups is often the most difficult and dangerous
part of the long-term adjustment of man to his
environment. Frequently, it is accompanied by a
prolonged period of ambiguity or ambivalence
between cooperative and conflict behavior among
coalescing communities. An extreme example is the
succession of increasingly destructive wars in
Europe which preceded the present, apparently
successful, integration of Western Europe into a
single, comparatively cooperative community in
which violent conflict among nations seems almost
unthinkable. Conflict and competition have by no
means disappeared, but they are well contained
and do not break into widespread violence. The
disappearance of extreme confrontations In
Western Europe is now taken for granted.
One can think of the modern world as having
evolved through history from a situation of frag-
mentation into tiny islands of cooperation, each in
periodic conflict with other islands in what each
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regarded as a zero-sum game. The interdepen-
dency of these islands gradually increased through
social complexity, shared resources, and a shared
environment until a time was reached when more
cooperation than conflict among the islands became
natural. The positive-sum aspects of the game
gradually became more apparent as the complexity
of the relations between the hitherto separate com-
munities and cultures grew. Today we are in the
midst of a very painful transition to a single, inter-
dependent global community in which it should be
increasingly apparent that the benefits of cooper-
ation to all its interdependent parts exceed the
rewards of rivalry. By the same token, however, the
ambivalence within each part between cooperative
and conflictual behavior is at a maximum, with a
resultant high degree of instability and uncertainty.
The danger of partial solutions
Breznitz divides the problem-solving processes of
individuals into three stages: presolutions, partial
solutions, and the best solution [47]. The preso-
lution stage is characterized by intensive exploration
of the individual's environment and of the resour-
ces and information available for the solution of his
or her problem. This exploration typically results
in the identification of a partial solution, but one
which is far from the best available. It is analogous
to a subsidiary peak in a mountain range. Neverthe-
less, it is a sufficiently successful adaptation to
greatly reduce the individual's incentives to con-
tinue further experimentation and exploration,
thus reducing the probability of going on to find a
better adaptation, let alone the best available. It
seems fairly evident that the same behavior charac-
terizes organizations or communities just as much
as individuals. In the literature of organizational
theory this is labeled as "satisficing". In social sys-
tems, among the partial solutions found first are
likely to be those involving less cooperation among
previously separate groups (families, tribes, corpo-
rations, states, nations). There is thus a natural ten-
dency for groups to settle for adaptations that could
be improved upon by cooperation at a higher level
of inclusiveness - higher levels of integration among
groups. If individual groups find adequate partial
solutions that do not necessitate cooperation with
other groups, they will tend to stop there, thus
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failing to search for opportunities for cooperative
solutions that would have been superior and
satisfied the mutual interests of several groups.
In the energy crisis of 1973, for example, the first
impulse of each country was to seek a solution that
minimized the impact on its own economy without
reference to impacts on other countries or the sys-
tem of consuming nations as a whole. In the 1973
crisis this was tempered by the fact that not all the
actors were nations, and the multinational oil com-
panies, acting in their interests, provided an impulse
toward transnational solutions, ultimately involving
a remarkably equal division of the supply shortfall
among all the industrialized nations [49]. In addi-
tion, with some encouragement from the oil multi-
nationals, the principal consuming nations created
the International Energy Agency (lEA), which was
able to make modest plans for supply sharing in
future emergencies [50]. However, the magnitude
of the shortfall required for triggering the sharing
agreement was greater than that of the crisis of the
Iranian revolution, and the lEA was therefore
ineffective.
The tendency toward fixation 011 the first reason-
ably successful partial solution is well exhibited in
the phenomenon of technological monoculture
described earlier. The narrowing of the innovation
agenda with the advent of the first commercial
success reflects exactly the kind of behavior in
organizations that Breznitz describes in individuals.
Initial commercial success of a product frequently
represents a partial solution, which not only sup-
presses further efforts to find better solutions, but
also reinforces types of organizational behavior that
stabilize this partial solution, making the organi-
zation more resistant to change or even to the recep-
tion of information that might suggest the pos-
sible need for change. If the organization has
sufficient market power or access to the political
process, it may even try to alter the environment
rather than adapt to it. In the early days of the
environmental movement and the energy crisis in
the USA automobile companies, oil companies, and
utilities were all slow to accept the possibility that
they were in "a new ball game", and they treated
the new market and political forces buffeting them
as temporary aberrations that provided no clear
signal as to future trends, and consequently did
not require a strategic response, that is, a major
alteration in long-term plans (ten years or more).
Breznitz and the organizational theorists also
show that there is an asymmetry in the effects of
good news and bad news on organizational behavior
in relation to partial solutions [47]. Worsening of
the environment, especially when it occurs in the
form of a shock, stimulates problem solving and
exploratory behavior, but good news tends to relax
problem solving and reduce sensitivity to the possi-
bility of better alternatives and the desirability of
searching for them. In the USA in the years follow-
ing the oil embargo, price controls on gasoline and
fuel were good news for the automobile companies
and drivers, which canceled out most of the impulse
toward adjustment that had been created by the
crisis. It took almost a decade for world prices to
be internalized in the USA economy.
Response pools
According to Breznitz [47] the capacity of
individuals to adapt to their environment is deter-
mined by what he calls their "response pool", the
repertory of behavioral responses on which they
draw to meet challenges presented by their environ-
ment. Probably such response pools are even more
limited in scope for organizations than for
individuals. According to Breznitz "unstable
environments increase, therefore, the adaptation
value of response pool variability [47, p 43]," which
affects the evolution of organizations and com-
munities, much as genetic variability within popula-
tions affects biological evolution. Market systems
and pluralistic political systems or organizations in
general have a greater capacity for adaptation
because the variability of their response pools is
enhanced relative to more centralized systems of
organization. On the other hand, as we have seen,
the dynamics of success in market competition can
also lead to the emergence of dominant organi-
zations whose survival or viability is based on a suc-
cessful partial solution - an incomplete, and ulti-
mately inadequate, adaptation. Moreover, such
organizations often have significant capacity to
influence their environment tem porarily, so
enhancing its apparent stability and thus delaying
adjustment measures. With such organizations -
perhaps typified by the automobile companies and
electric utilities in the USA - if a significant change
in environment or period of environmental
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turbulence succeeds a long period of stability (or,
even more fatally, stable growth), the low variability
of the response pools of the dominant organizations
renders them unprepared to cope. In fact, such a
model probably describes the effects of the tur-
bulent conditions of the 1970s on all of western
society, following the unprecedented period of
stable growth from 1952 to 1973.
Behavioral insurance
Breznitz [47] divides response pools into two classes:
the "currently active response pool" (CARP), and
the "general response pool" (GRP). CARP consists
of those organizational responses that can be con-
sidered as part of the "standard operating pro-
cedures" of the organization, the formulas which
the organization has developed for solving the
familiar and recurrent problems that it encounters
in its day-to-day environment. It is the set of
responses that Graham Allison identifies in his
"organizational.process" model of decision making
in organizations and bureaucracies [51]. The GRP,
on the other hand, consists of those organizational
responses that are not currently in active use, but
are implicit in the professional training, traditions,
and human resources of the organization. The GRP,
in other words, consists of those latent responses
that can be called forth under stress, but that are
less automatic, and take a longer time to mobilize
and orchestrate, than CARP responses. They are
those responses more dependent on organizational
leadership. Of course, the distinction between
CARP and GRP is not a sharp one; rather they
define ranges on a spectrum.
In order to increase the capacity of organizations
or communities to adapt to future changes it is
important to deliberately cultivate their response
pool variability. This involves periodic testing of the
environment as well as periodic retesting of pre-
viously discarded behavioral responses. The latter
is particularly difficult because over time organi-
zations develop an inventory of things that
everybody knows do not work, and this inventory
itself becomes a part of the organization's CARP,
long after the reasons why certain responses did
not work at the time they were discarded have been
long forgotten; reasons that may be no longer valid,
if they ever were.
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The deliberate cultivation of response pool vari-
ability for the explicit purpose of promoting future
organizational adaptability to a potentially tur-
bulent environment IS called by Breznitz
"behavioral insurance" (BI) [47]. Emergency plan-
ning and training are one form of behavioral insur-
ance that has often proved itself in practice. BI also
tends to reduce irrational or ineffective behavior
when an emergency arises and it also enhances the
self-confidence of the organization in encountering
surprises. Thus, BI is a way of directly addressing
the issue of surprises and discontinuities in planning
for the future.
Another form of BI, in both governments and
corporations, is investment in research and develop-
ment. This should probably be understood more
broadly than conventional corporate R&D
activities, including organizational and work prac-
tice experimentation, not just experimentation with
hardware. Indeed, much of the current literature
on industrial innovation seriously underestimates
the role of social innovation, even in the introduc-
tion and diffusion of new hardware [52]. The
extraordinary success of the Japanese automobile
industry in penetrating European and American
markets owes more to innovations in work-force
management and the social organization of produc-
tion than it does to specific technological innova-
tions in manufacturing [28].
One way in which given national societies expand
their behavioral response pools (and thus take out
BI) may be through the activities of what James Q.
Wilson [53] calls "policy entrepreneurs." Examples
include successful publicists, like Rachel Carson,
Ralph Nader, Amory and Hunter Lovins, and also
many organized public interest groups, and such
efforts as the "limits-to-growth" debate launched
by the Club of Rome [54]. Such efforts might be
better judged not on the accuracy or reliability of
the information they disseminate or the views they
espouse, but on their indirect contribution to the
more general broadening of the response pools of
institutions and of societies. Disruptive, and even
"irresponsible" , as such activities may appear in the
short run to some critics, they can be regarded as
a form of BI for the society, which may contribute
to its future adaptability. The important point is
that the notion of variability in the societal response
pool is inseparable from the existence of error. One
cannot experiment and explore without making
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errors, and the errors will probably always outnum-
ber the appropriate responses. One must hope that
natural selection through trial and error causes the
correct organizational responses to dominate
through a strengthening of the organizations or
societies that try them.
One way in which the variability of the response
pool can be promoted is by a conscious effort, when
addressing a problem, to prolong the experimenta-
tion of the presolution period. The organization
should continue to probe possibilities even after an
apparently satisfactory first solution has been
found. Failure of less promising or more difficult
approaches should not be accepted as "givens" for
all time. Sometimes solving a problem the hard way
can be more useful to society than a more elegant
solution because it leads to a deeper understanding,
which, though of little short-term usefulness, opens
up more options that may eventually be of use in
dealing with surprises and discontinuities. This is
the counterpart in behavioral terms of the techno-
logical diversity recommended in the approach to
technological innovation in the preceding section.
A possible research agenda
Nonlinearities
We need to analyze many more detailed case studies
to exemplify or verify the mechanisms of nonlinear
appearance of secondary impacts. These studies
should include examples of the nonlinear or thresh-
old public response to externalities, as well as
specific attempts to better quantify relations
between causes and outcomes for the purely phys-
ical effects, such as automobile emissions and sul-
fate aerosols (acid rain, interaction between sulfates
and oxidants, etc.). A systematic search for examples
of nonlinearities in the past, which can be well
documented and analyzed, might be the prelude to
a search for possible future nonlinearities and for
synergistic effects in existing industrial and develop-
mental activities.
What might have been
Although the literature is replete with retrospective
case histories of the development of technological
impacts and the societal and human responses
thereto, for the most part these histories restrict
themselves to describing and interpreting what hap-
pened, to identifying the players, and to describing
why they took the positions they did and what kind
of influence they had on outcomes. Few attempt
the much more difficult task of exploring what
might have happened or what alternative choices
might have been if the participants had been more
sensitive to underlying, longer term trends. The
actual design of policies that might have been fol-
lowed had we known then what we know now, and
the detailed exploration of the likely consequences
of these policies, is an ambitious task that has seldom
been attempted, yet I think much could be learned
from it. It would be important not only to suggest
which possible alternative policies or paths of
development might have been, but also to search
for the possible secondary consequences of these
alternatives with the same care as we try to identify
and describe, retrospectively, the unforeseen side
effects of the policies or paths actually followed.
For example, knowing what we know today of
trends in USA oil imports in the late 1960s, what
policies could have been adopted that would have
mitigated our vulnerability to the Arab oil embargo
in 1973? What, if any, other undesirable consequen-
ces would the implementation of these policies have
led to? Some of the alternative policies that might
have been followed include:
(l) Gradual restructuring of the USA tax system to
avoid subsidy of oil consumption, and even to
encourage efficiency in energy end-use.
(2) A tariff on oil imports to subsidize the creation
of a strategic petroleum reserve, perhaps con-
certed among all the OEeD countries.
(3) A more vigorous government R&D and private
incentive program to encourage development
of energy technologies based on domestic
resources.
(4) Retention of the oil import quota system intro-
duced in the 1950s.
Would any of these measures have been politically
feasible, given the general circumstances that
existed in the mid-1960s? Would it have been pos-
sible to design a coalition of interests that would have
supported any of these policies or some combination
of them? Would limitations on oil imports have
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resulted in accelerated depletion of USA petroleum
reserves, rendering the USA even more vulnerable
than it actually was by the mid-1970s? Would higher
energy prices in the 1960s have created greater
weaknesses in the USA economy and in its competi-
tive position relative to other countries, or would
they have helped the USA to identify inherent
weaknesses earlier and begin to correct them?
As another example, can one invent a detailed
strategy that the management of USA automobile
companies might have followed in the 1960s and
1970s that would have avoided, or at least mitigated,
the disastrous deterioration that took place after
1979? Was there a better strategy and timetable for
reducing automobile emissions than the tortuous
course that the USA has followed since the passage
of the Clear Air Amendments of 1970?
In the case of surprise, and essentially random,
events such as the oil shocks, TMI, or Love Canal,
it would be interesting to speculate what might have
happened in terms of societal response and public
policy if one or more of these systemic shocks had
come earlier or later than they actually did. To what
extent did the effect of anyone of these events
depend on other events that were happening simul-
taneously? Suppose the Arab oil embargo had not
occurred at a time when the whole industrialized
world was simultaneously following stimulative
economic policies and monetary expansion in the
wake of the 1970-1971 recession?
Regier and Baskerville (Chapter 3, this volume)
have traced the degradation of two important
ecosystems as a consequence of what they term
"exploitative development." It would be an
extremely interesting and informative exercise to
produce alternative scenarios for the development
of these two ecosystems. What would have con-
stituted a truly "sustainable" strategy for exploita-
tion in these two cases, and what, if anything, would
have been the net economic cost of following this
strategy? Would it have been inevitable that any
more sustainable strategy would have foundered
on political infeasibility because of local pressures
for economic development, or can we see in retro-
spect the possibility of forging a political coalition
that would have sustained this strategy? Would it
be possible to develop a systematic methodology of
accounting for the benefits and costs of various
alternative development strategies for specific
ecosystems, or for specific resource systems in
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assoCIation with their ecosystems? Even granting
that the design of any such accounting system entails
important value judgments along the way, it may
be possible to develop several alternative accounting
systems that involve different value judgments.
These would be compared by testing them with
several development scenarios for ecosystems on
the historical development of which we already have
detailed knowledge. One of the difficulties of such
a program would be the validity of isolating the
system under study. To what extent would the
benefit-cost accounting system break down because
of linkages and feedbacks from other ecosystems
or sociotechnical systems to which the given system
is linked?
A major purpose of the research strategy
described above would be to help define more pre-
cisely the whole concept of "sustainable develop-
ment", which is at the heart of the IIASA program,
by actually reconstructing past development
scenarios in alternative ways and discovering
whether it is possible to evaluate these alternative
scenarios on some plausible scale of "sustainability".
Perhaps the concept of sustainability cannot be
expressed in terms of a single objective function,
but has to be treated as multidimensional. Even in
this case, however, it must be possible to devise some
system of valuation. This system might not be an
intellectual process or methodology, but rather a
social or political process that proceeds according
to a set of ground rules that can be specified or
agreed to in advance.
Innovation linkages
In this chapter I have suggested that one of the
important sources of nonlinearities in the impact
of emerging technologies may arise from the link-
ages among innovations, such as the effect of one
particular innovation in generating demand for
others required to make it economically successful.
Such linkages may also include demands on resour-
ces or impacts on ecosystems, which can be either
increasing or decreasing. A simple example would
be the impact of information technology and com-
munications on the demand for energy or raw
materials, or the development of closed-cycle
manufacturing or food production systems in which
most of the material inputs are recycled [34].
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Most of the research to date that points to such
linkages is qualitative and impressionistic. Can the
relationships be made more quantitative and pre-
cise, e.g., by actually tracing the market growth of
a number of innovations hypothesized to be causally
linked, or tracking actual transactions among firms?
Can we develop a convincing way of delineating the
macroeconomic effects of specific innovations or
clusters of innovations? In the case of sustainable
or nonsustainable development or exploitation
scenarios, which we proposed investigating in the
preceding section, it would be important to under-
stand how alternative scenarios are linked to the
economy of a whole region or country. Is there a
way of using the strategy applied to a particular
ecosystem or resource base to give plausible predic-
tions about the behavior of the larger sociotechnical
systems in which it is embedded?
There is even less information or research on
how clustering and synergism among innovations
affect the generation of externalities or lead society
to neglect research directed at identifying and over-
coming externalities.
Globalization of linkages
The globalization of the world economy has
apparently been accompanied by globalization of
the process of technological innovation. Innova-
tions developed in one country become standard
practice of the industry worldwide in a much
shorter time than in the past. This leaves less time
for society to assess the potential impact of new
technologies and affords less opportunity for coun-
tries to control or regulate the secondary effects of
technology within their own boundaries. Inter-
national competition may force the rapid adoption
of some technologies internationally, with little
opportunity for individual societies to decide
whether or not they wish to accept the social or
environmental consequences that may accompany
these technologies. Regulation is for the most part
a national activity, decided upon through national,
political mechanisms. Yet national controls on the
use of technologies, particularly new or emerging
technologies, are difficult or impossible to imple-
ment without a high level of cooperation and agree-
ment among nations.
Two examples of the above problem may be
worth citing in order to illustrate the kind of
research that may be needed. The first relates
primarily to the transfer of technologies among the
highly industrialized countries and the second to
the transfer of technologies from industrialized to
less developed countries. Many countries are very
apprehensive about the impacts of information-
based technologies, both on aggregate employment
and on the quality of working life and the mix of
skill requirements in the labor force. Several of the
Scandanavian countries, for example, have legisla-
tion that controls the manner and rate of introduc-
tion of computerized systems into various work
settings and gives organized labor considerable
influence in the decision process [55]. However, it
is extremely difficult to implement such laws or
regulations on a national basis when controls on
technology introduction can strongly affect the com-
petitiveness of national firms in the world economy.
This is particularly true of the very open economies
of many European nations, which are heavily
dependent on exports. Regardless of the merit of
such regulations, the point is that the imperative of
national competitiveness tends to disenfranchise a
national electorate, which elects to maintain certain
social or environmental standards within its
boundaries. This phenomenon, of course, is not
unknown within the USA and is what led the USA
to increasingly go federal in various environmental
and social regulations, but in this case there is a
national constituency. In the international sphere
there is really no corresponding constituency, and
therefore no real mechanism for reaching a social
consensus on a strategy of economic development
which can respect the value of sustainability.
The other example that presents even greater
difficulties is that of the transfer of technologies
from developed to developing countries, where
there are wide differences in the level of infrastruc-
ture between the two societies. This can work to
the disadvantage of both societies. For example,
the transfer of labor-intensive manufacturing
operations from developed to developing countries
to take advantage of low labor costs may provide
economic benefits to the developing country, but if
the discrepancy in labor standards - not only wages
but also health and safety - is too large, the effect
of the competition may be simply to erode standards
in the developed country, especially if the difference
,
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is so large that it cannot be offset by more sophisti-
cated labor-saving technology and management
methods. Not only high wages, but also health and
safety standards in the workplace may be most easily
offset by the replacement of people with machines,
which can work in environments not fit for humans.
In either case, competition from low-wage countries
displaces labor in high-wage countries. On the side
of the developing country, its workers may be con-
sidered as being exploited for the benefit of con-
sumers in the developed country. Not only workers,
but the environment of the developing country may
be exploited to lower the cost of goods to consumers
in developed countries. Yet the interdependencies
within the global environment mean that what hap-
pens in the developing countries cannot be con-
sidered in isolation. To an increasing extent, both
resources and the environment and biosphere form
part of a global "commons". To the extent that the
whole world has an interest in the nondegradation
of key ecosystems or resource systems anywhere in
the world [56], the inability to regulate exploitation
to a reasonable standard of sustainability in the
developing country becomes a problem for the
world as a whole. On the other hand, to the extent
that the shift of manufacturing occurs because the
developing country environment truly has higher
assimilative capacity, then it could be argued that
the transfer of technology is legitimate, dictated by
a genuine, natural advantage.
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Commentary
M. Cantley
How do societies learn to manage better their tech-
nologies and their ecosystems? Harvey Brooks gives
some useful pointers, if not complete answers, in
this exciting and important chapter. It is important
because, through case examples and the iden-
tification of deep common features, he deepens our
understanding and sharpens our perception of the
societal processes involved in the advancement and
control of innovation.
The questions addressed become more urgent as
we tighten the knots of our global interdependence,
both economic and ecological; the two increasingly
linked by technology. Brooks highlights a common
mechanism of technological success leading,
through economies of scale and cumulative learning
effects, toward technological monocultures. The
unforeseen adverse and nonlinear effects which
then emerge as a result of dominant scale may
demand a broader repertoire of response
capabilities than has survived the competitive battles
of the earlier stages of innovation. Resilience
demands diversity. Technolo~ical ancl social
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mechanisms too focused on short-term competitive
success, or ad hoc responses to the fast variables,
reduce diversity.
Brooks commends R&D as behavioral insurance,
in both corporations and governments, but under-
stood more broadly than just hardware. Certainly
there are some attempts - one could cite the
strategic environment units of some large multina-
tionals, the development of business theories on the
management of strategic surprise [1], or some of
the governmental futures groups, such as the UK's
Systems Analysis Research Unit (deceased), the US
Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, or
the European Community's FAST (Forecasting and
Assessment in Science and Technology). Such
CASSANDRA units (Centres for the Analysis of
Science and Society, Advising on New Directions
for Research and its Applications) face Cassandra's
problem - the forecasting may be perfect, but she
couldn't win political credibility (until too late) [2].
Faced with the recurrent prospect of Schum-
peterian gales of creative destruction, can we
improve our weather forecasting and contingency
planning? Brooks's chapter is relevant in drawing
our attention to the slow variables. For these,
religion may be a better guide than technological
economics. In primitive cultures, it is religion - or
let us say the sociocultural value system - that
enshrines the accumulated societal wisdom and
transmits it across generations. But we have to learn
which elements of locally specific taboos can be
jettisoned; and which eleme'nts remain of value in
a changing, technologically interdependent world.
It is striking to consider how closely the Brooks
analysis matches the classic Emery and Trist
typology [3] of the causal texture of organizational
environments, in which 20 years ago they predicted
and emphasized the emergence of the increased
complexity of turlmlent fields, "In these, dynamic
processes, which create significant variances for the
component organizations, arise not simply from
(their) interaction, but also from the field itself,"
because of:
I. The growth ... of organizations, and linked sets
of organizations, so large that their actions are
both persistent and strong enough to induce
autochthonous processes in the environment ...
ii. The deepening interdependence between the
economic and the other facets of the society...
111. The increasing reliance on research and develop-
ment to achieve the capacity to meet competitive
challenge. This leads to a situation in which a
change gradient is continuously present in the
environmental field.
For organizations, these trends mean a gross increase
in their area of relevant uncertainty. The consequen-
ces which How from their actions lead off in ways
that become increasingly unpredictable: they do not
necessarily falloff with distance, but may at any point
be amplified beyond all expectation ... [3].
In such systems, Emery and Trist suggest as a pos-
sible solution "the emergence of values that have
overriding significance for all members of the field [3]."
This again fits well with Brooks's analysis: given
that we are"... in the midst of a very painful transi-
tion to a single, interdependent global community
in which it should be increasingly apparent that the
benefits of cooperation to all its interdependent
parts exceed the rivalry [p 340]," then we need to
emphasize cooperative values; the difficulty of this
switch he acknowledges, since at the same time
" ... the ambivalence within each part between
cooperative and conflictual behavior is at a
maximum, with a resultant high degree of instability
and uncertainty [p 340]."
To stress cooperative values in the management
of our planet is not incompatible with the emphasis
on diversity - for given the certainty of ignorance
and error, there is all the greater need for openness,
for the intellectual freedom and self-critical spirit
of a Popperian "open society", even where it may
appear in the short run to be at a disadvantage
against purposeful targetting by more monolithic
or consensual societies [4].
What underlies Brooks's chapter and, indeed,
surfaces explicitly is a picture of a societal learning
system. This global learning system operates under
conditions of increasingly rapid knowledge acquisi-
tion and near instantaneous diffusion, through
R&D and the information and communication
technologies to which it has given rise (one of the
examples of the positive feedback nonlinearities
with which Brooks illustrates his typology of sur-
prises). Yet this learning system, in spite of its mas-
sive accumulation of experience, has somehow to
remain sufficiently self-critical to jettison or to reor-
ganize its knowledge, its perceptions, its in-built
assumptions, whenever - or, preferably, just before
;
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- their obsolescence is made manifest [5]. It has to
learn, in the context of technological development,
the difference between full speed ahead, and optimal
speed, right direction.
Learning should mean performance improve-
ment - are we becoming better managers? One of
the most refreshing features of the chapter is its
balanced consideration not only of negative sur-
prises, of the emergence of unforeseen and long-
latent surprises, but also of positive surprises. And
among these latter, "One of the most important
sources ... is human ingenuity, which almost always
tends to be underestimated [p 332]." I could have
cheered out loud; for here was always the weakest
point of the clockwork, mechanistic "limits to
growth" models: they were nonteleological, devoid
of intelligent life and human pu rposes. Brooks cites,
in the same context of positive surprises, the applica-
tion of genetic engineering to food production and
of information to energy control. Such triumphs as
these of human ingenuity, of mind over matter, of
that key concept "dematerialization" [6] - it sounds
better in the original French - are the crux of the
matter. For they illustrate precisely the practical
significance, the declining ratio of materials to gross
national product, implied by the Club of Rome's
happier and more recent publication, No Limits to
Learning [7]. The chemistry of .function and
targetted effect must displace the chemistry of bulk
processing, with its side effects and unintended
externalities.
Harvey Brooks offers an analysis, and a research
agenda, of interdisciplinary, intellectual challenge,
and of relevance to learning how to improve the
management of our technology, our societies, and
our planet. Though as to his proposed studies of
"what might have been [p 343]," I confess that it
brought immediately to my mind that remarkable
character of Michael Frayn, Ivan Kudovbin [8]. In
fact, an incisive "might-have-been" study on electric
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power plant designs and scale in the UK from
1950 onwards was undertaken by Abdulkarim and
Lucas [9].
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Chapter 12
G. Majone
International institutions
and the environment
Editors' Introduction: Institutions and organizations provide a wide array of means
through which societies can respond to the challenges of sustainable development. Efforts
to design better social response capabilities require a better understanding of the strengths
and weaknesses of alternative institutional structures in dealing with long-term, large-scale
environmental issues.
In this chapter institutional options for dealing with environmental problems in the
larger context of international relations are examined. Global treaties and regulations
represent only one extreme form of international organization. Less formal "regimes"
based on shared principles, people, and values often have a greater influence on the actual
course of events. In setting the tone and agenda of such regimes, key roles are played by
the international scientific community and, somewhat surprisingly, by regional and even
national initiatives.
The internationalization of
ecological issues
Students of international relations tend to agree
that issues related to environmental and resource
interdependence will become increasingly impor-
tant in the coming decades; and that this trend will
have to be reflected in new institutional arrange-
ments, as well as in a greater sensitivity of trade and
development policies to ecological concerns. Since
in the post World War II period money and trade
have ceased to be "low politics" for top policymakers
and become "high politics", on the same level as
the traditional concerns of diplomacy, so, it is
argued, the next decades may witness policy and
institutional developments in the area of ecological
interdependence that are comparable to the earlier
innovations in economic interdependence.
The analogy can be pushed a bit further. The
international economic system has recently become
the object of study for different academic disci-
plines. Both international economics and inter-
national politics theorize about its functioning - the
roles and relationships of actors in it, and the nature
and courses of change affecting it. The approach is
increasingly interdisciplinary: international
monetary relations, for example, are part of the
international political system, since it is govern-
ments that are the main actors; but they are also
part of the international economic system, since a
subject of the governments' deliberation is money
[1 J.
Similarly, issues of environmental and resource
interdependence cannot be easily separated from
other economic and political aspects of international
relations. True, the study of ecological interdepen-
dence is still at the embryonic stage. As long as the
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nature of key ecological interdependencies remains
poorly understood, the scope of the issues and roles
of different national and international actors must
remain ill-defined. It would, however, be a serious
pitfall to search for solutions exclusively in the area
of natural science: environmental problems need
not have "environmental" solutions, especially at
the international level [2]. Political and economic
factors can be expected to interact with trans-
national environmental issues in three different
ways:
(I) International environmental policies and insti-
tutions will have to rely to a great extent on the
existing structure of international relations. In
fact, international cooperation on ecological
issues may depend on broader political agree-
ments. Thus, the structure of detente of the
I970s and the results of the first round of the
Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooper-
ation in Europe made possible the Helsinki Con-
vention on the Pollution of the Marine Environ-
ment in the Baltic.
(2) Environmental concerns will increasingly affect
international economic and political relations as
the notion of economic interdependence is
expanded to include that of environmental and
resource interdependence. Conversely, it has
been argued that a major obstacle to the
implementation of environmentally sound
development strategies lies in the present struc-
ture of the international political and economic
order.
(3) International environmental relations, in and
of themselves, are political relations since
national actors are sovereign in the inter-
national arena.
A related point of methodology is that inter-
dependence, although it has an objective physical
and economic basis, is primarily a conceptual con-
struct, a way of interpreting the changing nature
of international relations. Contrary to the assump-
tions of traditional theories of international rela-
tions, the interdependence model recognizes that
contemporary societies are connected by multiple
channels - including informal links among govern-
mental, professional, and scientific elites, and func-
tional relations among international organizations
- and that the international agenda is no longer
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monopolized by questions of military and political
security, but includes a variety of issues in the areas
of science, technology, economics, and the environ-
ment. As Keohane and Nye have noted [3], in a
world of multiple and imperfectly linked issues, in
which coalitions are formed transnationally and
transgovernmentally, the potential role of inter-
national organizations is vastly increased. Such
organizations set the international agenda, act as
catalysts for the formation of coalitions, and provide
arenas for political initiatives and linking of prob-
lems. By defining salient issues, providing advance
warning, and deciding which issues should be
linked, international organizations, but also inter-
national bodies like scientific and professional
associations, can help determine governmental
priorities and even the relative importance of
different departments and policy positions within
governments.
In their search for improved understanding of
the changing nature of international relations,
scholars have used a variety of approaches. If the
key concept in the I950s was "international sys-
tem", in the I970s and I980s the notion of "inter-
national regime" has proved to be analytically useful
in explaining an increasingly complex and inter-
dependent world [4].
International regimes - formal
and informal
Regimes are defined as the principles, norms, rules,
and decision-making structures on the basis of
which the expectations of actors converge with
respect to any given kind of issue. Such networks
of rules and procedures are pervasive characteristics
of the international system because no patterned
behavior can sustain itself for any length of time
without generating a congruent regime [5].
The management of natural resources, such as
marine fisheries and deep seabed mining, has
proved to be a particularly fruitful area of applica-
tion of the regime paradigm. Attention to the prac-
tical problems of managing natural resources inevi-
tably leads to the adoption of an institutional per-
spective: society's decisions about the use of such
,
,
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resources are seen to depend crucially on the social
institutions, rules, and practices that serve to order
and implement the decisions of those interested in
the use of those resources. From this viewpoint, the
essential feature of resource regimes is the conjunc-
tion of convergent expectations and patterns of
behavior or practice. Such a conjunction tends to
produce conventionalized behavior, i.e., behavior
based on recognized social conventions [6].
According to our definition, regimes are special
kinds of social institutions. Now, institutions may
find explicit recognition in contracts, constitutions,
treaties, or formal organizations, but this is not
necessary for their emergence or effective function-
ing. Some of the most fundamental social institu-
tions - the family, natural languages, exchange
markets - exist almost independently of formal
sanctions.
In other cases, explicit organizations may facili-
tate the operation of an institution (regime), or even
become an essential element of it. The regional
fishery management councils set up by the
American Fishery Conservation and Management
Act of 1976 and the Baltic Marine Environment
Protection Commission created by Articles 12 and
13 of the 1974 Helsinki Convention are examples.
But highly formalized institutional arrangements
usually also depend on associated informal patterns.
The cost of implementing even the most precisely
drawn legal contract would be prohibitive in the
absence of informal sanctions, tacit agreements,
mutual trust, and other nonformalized relations [7].
Similarly, informal elements of regimes may serve
to provide interpretations of ambiguous aspects of
formal agreements, to deal with issues not explictly
covered by these arrangements, to facilitate com-
munication and information, and so on. Thus, in
studying international regimes it is important to
make a distinction between the regime as a social
institution and the contractual and organizational
elements that accompany it [6].
National and subnational regimes for natural
resources and the environment can usually rely on
specialized agencies, such as courts, police forces,
and research organizations, for information gather-
ing, monitoring, enforcement, and the settlement
of disputes. At the international level, however,
comparable institutions either do not exist or are
severely underdeveloped. For example, the United
Nations has no administrative apparatus for
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monitoring activities carried out under the regime
for Antarctica or for settling disputes pertaining to
deep seabed mining. Hence, even when there is a
clear need for formal organization, international
regimes lack the extensive institutional support
enjoyed by national regimes. This is another reason
for the importance of informal and semiformal
arrangements with relevant public agencies in the
member states and with independent professional
and research organizations.
Globalism versus
functional regionalism
As already noted, international regimes for natural
resources and the environment can hardly operate
in the absence of some explicit organization. Infor-
mation about environmental damage and abate-
ment costs must be obtained, activities monitored,
and general standards interpreted and adapted to
changing circumstances. In some cases, revenues -
pollution taxes or royalties for deep seabed mining,
for example - must be collected and disposed of;
applications must be reviewed and licenses granted.
As a minimum, a small secretariat is needed for
keeping regular contacts with the national member
organizations, scheduling meetings, and keeping
records.
Recognition that formal organizations are often
necessary for operating international regimes
immediately raises classic issues of institutional
design: staffing, financing, management controls,
discretionary powers, jurisdictional boundaries.
Jurisdictional problems loom particularly large in
the debate on international regimes and are
reviewed in this section. Questions related to the
power that international organizations can realisti-
cally expect to be granted are discussed in the next
section.
The current popularity of the notion of ecological
interdependence reflects a growing concern of
international public opinion with problems of trans-
boundary pollution, international trade In
hazardous substances, and especially with global
issues, such as worldwide changes in climate or the
risk of depletion of the Earth's ozone (03 ) layer by
;
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the inert chlorofluorocarbons used in a variety of
domestic and industrial applications.
It is tempting to assume that regulation of such
global problems requires the creation of global
regimes, but this is not always, or even usually, the
case. Interdependence is not synonymous with
globalism, so the best approach is often that of
"thinking globally while acting locally" - or
regionally.
At the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment held in Stockholm in 1972, some
people argued that the need for a common jurisdic-
tion over global resources, such as the oceans or the
stratosphere, can be met effectively only by trans-
national structures with sufficient regulatory power
- for example, an international regulatory body for
the stratosphere.
In theory, such a global organization would avoid
the free rider problem, since all countries would be
forced to regulate. Uniform regulation would pro-
vide no incentives for multinational firms to move
production from heavily regulated countries to
countries where regulation is weaker or non-
existent. Regulatory costs would be equitably dis-
tributed between rich and poor nations. Expensive
duplications in research, testing, data collection,
and monitoring would be avoided.
However, the idea of a world regulatory agency
immediately runs into serious conceptual and prac-
tical problems. Observe, first, that some global prob-
lems (e.g., climatic change) have regionally different
impacts and, hence, their solutions should also be
regionally differentiated. In other cases the con-
sequences are global, but the causes are localized
in particular areas (e.g., the chlorofluorocarbon
problem, see below).
Second, persons, firms, and even capital are not
globally mobile. Economic, political, and cultural
barriers all limit the actual domain of mobility of
the factors of production. Hence, a global authority
is not needed to prevent firms from moving produc-
tion from regulated to unregulated or less regulated
countries.
Nor is there a strong case for global organization
on equity grounds. A large international body can
take important decisions only through some process
of bargaining in a highly politicized atmosphere,
where all issues, including equity, are inevitably
colored by the prevailing state of North-South or
East-West confrontation. What is perhaps even
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more serious is the tendency of organizations with
a large and heterogeneous membership to define
equity in terms of equality of treatment. Thus, one
would expect a world regulatory agency to set uni-
form standards that are too strict for some members
(e.g., poor countries which may well prefer to accept
a higher level of risk if it can give them faster
economic development) and not sufficiently strin-
gent for others.
Moreover, uniform regulation, like a worldwide
ban on a new drug because of the risk of certain
side effects, would make it impossible to obtain
experience that would reduce uncertainty, and thus
deprive the world of a potentially valuable product.
Conversely, approval of a product on a worldwide
scale, rather than in a limited number of countries,
could have disastrous consequences if the product
subsequently poses serious health hazards. If
thalidomide had been approved by a world food
and drug administration and had come into use
simultaneously everywhere, the consequences
would have been far worse [8].
Transactions costs - the costs of identifying the
parties and persuading them to agree; of collecting
the information necessary for maintaining and
revising the initial agreement; of monitoring and
policing performance by members - tend to
increase rapidly with jurisdictional domain, func-
tional scope, and size of membership. Hence, a
global organization would be extremely expensive
to set up and operate.
Again, the membership of such a global organi-
zation is bound to be highly heterogeneous with
respect to preferences, risk perceptions, level of
economic development, cultural, and legal tradi-
tions.
Last, but certainly not least, it is highly improbable
that most states would be willing to set up an
organization endowed with adequate power and
authority to deal with environmental issues on a
global scale. I conclude that creating a global
organization to regulate transboundary pollution
and environmental hazards is not a feasible, or even
desirable, solution, though broad international con-
ventions, in areas such as international trade in
hazardous substances, remain a desirable long-term
goal.
To understand why, and under what conditions,
certain global problems may be solved faster and
more effectively by seeking agreements between a
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limited number of countries rather than setting up
a global regime, consider the problem of 0:1 deple-
tion due to emissions of chlorofluorocarbons into
the atmosphere.
Production of chlorofluorocarbons is remarkably
concentrated: 12 countries account for 80% of the
total world production of the major chloro-
fluorocarbons. These countries are all members of
OECD, utilize similar technologies in production,
share the same technical perception of the problem,
have similar political systems and similar preferen-
ces for environmental quality, and are extensively
linked by a variety of transnational networks.
Hence, it should not be too difficult to reach an
effective agreement limiting production of chloro-
fluorocarbons in these countries. At the same time,
given their share in world production and use of
chlorofluorocarbons, such an agreement would go
a long way toward solving the global problem of 0 3
depletion.
The attractiveness of this strategy is increased
because regulations would be unlikely to induce
significant shifts in the location of chlorofluorocar-
bon production facilities to countries with less strin-
gent regulations. There are several reasons for this,
including the particular structure of the industry,
the expectation of many executives that substantial
convergence will occur among OECD countries with
regard to chlorofluorocarbon regulation over the
next 5 to 10 years, and their belief that these coun-
tries would impose countermeasures (selective
import duties, border adjustments, quotas, and
embargoes) to block any observed relocation to
"chlorofluorocarbon pollution heavens". Hence,
regulation in this area would not exert, at present,
any great influence on patterns of industrial loca-
tion. As the analysts of Resources for the Future
conclude, "the emergence of regulation differen-
tials among nations will represent a shift at the
margin in the locational calculus of CFC-related
firms [9]."
Beside the direct benefit of a significant reduction
of world chlorofluorocarbon emissions, the strategy
suggested here would produce important indirect
consequences. Bohm [10] has usefully classified
these indirect effects of "policy linkages" into push
and pull effects. In the push case, the regulated
countries influence the willingness of other coun-
tries to take action by such means as making further
extensions of chlorofluorocarbon control policy
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(e.g., going beyond a ban on the use of chloro-
fluorocarbons in aerosols) dependent on their
promise to initiate regulatory actions. Alternatively,
chlorofluorocarbon regulation could be used to bar-
gain over other regulatory issues (e.g., shipment of
radioactive materials or dumping of toxic wastes in
the oceans).
In addition to influencing the willingness of other
countries to take regulatory action, the regulated
countries can influence their ability to do so by
providing cost information, technical data, know-
how, and administrative experience acquired in
controlling chlorofluorocarbon emissions.
Important pull effects are the moral example set
by the regulated countries, policy imitation, and
what may be called the "demonstration effect".
Moral example can exert a powerful influence on
the international community by influencing public
opinion and decision makers through the media,
scientific channels, and the policy debate.
Many problems in natural resource manage-
ment and transnational pollution are regional
rather than global, and there is no good reason for
expanding the scope of management schemes
beyond the boundaries of the relevant ecological
and socioeconomic systems. In fact, the historical
record shows that most viable international ar-
rangements involve regional institutions having
responsibility for dealing with fairly specific issues
in some geographically or functionally demarcated
area.
These results conform with the predictions of
functional federalism. According to this theory,
the trade-off between scale economies and other
factors pressing for the expansion of jurisdictional
boundaries, and diversity of preferences, pushing
in the opposite direction, leads to many overlapping
jurisdictions, each dealing with its own set of highly
specialized and closely related problems.
Unlike global organizations (or purely national
regimes) regional authorities can be defined so as
to make their boundaries congruent with the rel-
evant ecological and socioeconomic systems. This
fact, together with the greater homogeneity of pref-
erences, cultural traditions, and levels of develop-
ment, justifies the expectation of negotiations
leading to productive results. For all these reasons,
regional regimes typically represent the preferred
institutional alternative for the management of
international environmental problems.
;
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Nevertheless, functional regionalism has its limi-
tations. As Cooper [II, p 51] points out:
[Aj system of functional federalism would, in the
absence of a higher authority willing and able to
sacrifice its vested interests in particular ju risdictions,
inhibit bargaining and political compromise across
functional, jurisdictional boundaries. For much of
the time it is useful to have each issue operate on its
own track, with its own set of conventions and sanc-
tions to influence behavior. But from time to time
the inability to bargain across issue areas would
prevent communities from reaching an optimal
configuration of public goods.
However, this problem may be more serious at the
national than at the international level. The reason
for this lies, paradoxically, in the intrinsic weakness
of international organizations. As already noted,
international organizations are always weaker than
comparable national organizations. Lacking
sufficient regulatory authority, they depend on the
cooperation and support of national governments,
and these are in a position to bargain across func-
tional boundaries. In fact, it may be argued that
one of the important functions of international
organizations consists precisely in providing
national members with a forum for policy discussion
and political compromise.
International organizations:
limitations and possibilities
If the view of international organizations as
incipient world governments is archaic [3], it is also
naive to expect that such organizations could
become minigovernments with the power to define
and implement optimal programs of conservation
or pollution abatement, independent of the policies,
attitudes, and socioeconomic structures of the mem-
ber states.
Often, the responsibility for the regulation of
transboundary environmental problems is assigned
to organizations originally created for other pur-
poses. A good example is the bilateral International
Joint Commission (IJC) of the USA and Canada,
originally established to oversee the provisions of
the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909. Although
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water quality was a consideration in that treaty, IJC
paid relatively little attention to environmental
issues until 1972, when the USA and Canada con-
cluded an agreement on water quality in the Great
Lakes, specifying quality objectives and means to
achieve them, and extending the authority of the
IJC to advise and make recommendations concern-
ing a broad range of environmental problems.
But even when they are created for a specific
purpose, international organizations are much
more constrained than the corresponding national
regimes; they have fewer and less powerful policy
instruments at their disposal than functionally
equivalent national agencies, and cannot rely to the
same extent on a network of supporting institutions.
Compare, for example, the powers usually granted
to international fisheries commissions with the com-
prehensive management system set up by the US
Fishery Conservation and Management Act to
govern the harvesting of fish in the extensive area
known as the fishery conservation zone.
Again, the major function of the International
Baltic Sea Fishery Commission is to prepare and
submit to the member states recommendations with
regard to measures for management of the natural
resources of the Baltic. Aside from collecting,
analyzing, and disseminating statistical data, it does
not carry out scientific research itself, but simply
submits proposals for coordinating such research
and seeking the services of the member states and
of scientific organizations. The powers of the Baltic
Marine Environment Protection Commission are
also limited, being mostly confined to defining pol-
lution criteria and objectives for pollution abate-
ment. Implementation of both international
regimes for the Baltic is based on national enforce-
ment [12].
The fact is that for a number of political and
economic reasons, governments are reluctant to
entrust the welfare of their citizens to other govern-
ments, just as citizens generally dislike the thought
that their welfare may depend on decisions taken
by officials of other governments or of international
organizations. Moreover, where scientific uncer-
tainty is high, and when technical and economic
conditions are rapidly changing, the risks of far-
reaching international agreements are objectively
great. Governments respond to these risks by reduc-
ing the scope of agreements and by surrendering
as little national power as possible [131.
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For all these reasons, it seems likely that future
international organizations for dealing with ecologi-
cal interdependencies will not be radically different
from some of the international fisheries and
environment commissions already in existence. The
main test of their success will be their capacity to
obtain information that is accepted by all interested
parties as a basis for productive negotiations, and
to put forth proposals that are widely accepted as
being based on solid facts and reasonable assump-
tions. One important method of gaining acceptabil-
ity comprises using experts from the national
bureaucracies and research institutions in an
innovative and intellectually stimulating way, so
giving the experts an incentive not only to serve
their own national institutions, but also to put their
scientific and professional skills at the disposal of
the international organization [14].
Such transgovernmental relations are not the
only means by which the lack of formal regulatory
powers may be compensated. The importance of
informal relations for the smooth functioning of
international regimes has already been noted.
Informal channels of communication and per-
suasion are especially relevant in the present con-
text. For issues with long time horizons, a certain
degree of persuasion, education, and politicization,
in the sense of the generation of controversy and
debate, is probably a necessary condition for proper
attention and timely decisions [15]. Science - man's
most sophisticated system of communication and
persuasion, and the only international institution
enjoying worldwide acceptance regardless of ideo-
logical and cultural differences - can playa crucially
important role in this regard, giving legitimacy as
well as a factual basis to ecological concerns.
In fact, transnational groupings of individual
scientists, ranging from the Scientific Committee
on Problems of the Environment and the Inter-
national Union for the Conservation of Nature and
Natural Resources to the Baltic Marine Biologists
and Baltic Oceanographers, are already investigat-
ing and politicizing different aspects of ecological
interdependence. However, such efforts tend to be
episodic and uncoordinated. Moreover, they are
often remote from concrete management problems
and oblivious to the political and economic realities
of the international system.
Supranational institutions organized to deal with
particular groups of problems, in a broad perspec-
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tive of global interdependence, can fill the gap that
exists at present between transnational scientific
groups and the international system in its political,
economic, and institutional components. Such insti-
tutions can mobilize and coordinate scientific
knowledge, and provide mechanisms by which this
knowledge may capture the attention of policy-
makers, while increasing the sensitivity of the scien-
tific community to the policy implications of new
knowledge about environmental and resource
interdependence.
The institutional model that emerges from the
discussion of the limitations and possibilities of
international organizations bears little resemblance
to Weberian bureaucracy. Rather, it suggests a web
of intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and
interorganizational relations at different levels of
formalization. As Keohane and Nye [3] have
argued, neither leadership nor effective power can
come from international organizations; but such
organizations can provide the cognitive and concep-
tual basis for the day-to-day policy coordination on
which effective multiple leadership depends.
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Commentary
N. Haigh
The practice of international relations in the field
of the environment is, as Giandomenico Majone's
chapter implies, still relatively new, but very rapid
developments over the last few years now provide
a body of experience against which to test some of
the propositions put forward in the chapter.
The UNEP Register of International Treaties and
Agreements in the Field of the Environment [1] lists a
total of 108 texts, only two of which are earlier than
1940. The first, of 1921, restricts the use of white
lead in paint and arose from the work of the Inter-
national Labor Organization (ILO), while the
second, of 1933, is concerned with the preservation
of flora and fauna, particularly in Africa. A rather
more comprehensive register [2] lists 288 multi-
lateral treaties of interest to the protection of the
environment and signed before 1983, only ten of
which were signed before the end of 1939. The
earliest is the Convention on the Navigation of the
Rhine of 1868 whose effect on the environment is
only in establishing an international organization
for a great river that carries pollutants across
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national frontiers. The two compilations differ in
length because the second is not only more catholic
in its interpretation of the 'environment', but also
includes treaties or conventions that merely created
international organizations that can then deal with
environmental matters.
The use of the treaty or convention to regulate
the environment is the natural extension of the
centuries-old mechanism by which sovereigns of
nation states formalized their relationships. There
are, however, difficulties with treaties and conven-
tions, whatever their subject matter. Beyond the
difficulty of agreement of terms which increases
with the number of parties, there are uncertainties
resulting from involvement of parliaments before
ratification, and there are difficulties of
implementation, since there is no easy way in which
one nation state can ensure action 9Y another. In
the environmental field the difficulties may be
greater than in the traditional fields of international
relations, since the subject matter often has to be
regulated in some detail if the desired results are
to be achieved. Yet regulations are often handled
by local governments or agencies with quite
different traditions of administration. Consequently
the need has been felt for supplementary channels
of communication and action.
Undoubtedly the United Nations' Conference on
the Human Environment held in Stockholm in 1972
gave a major impetus for environmental activities
to be undertaken by international organizations.
The United Nations' Environment Programme
(UNEP) is one product of that conference, and is
one of the rather few international organizations
that deals exclusively with broadly environmental
matters. More commonly, an increasing number of
previousiy existing international organizations have
adapted themselves to the needs of international
efforts at environmental protection, many on a
regional basis as Majone suggests.
A compendium of Environmental Programmes of
Intergovernmental Organizations [3] lists 17 relevant
organizations, but since it was drawn up primarily
for the benefit of the chemical industry of the
western world it omits intergovernmental organi-
zations of the eastern world, e.g., the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The 17
organizations differ widely from one another and
include the Council of Europe, the United Nations'
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE), the
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European Economic Community (EEC), the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the Inter-
governmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(IMCO), the Organization for Economic Cooper-
ation and Development (OECD), and the World
Health Organization (WHO).
A category of organization not listed in this com-
pendium is the body established by a treaty or
convention to deal with one specific topic. Such a
body may go beyond trying to ensure consistency
of application and may itself develop new proposals.
Examples are the executive body that has to meet
once a year under the Convention drawn up by tht>
UN ECE on long-range transboundary air pollution
and the commissions that exist under the Paris and
Oslo Conventions on pollution of the sea.
There is scope for more analysis of the effective-
ness of these various international organizations
and treaties. Some do little more than ensure a flow
of information between countries; others have their
own institutions able to generate political pressure.
The reason that the Council of Europe was the first
international organization to work systematically in
the environmental field is, in all probability, linked
to the fact that it has a Parliamentary Assembly that
created a pressure long before government officials
saw the environment as requiring international
efforts. The lack of opportunity for public pressure,
and indeed for public information, is a problem
that many international organizations have still to
recognize. Yet at a national level public interest has
been a generator for action in the environmental
field and supplies the pressure for implementation
of legislation.
One particular phenomenon that deserves atten-
tion is the way a subject shifts from one international
organization to another. OECD did pioneering
work in the field of long-range transport of air
pollutants, but activity then moved to the UN ECE
following an initiative of the USSR. The EEC has
since proposed much more detailed legislation,
indeed, no discussion of the environmental work
of international bodies can ignore the EEC, which
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differs from all other international organizations in
having its own institutions able to adopt legislation
that is binding on the Member States without fur-
ther review or ratification, and that furthermore
has a Court of Justice able to ensure that the legisla-
tion is applied.
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Editors' postscript
Since this chapter was completed, more than 20
states plus the EEC have adopted the Vienna Con-
vention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, thus
adding yet another international agreement to the
list discussed by Haigh. Nonetheless, the Convention
failed to produce a common protocol for future
control. Drafting work continues, but for now the
regional protocols proposed by the "Toronto
Group" and the EEC remain the most likely bases
for actual control of 0 3 damage. Majone's "func-
tional regionalism" thus continues to provide a use-
ful perspective on the 0 3 question, despite adoption
of the international Convention. For further infor-
mation on the Convention, see Sand, P. H. (1985),
Protecting the ozone layer: the Vienna Conven-
tion is adopted, Environment, 27(5), 18-20, 40-43.
Chapter 13
Yu. A. Izrael
R. E. Munn
Monitoring the environment
and renewable resources
Editors' Introduction: Reliable knowledge about how the biosphere has actually responded
to human actions is a prerequisite for effective social responses to environmental problems.
Lack of such knowledge is a major impediment to the design of sustainable development
strategies.
In this chapter we explore how environmental monitoring systems can be made more
useful for the management of long-term interactions between development and environ-
ment. We begin with a review of objectives for integrated monitoring of the physical,
chemical, and biological components of the biosphere. The problems of linking local and
global scales of observation are discussed, as are issues on the optimization of monitoring
systems. Special attention is devoted to how monitoring systems can be designed to help
address the problems of timely detection of potentially irreversible trends and of iden-
tification of unexpected environmental impacts.
Introduction
Environmental and resource management (ERM) is
greatly dependent on a continuous flow of relevant
information from various data-gathering systems.
Without meaningful field measurements the
operation of effective systems to protect human
health and to manage biosphere resources wisely
would be hardly possible. Yet the monitoring needs
of ERM are often not given sufficient attention.
Monitoring systems are imperfect for several rea-
sons. First, there are limitations in technology, such
as the inability to measure evaporation from an
open body of water during gale-force winds (when
evaporation rates are greatest!). Second, there is a
lack of understanding of the processes involved,
e.g., of the role of microbial organisms in the soil
with respect to the global sulfur cycle (but as models
of the environment improve, monitoring systems
become better targeted to user needs). Third, there
is the high capital and operating costs of monitoring,
which often impose limitations on existing and new
programs.
Fourth, there is the problem that the needs of
users change over the years, requiring modifications
in system design to accommodate new applications.
This phenomenon is illustrated by the six stages in
programs to monitor urban air pollution. In Stage
1, a monitoring network is established to describe
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ambient air quality, i.e., to obtain a general overview
of spatial gradients, seasonal cycles, and frequency
distributions of pollutants. In Stage 2, the program
objective is to predict air quality, requiring that a
model be formulated and tested and that emission
inventories and meteorological measurements be
incorporated in the monitoring system. Once the
model is operating satisfactorily, data needs become
more sharply focused; the objective in the next
stage, Stage 3, is to check that the prediction system
remains in calibration.
In Stage 4 (management), which may sometimes
precede Stage 2, the goal is to ensure that air quality
criteria or standards are achieved. The associated
monitoring system is thus designed to check "hot
spots" and may be supplemental to the network
required with respect to Stages 2 and 3.
The air quality criteria used with respect to Stage
4 are obtained from the published literature, as
summarized by the World Health Organization
(WHO), for example. Contributing to the develop-
ment of dose-response relations contained in such
summaries may be epidemiological studies using
various health indicators and ambient air pollution
data of the Stage I or 4 type. But urban populations
spend much of their time indoors and in commuting
from homes to offices, factories, and schools. So in
Stage 5 (health effects research), three new sets of
factors need to be monitored: human exposure to
air pollution (using personal samplers); selected
health indicators (e.g., asthma attacks) [l, 2]; and
activity patterns (e.g., hours spent at home, out-
doors, in offices, etc.).
Finally, recognizing that some pollutants, such as
lead and pesticides, reach people by various path-
ways (air, food, drinking water), air quality monitor-
ing has to be integrated into a larger program for
monitoring food and drinking water (Stage 6).
This example (monitoring urban air pollution) is
not exceptional and it is important to review peri-
odically the ability of monitoring systems to meet
changing program needs.
Historically, monitoring has been subdivided into
four categories:
(l) Physical.
(2) Chemical (including environmental pollution).
(3) Biological-ecological (including renewable
resources, such as forests and fisheries).
(4) Socioeconomic.
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This framework is used here for convenience,
although the existence of strong interlinkages is
recognized, requiring an integrated approach. As
an example, management of the chemical environ-
ment requires knowledge not only of the concentra-
tions of various pollutants, but also of:
(I) The physical environment (e.g., wind fields,
river flows, ocean currents).
(2) The biological environment (e.g., exchange
rates to and from terrestrial and marine biota).
(3) The socioeconomic environment (e.g., produc-
tion rates of anthropogenic substances).
We conclude this introduction with some
definitions. An Intergovernmental Working Group
defined monitoring as "a system of continued
observation, measurement and evaluation for
defined purposes [3]." The urban air pollution
example given earlier is very much in the spirit of
this definition, particularly with respect to the last
three words: "for defined purposes." However, the
definition is rather general, and another term,
integrated monitoring, is often used (see, for example,
Izrael [4, 5, 6]):
The repeated measurement of a range of related
environmental variables and indicators in the living
and non-living compartments of the environment,
for the purpose of studying large parts of the bio-
sphere as a single system.
It seems clear that an integrated approach to
monitoring is essential, in which biological-
ecological indicators are some of the main building
blocks in system design. To illustrate the consequen-
ces of not recognizing this principle, we cite the
well-established EMEP (European Monitoring and
Evaluation Programme or, more formally, the
Cooperative Programme for the Monitoring and
Evaluation of Long Range Transmission of Air Pol-
lutants in Europe) system for monitoring atmo-
spheric pollution [under the auspices of the
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE)] and
BAPMoN [Background Air Pollution Monitoring
Network under the auspices of the World Meteoro-
logical Organization (WMO)], which failed to pro-
vide a warning of forest damage in central Europe.
Included in the monitoring process, of
course, are quality control, data assimilation in
user-friendly form, and system optimization, i.e.,
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assessment to determine whether the system design
could be improved to meet the prescribed objec-
tives.
Designing or redesigning a
monitoring system
Sometimes an opportunity arises to design a
monitoring system from first principles. More
often, however, a system is already operating and
the question is whether it is able, perhaps with
modification, to meet the needs of a new program.
To answer this, the following factors must be
considered:
(1) What questions are to be asked of the monitor-
ing system? This has already been mentioned
but here it is useful to list some of the objectives
of monitoring;
(a) Exploratory (curiosity monitoring).
(b) Research and model development.
(c) Support for operational prediction systems.
(d) Regulatory.
(e) Early detection of trends.
(2) With what space and time resolutions are the
questions to be answered? Sometimes it is desir-
able to observe fine-scale detail with the
monitoring system; in other cases, the preferred
strategy is to remove this noise.
(3) With what accuracy are the questions to be
answered? The precision with which an objec-
tive is to be met must be expressed in statistical
terms, e.g., is a system designed to provide early
warnings of trends of 1, 5, or 10% change per
annum, with a 90, 95, or 99% confidence?
(4) What are the measurement errors? Are they
likely to be random or is there bias? In the case
of ground-based monitoring stations, measure-
ment error includes that due to nonrepresenta-
tiveness of observational sites. (For a useful
statement on the representativeness of meteoro-
logical stations, see Nappo [7].)
(5) What is the space variability of the field and
how strong are the space correlations? Research
on this topic was pioneered by Gandin [8] and
his associates at the Main Geophysical Observa-
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tory in Leningrad. In ecosystem studies, there
is the special problem of patchiness, i.e., areas
with an abundance of a species surrounded by
areas sparsely populated by that species.
(6) What are the time variabilities and autocorrela-
tions in the data?
(7) What are the practical constraints that limit the
successful operation of a system? For ground-
based monitoring, these may include difficulty
in finding a representative site, lack of a suitable
power supply, and lack of protection from van-
dalism. For monitoring from space platforms,
practical problems include the long lead time
required for system design, and the assimilation
of data that accumulate at a very rapid rate.
(8) Finally, there is the problem of designing a
monitoring system sufficiently flexible to meet
two or more objectives, or to be responsive to
an evolving understanding of the processes
being monitored [9, 10]. This is an interesting
optimization problem that should be of par-
ticular interest to the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (llASA).
Three further points should be made. First, a
mismatch will sometimes become apparent between
program objectives and system capability. The
manager should then try to estimate the additional
resources required to meet objectives and the
degree to which tolerances (space and time reso-
lutions, precision) must be relaxed if the budget
remains fixed. Second, it should be emphasized that
the framework for a monitoring system is depen-
dent on the designer's concept of the processes
being monitored, and competing models of the
environment could imply different monitoring
strategies. As an example, the information needs
for resource management depend greatly on
whether an input-output or stress-response model
of the biosphere is being used. Third, there is the
problem of retrospective or historical monitoring, in
which the data are fragmentary or impossible to
check. In order to have an historical perspective of
biogeochemical cycles, for example, it would be of
great value to know, over the last few centuries, at
least:
(1) The atmospheric concentrations of carbon
dioxide (C02) and other gases.
(2) Changes in land-use patterns over successive
decades.
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Many clues about historical trends exist in tree rings,
sediments, snow and ice cores, early government
and church records, and personal diaries. However,
these data are not easily retrieved in a compatible
form.
Monitoring the physical
environment
Various geophysical organizations have long been
involved in the observation of the physical environ-
ment. H ydrometeorological services of various
countries possess rather rich experience in this field.
The World Weather Watch (WWW) of WMO coor-
dinates activity on weather observation, including
methods, quality control, and data exchange
throughout the world.
Particularly for time scales of years, and even
decades, the interpretation of geophysical data
often requires information on the chemical environ-
ment (see the next section) and on long-term
changes in properties of the Earth's surface, includ-
ing assessment of:
(l) Anthropogenic heat fluxes into the biosphere.
(2) Changes in surface albedo.
(3) Changes in the character of the Earth's surface
due to human activity, including potential
physical and ecological consequences (special
attention should be given to urbanization).
(4) The role of agriculture in various geophysical
and ecological processes (deforestation, redistri-
bution of water resources, the change of the
character of the underlying surface, mass pro-
duction of monocultures, wide use of chemical
protection methods).
(5) The role of exploitation and unintentional
destruction of renewable resources - biological
(deforestation, fires, marsh drainage, etc.) and
geochemical (soil impoverishment, overcon-
sumption of water leading to desertification,
etc.). It is especially important to stress the
danger of mass destruction of tropical forests.
Monitoring the chemical
environment
Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to find
sites on Earth where the chemical environment
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resembles that of preindustrial times, it is neverthe-
less useful to take measurements at so-called
baseline or background stations. This is done, for
example, at WMO BAPMoN sites.
To assess the impact of mankind on the chemical
environment, the following substances should be
monitored at both background and impact location
levels [4]:
(1) Atmospheric inputs of sulfur dioxide (S02) and
nitrogen dioxide (N02) and subsequent trans-
formations to particulates in the environment.
(2) Biogenic elements, particularly phosphorus and
nitrogen and their fluxes.
(3) Propagation of radioactive products from
nuclear explosions and nuclear power plants,
particularly cesium-137, strontium-gO, and
krypton-85.
(4) Fluxes and biospheric cycles of heavy metals,
particularly mercury, cadmium, and lead (in the
atmosphere, their deposition on land surfaces,
in streams and other land water bodies, and in
oceans).
(5) Organochlorine compounds such as pesticides,
polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs; in the atmo-
sphere, surface waters, oceans).
(6) Petroleum products such as polychlorinated
aromatic hydrocarbons (PAH) benzol a]pyrene
(in the ocean).
(7) Stratospheric and tropospheric aerosols, includ-
ing particle size distributions. This information
would be used to study aerosol budgets, the role
of highly dispersed tropospheric aerosols in cli-
matic change, and the possibility that highly
dispersed aerosols from forest fires could
penetrate the stratosphere.
Associated tasks are to study:
(1) The environmental behavior of various sub-
stances.
(2) The pathways.
(3) The role of atmospheric and oceanic transport.
(4) The atmospheric distribution of substances-
both existing and potential.
(5) Substance fluxes, using balance approaches.
(6) Accumulation rates of pollutants in surface
waters and the oceans.
(7) Major fluxes between biosphere compartments,
keeping track of anthropogenic components
separately.
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This program of monitoring should help reveal
the ecological consequences of any observed build-
up.
Monitoring the
biological-ecological
environment
The variability of biological-ecological
systems
Biological-ecological systems contain tremendous
internal variability, both in space (e.g., the patchi-
ness problem) and in time (e.g., population
explosions at irregular intervals). Furthermore, the
responses of these systems to external stresses may
be exceedingly variable, with a broad range of
responses to a given stress. Children and the very
old are particularly sensitive to air pollution, for
example.
Applications in environmental pollution
management
For the reasons already given, monitoring strategies
designed to help protect the health of people and
of ecosystems often concentrate on monitoring the
environment rather than the organisms being
stressed. Protection of people and of ecosystems is
supposed to be assured if environmental exposures
do not exceed specified values obtained from pub-
lished dose-response curves. Nevertheless, biologi-
cal-ecological monitoring does play an important
role in several key areas [11-15]:
(1) Research. In order to develop or improve dose-
response relations, a continuing program of
biological monitoring under a range of environ-
mental conditions is required. In the case of
epidemiological studies, for example, various
health indicators have bccn used, including
death rates, hospital admittances, school and
office absenteeism rates, census information,
and personal diaries. In most countries such
data are incomplete and not very accurate. For
example, death certificates and hospital admit-
tance forms give no information on smoking
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habits, which could dominate air pollution
exposures.
(2) Early warning. In this case, species that are
especially sensitive to particular kinds of
environmental stress are used as indicators of
damage. For example, delphinium plants and
tobacco leaves are sensitive to oxidants. An
extreme example is the miner's canary, but the
absence of certain species of fish in a river or
of lichens in a city also suggests that the local
environment is somewhat unhealthy.
(3) Accumulator species. Lichens, moss, fish, and
wildlife oftcn accumulate potentially toxic sub-
stances in measurable amounts, e.g., pesticides
and metals, even though the substances cannot
be detected in the surrounding medium. This
is one of the justifications for the mussel watch
program [11]. Also the moss bag [12] can be used
to estimate the deposition of heavy metals.
(4) Integration of the effects of multiple pathways or
multiple pollutants. In many cases, a pollutant
reaches the target by several pathways (e.g., air,
drinking water, food). Alternatively, several
pollutants may be present at the same time,
sometimes producing synergisms; an oxidant
smog contains a multiplicity of pollutants, for
example. So it is sometimes rather wistfully sug-
gested that dose-response relations would be
more useful if they could be developed for
typical mixtures of substanccs rather than for
individual pollutants. However, the practical
difficulties in calibrating such a system have still
to be overcome.
(5) Indicators of spatial patterns. Conventional
networks of monitoring stations can sometimes
be supplemented by biological indicators, e.g.,
areal extent of leaf-tip damage around a smel-
ter; number of telephone complaints per unit
area of odors from a refinery; absence or pres-
ence of particular species. A second justification
for mussel watch [II] is as an indicator of spatial
patterns.
Applications in resource management
Introduction
Monitoring methodologies reported in the scientific
literature have, until recently, been concerned
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exclusively with weather-climate and pollution
applications. However, this is beginning to change
as the needs of resource managers are being stated
more explicitly [16-21]. Below we discuss only a
few examples of this type of application, but we
expect considerable methodological developments
in the next decade.
The local scale
Biological-ecological monitoring is increasingly
required on the local scale with respect to land-use
planning and assessment of environmental impacts.
Before permission to proceed with a project can be
obtained, many jurisdictions require so-called
baseline monitoring, which may include, e.g., fish and
wildlife censuses. Current approaches to baseline
monitoring have been criticized [17, 18] on several
grounds, but particularly because species abun-
dances depend on several factors, such as the pres-
ence of predators, the availability of food, and the
suitability of habitats for nesting. Unless these other
factors are monitored, the ecologist has no basis for
predicting the impact of development. Also
monitoring the presence or absence of rare or
endangered species introduces some very difficult
extreme-value statistical considerations. An ecosys-
tem approach is therefore recommended, in which
predator-prey relations and life cycles of selected
species are monitored [16, 17].
Postassessment appraisals of the accuracy of pre-
dictions contained in an environmental impact
assessment also require biological-ecological data.
The permit to construct a power station or smelter
should specify the monitoring strategy to be adop-
ted, i.e., biological indicators to be used, network
design, frequency of monitoring, and action to be
taken if ecosystem behavior is significantly different
from that predicted in the environmental impact
statement. In this connection, a precondition for
receiving money as a loan or grant from a govern-
ment or an international body, such as the World
Bank or United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP), ought to be that the developer be required
to carry out postconstruction biological monitoring.
As emphasized by Beanlands and Duinker [17],
a main goal of ecological monitoring should be
hypothesis testing.
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The intermediate scale
Various requirements exist for biological-ecological
data on the national, provincial, or county scale.
Here we discuss two particular examples: forest
management and resource accounting. First,
however, it is worth quoting a principal recom-
mendation contained in a recent United Nations
Environmental Programme (UNEP) collection of
papers on ecological monitoring of arid zones [19],
viz. that a three-pronged approach be used for
biological-ecological monitoring on the intermedi-
ate scale:
(1) Ground observations from both fixed and
mobile stations.
(2) Aircraft observations.
(3) Satellite observations.
Forest management As emphasized by Regier and
Baskerville [20], successful resource management
requires detailed biological-ecological data. Yet it
is difficult in most countries to obtain reasonable
estimates of even such a simple quantity as the rate
at which prime agricultural land is lost to urban-
ization.
For forest management in New Brunswick,
Canada [20, 21], the elements included in the cur-
rent forest monitoring program are:
(1) Abundances of the several commercially impor-
tant tree species.
(2) Age distributions of these species.
(3) Current state of susceptibility of these species
to damage by the spruce budworm.
(4) Annual updates.
(5) Spatial resolution of a few hectares, i.e., the size
of an individual stand.
Regier and Baskerville [20] are convinced that
forest sustainability can be achieved only if manage-
ment is on the mesoscale.
Resource accounting Current national accounting
systems in most countries concentrate on economic
indicators, such as gross national product (GNP),
cost of living, trade surpluses, etc. However, there
has been recent interest in establishing an
equivalent system for the resource sector. So a new
term, resource accounting, is used by economists and
statisticians to denote a data gathering and retrieval
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system for keeping track of stocks and flows of
resources [22, 23, 24]. Although this is a good idea,
there are several obstacles to be overcome before a
system can become operational:
(l) Conceptual difficulties. The following problems
in definitions arise at the outset:
(a) Quantity of a resource. A substance IS a
resource only if it is of use to someone and
if it is economic to obtain (in comparison
with the cost of a substitute). For example,
should forests in remote areas be included
in forestry accounts?
(b) Quality of a resource. How should the quality
of a resource, such as agricultural land, be
measured?
(c) Multiple uses of a resource. Quite often a re-
newable resource is quantified in different
ways by different users. For example, a river
may provide drinking water, commercial
fishing, recreation, dilution of sewage,
hydroelectric power, and industrial coolant.
(d) Wastes. In the course of using a resource
(both renewable and nonrenewable), wastes
may be created, thus degrading the
environment and resource base. How is this
to be characterized in the national account-
ing system?
(e) Multiple users of the resource accounting system.
It is difficult to design a system that will
meet the needs of multiple users. For
exam pie, one of the objectives for operating
such a system is to popularize the idea of
resource management. But this goal is in
conflict, to a certain extent, with that of
providing very technical data to modelers
of economic systems.
(2) Practical difficulties. The information needed for
resource management is often compiled by
different levels of government and by different
departments at the same level of government.
Assembling data from these disparate sources
is often a frustrating task. In this connection,
Rapport and Friend [23,24] have recommen-
ded that renewable resource data should be
organized according to ecozones (such as the
Great Lakes basin) rather than according to
census tracts.
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Despite these difficulties, senous attempts are
being made in several countries, e.g., Norway,
France, and Canada, to introduce resource accounts
into the national accounting system.
The large scale
On the large scale two or more jurisdictions often
have a common interest in sustaining a resource,
such as fisheries. It is critical that they agree upon
the integrity of the statistical data sets and monitor-
ing systems being used. This means that data collec-
ted in different countries must be intercomparable,
with regular intercomparisons of monitoring and
analysis protocols. The WMO has a long tradition
in this field, but only since the UN Stockholm Con-
ference have other intergovernmental bodies
attempted to standardize collection systems of bio-
logical and ecological data. UNEP has played a
major role in this effort.
Information needs in the field of intergovern-
mental ERMs are application specific. So existing
biological data banks and monitoring systems may
be of high quality, but may not be appropriate for
the application in mind.
One of the first steps in developing a strategy for
monitoring (to meet a specific objective) is, of
course, to undertake an inventory of existing data
banks and monitoring systems. Independently,
however. an evaluation should be made of the real
needs for biological-ecological data. Matches and
mismatches can then be assessed in an attempt to
produce an acceptable monitoring strategy.
Biological-ecological monitoring in the
context of "integrated monitoring"
An interesting practical example of the concept of
integrated monitoring is the proposal by Brejmeyer
[25] for a network of stations to monitor the pine
forests of Poland, one station in each of the 49
provinces of that country. The sites are to be in
protected areas (national parks, biological reserves),
where the character of the surrounding area is
unlikely to change. The main monitoring com-
ponents are:
(l) Ecosystem functioning:
(a) Production of new, green material.
(b) Loss of organic material.
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(2) Environmental pollution:
(a) Air pollution concentrations.
(b) Heavy metal concentrations in lichen, bark,
and needles.
(c) Sulfur and heavy metal concentrations in
the litter and upper soil layers, and in
earthworms.
(3) Phytosociological data:
(a) Basic properties of site.
(b) Species diversity and abundance.
(c) Microclimate.
The obje(;tive is to develop a system that is relatively
simple to operate, but that can provide meaningful
inputs to ecosystem models, including pollutant
pathway analyses. The data may also be useful for
those who study global biogeochemical cycles.
In Sweden, a National Environmental Program
(PMK) has been established to keep track of long-
term changes in environmental conditions, includ-
ing the fluxes of pollutants in and between various
media [26]. This work is carried out in or near some
20 small watersheds, mostly in national parks or
nature reserves.
Monitoring socioeconomic factors
Monitoring of socioeconomic factors is important
in ERM for two reasons:
(I) Some of the driving variables in ERM models
are socioeconomic. For example, market prices
have a considerable effect on the rates of pro-
duction of lumber and wheat. Similarly, an
indicator of overcapitalization of the fishing
industry might provide an early warning of
economic collapse.
(2) Some of the socioeconomic variables may be
useful surrogates for ERM variables. For
example, the daily production of energy from
a coal-fired power station can be used to infer
the emissions of sulfur and CO2 from the chim-
ney. As a second example, farm productivity
might be helpful in interpreting soil erosion
rates.
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Unfortunately, the space and time resolutions of
conventional socioeconomic data are frequently
inappropriate for ERM applications. In studies of
long-range transport and acid deposition, for
example, atmospheric modelers require inventories
of daily emissions, but sometimes must be content
with annual or seasonal estimates. So it is important
that the requirements for socioeconomic data to
support ERM studies should be specified in as much
detail as possible.
The use of indicators
The designer of a monitoring system has a very
large selection of variables from which to choose a
relevant and manageable subset. It is clearly impor-
tant to make a careful choice. What are the critical
points in a complex system (such as the world carbon
cycle) where observations will be of most use? Can
several variables be combined into a single quantity
(such as Reynolds number, Richardson number, or
the Monin-Obukhov length), which will meaning-
fully represent the net effect of several processes
[27].
There are many examples of such indicators,
although the question has not yet been studied from
an interdisciplinary perspective. Here we illustrate
our ideas in terms of pollution potential, or carrying
capacity, of marine ecosystems [28]. It is clearly
important to estimate the maximum pollution load-
ing that can be placed on individual ocean ecosys-
tems, regions, and the world oceans as a whole
without sustainability being impaired.
The assimilative capacity of a marine ecosystem,
Ami, for the given pollutant i (or sum of pollutants)
for ecosystem m is a measure of the maximum
amount of pollutants (in terms of the whole zone
or the unit volume of the marine ecosystem) that
can be accumulated, destroyed, transformed (bio-
logically or chemically), and removed per unit time
due to sedimentation, diffusion, or any other trans-
port process out of the ecosystem that does not
disturb its normal functioning. Assimilative capacity
Ami characterizes the ability of the marine ecosystem
with respect to the dynamic accumulation of toxic
substances and to the active removal of various
,
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When assessing Ami it is important to introduce
critical anthropogenic loadings, critical ecosystem
processes, and critical (with respect to the impact)
marine species. When determining assimilative
capacity Am" two indices are of great importance:
maximum permissible (to provide normal function-
ing of the ecosystem) concentration of the given ith
substance C (or sum of substances) and a multi-
plicity coefficient K of the amount of substance (per
unit volume) that can be assimilated by the given
ecosystem and removed per unit volume as a result
of various processes (for a given averaging time,
determined for the permissible concentration Cp;).
Then
pollutants, with the mam ecosystem properties
being preserved.
The numerical value of Ami depends on many
natural and anthropogenic factors: stream velocity,
turbulence, water exchange, water temperature,
and structure and functioning of biotic com-
ponents, as well as the chemical and physical
properties of the pollutants entering the marine
ecosystem. The whole complex of natural
phenomena responsible for "self-purification" of
the marine environment can be reduced to a few
important processes.
Three main processes that, for all practical pur-
poses, determine the assimilative capacity of the
marine environment (ecosystem) can be singled out:
hydrodynamic processes (A",w), microbiological oxi-
dation (A) of organic pollutants, and biosedimenta-
tion (Ak,v), i.e.,
Ami = At,.w + A + A k." (13.1 )
(13.2)
Space-time optimization of
monitoring systems
Optimization of a system to meet a
single objective
As mentioned previously, optimization of monitor-
ing systems is used in two senses: space-time
network optimization, and selection and fine tuning
of subsets of the most relevant variables. We do not
deal with this second case except to note that it is
of fundamental importance, particularly with
respect to large programs, such as the Global Atmo-
spheric Research Program (GARP) and the Inter-
national Geosphere Biosphere Program (IGBP),
and also to note that optimization is achieved
through models and sensitivity analyses.
Turning to the first case, measurements of an
environmental element or indicator are correlated
in space and time, the correlations decreasing with
increasing separations in space and/or time. In addi-
tion, measurements of two environmental elements
or indicators are cross-correlated. For these reasons,
monitoring systems contain a certain amount of
duplicate information. World weather patterns, for
example, are coherent and it is possible to predict
synoptic developments from surface observing
stations 300 km apart and upper atmosphere
stations 600 km apart. These separation distances
were obtained by trial and error during the last
century, but they have since been derived on statis-
tical grounds.
The problem of optimization of a monitoring
system has been widely studied in meteorology and
in air pollution, based largely on the correlation
fields and associated structure functions [8]. These
studies reveal that optimization depends on:
where V is the marine volume under consideration.
Criteria for oceanic ecological well-being are
based on the concept of assimilative capacity.
The approach described may also be applied to
terrestrial ecosystems (including fresh-water
ecosystems).
The above remarks indicate that there are some
real opportunities in the field of monitoring
optimization, in terms of the development of
integrated approaches and of maximum use of
indicators for ecological purposes.
(1) The objective(s) of monitoring.
(2) The tolerances permitted by the user with
respect to meeting the objective.
(3) The extent of measurement errors, includ-
ing those due to poor siting of monitoring
stations.
(4) The strength of the correlation fields.
(5) Constraints imposed by budgets.
The problem is greatly simplified if only a single
objective and tolerance are to be met. Then there
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are three approaches that can be taken to optimiz-
ation [29]:
(l) The statistical approach. If sufficient data have
already been collected from an eXlstmg
monitoring system, statistical tests can be
applied to determine whether the system is
meeting specified goals and to improve its per-
formance.
(2) The modeling approach. If the processes being
monitored are well understood (even if there
are no data for the region or application of
interest), mathematical models can be used to
design a system that will meet designated per-
formance standards.
(3) The combined statistical and modeling approach.
Best of all, if monitoring data exist and the
environmental processes being monitored are
reasonably well understood, a combined statis-
tical and modeling approach can be used to
optimize the system. For example, root-mean-
square differences between observed and pre-
dicted values could provide a basis for selecting
the most important elements of a monitoring
system.
Efforts should be made to try to apply these
approaches to the environmental and resource
management field. There is also a need to quantify
the uncertainty in optimization procedures, i.e., due
to the fact that data sets from different time periods
yield slightly different optimization results. Recent
developments in the analysis of fuzzy data sets using
the maximum entropy principle [30] may be worth
exploring here.
Optimization of a surface network to
meet multiple objectives
A large body of information exists in the engineer-
ing literature with respect to system optimization
to meet multiple objectives. This area of study has
hardly been tapped by environmental and resource
management researchers, despite its obvious
importance. We recommend that IIASA serve as a
focal point for such work. We also briefly sketch a
recent environmental application [31] to the design
of a monitoring network for urban air quality that
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is to be optimal for more than one type of pollutant.
The objective in this study was to detect violations
in air quality standards, but because the sources
contributing to the concentrations of one pollutant
are different from sources contributing to another,
an optimal network would be pollutant specific,
increasing operating costs considerably. So the
authors of this study selected subsets of common
sites, using the principle of Pareto optimality [31].
Each pollutant was treated as a subutility, and
network optimization occurred when none of the
subutility functions worsened when any other
improved.
Optimization of monitoring from space
to meet multiple objectives
A rather different example of optimization of a
monitoring system is to be found in the study of
Kondratyev and Pokrovsky [10] concerning the
spectral intervals to be used for monitoring the
Earth's resources from space. The "best" spectral
bands depend on the application, and Kondratyev
and Pokrovsky indicate that in oceanography,
hydrology, geology, and forestry-agriculture they
have identified 102, 33, 36, and 32 applications,
respectively. Because of the high cost of satellites
and of ground-based transmission and data-
processing centers it is necessary to rationalize sys-
tem design. Given the relative importance of each
requirement, the incremental costs of making addi-
tional measurements, and the signal-to-noise ratio
in each spectral interval, the authors suggest that a
least-squares technique can be used to optimize the
system to meet the majority of user needs and
tolerances.
Monitoring to provide early
detection of change
Strategies for environmental and resource manage-
ment often assume that conditions prevailing over
the last few years give a good indication of future
states (i.e., of mean values, frequency distributions,
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and probabilities of occurrence of various types of
rare events such as floods and droughts). But this
is not likely to be so. In the nrst place, the historical
records of many environmental variables contain
low-frequency oscillations of the order of decades
or longer, e.g., the Little Ice Age. This means, for
example, that a water management system based
on rainfall records over the last 30 years may not
be optimal for the next 30 years. Second, the
environmental impact of mankind, which has always
been important locally and sometimes regionally,
now threatens to become continental and even
global, with increasing probabilities of irreversible
trends (e.g., CO 2 greenhouse warming) and flip-
flops (see p 371) to new stead y states (e.g., large-scale
dese rtincation).
UNEP [32] has expressed the view that forward
planning must reckon with considerable uncer-
tainty and surprise, and that one of the main tasks
of the next decade is to design appropriate early
warning systems. Most existing monitoring systems
were not created with this application in mind; in
terms of early warning, they provide information
only on the current noiseJevel in the environment.
We deal with three related questions in turn.
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Irreversible trends
To anticipate an irreversible trend in an environ-
mental variable it is necessary to have a model of
the phenomenon. But because the model will have
been calibrated on cu rrent or historical data, predic-
tions will be rather uncertain. Furthermore, the
early stages of a trend will be difficult to detect
experimentally because of great natural variability
in environmental conditions. Thus, it is important
to try to optimize early warning monitoring systems,
e.g., by a careful selection of indicators, monitoring
sites, and averaging times. For example, it is likely
that if stratospheric ozone (03 ) depletion were to
occur, there would be particular heights, latitudes,
and seasons where the effect could first be isolated
[33].
Wigley and Jones [34] studied this general ques-
tion in the context of CO 2 climate warming, using
signal-to-noise ratios. They obtained a signal from
predictions of surface-temperature warming from
a climatic model in which the atmospheric CO 2
concentration was doubled, as shown in Figure 13.1
[35]. The noise was the computed variance of tem-
peratures for the years 1941-1980. The resultant
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Figure 13.1 Latitude-time distribu-
tion of zonal mean difference in
surface-air (70 m altitude) tem-
peratures (K) between present and
quadrupled CO 2 experiments [35].
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Figure 13.2 Signal-to-noise ratio for
predicted COT induced changes in
surface-air temperature as a function
of latitude and month. The signal is
based on the numerical modeling
results of Manabe and Stouffer [351.
The noise has been calculated from
grid-point surface-temperature data.
The value for month j at latitude L is
the areally weighted average of grid
points at L -5, L, and L +5, and the
noise level is proportional to the stan-
dard deviation of month-j values over
the period 1941 to 1980, corrected for
autocorrelation effects [341.
isopleths of signal-to-noise ratio are shown in Figure
13.2 [34], which suggests that CO2 induced warm-
ing is likely to be detected first in middle latitudes
in summer, even though the warming will be
greatest at high latitudes in autumn and winter.
Overshoots, flip-flops, and other
discontinuities
In recent years, developments in such fields as catas-
trophe theory have indicated that many systems
have outer limits. When these limits are
approached, a chance event or a slight enhancement
of the current conditions may cause a system to
overshoot, to Rip-Rop rapidly to a new and radically
different steady state, or even to collapse. These
ideas are well understood in engineering and the
physical sciences (with respect to resonance causing,
e.g., the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows bridge
some years ago, feedback on microphones, critical
damping of wind vanes, and the "almost intransitiv-
ity" of climate [36]); these phenomena are generally
modeled with second-order differential equations
having more than one solution.
Application of these ideas to ecological and even
to socioeconomic [37] systems is a welcome develop-
ment of the last few years. Models that include
Monte Carlo simulations of randomness are now
sufficiently elaborated that it should soon be possible
to identify the key elements of an early warning
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monitoring system. For terrestrial ecosystems, Holl-
ing (Chapter 10, this volume) has suggested patchi-
ness and soil composition as priority indicators.
Field studies are also in progress or planned, e.g.,
with respect to the flip-flop of grassland to desert
due to overgrazing (Brian Walker, personal com-
munication).
In connection with socioeconomic applications,
there is the added complexity that the resilience of
society may change drastically with time, due to the
introduction of new technology, for example. So it
will be necessary to monitor not only the environ-
mental stresses, but also the response characteristics
of the system being stressed.
Examining the effectiveness of
proposed management strategies
in avoiding irreversible trends
and flip-flops
In this application, it is supposed that several pos-
sible management strategies are to be compared,
the objective being to select the one that minimizes
the possibility of subsequent irreversible trends or
flip-flops. Then certain key elements of the environ-
ment are to be monitored to provide the earliest
possible indications that the strategy is working or
not working. (It is conceivable that a strategy would
not be acceptable due to difficulty in determining
its effectiveness because of environmental vari-
ability.)
This area of interest can best be illustrated with
an example. Suppose that it is predicted that acidic
deposition will cause irreversible damage to lakes
unless sulfur emissions from large point sources are
reduced by x%. Then a number of management
questions arise:
(1) Assuming that acidic deposition would decrease
proportionally to a decrease in sulfur emissions,
what length of record of the chemical con-
stituents of precipitation would be required
before the decrease in acidic deposition would
be demonstrated?
(2) What is the minimum percentage reduction in
sulfur deposition that could be detected in y
years with 95% confidence?
(3) What is the optimum array of monitoring
stations for answering these questions?
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A statistical framework for dealing with this kind
of problem was developed at a recent workshop
[38]. Among the recommendations made is that the
signal-to-noise approach be used.
There are many similar kinds of environmental
issues, e.g., stratospheric 0 3 depletion, CO2 green-
house warming, desertification, soil salinization,
health effects of ionizing radiation. One of the ques-
tions that needs to be discussed in each case is the
adequacy of existing monitoring systems for com-
paring proposed alternative management practices
whose objective is to avoid undesirable change.
Monitoring to support studies of
sustainable development: the main
considerations and research needs
When designing or redesigning a monitoring sys-
tem, it is essential at the outset to specify goals and
tolerances. A high-quality data set that happens to
be available may be largely irrelevant for the prob-
lem at hand. It is pointed out by McElroy (Chapter
7, this volume) in the context of IGBP that pro-
grams should be formulated around specific ques-
tions and hypotheses. They should not be driven
by the availability of new experimental techniques,
however powerful. Nevertheless, it may be
illuminating to determine the questions that exist-
ing monitoring systems and data banks are capable
of answering, including uncertainty bands. In any
event, it is always useful to compile an inventory of
such monitoring systems.
A second main conclusion is that monitoring and
modeling are interdependent, interactive processes.
For this reason, and also because the goals for
monitoring often change over the years, an adaptive
monitoring strategy is recommended. The program
should not become locked into specific sampling
and analysis protocols, for example. To illustrate
with three competing resource models:
(l) Input-output. The main variables of interest are
the flows from one sector or location to another,
for example, the energy inputs to and from a
city [39].
,
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(2) Stress-response. Variables of interest are:
(a) Stress. Water quality, air quality, overcon-
sumption of the resource (e.g. overfishing),
etc.
(b) Response. Changes in the age distribution,
size, and commercial value of the stock;
indicators of ecological damage; etc.
(3) Forest sustainability. In the New Brunswick case,
the management strategy to achieve sustainable
forest yields is clearly in focus, requiring a
mesoscale information network (p 365 and [20,
21]).
It is clear that the data requirements In these
three cases are quite different. The possibility that
the resource monitoring system may have to
accommodate some other conceptual framework at
some future time should therefore not be over-
looked.
A third conclusion is that developing early warn-
ing indicators of irreversible changes and discon-
tinuities is at the leading edge of research, and some
real progress could be made in the next 5-10 years.
Current ideas should be elaborated on several
fronts:
(1) Historical analogies. There are many reasonably
well-documented cases of discontinuities and
surprises (prolonged droughts, collapses of
resource-based industries, ecological popula-
tion explosions, etc.). What indicators could
have been used to detect these phenomena at
a very early stage? As pointed out by Lovelock
(personal communication) in an epidemiologi-
cal context, the annual death rate is not a very
useful early warning indicator of an epidemic.
What other indicators should be used?
(2) Ecological applications. C. F. Holling (Chapter
10, this volume) has some interesting ideas on
early warnings of ecological shifts. Initiatives
such as his should be encouraged, as well as
attempts to test such theoretical hypotheses with
field data.
(3) Studies of feedbacks. One of the suggestions made
at the IIASA Workshop was that the health of
a biogeophysical, ecological, or socioeconomic
system is maintained as a balance amongst
various positive and negative feedbacks. Then
an early indication that the system might go out
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of control would be given by a sharp increase
or decrease in the strength of one of the feed-
backs, with a counteracting response from one
of the others. An appropriate early warning
system would then require identification, quan-
tification, and monitoring of these feedback
mechanisms.
Finally, we wish to stress that if sustainable develofr
ment of the biosphere becomes a long-term IIASA
project, monitoring should become an integral com-
ponent. Whether there is a separate subproject
labeled monitoring is not important, and it might
be better to have a monitoring element within each
of the other subprojects. In any event, the work
could not all be done at I1ASA, and a recommended
strategy is to involve scientists in several countries,
with coordination and summer workshops at
I1ASA. The main monitoring themes to be con-
sidered could be:
(1) Optimization of monitoring systems to meet
various objectives.
(2) Design of a conceptual framework for resource
accounting.
(3) Design of monitoring systems to provide early
warnings of irreversible changes and discon-
tinuities.
(4) Conceptual studies to support the development
of IGBP proposed by the International Council
of Scientific Unions.
In the first two cases, I1ASA has the special advan-
tage of having system analysts and economists
already working within the Institute.
Further reading
Two books that provide an excellent overview of
current views on integrated monitoring systems are:
World Meteorological Society (1980), Proceedings
of the First Intemational Symposium on Integrated
Global Monitoring of Environmental Pollution,
Special Environmental Report No. 15 (WMO,
Geneva). (Also published in Russian by USSR
j
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State Committee for Hydrometeorology and
Control of Natural Environment.)
Gidrometeoizdat (1983), Proceedings of the Second
International Symposium on Integrated Global
Monitoring of Environmental Pollution
(Gidrometeoizdat, Moscow) (in English and
Russian).
A synthesis of current practices for optimization of
air quality monitoring networks is given in:
Munn, R. E. (1981), The Design of Air Quality
Monitoring Networks (Macmillan, Basingstoke,
UK).
A collection of papers that provides a useful entry
into the literature on monitoring the biosphere,
including natural resources, is:
United Nations Environment Programme (1980),
Selected Works on Ecological Monitoring of Arid
Zones, GEMS/PAC Info. Series No. 1 (UNEP,
Nairobi, Kenya).
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Commentary
M. Gywnne
The links between monitoring and management
whereby those who plan and those who manage
environmental resources are supplied with a steady
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flow of appropriate, reliable field information upon
which to base their decisions and actions are, as set
out in this chapter, so obvious that it seems impos-
sible for anyone to doubt the need. Yet those of us
who have to design and implement such monitoring
programs know that this is far from the case.
Even now there are many people who say that there
is no need to spend money on obtaining yet more
information about what we already know. We have
sufficient knowledge, these critics say, to enable us
to act now. In the developing world, environment
and resource monitoring are often viewed as an
unnecessary ploy to delay development action, as
well as a waste of good money that could be better
spent on meeting more immediate practical
development needs, such as direct measures to com-
bat desertification. This attitude, however, is not
the exclusive prerogative of developing nations. In
a recent international forum on the effects of acidic
deposition, for example, many from the Nordic
countries were arguing along similar lines. In this
case the cry was that we already know enough about
the effects of acid rain upon lakes and forests so
that there is no need to waste valuable time in
seeking more information. Once again the call was
for immediate action based upon what we already
know.
Even among those who recognize the general
need for monitoring activities, there are some who
do not see why it is necessary to continue monitoring
once management actions have been implemented.
The need to monitor the effectiveness of manage-
ment so that improvements in management
strategies can be made is often not realized. Nor is
the desirability fully appreciated of continuing sur-
veillance monitoring in order to detect further
unexpected changes in the environment or resource
state.
That people still have these attitudes is, I think,
probably the fault of those who are responsible for
the monitoring programs themselves: too often
monitoring is seen as an end in itself. Although the
programs usually have clearly stated objectives,
these objectives are often couched in terms suggest-
ing that monitored data are only to help understand
processes, to be used to develop models, or to indi-
cate further research needs. In other words, the
obvious practical benefits of monitoring programs
are frequently not indicated so that those who
are asked to participate in or support monitoring
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programs are not fully aware of the practical
links to management and the resultant economic
benefits and improvements in the quality of life.
The relationships between monitoring and assess-
ment are also not fully appreciated. Yet it is when
monitored data are evaluated in such a way that an
assessment statement can be made on the condition
and trend of particular environmental variables or
natural resources that people most readily compre-
hend what is happening to their environment. They
can thus better appreciate the value of the monitor-
ing programs that produced this information
and the practical benefits that can result. Without
this understanding by both the informed public and
the planners it is doubtful whether many
essential monitoring programs will be able to
continue.
The demonstration of the practical benefits that
can arise, or are arising, from particular monitoring
programs must be seen as an essential com-
ponent in the design and implementation of those
programs. This aspect is one that I feel is not
adequately covered in this chapter though I think
it is appreciated by the authors. It is an aspect that
we and our colleagues in the United Nations agen-
cies have learned the hard way, through designing
and implementing the many and various worldwide
monitoring networks that make up the Global
Environment Monitoring System (GEMS) as we
know it today. This lesson had not been learned in
the early days and so the relevant elements were
not given sufficient prominence in the initial GEMS
networks, such as the European Monitoring and
Evaluation Programme (EMEP) and the Back-
ground Air Pollution Monitoring Network (BAP-
MoN). All new GEMS monitoring programs
have built-in periodic assessments and relatively
frequent outputs of plain language statements on
environmental conditions and trends. The recent
WHO/UNEP report [I] on urban air pollution,
based on the findings of one of the GEMS health-
related monitoring networks, is an example of a
plain language assessment statement that was given
wide distribution in English, French, and Spanish,
and led to immediate interest in further participa-
tion in the network.
The authors point out that costs may require a
monitoring program to meet more than one set
of objectives and consequently to monitor more
than one set of variables at any given site. One-site,
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multiple-data-set monitoring is also at the heart of
the new integrated monitoring approach as now
used, for example, in some GEMS' temperate forest
monitoring projects. Monitoring of this type may
result in a reduction of both accuracy and precision
with regard to individual variables. These reduc-
tions will have to be considered on a case-by-case
basis, but they will, in general, be acceptable as long
as the methods used allow the data collected from
different sites in different countries to be intercom-
parable in a meaningful way. The importance of
quality assurance procedures and regular intercom-
parisons of monitoring and analytical methods in
this respect cannot be over emphasized. Without
the consequent ability to compare monitored data
in a meaningful way it is not possible to build reliable
global, regional, and national pictures of the state
of the variables concerned.
The environment is a complex composite of sys-
tems - physical, biological, and socioeconomic - and
few management decisions can be taken without
regard to them all. Traditional access to environ-
mental data no longer meets the demands of plan-
ners faced with a world where the nature of environ-
mental change is infinitely complex. With the
development of computers that can handle and
analyze the immense quantities of data that large-
area environmental monitoring dictates, a compre-
hensive global data base is now possible.
The basis of this approach is a geographical infor-
mation system in which various data planes
gathered through inventory and monitoring can be
related to each other and to a particul;l~ part of the
Earth's surface - be it the whole globe or a local
area. Data planes can include, for example, topogra-
phy, soils, water resources, vegetation, fauna, land-
use, climate, and atmospheric constituents, as well
as various socioeconomic inputs.
Globally, such a system can be used to make
statements about global trends, such as changes in
climate and increasing desertification. Nationally,
it can be used at any scale of planning from nation-
wide agricultural schemes to the siting of roads and
human settlements. To make better use of the infor-
mation held in its various data banks, GEMS has
created such a system in GRID - the Global
Resource Information Database. GRID enables
various GEMS monitored data sets, combined with
information from other sources, to be focused on
the environmental and developmental problems of
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specific geographical areas, thus allowing more
informed planning and management decisions to
be made. This approach is a new and important
aspect of environment and resource monitoring
which I feel has not been given sufficient attention
by the authors. It provides a major bridge between
monitoring and management.
Limitations of space in this commentary prevent
me from elaborating on two other points touched
upon by the authors. First, historical monitoring -
the obtaining of information on past environmental
conditions from sources available to us today - is
important for the proper understanding of what
we see and measure in our current environment. I
can do no more here than direct interested readers
to a new GEMS report on this very neglected, but
important, subject [2]. Second, economists and
sociologists have not kept pace with scientists in
deriving suitable and meaningful socioeconomic
monitoring methods. Consequently, socioeconomic
inputs to environmental monitoring and assessment
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procedures remain inadequate and unsatisfactory.
This situation is changing, but slowly, so that it will
be some years yet before the imbalance is corrected.
No single account of environment and resource
monitoring can adequately deal with all aspects of
the subject, so it is not surprising that this chapter
does not cover some of them satisfactorily - renew-
able resource monitoring, for example. Neverthe-
less, the chapter does represent a useful attempt to
put forward the principles behind the design and
implementation of environment and resource
monitoring programmes.
Note and references (Comm.)
[I] UNEP/WHO (1984), Urban Air Pollution 1973-1980,
UNEP/WHO Report (World Health Organization,
Geneva).
[2] MARC (1985), Historical Monitoring, MARC Report
No 31 (Monitoring and Assessment Research Centre,
London).
1Chapter 14
M. L. Parry
Some implications of
climatic change for
human development
Editors' Introduction: Social processes of adaptation and adjustment are central to the
interactions of human development and the environment. Relatively little is understood,
however, about how such processes respond to long-term environmental changes.
This chapter is focused on the responses of agricultural development to long-term
changes in climate. It is argued that such changes often increase societies' vulnerability
to disruptions that may ultimately be precipitated by other events. (This is a specific
example of the "slow variable" issue more generally discussed in Chapters 10 and 11.)
In addition, however, it is shown that long-term changes in climatic means may exert
some of their most significant social impacts through associated changes in the frequency
of extreme events. The implications of such changes for the economic risks faced by
individual farmers and for the resource opportunities available to individual regions are
discussed.
Introduction
A recent report by the United Nations Environ-
mental Programme (UNEP) on world environ-
mental trends referred to three main current con-
cerns with our climate: rising carbon dioxide (C02)
concentrations, acidification of rain and snow, and
stratospheric ozone (03) depletion [1]. These were
part of a list of environmental changes which
included loss of tropical forests, desertification,
waterlogging, salinization, etc. It was curious to
some, particularly from the so-called South, that
the report and the meeting it addressed preoc-
cupied itself primarily, at least in the field of climate,
with what those of the South consider as problems
of the North; that is, with anthropogenically caused
changes of climate. To their minds the overriding
concern should be the awesome hazard posed now
by natural climatic variations, particularly in those
countries least able to cope with them [2]. Their
argument is leant some support by the continuing
impact weather has on the modern (increasingly
buffered and integrated) food system. The year
1972 is a favorite example: serious droughts occur-
red in the Sahel, USSR, India, Australia, and South
America, with a million or more excess deaths in
India and Bangladesh alone attributed to this bad-
weather year [3]. Depleted grain supplies in several
of the major food-producing areas led to increasing
food prices and some famine. There was a 3% drop
in total world grain production in 1972. World food
stocks dropped by more than a quarter after 1971
to 134 x 106 tons in 1974 [4] and, although they
recovered in the late 1970s to precrisis levels, the
level today of grain security as a proportion of
consumption remains below the 1969 level.
An argument could thus be adduced that the
most pressing climatic issue today is existing short-
term variability, not future medium- or long-term
average change. This is given further weight by the
fact that those regions of the world with the most
variable climates are generally located near the
Tropics - that is, often in countries with less
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developed economies which, on the face of it, are
less able to deploy resources to make good any
impact from unfavorable weather (Figure 14.1).
Moreover, there are also indications that variability
of production of certain food grains has increased
over the last decade in many tropical countries [6].
At this point we should circumnavigate the related
que lion (viz., how far is level of developm nt related
to climatic resources), merely noting that there is a
respectable amou nt of scientific literatu re on this
subject and that here is yet another dimension of
the climate-development issue: that climate as a
resource varies greatly from one part of the globe
to another and that this climatic change over space
may be of greater consequence for human develop-
ment than climatic change over time. I n fact, in man y
countries and for a wide range of crops the present
interannual variability of yields is greater than those
predicted for a range of future climatic scenarios
(from large cooling to large warming) in the
National Defense University tudy [6, 7]. Climatic
hazards and climate-related agricultural pests and
diseases are much more prevalent in tropical than
in temperate climates. The loss of gross national
product (GNP) to natural hazards is, on average,
20 times greater 10 less-developed than 10
developed countries [8]. Hence the view that the
task of reducing the effects of this "great climatic
anomaly" between \!orth and South is a more press-
ing issue than that of preventing or reducing the
threat of change to the status quo by (for example)
an increasing atmospheric concentration of CO~ [9]:
While the fact and magnitude of [climatic change]
are still uncertain, variability is always present and
often high. Fortunately many of the policies that
could prepare us better for the first contingency are
also those that would provide some insurance against
the second (6).
RAINFALL VARIABILITY
The figures denote percentage departures from normal
under 15 15 - 25 over 25
I I
Figure 14.1 The global pattern of climatic variability, as indicated by the percentage departure of annual
rainfall from the mean annual normal rainfall. Note that, in general, the most variable rainfall occurs near
the Tropics (adapted from [5]).
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Yet changes of climate have occurred over the
longer term and are likely to occur in the future
(see Dickinson, Chapter 9, this volume). 1 draw a
distinction between medium-term climatic changes
(occurring over 10 to 200 years) and long-term ones
(occurring over more than 20U years). We thus have
three types of climatic fluctuation: climatic variabil-
ity, the observed year-to-year differences in climatic
variables, to which economic and social systems gen-
erally adjust; medium-term climatic changes, to which
society probably needs to adapt in order to avoid
undesirable impact; and long-term climatic changes,
which occu r on time scales too large to be considered
significant for the planning horizons of most
societies.
It may seem a little unusual to classify climatic
phenomena on the basis of their human impact,
but if it is ultimately our intention to specify the
role of climatic changes in human development,
then it is helpful to attempt, at the outset, to
integrate the approaches of social and natura!
science, and thus emphasize their complementary
roles. In particular we should exploit the com-
plementarity between direct (or causal) method-
ologies of the natural scientist and "adjoint method-
ologies" of the social scientist [10]. There has
been a tendency to focus on the former, perform-
ing, for example, a sensitivity study by perturbing
one input variable (such as CO2 concentration) and
tracing the effects (climate ~ agricultu re ~ indi-
vidual farmer ~ food prices ~ society). In the adjoint
approach, for example, one might consider the
perturbations, both climatic and nonclimatic, that
influence farmers' decisions and perceptions, and
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trace those that have a climatic origin to a number
of climatic variables and their relationship to the
level of atmospheric CO2 (society ~ food prices ~
individual farmer ~ agriculture ~ climate). Both
approaches may be necessary to understand the full
complexity of the interactions, but the adjoint
approach has received less attention. Its advantage
for those concerned with climatic impact is that, by
evaluating perturbations caused by climate in rela-
tion to perturbations caused by other Sources (tech-
nology, demand, etc.), the social scientist can pro-
duce outputs that can be expressed more readily in
terms of policy.
In this chapter 1 emphasize medium-term changes
of climate because these occur on time scales to
which societies can respond. Figure 14.2 illustrates
a pronounced example of this - the dramatic
medium-term change in mean annual temperature
experienced in Iceland after 1920. I subsequently
show that the economic effects of this were quite
dramatic.
Long-term, or secular, climatic changes have
occurred and no doubt have affected the resource
base of societies in the past. But the task of disen-
tangling those changes from the web of other vari-
ables, and to do so with such imprecise data, is
daunting. Moreover, 1 am unsure what we could
learn from such an exercise when we come to think
about planning our own responses to climatic
change. The time scales simply exceed our ability
and imagination. The secular trend in Figure 14.3
illustrates such long-term changes [12]: yet em-
bedded within this trend are important medium-
term fluctuations, such as that in the Northern
4
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Figure 14.2 Annual mean temperature at Stykkisho'imur, Iceland. Values below the 1846-1982 average are
shaded yellow and extreme warm and cold years are delineated for two arbitrarily chosen periods. Extremes
are defined as those with a return period of 10 years or more [11].
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16000 8000 Figure 14.3 Schematic representa-tion of temperature changes during
the past 18000 years [12].
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Hemisphere between the so-called "Medieval warm
epoch" and "Little ice age". In northern Europe,
between these periods, mean annual temperatures
were reduced by about 2 cC, with significant impli-
cations for agricultu ral potential [13].
Although it falls outside my remit implied by the
title of this chapter, I would exclude consideration
of short-term climatic variability only with reluc-
tance. It is the major source of climatic impact today,
and almost certainly will be in the future. More
importantly, it is likely that short-term impacts are the
mechanism through which any longer term change is felt.
For example, the impact of a possible CO2-induced
warming on agriculture is likely to be felt as much
through changes in the frequencies (or risk) of
specific events (such as days of plant moisture stress
or short moisture-limited growing seasons) as
through the change in mean conditions [14]. Short-
term impacts will thus be embedded in any long-
term future change.
In general, I focus here on impacts on the biologi-
cal resource base, that is on agriculture, fisheries,
and forestry potential, primarily because such first-
order effects are more readily measurable and less
obscured by changes in technology, institutions,
social values, etc. For the same reasons I also place
as much emphasis on the possible effects of known,
measurable climatic changes in the present or recent
past as on those which may occur in the medium-
term future, for example from an increase in atmo-
spheric concentration of CO2 •
The questions I address are these: What assump-
tions underlie the study of climatic change and
human development? What has been the recent
progress in comprehending the array of relation-
ships? Do we need to redefine the research problem
into forms more amenable to solution and more
appropriate for application in policy? What concep-
tual framework is best suited to future research?
What are the research priorities? I try to answer
these in turn, focusing largely on first-order impacts
on food supply. In doing this, I do not mean to
diminish the role of climatic change on the sec-
ondary and tertiary sectors (or on those direct
impacts from other biophysical systems, such as
from rising sea levels or from disease). No doubt
these are important, but they are likely to be less
so than impacts in agriculture, fisheries, and for-
estry.
Clarifying the assumptions
It is important to clarify some distinctions and
assumptions that have tended to obfuscate the
study of climatic change and human development.
First, we must be clear about the time scale. Short-
term climatic variations can generally be expected
to have a short-term effect on society, unless they
happen to trigger a response that has been precon-
ditioned by other long-term factors.
Second, we can thus assume a distinction between
(a) hypotheses of climatic change as proximate or
precipitating causes of economic and social change
1
382
and (b) those that are underlying or indirect causes
of economic or social change. For example, we
should be extremely wary of assuming a climatic
"cause" when the weather may merely have precipi-
tated impacts which were fundamentally economic,
social, or political in origin [15]. What, for example,
were the real "causes" of the Sahelian crisis in the
mid-1970s - meteorological drought or enhanced
vulnerability due to economic and political develop-
ments insensitive to an environment that has always
been changeable?
This brings us to the third distinction: that be-
tween contingently necessary and contingently sufficient
conditions for an occurrence [16]. It is probable that
increased vulnerability was a necessary condition
(or precondition) for the Sahelian disaster; without
it the economic system might have been more
resilient to the meteorological drought. It was not,
however, a sufficient condition, because it required
a further event (meteorological drought) to precipi-
tate the effect. On the other hand, a broadly similar
effect could have been triggered by a different short-
term event, for example, a political upheaval. If this
were the case, then climate was neither a sufficient
nor a necessary condition for the Sahelian crisis,
nor for many other events of which it may be
deemed a precipitating factor [17]. It may, however,
trigger a cascade of misfortunes which, in concert,
have a lasting impact on the pr'ogress of human
development. Such is the scenario portrayed in a
recent study of the role of climate in the crisis facing
Sumeria in the Tigris-Euphrates lowlands around
the beginning of the first millennium Be, when
drought may have decreased available water sup-
plies and led, in turn, to increased salinization, and
hence to reduced crop yields. As a result less food
may have been stored, thus increasing the vulnera-
bility of society to recurrent environmental impacts
[ 18].
Finally, we should examine the set of four
assumed relationships or functions by which we
normally proceed to disaggregate the complexity
of the connection between climate and society [19]:
(l) Function 1. Utility function (that is satisfaction
in farming, fishing, etc.) that depends on:
(a) Personal characteristics.
(b) The probability distribution of financial
performance.
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Increasingly recognized as important here are
attitudes to risk of climatic impact which may
modify the traditionally assumed goal of
maximizing expected profits.
(2) Function 2. The second general relationship is a
mix of behavioral and environmental effects
which are part of (l b). That is, a probability
distribution of financial performance that
depends on:
(a) Allocative decisions.
(b) The probability distribution of yields.
(c) The probability distribution of prices.
(d) Institutions and government interventions.
Both the probability distributions (2b) and (2c)
may often be related to climate, and govern-
ment interventions may be related to mitigating
climatic impacts.
(3) Function 3. Probability distribution of yields
that depends on:
(a) Climate.
(b) Allocative decisions.
The influence of climate on yields can be esti-
mated either empirically or by simulating, for
example, plant responses. Many of the allocative
decisions [both in (2a) and (3b)] are influenced
by climate, being intended to mitigate the effect
of climatic variations.
(4) Function 4. Probability distribution of prices
that depends on:
(a) Consumer demand (i.e., incomes, tastes,
etc.).
(b) Institutions and government interventions.
(c) Supply and thus also climate.
Climate may act directly on demand and
directly on prices.
Anderson summanzes the relationships as
follows:
Taken together, Functions I to 4 depict an agricul-
tural sector directly dependent on climate .... Each
of Functions I to 4 has a dual interpretation depend-
ing on whether it is being construed as a planning
(ex ante) device or an observational recording (ex post)
device. Broadly speaking the ex ante relationships
can be characterized as risk (or uncertainty) and the
ex post relationships as instability [20].
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Thus climatic fluctuations can make themselves
felt through several functions operating in both the
agricultural and nonagricultural sectors. It is not
simply a matter of modeling crop yields and tracing
the downstream effects of their variations on the
wider economy.
Preliminary models
To organize this array of relationships into an ana-
lytical framework a number of conceptual models
have been developed, which have generally become
more complex in recent years, allowing for an
increasing variety of feedback processes to be
described. In this section, I outline the recent
development of these models and illustrate their
use with one or two examples.
Impact models
Impact models are graphic representations of those
types of study methodology which view climate as
causing impacts in a more or less linear, noninterac-
tive fashion [21]. In some cases the mechanisms are
treated as a single unordered set, the impacts
(effects) being immediately contingent to the cli-
matic event (cause). Little account is taken of inter-
vening factors.
A basic model of this kind characterizes the
hypothesis of climatically induced settlement
change as an explanation for the decline of the
Mycenaean civilization between about 1200 and
900 Be [22]. The abandonment of Mycenaean
palaces and evacuation of settlements in the south
Peloponnese has generally been attributed to
invasion by the Dorians from the northeast. But the
Dorians might have been moving into an area that
had already been depopulated by outward migra-
tion - an evacuation induced by famine caused by
recurring drought; whatever the reasons, there is
archaeological evidence that the Mycenaean settle-
ment shifted to the northwest Peloponnese.
Any weakening of the polar high pressure at this
time would have caused a more northerly track of
the Atlantic depressions which, generally, bring
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spring and autumn rain to the Aegean. If this had
occurred, then the only rainfall that would have
continued to be reliable would have fallen on the
western Peloponnese. The original Mycenaean
settlements could have suffered persistent drought,
and responded by migrating.
In archaeological and documentary terms, there
is little evidence to support this hypothesis of
climatically induced migration: and the alternative
hypothesis of military overthrow is not refuted [23].
Moreover, little evidence exists either for the cli-
matic changes per se or for their possible effects in
changing vegetation in the region [24]. However,
an analysis of patterns of winter climate in the south
Aegean has revealed that a type of hemispheric
circulation characterized by patterns consistent with
that proposed for the Mycenaean drought occurred
during the period November 1954 to March 1955,
and can be used as an analogue of the dry weather
postulated for the late Mycenaean period [25]. The
drought pattern could, therefore, have occurred -
but did it occur at that time and over several con-
secutive years? Can we specify in much greater
detail the supposed connections between meteoro-
logical drought, changes in the agricultural resource
base, and the shift of settlement?
Similar simple causal models characterized earlier
excursions into the study of climate and cultural
history, studies now associated with the philosophy
of determinism [26]. In 1907 Ellsworth Huntington
argued for the existence of climatic "pulsations",
which periodically drove the nomadic peoples of
central Asia to the fringes of the sedentary world
in Europe and southwest Asia [27]. He also sug-
gested that Mayan migrations in central America
and the desertions of Roman settlements in Syria
were in part a consequence of climatic shifts [28].
These ideas were subsequently rejected and it
became fashionable in the 1940s and 1950s (the
height of the possibilist movement in geography
[29]) to ridicule Huntington's work. Today, par-
ticularly with the renewed interest in links between
cultural history and environmental change a more
reasonable judgment might be that Huntington's
naive conclusions stemmed from insufficient data
and inadequate analytical techniques rather than
from unpromising hypotheses.
Studies of the cyclical connection between climate
and history still have a toehold in science, but gen-
erally lack sufficient rigor to be convincing. An
384 Sustainable development of the biosphere
SYSTEMS AFFECTED--.-
Social
Stress
e.g., trade balance
inflation
Stress
e.g., migration
tax base
Stress
e.g., health effects
bankruptcy
Economic
Farm
vulnerability
Economic
productivity
Prices, govern-
ment policy
Farm
income
Global
food
supply
Agricultural
USA food ......,..:~IIRJ
supply
Global
Regional
production
National
Perception
----_.~-
Yields
Agricultural
management' •.
Regional
Figure 14.4 The hypothetical pathways of drought impacts on society [32].
example is the hypothesized relationship between
a supposed 80-year temperature cycle, the rate of
population increase, and the degree of social dis-
turbance (measured by a weighted index of his-
torical chronologies) [30]. More promising is a
recent exploration of the connection between
weather and "long swings" in the agricultu ral sector
[31 ].
More detailed studies of climate-society interac-
tions attempt to trace the effects of the climatic event
as they cascade through physical and social systems,
meeting other sets of intervening factors which dis-
guise and modify the link. A specific example is the
work by Warrick and Bowden, tracing the impacts
of drought occurrence in the US Great Plains [32].
They traced a variety of pathways that drought
impacts could take, spanning a variety of spatial
scales (from local to global) and a variety of systems
(from agricultural to social). From the source of
impact in the lower left of Figure 14.4 the pathway
can be traced from the first-order (direct) physical
impact to the higher order (less direct) effects on
society. What starts as meteorological drought
becomes agricultural drought, and subsequently,
perhaps, a perturbation in the wider economy.
Interactive models
A greater degree of realism can be introduced by
considering adapation and adjustment to climatic
change. By adjustment we mean the short-term con-
scious response to a perceived impact or risk of
impact (for example, building a dam to store addi-
tional water for a drought period). By adaptation
we mean the long-term, often intuitive (subcon-
scious) response to an environment which embodies
many sets of risks and opportunities (for example,
a system of slash-and-burn agriculture which, over
the years, has matched farming activities in different
parts of the world to the local agricultural resource
base) [33]. These two types of interactions allow us
to consider, first, a whole suite of other factors, such
as the vulnerability or resilience of different systems
to impact, which in tu rn affect how societies can
(and do) respond to climatic change. These are
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considered elsewhere in this volume by Holling
(Chapter 10) and Timmerman (Chapter 16).
Second, these interactions introduce the issue of
perception, that is, the cognition of potential or
actual impact, the risks or benefits involved, and
the opportunities to avoid or take advantage of
them. To illustrate, faced with the task of defining
a set of researchable problems, Kellog and Schware
simplified the CO2 problem into a hierarchy of
issues [34]:
a. For a given scenario of fossil fuel use, determine
the future levels of CO2 concentration in the atmo-
sphere.
b. For a given scenario of CO2 concentration, deter-
mine the resulting climatic change in terms of
regional and seasonal patterns of temperatures, pre-
cipitation, and soil moisture, among other variables.
c. For a given scenario of polar-region climatic
change, determine what will happen to the volume
of the major ice sheets and the subsequent effect on
sea level.
d. For a given scenario of regional and seasonal
climatic change, determine the effects on specific
activities such as agriculture, land use, water resour-
ces, industry, transportation, and energy require-
ments on a country-by-country or region-by-region
basis.
e. For a given scenario of specific socioeconomic
effects, determine the probable or desirable
responses of societies.
f. Along with the preceding set of considerations,
determine the influences on earlier aspects of the
problem of feedbacks resulting from implementing
alternative strategies to mitigate the impacts or, per-
haps, to avert the climatic change.
Yet by (realistically) including the last of these tasks
the dimensions of the research problem are expan-
ded enormously. A suite of ex ante relationships are
now a part of the research problem:
(l) How to measure the risks from increasing CO~)
(2) How to identify the alternative possible re-
sponses to these risks?
(3) How to evaluate these responses?
For a second, and somewhat contrasting, illus-
tration of the importance of perception in the cli-
mate --'> society and society --'> climate relationship we
turn back the calendar almost 1000 years - to those
Norse settlements that gained a foothold along
the Greenland coast in ca. AD 985, but were extin-
guished by AD 1500, probably between 1350 and
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1450. In the thirteenth century the population,
which then totaled about 6000 in two settlements
on the south and southwestern coasts of Greenland,
was subjected to a synergistic interaction of stresses
from hostile Eskimos (Inuit), the decline of the
European market for walrus ivory, and challenging
climatic fluctuations, particularly during ca. 1270-
1300, ca. 1320-1360, and ca. 1430-1460:
Had these factors not coincided when they did, Norse
Greenland very probably would have survived the
fifteenth century and might well have endured to
the present in some form. However, this sort of
explanation treats human response to climatic stress
as a minor and dependent variable ... we must con-
sider not only the nature of the external stresses that
seemed to have killed Norse Greenland, but also the
reason for that society's selection of ultimately unsuc-
cessful response to such stress [35].
McGovern concludes that failure to adapt to the
changing circumstances explains much of the Norse
decline. The Norse continued to emphasize stock
raising (cattle, sheep, and goats) in the face of
reduced capacity of the already limited inner-fjord
pastures. The options to improve their hunting
skills and to exploit the rich seas around (just as the
Inuit successfully did) were not taken up. One rea-
son for this may have been simply poor manage-
ment by the elite in a highly stratified religious
society:
Baldly put, a society whose administrators (as well as
its peasants) believe that lighting more candles to St
Nicholas will have as much (or more) impact on the
spring seal hunt as more and better boats is a society
in serious trouble [35].
In a successful society we would expect adaptive
strategies to be in constant interchange with the
environment, allowing a continuous identification
of new risks and potential benefits within that
environment, and incorporating these into revised
strategies that preserve and propagate the more
successful variables of the system. This adaptive
system can be visualized as the three-dimensional
intersection described by social behavior, tech-
nology, and resource opportunities (Figure 14.5)
[36]. If McGovern is right, the Norse society had
surrendered some of the adaptive abilities that
it displayed 300 years earlier at the time of settle-
ment to a hierarchical social structure that may
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Figure 14.5 A three-dimensional
model for the interactive variables of
an adaptive system [36].
have been appropriate In Demark but was much
less so in Greenland.
This brief examination of adaptation and adjust-
ment points to two conclusions. First, most social
and economic systems have adapted. perhaps slowly
and over many years, so that they can absorb a
certain range of exogenous perturbations (for
example, short-term climatic variations) without a
major disruption of the systems' normal behavior.
These adaptations are probably based on the
experience of perturbations in the past and are
presumed to accommodate a certain perturbation
range in the future. The entire range is unlikely to
be accommodated because the cost of insuring
against the least likely events is greater than the full
(unmitigated) cost of the impact from those events.
For example, farming systems in a drought-prone
region may be adapted to accommodate droughts
of a certain degree of severity and frequency. But
more severe droughts are considered sufficiently
infrequent to be ignored. Thus, Saarinen found
that the farmers on the US Great Plains tended. in
their farming strategies, to ignore droughts with a
long return period [37].
It is fair to assume that agricultural and other
systems of a successful society have developed to
accommodate a major part of the expected range
of climatic anomalies. Less rare and less extreme
anomalies are absorbed without major shock to the
system. However, our second conclusion is that the
rare and extreme event (for example, those occur-
ring with a probability of 0.05 or less) may exceed
the resilience of the system, and may cause a major
perturbation that can cascade into other subsets of
the system (e.g., wider sectors of the economy),
which would not normally expect to experience
such a perturbation and are not adapted to absorb
them. A change in the central tendency of climate
or its variability by altering the frequency of the
extreme events can thus upset the pattern of ad just-
ment. For example, Figure 14.2 illustrates for Ice-
land the change in frequency of extremely warm
or cool years between two arbitrarily chosen peri-
ods, and the range of adjustment theoretically
required to maintain resilience to extremes with a
return period of not more than 10 years. To opti-
mize its use of climatic resources the Icelandic
economy (essentially limited to farming and fishing)
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would have had to respond over about 30 years to
quite marked changes in the frequency of extremes.
Redefining climatic change
If this analysis is correct, the impact from climatic
change comes not only from the average, but also
from the extreme event. Thus, even if there is a
change in the central tendency of the climate, an
important medium through which this change is
felt may be through a change in the frequency of the
extreme anomalies, such as the number of years of
particularly difficult weather that, for example,
reduce food supplies, raise prices, and bring scarcity
or (conversely) bumper years that flood the food
market, drop prices, and reduce farm incomes to
the point where the planting area in the following
year can be affected. This has important implica-
tions for the CO2 question, because one of the
obstacles to active government interest in the impact
of possible future climatic change rather than of
present-day climatic variability is government's
overriding concern with the short term rather than
the long term. In general, the concern is with
impacts from short-term anomalies such as floods,
droughts, and cold spells. This suggests that a useful
form in which long-term climatic change can be
expressed to the policymaker is as a change in the
frequency of such anomalies. A further advantage of
this approach is that the change can be expressed
as a change in the risk of impact. Government pro-
grams could then be devised to accommodate
'specified, tolerable levels of risk by adjusting
activities as necessary to match the change of risk.
Finally, climatic change can also be viewed as a
change in resource opportunities where increasing risks
close some doors, but reduced risks open others
elsewhere. I deal with each of these approaches in
turn.
Interpreting climatic change as a
change in the frequency of extreme
events
One of the critical issues concerning the impact of
possible COTinduced climatic changes is how costly
387
it would be for present economic systems to adapt.
Any answer to this question presumes a knowledge
of how, in general, society adapts to environmental
change. At present it is fair to say that we do not
know. One possibility is that society gradually adapts
to slow cumulative tendencies in the perceived
average. That is a comforting thought, particularly
when changes in mean tendencies of climate might
reasonably be expected to change slowly with steady
increases in atmospheric CO2 ; and this has probably
encouraged thinking about matching rates of tech-
nological change (for example, of crop breeding)
to rates of climatic change [38].
Our alternative hypothesis, however, is that
impacts come not from the average, but from the
extreme event - and that society is more likely to
respond to its perception of a change in frequency of
these extreme events [39]. To illustrate, few farmers
(whether commercial or subsistence) plan activities
on their expectation of the average return. They
either gamble on good years or insure against bad
ones [40]. More risk-prone farmers tend to tune
their activities to bad years, commercial farmers
(such as those on the Canadian prairies) to good
years. The prairie community is thus periodically
stressed when the reverse conditions prevail [41].
The impact from extremes can alter according
to three types of climatic change. To illustrate this,
let us assume that annual rainfall or temperature
has a Gaussian (normal) distribution about the mean
x and variance (J2. We also assume that agriculture
is only seriously affected if rainfall or temperature
is outside the range of (x±k) [Figure 14.6(a)]. In
the first type, x changes but (J2 remains unchanged
[Figure 14.6(b)]. The frequency of negative ex-
tremes (as defined originally by the agricultural
system which we presume to be slow to adapt to the
new climate regime) is increased, and that of posi-
tive extremes is reduced. I f this change occurred
for rainfall on the Canadian prairies we might
expect the bad years to far exceed the good years.
In the second type of climatic change, (J2 changes
but x does not [Figure 14.6(c)]. There is increased
risk of both deficient and excessive temperatures
and/or rainfall. Both x and (J2 change in the third
type [Figure 14.6(d)] [42].
Such changes feature frequently in the instru-
mental records for all but the most stable climates.
For example, the rainfall record for 22 stations in
India (Figure 14.7) indicates, for 1890-1919, a
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Figure 14.6 Three types of climatic changes with respect to the vulnerability of agriculture. Shaded areas
show the frequency of extreme events to exceptionally high (+) or low (-) yields [42).
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period rich in extremes of both floods and droughts,
but for 1920-1939 a period with a few extremes
(i.e., the second type of climatic change). In the
1950s a high frequency of floods was accompanied
by a low frequency of droughts, while the reverse
was true in the 1850s (the first or third type of
climatic change) [43].
Interpreting climatic change as a
change in level of risk
If social and economic systems are tuned to the
frequency of likely impact from extreme climatic
events, it is logical to assume that human activities
are being matched to a perceived level of climatic
risk. One way of evaluating climatic change in
human terms is therefore to consider it as a change
in level of risk, that is, in the probability of an adverse
or beneficial event, such as shortfall from some
critical level of output or excess above the expected
yield. In agriculture, for example, we might assume
that farmers are entrepreneurs whose activities are
based upon the expected return from their gam-
bling on a certain mix of good and bad years. This
has important implications for the impact of climatic
change for two reasons. First, because broadly linear
changes in mean temperature and precipitation
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Figure 14.7 Extreme summer mon-
soon rainfall in India (22 stations),
June-September [43].
(either over time or between one place and another)
have strongly nonlinear aspects when redefined as
the probability of occurrence of a certain anomaly.
For example, let us suppose that extremely cold
winters or dry summers occur with a probability of
p = 0.1. The return period of a single extreme is
10 years, while the return for the occurrence of two
consecutive extremes is 100 years (assuming in-
dependence and a normal distribution of frequen-
cies). Any change in climate will lead to a change
in p, either through changing variability, which will
change p directly, and/or through a change in mean
conditions, which must also change p if extremes
are judged relative to an absolute threshold.
Alternatively, p may change through changes in
some critical impact threshold as a result of land-use
changes, new crops or crop mixes, increasing popu-
lation pressure, and so forth. If p becomes 0.2, then
the return period for a single severe season is halved
to 5 years. The return period for consecutive severe
seasons, however, is reduced by a factor of four to
only 25 years. Thus, linear changes in climate can
cause quasi-exponential changes in the probability
of crop failure or, conversely, bumper harvests [44J.
The second reason why change of risk may be
crucial is that, for many activities, these levels of
risk are already critical. This is self-evident in the
case of marginal farmers whose risks are already
high. Amongst nonmarginal farmers, however,
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change of risk is also likely to have a similar quasi-
exponential effect on the risk of one type of farming
(crop type, mix of crops, and livestock, etc.) being
more profitable than another, i.e., on the comparative
advantage which one farming type may have over
another. We may conclude that surprisingly large
changes in farming types may be necessary to accommo-
date apparently small changes in average climate.
An increase in average temperature would thus
cause substantial increases in the probabilities of
high extremes of temperature which, in regions like
the US Corn Belt where maize can be close to its
maximum-temperature tolerance limits, can have
significant deleterious effects on crop growth and
final yield. For example, a 1.7°C increase in the
mean temperature at Des Moines (Iowa) would
increase threefold the likelihood of occurrence of
a run of five consecutive daily maximum tem-
peratures of at least 35°C [45].
One means of developing scenarios for a high-
CO2 warm world has been to base them on climatic
patterns prevailing in analogous circumstances,
either in the distant past (from paleoenvironmental
data [34]) or in the historical period (from the
instrumental climatic record [46]). Bergthorsson
has suggested a similar approach in assessing the
impact of a CO2-inducing warming on the Icelandic
economy [11]. The quite sudden warming around
1920 resulted in mean annual temperatures some
1.2°C higher for 1931-1960 than the~ were for
1873-1922. What impacts would a similar increase
over present temperature have on today's Icelandic
economy? We could expect substantial increases in
hay production on improved pastures, in carrying
capacity of the unimproved rangelands, and in pro-
duction of sheep meat, with reduced spending on
imported feed substitutes. All this would sig-
nificantly alter Iceland's balance of payments.
Translated into the frequency of extreme events,
or of certain levels of production contingent upon
such events, the effects of a recent warming, such
as that in Iceland, can be surprising. Consider, for
example, the warming in northwest Europe be-
tween about 1660 and 1980. If we compare the
cool 50 years (1661-1710) and the warm 50 years
(1931-1980) on the long instrument-based tem-
perature record for central England from 1659, the
difference in mean annual temperature is 0.75 DC.
That difference lies well within the range of warm-
ing at 60 ON predicted by most general circulation
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models for a doubling of atmospheric CO2 , Changes
in occurrence of extreme events between the two
periods thus enable an estimate to be made of
similar changes that might occur as a result of
increased CO2 (though we should not automatically
assume that the same relationship between mean
and variance would hold in a high-C02 world).
One major change between 1661-1710 and
1831-1980 has been in the probability of crop
failure in northern and upland Europe due to
inadequate summer temperatures. At locations near
the present upper limit of cereal cropping this prob-
ability has been reduced tenfold (from 0.2 to 0.02).
Thus the risk to cropping posed by crop failure has
altered markedly with climatic warming in the past
three centuries; and it is quite probable that a
broadly similar alteration in risk levels would occur
with a CO2-induced climatic warming [47].
Interpreting climatic change as a
change in resource opportunities or
economic options
Implicit in the assumption that a change in risk
affects economic activity is that perception of the
risk change affords information about changes in
resource opportunities or economic options. Since,
in agriculture at least, climate can reasonably be
construed as a resource, climatic change can pro-
duce benefits or disadvantages that may require an
adjustment to match altered resource levels. One
important path of these impacts is through range
of choice:
Changes in climate can alter the range of options
that may compete for investment of time, money,
and other resources. Moreover, the perception of
these changed options is often important because the
timing of investment in relation to weather can sig-
nificantly influence the return on that investment.
For example, the timing of farming operations
(ploughing, sowing, harvesting, etc.) frequently
explains much of the variation in yields from farm
to farm at the local level. Changes in climate might
tend to enhance the mismatch between weather and
farming operations because of a lag in management
response to changes in, most importantly, the "time
windows" for planting and harvesting. For this rea-
son, crop selection is probably one of the most
effective means of response to an adverse climatic
change, for the development of new strains or the
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introduction of new crops can serve to keep open
these time windows sufficiently to allow adequate
yields to be maintained [47, emphasis in original].
The task of capitalizing on an altered array of
options is quite complex. To simplify matters, let
us assume:
(2) Different farmers have different attitudes to-
ward risk, thus affecting their optimum crop-
plOg mix.
(3) Different farmers have different estimates of
the probabilities of types of weather-year, thus
affecting their response.
Figure 14.9 Hypothetical payoff versus climate
functions for maize and sorghum; for explanation,
see text.
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Any of these three factors can change the
optimum farming strategy quite markedly. To illus-
trate, let us assume that farmers in central India
seek an optimum mix of two crops - sorghum and
maize. The payoff from these crops varies, with
sorghum faring better in dry years and maize in
wet. A hypothetical payoff-climate function for the
crops is given in Figure 14.9.
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(l) That all farmers wish to maximize their income
(rather than some of them, say, wishing to
minimize their risk).
(2) That the average climate is unchanged, only the
weather varying from year to year.
Our farmer (in, say, the US midwest or USSR
Ukraine) must decide whether to plant wheat or
barley, the yields of which are most affected by
rain fall in the growing season [48]. The situation is
depicted here as a decision tableau (Figure 14.8).
The farmer receives a return of rand u for wheat
and sand t for barley under wet and dry years,
respectively. His estimates of the probabilities of
each of those types of year wiH affect his decision
regarding the optimum cropping mix.
Figure 14.8 The decision tableau, including the
expected returns associated with the actions under
prior information, for the agricultural decision-
making situation presented in the text [48].
In reality the picture is complicated in three ways:
(1) The real (i.e., instrument observed) prob-
abilities of types of year can change from decade
to decade.
Now let us assume that there are four types of
farmer:
(l) Those wishing to maximize average payoff over
the medium term (i.e., over 10 years), regardless
of short-term variations in payoff.
(2) Those wishing the same, but having regard to
short-term variations, ensuring that no annual
payoff is less than two thirds of the maximum
average.
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LI . Figure 14.10 Cropping strategiesand climatic change.
(3) Those acting as (2), but ignoring in their calcula-
tions low-probability extremes (i.e., 0.05 or less).
(4) Those wishing to maximize the minimum payoff
in the worst possible year.
From a payoff matrix we can identify, for a given
climate, the optimum crop mix for each type of
farmer (Figure 14.10 and Table 14.1). For climate
1, farmer (1) would choose a maize and sorghum
mix of 100: 0, farmer (2) 70: 30, farmer (3) 100: 0,
and farmer (4) 20: 80. Thus, for the same climate,
farmers with different goals and different attitudes
choose, not surprisingly, different strategies.
Now let us assume (Figure 14.10) a spell in which
dry years are more frequent, the sort of change that
might occu r over a 10- or 20-year period, as for
monsoon rainfall in India (Figure 14.7). In seeking
to minimize his risks, farmer (4) has, in fact, chosen
the strategy that is also most resilient to the hypothe-
sized climatic changes: he can maintain an
unchanged crop mix and still achieve his optimum
payoff. In contrast, the others must change their
crop mixes quite radically if they are to maintain
what they regard as an optimum payoff.
To sum up: apparently small climatic changes
(particularly changes in mean tendency of climate)
can have marked effects on the frequency of ex-
treme events, on levels of risk, and on the pattern
of optimum response strategies. If, for example,
those farmers seeking to maximize average payoff
continued, under the drier climate we have hy-
pothesized, to pursue their concentration on
Table 14.1 Payoff for different crop mixes in different types of year.
Maize: sorghum crop mix
Type of year 0: 100 10:90 20:80 30:70 40:60 50:50 60:40 70:30 80:20 90: 10 100:0
Very dry 61.0 57.9 54.8 51.7 48.6 45.5 42.4 39.3 36.2 33.1 30.0
Dry 58.0 56.9 55.8 54.7 53.6 52.5 51.4 50.3 49.2 48.1 47.0
Moist 55.0 55.4 55.8 56.2 56.6 57.0 57.4 57.8 58.2 58.6 59.0
Wet 52.0 53.5 55.0 56.5 58.0 59.5 61.0 62.5 64.0 65.5 67.0
Very wet 49.0 51.2 53.4 55.6 57.8 60.0 62.2 64.4 66.6 66.8 71.0
Climate 1
Mean payoff 55.0 55.2 55.5 55.7 55.9 56.2 56.4 56.6 56.9 57.1 57.3
Climate 2
Mean payoff 57.3 56.3 55.4 54.5 53.6 52.7 51.8 50.9 50.0 49.1 48.2
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maize they would, in fact, have achieved the lowest
average payoff possible. Thus, the impact of climatic
change on those who either do not perceive it, or
who perceive it and choose not to adjust, can be
surprisingly severe.
Toward a framework for
considering the impact of climatic
change
Can any large-scale, long-term patterns and
relationships be seen to connect climatic change and
human development? For the present, at least, we
can borrow a term from Scottish law which allows
a verdict of Not Proven (i.e., although there is prob-
ably a case to answer, there is insufficient evidence
to convict), and it is uncertain whether we shall ever
have sufficient evidence simply because the concept
of "proof" in history is not the same as in physical
sciences. We can say with certainty that history is
played out on a fluctuating stage, fluctuations to
which the successful actors have had to be extraor-
dinarily responsive. This is a function of the "end-
less variability of climate on all time scales [49]."
But to be certain that long-term climatic changes
have had a lasting impact on the development of
human affairs, we must have an answer to the
"What ... if" question: What would have been the
path of human development if the climate had not
changed? Can we, with confidence, put forward one
single major train of events in human affairs for
which we have the answer?
Let us consider a conditional counterproposition:
that if there had been no climatic change over the
past millennium, then the history of modern man
would not, in any general sense, have been
different. Following this argument, some historians
conclude that:
There are no explanatory lacunas [sic] which need
to be filled by reference to the presumed effects of
(long-term) climatic deterioration ... the most fruit-
ful approach would appear to be the investigation
of the impact, and short-run implications of climatic
shocks experienced by the productive system [50].
This returns us to an earlier conclusion: that short-
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term shocks, embedded in long-term change, are
an important mechanism of climatic impact. Thus,
even if we are only interested (as in the present
context) in long- or medium-term changes at quite
large spatial scales, we need to comprehend the
short-term mechanisms of impact if our policies of
response are to be appropriate. In the remainder
of this chapter I discuss, first, methods available
for measuring sensitivity to climatic impacts and,
second, the range of adaptations and adjustments
that are suggested by such measurements.
Estimating sensitivity to climatic
change
Two broadly different approaches have been taken.
One approach is the use of detailed semidescriptive
case studies, concentrating on particular periods of
apparently marked climatic impact on particular
economies and societies [51]. The abundance of
detail and the attention often given to large num-
bers of variables, in addition to imperfections of
the data, frequently mean that rigorous modeling
is not feasible. But such studies may yield hy-
potheses that can later be tested more rigorously.
An illustration of this approach is Garcia's case study
of the 1972 Sahelian drought, which seriously ques-
tioned the premise of meteorological drought as
the main cause of the crisis and which, by implica-
tion, has brought into question the array of assump-
tions by which we have, rather simplistically, linked
climate and society [52].
Although the descriptive approach is often the
best-suited to historical enquiry, some case studies
of climatic impact have been based on inductive
forms of reasoning and incorporate the weaknesses
of inductivism [53]; that is, they lack an unbroken
logic to establish the relationships between the
various propositions linking climate and develop-
ment and have not sought to test the propositions
either empirically or theoretically. An alternative is
to construct a model of the climate-development
interaction and to test this model against historical
actuality using time series data of chosen dependent
(i.e., impact) and independent (i.e., climatic) vari-
ables [54].
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If we harness to this approach the prediction of
isopleth shifts we have a method that can help identify
areas affected by climatic change or variability. It
focuses on the shift of limits or margins represent-
ing boundaries between arbitrarily defined classes,
the classifications being of vegetation, land use,
yields, and so on. In this sense, the boundaries
delimit zones on maps that can undergo a spatial
shift for a given change of climate, thus defining
impact areas. An example of this method is illus-
trated in Figure 14.11 [47] where the impact of
climatic change is described in terms of the resultant
change in the probability of harvest success or
failure. The weather for a number of years,
described by a set of meteorological data, can be
expressed as a probability of risk or reward using
an appropriate model. When calculated for a num-
ber of stations this probability level can be mapped
geographically as an isopleth. Scenarios of changing
Model of a particular climate (defined by a. r'lJn of years
Mapping of probability
isopleths across
station network
Figure 14.11 Identifying areas of climate impact,
using shifts in the isopleths of probability of crop
failure [47].
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climates can then be used as inputs to the model to
produce geographical shifts of the probability iso-
pleth, which are then identified. The areas
delimited by these shifts represent areas of specific
climatic impact. We can use this approach to esti-
mate the climatic sensitivity of numerous variables,
some of which are directly affected by climate (e.g.,
climatic classifications, measures of agricultural
potential) and some of which are more distantly
related (e.g., actual agricultural yield, regional and
national food production). I take these two
categories in turn.
Estimating the sensitivity of agricultural
potential to climatic change
One means of portraying the direct effect of a
climatic change is by mapping the shift in climatic
zones. Since most climatic classifications (like that
of Koppen) are closely related to vegetation classes,
the shift of such zones essentially reflects a shift of
climatic potential for plant growth. Figure 14.12
illustrates the sharp spatial effect in eastern Aus-
tralia when mean annual precipitation significantly
decreased in the period 1911-1940 as compared
with the previous 30 years [55]. At Bourke in New
South Wales the isohyets had to be redrawn about
100 km to the east of their original line.
More specifically related to ecosystem needs are
climate-life-zone classifications. That by Holdridge
attempts to represent the broad distribution of ter-
restrial ecosystem complexes as a function of annual
temperature and precipitation [56]. A perturbation
of one or both of these variables would thus alter
the distribution of life zones. A preliminary experi-
ment for a doubling of CO2 climate using the GCM
results of Manabe and Stouffer [57] indicates quite
substantial changes in the distribution of ecosystems
(Figure 14.13.) [58].
More closely related to agricultural potential are
agroclimatic indices which may give, for example,
in semiarid areas a quantitative evaluation of the
water balance during the growing season. To illus-
trate, the isopleths of rainfall excess over potential
evapotranspiration have been mapped for each year
of the 1969-1973 Sahelian drought. In the driest
year, 1972, these isopleths underwent a southward
shift of about 120-200 km [59]. This sort of year-by-
year analysis of the shift of agroclimatic zones may
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Figure 14.12 Shifts in the climatic
belt boundaries for southeast
Australia: 1 is 1881-1910 and 2 is 1911-
1940 [55].
permit a better understanding of the effect of cli-
matic variability on agriculture on a regional basis.
Very recently some experiments have been made
to estimate the effect of a COTinduced climatic
change on yields predicted by crop-weather simula-
tion models. Data for changes in temperature,
rainfall, and cloudiness under a doubling of atmo-
spheric CO2 , derived from experiments with a
global circulation model developed at the Goddard
Institute for Space Studies (GISS), have been used
as inputs for a variety of crop-weather simulation
models in Canada, the USSR, Japan, Iceland, and
Finland [60]. As an example, Figure 14.14 illustrates
the predicted changes in spring-wheat yields in Sas-
katchewan.
Estimating the sensitivity of crop yields
to climatic change
We can also estimate the impact that might result
today (with present-day technology) from a recur-
rence of a climatic event known to have had a severe
impact in the past. What, for example, would be
the impacts on wheat production if the US Great
Plains were to suffer another severe, prolonged
drought? During 1932-1937 this helped bring
about ca. 200000 farm bankruptcies or involuntary
transfers and the migration of more than 300000
people from the region. Assuming 1975 technology
and a 1976 crop area the impact would still be sharp
(Figure 14.15) [61]. For a recurrence of the worst
weather-year, 1936, simulated production shows a
drop of 25%, reducing national wheat production
by about 15% (assuming average production else-
where in the USA). The cumulative effect could be
substantial: yearly yields simulated for the weather
during 1932-1940 average about 9-14% below nor-
mal and amount to a cumulative loss over the decade
equal to about a full year's production in the Great
Plains.
Similarly, Saskatchewan wheat yields for the
1930s would, with 1978 technology, have been 20%
below average, according to yield functions that
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relate average provincial wheat yields to corre-
sponding May to August net evaporation data for
the period 1921-1978 [62].
A conceptual framework
The most promising aspect of these approaches is
that they offer the prospect of constructing a
hierarchy of models to analyze fu rther the cascade
of climatic impacts through various elements of the
biophysical, economic, and social systems. The path-
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ways and linkages can be traced with three sets of
models - of climatic changes, of climatic impacts on
potential and actual yield, and of the downstream
economic and social effects of these (Figure 14.16).
Scenarios using outputs from general circulation
models, data from instrumental climatic records, or
a combination of the two, are used as inputs to
impact models to predict potential or actual yield
responses to climatic changes. To trace the down-
stream effect of yield changes, outputs from the
impact models are used as input to economic models
(farm simulations, regional input-output models,
etc.). It is then possible to consider what policies
best mitigate certain impacts at specified points in
the system.
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Figure 14.13 (a) Holdridge life-zone classification for present conditions of mean annual biotemperature
and precipitation [58].
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Figure 14.13 (b) Holdridge life-zone classification for doubling of CO 2 conditions of biotemperature
(assuming unchanged precipitation) [58].
Conclusions
Options and policies
There are many potential responses to mitigate the
impacts of climatic variability or change. These may
range from a multitude of long-standing adapta-
tions within the economic or social systems (for
example, widespread tillage practices which reduce
the likelihood of pest infestations resulting from
certain weather conditions) to specific large-scale
projects, such as the construction of reservoirs and
irrigation systems. Considered at the global level,
an expansion of the area under assured irrigation
is the surest way to increase food security, par-
ticularly in the tropics and subtropics where rainfall
reliability is often low. At the regional and local
level a huge array of measures is both available and
in use to combat shorr·term climatic variability. To
illustrate, the options for drought mitigation in Sas-
katchewan range from tax adjustments to water
pricing, and from snow management to stubble
mulching (Table 14.2, p 401). During 1930-1980
the accumulated 50-year cost of these measures was
$1.3 billion (in 1980 terms), compared to the direct
annual cost of (unprevented) impact from drought
to the Saskatchewan economy of $4.7 billion.
It is less easy to identify the response options to
a possible future change of climate, such as that
which might result from increasing atmospheric
CO\! and much less easy to say what would be their
cost and their effectiveness. As in most issues of
pollution abatement, there are four possible lines
of approach:
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Figure 14.14 Change in spring-wheat yields (percentage of 1951-1980 normal) in Saskatchewan resulting
from doubling-of-C02 experiments, with the GISS general circulation model: (a) for predicted changes in
temperature and precipitation; (b) for predicted changes in temperature, and normal precipitation (from
Stewart in [60]).
(l) Decrease the effluent output (i.e., reduce CO2
production).
(2) Reduce polluting effects of effluent (i.e., remove
CO 2 from effluents or from the atmosphere).
(3) Pay the price of making good the damage (i.e.,
make countervailing modifications to climate,
weather, or hydrology).
(4) Suffer a reduced environmental utility (i.e.,
adapt to increasing CO2 and changing climate).
Within these broad lines of response are many tech-
nological, economic, and social devices to avoid
damage, remove it, or adapt to it (Table 14.3, p 402)
[631.
Adapting to climatic change
Most of the preventive or adaptive mechanisms
listed in Table 14.3 involve the transfer of resources
from other sectors or other regions. This presumes
a certain degree of technological ability and a cer-
tain degree of economic integration. In general.
the greater the level of technological development
and social organization, the better are societies able
to lessen the impact of minor climatic stresses [64].
At the same time, however, the degree of integra-
tion with other economies may affect the extent to
which the impact is devolved or shared. To a par-
tially closed economy, such as that of Norse Green-
land in the fourteenth century. extreme climatic
stress may cause a major shock to the system. A
similar, though temporary, impact was felt in the
USA Great Plains as a result of drought in the 1890s
when thousands of square miles on the dry margins
of the Plains were effectively depopulated. By the
1930s, however, the Plains "were a full part of the
open and enlarging national economy which
directly shared the drought impact [65]." Increas-
ing economic integration may thus devolve the
impact of changing climate while technology and
social organization enables adaptation to it, though
there are numerous intervening factors that are
likely to bring very many exceptions to this rule
(Figure 14.17).
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Research priorities
The naivete of the foregoing discussion illustrates
something of the youth of assessment of climatic
impact. We have a very long way to go, and many
paths to follow. Assuming limited resources, only a
few of these paths can be pursued at anyone time,
so we have some difficult choices to make. What
follows is a personal selection of these (Figures 14.18,
p 405, and Table 14.4, p 404).
First, we require more specific and user-oriented
information regarding climatic change (its likeli-
hood, nature, magnitude, areal extent, duration
and, most important, rate of onset). This informa-
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Figure 14.15 Simulated wheat yields
for US Great Plains: 1936 weather,
1975 technology [61].
tion needs to be expressed in terms readily applic-
able to the user (and often as derived parameters,
such as date of first and last frost, days of heat stress,
etc.) which would enable agroclimatic measures,
such as length of growing season, to be more readily
assessed. It is also important that information on
variability be available, to provide estimates of pos-
sible changes in those extreme conditions that we
have seen to be important in agricultural decision-
making.
Second, an important path of climatic impact on
the most climate-sensitive sectors of our society
(farming, fishing, and forestry) is an indirect one -
i.e., through changes in other physical systems (soil
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Figure 14.16 A hierarchy of models for the assessment of climate impacts and the evaluation of policy
responses [60].
chemistry, ocean currents, agricultural pests and
diseases, and their vectors). Although we have
barely begun to grasp these interactions they clearly
have a major influence on some production systems.
The collapse of the Peruvian anchory fishery as a
result of the 1972 EI Nino is one example. Probably
more widespread is the effect of climatic conditions
on disease. Outbreaks of many plant diseases (such
as potato blight, wheat rust, etc.) are triggered by
specific weather conditions. Climatic changes that
affected the frequency of these conditions could
alter the incidence of such outbreaks.
Furthermore, we need to specify with greater
precision the interaction between climate and other
resources in the primary sector, by modeling (em-
pirically or by simulation) crop-climate, timber-
climate, and fisheries-climate relationships. It
should then be possible to trace, with greater
confidence, the downstream effects of these first-
order impacts on other sectors of economy and
society by reference to a hierarchy of the three types
of models we have considered: climatic, impact, and
economic.
Finally, we need to focus on the human side of
the climate-human development equation: the con-
straints on choice, the role of decision making at
the enterprise (e.g., farm) level, and the process of
formulating strategies to cope with climatic change.
Specific activities
The above is a rather abstract shopping list. How
can these be incorporated into concrete research
activities over the next few years? Four interlocking
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Table 14.2 Drought mitigation options in Saskatchewan [62].
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(A) Water augmentation
1. Weather modification
2. Irrigation/ dugouts/wells
(B) Conservation of water
1. Agricultural cultivation practices:
summer fallow
stubble mulching
strip cropping
contouring and terracing
land leveling
minimum tillage
2. Other cultural practices:
chemical weed control
fertilization
snow management
shelterbelts
3. Bioengineering
4. Water supply protection:
irrigation canal linings
evaporation loss retardants
low-flow showerheads, and other residential
water-saving devices
5. Waste water reuse:
irrigation return flows/ recirculation of
industrial waste water
(e) Modification of water demand
1. Economic incentives and penalties:
metering/pricing policies
2. Legal mechanisms:
building code regulations
user priorities
water-use quotas
3. Voluntary changes in use:
educational programs
activities, which build on existing studies and would
extend our knowledge in the desired directions,
come to my mind:
(I) Studies to improve our understanding of the
sensitivity of agroecological potential (both at
global and regional scales) to climatic change.
Agroecological zone surveys [by FAO, Office de
la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-
Mer (ORSTROM), and national governments)
have now been completed for many countries,
being intended as a planning tool in agricultural
(D) Modification of intrasectoral characteristics
1. Operational flexibility:
farm size
drought resistant crops and livestock
diversification of production
off-farm work
information and management assistance
change cropping plans
haul water
2. Land-use management/regulation:
zoning/ land-use restrictions
removal of marginal land from crop pro-
duction
preservation of wetlands
3. Prediction and forecasting:
soil moisture/ crop growth monitoring
stream flow monitoring
water supply/ demand projections
4. Alternative design of urban water systems:
interbasin transfers
system construction/ enlargement/ upgrad-
ing
deep wells
water bank
(E) Spread/share losses and costs
1. Financial protection:
drought crop insurance
feed/fodder bank
short-term credit
tax adjustments
2. Relief and rehabilitation:
low-interest loans
direct transfers
subsidies/grants
development. Prime facie, these zones are very
sensitive to certain types of climatic change,
including that likely to result from increasing
atmospheric CO2 , Taking a number of alterna-
tive scenarios of change (both CO2-induced and
those analogous to recently observed climatic
fluctuations) it should be possible to examine
the shift of such zones and the significance of
these shifts for agricultural development pro-
grams. At the outset such studies could be
undertaken in areas that are both ostensibly
highly sensitive to climatic fluctuations and
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Table 14.3 CO2-induced climatic change: Framework for policy choices [63].
Policy choices for response"
Possibly changing
background factors
Natural warming,
cooling, variability
Population:
global distribution,
nation, climate zone,
elevation (sea level),
density
Income:
global average;
distribution
Governments
Industrial emissions:
non CO2 greenhouse
gases;
particulates
Energy:
per capita demand;
fossil versus nonfossil
Agriculture:
forestry. land use,
erosion:
farming and other dust;
ag ricu Itural
emissions
(N20, CH4 )
Water:
supply, demand,
technology, transport,
conservation, exotic
sources (icebergs,
desalinization)
Reduce CO2
production
Energy management:
reduce energy use;
reduce role of fossil
energy;
increase role of
low-carbon fuels
Land use:
reduce rate of
deforestation
preserve undisturbed
carbon-rich
landscapes
Remove CO2
from effluents
or atmosphere
Remove CO2 from
effluents:
dispose in ocean,
land;
dispose of by products
in land, ocean
Reforest:
increase standing
stock,
fossilize trees
Countervailing
modifications
Weather:
enhance precipitation;
modify, steer
hurricanes and
tornadoes
Climate:
change production of
gases, particulates;
change albedo of ice,
land, ocean;
change cloud cover
Hydrology:
build dams, canals;
change river courses
Adapt to
increasing CO2
and changing climate
Environmental controls:
heating/cooling of
buildings, area
enclosures
other adaptations:
habitation, health,
construction, transport,
military
Migrate:
intranationally;
internationally
Compensate losers:
intranationally;
internationally
Change agricultural
practice:
cultivation;
plant genetics
Change demand for
agricultural products:
diet
Direct CO2 effects:
change crop mix;
alter genetics
Improve water-use
efficiency
" Responses may be considered at individual, local, national, and international levels.
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Figure 14.17 Technology, integra-
tion, and the vulnerability of society
to impact from climatic change.
central to the world food system. The wheat
belts in the Canadian Prairies and eastern Aus-
tralia are appropriate examples. Subsequently,
these could be extended to provide inputs for
a global assessment of agroecological sensitivity.
Current research funded by the International
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA),
the United Nations Environment Programme
(UNEP), and FAO would provide the starting
point for this activity.
(2) Parallel to this, and using a similar agroecologi-
cal data base and similar climatic scenarios, it
would be logical to pursue a sensitivity study of
food systems which are, on past experience,
highly vulnerable to climatic change. The Sahel,
northeast Brazil, and east Africa are probably
the most appropriate choices, given the available
data and the urgency of the problem in these
regions. This activity could tie in with associated
programs in which the UN University, FAO,
UNEP, and IIASA are now involved.
(3) We have considered changes in agroecological
potential to be the major first-order impact of
climatic change. But how do these cascade
through the different sectors of a society and
how are they thus modified? Some answers
might well be provided in a few concrete studies,
focusing on regions where robust climate,
impact, and economic models exist, and where
these can be linked together in order to trace
climatic impacts through the entire regional
or national economic system. The provincial
economic models developed for Manitoba and
Saskatchewan are the only complete examples
that I know of. There may well be others, par-
ticularly in the USSR. Experiments with hierar-
chies of such models for COz-induced and other
climatic changes would provide us with infor-
mation about the impact of the secondary and
tertiary sectors.
(4) What sort of institutional frameworks are best
suited to planning for sustained agricultural
potential and production in the face of climatic
change? We need some substantive research -
ideally some experiments in planning. An
appropriate example is Frojecto Nordeste, a
medium-term heavily financed federal program
to "drought-proof" northeast Brazil. This pro-
ject, which is now in the stage of preliminary
planning, presents an opportunity to evaluate
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Table 14.4 Climatic change impact analysis: some research needs.
(1) More appropriate data on climatic change for impact analysis:
• greater spatial and temporal resolution of climatic data for impact analysis
• more information on likely rate of change
• other data (e.g., wind speed), including derived parameters (e.g., growing season length, days of high
temperature stress, heating degree days, etc.)
(2) Improved understanding of the relationship between changes of climate and changes in other physical
systems: specifically, climate and:
• soil and soil nutrients, erosion, salinization, etc. (especially with regard to agricultural potential)
• ocean temperatures, currents (especially with regard to fisheries potential)
• pest and diseases, and their vectors (especially with regard to agriculture)
(3) Improved understanding of the relationship between climatic variations and first-order impacts in
unmanaged ecosystems, agriculture, and energy-transport; specifically:
• climate and timber growth, fisheries and crop yields (empirically or by simulation modeling)
• climate variation and changes in the agroecological resource base
• direct impacts of climate on energy requirements (especially for space heating), and of weather on
tra nsportation costs
(4) Greater precision in tracing the downstream effects of climatic change in secondary and tertiary sectors
(i.e., second- to nth-order impacts); specifically:
• by using hierarchies of linked climate, impact, and economic models to trace the pathways of impacts
(5) and (6) Greater precision in simulating impacts at the enterprise level (e.g., by farm simulations) and
regional level (e.g., by input-output models)
(7) Improved understanding of the role of perception of climatic change (its actual or potential impacts)
and the array of potential responses:
• of the appropriate measures of climatic change-impact (e.g., changes in mean, in frequency of
extreme events, in risk levels)
• of the appropriate measures of costs and benefits of impacts
• of the choice range of potential or actual adjustive mechanisms; their costs and benefits
(8) Improved understanding of adaptive responses at the enterprise level, especially of:
• firm and farm-level decision-making, particularly in the face of risk, uncertainty, and constraints on
choice
• the resilience-vulnerability of economic systems (from sensitivity analyses of farming types and of
fishery and forestry systems)
(9) Strategy formulation at the regional, national, and international level:
• the range of possible policy responses
• the process of policy formulation
• the constraints on choice (with respect to other resource needs and problems)
the array of response strategies and the institu-
tional frameworks most suited to their imple-
mentation. Projecto Nordeste aims to harness
interdisciplinary research with integrated plan-
ning, bringing together climate modelers,
meteorologists, agroclimatologists, agrono-
mists, economists, planners, and politicians.
Starting with FAO-type surveys of agroecologi-
cal potential the program seeks to take the input
of climatic impact analysis through to the level
of federal and regional legislation.
Each of the four activities outlined above have a
number of subareas which link to one another: they
Some implications of cL-imatic change for human development 405
Natural
ecosystems Q>Cl
C
III
.c
u
.~
....
III
E
(]
(2l
I~==I Other
physical
systems
(5)
Energy-
transport
irs't-order im act
Impacts at the enterpri e level
(e.g., firms, farms, etc.)
<ti
c:
0
'';:;
ro Q>
c >~
<ti OJ
C til
0 .~
'0> Q.
'-OJ OJ
'- ....
Q> c:
.c OJ
.... OJ
....
.croo!!? ....
c: g! ....
o Q> ro
-..:- ~ro-
_ro C
:J C 0E.2 Q.
'-
....
til
0 III QJ
--
c: ....
'- OJ
>-Q> >Cl ....
'';:;OJ c:
.....- Q.
r:-o ro
.... c: ~Ul ro
Downstream effects at the
regional and national levels
(6)
Figure 14.18 Climatic impact analysis: some research priorities. For (1 )-(9) see Table 14.4.
are interwoven, not discrete. There are many other
paths; but those outlined here are feasible, relatively
inexpensive tasks from which the likely payoff is
substantial; and they would draw together the
threads of existing work by a number of different
organizations into a more coherent program for a
sustainable development of the biosphere.
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Commentary
M. Yoshino
Introduction
The various effects of human activities on climate
occur over different time scales, of which the
medium-term change of climate and its subsequent
effect on socioeconomic conditions has been rather
neglected by researchers. Generally, short-term
implications, such as weather-crop relationships
and weather-health relationships, have been phys-
iologically measured and analyzed extensively and,
on the other hand, long-term implications of cli-
matic change, with respect to the history of civili-
zations, for example, have long been studied by
historians and climatologists. Medium-term impli-
cations are relatively difficult to study, because of
the lack of homogeneous data and because the
·1
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applicable methods of study include those of both
natural science and the socioeconomic sciences.
Parry describes these comprehensively in this
chapter.
General
In order to analyze quantitatively the implications
of climatic change for human society, one must pay
attention first to the whole choice of relationships;
for instance, the chain climate-agriculture-indi-
vidual farmer-food prices-society. This is not an
easy task, even if we consider only a part of the
process between climate and agriculture. Climate
itself can be considered in many terms, such as
frequency distribution, extreme value, standard
deviation, periodicity, and secular trend, in addition
to the mean, average, or normal values. In agricul-
ture, there are aspects to be considered, such as a
change of main crop, a change of cash (economic)
crop, development of a land-use pattern, and a
change of political system or economic structure,
in addition to the generally discussed components,
such as the introduction of new varieties and cultiva-
tion techniques. Also, the family construction (work
force) of individual farmers and their traditional
customs in cultivation change. Food prices are
determined by policymakers in many countries. So
the quantitative relationships between climate and
society are quite obscured in this labyrinth of chang-
ing inputs.
Furthermore, it is very important that human
society adapt and adjust to the new environmental
conditions. The nature of such adaptation changes
as society develops. Acclimation or acclimatization
has been much studied from the standpoints of
medical biometeorology and cultural human
geography, but little from the agroclimatological
viewpoint. Adaptation or adjustment of societies
should be considered not only in the short term
with respect to perceived impact or risk of an
impact, but also in the medium term.
Problems
There are many difficulties in such studies. Here,
I summarize the problems briefly:
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(l) Data. As mentioned above, homogeneous data
prior to the late nineteenth century are gen-
erally unavailable, but they are essential for
statistical work. Using old diaries or chronicles,
some data can be reconstructed, but this is a ppli-
cable only to limited regional studies. In this
historical approach, insufficient data and
inadequate analytical techniques produce
inconclusive results, even if built on promising
hypotheses. This might be the case for some
work by Huntington, as Parry mentions.
(2) Synoptic climatological considerations. Medium-
term and long-term changes of climate are
interpreted in most cases through short-term
synoptic climatological conditions. For instance,
weakening of polar high pressure causes a
northward shift in the track of the Mediter-
ranean depressions, which bring rain to the
Aegean. This is true for the short term, but we
do not know that this also occurs in the medium-
and long-term sequences, which would have
affected the Mycenaean settlements.
It is not clear from our present knowledge
whether the synoptic climatological conditions
for the medium term are affected by the
intensification of extreme cases, the higher
frequency of extreme cases, or situations unpre-
dictable from the short-term conditions.
(3) Multiple effect. This involves the striking con-
clusion that surprisingly large changes in farm-
ing types may be necessary to accommodate
apparently small changes in average climate. In
North Japan, the difference of growing-season
mean temperatures between good and bad har-
vest years during the last 30 years was only I °C
[1]. Increased concentrations will not only pro-
duce the predicted temperature increase of 4-
6°C and its consequences, but also indirect
effects due to resultant changes in othe!' climatic
elements. As has been pointed out, in Canada
the temperature rise will increase evapotrans-
piration, thus reducing soil moisture and caus-
ing strong wind erosion. A similar temperature
rise in Japan implies that snow in mountainous
regions may not accumulate in winter, resulting
in a serious water shortage for irrigation in the
succeeding growing season. As has been made
clear by Sri Lanka's striking drought [2], rainfall
smaller than the mean value (mean minus stan-
dard deviation) in the northeast monsoon
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season caused a marked decrease in the sowing
acreage of paddy cultivation in the succeeding
southwest monsoon season.
We should therefore study first both the
direct and indirect effects of a change in climatic
element, and second the complex effects during
the same season and the succeeding season.
(4) Seasonal competition. In the middle and lower
latitudes there are broad regions with double
and triple croppings or even more. In these
regions, croppings have been combined in a
highly developed calendar. For example, short-
ening the winter crop season results in an
extension of the summer crop season, or short-
ening the dry season cultivation period results
in an extension of the rainy season cultivation
period, causing the change of land-use pattern
to be in cycles of a year or more. This means
that climatic impacts producing crop failure, as
discussed in Figure 14.11, should be studied
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further in connection with the seasonal competi-
tion of the crops in the regions under consider-
ation. The effects of the medium-term change
of climate on changing seasonal land-use pat-
terns or crop calendars are of great importance,
because failure of the first crop may produce,
in some cases, success of the second or third
crop under some new conditions.
Notes and references (Comm.)
[1] Yoshino, M. M. (1985), AnaLysis of CLimatic Changes
and Variations from the Japanese InstrumentaL and Proxy
Data Record, a paper presented at the Task Force
Meeting at llASA, Laxenburg, 1-5 April 1985.
[2] Yoshino, M. M., Kayane, 1., and Madduma-Bandara,
C. M. (1983), Climatic fluctuation and its effects on
paddy production in Sri Lanka, CLimatoLogicaL Notes,
33,9-32.
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]. R. Ravetz
U sable knowledge,
usable ignorance:
incomplete science with
policy implications
Editors' Introduction: In this book, we have so far reviewed a wealth of rapidly expanding
scientific knowledge that may help to illuminate the interactions between development
and environment. But in every chapter we have also emphasized how limited our under-
standing remains relative to the complexity and magnitude of the policy problems that
motivate us.
In this chapter Ravetz confronts the dilemma that, despite all our research, a truthful
response to questions such as "What's going to happen to the biosphere?" will most often
be "We don't know, and we won't know." He goes on to explore how, in the face of
overwhelming ignorance, scientific inquiries in policy-related contexts can most responsibly
and effectively be conducted. Better procedures for self-criticism and quality control in
science are argued to be central to the construction of "usable ignorance". A key role is
also assigned to the design of approaches through which incomplete science can be better
integrated into policy debates.
Introduction: the problem
All those involved in the IIASA Project on the
Sustainable Development of the Biosphere will be
aware that we are attempting something novel. At
one level the novelty is of style of work: we hope
to achieve a genuine integration of effort of scien-
tists, scholars, and policymakers from a variety of
disciplines and a variety of political cultures. At
another level the novelty is methodological: we hope
that colleagues from different backgrounds will
engage in dialogue and constructive criticism, even
(or especially!) outside their spheres of expertise, so
that the eventual product of our labors will be a
true synthesis of our work. Further, the Project
itself is self-consciously exploratory, designed to
foster learning about this new task while we are
engaged in accomplishing it. Finally (for the project
itself), our detailed goals, and also our criteria for
success, will necessarily evolve in the course of our
collaborative endeavors.
All these novelties, taken together, will produce
a Project that is either a challenging adventure or
(in terms of investment of the time, talent, and
resources of each of us) a hazardous undertaking.
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It is by now well appreciated in technology that
innovation by qualitative jumps rather than quanti-
tative movements is always risky; and the greater
the leap forward, the more the likelihood of a fall.
Yet those of us who have already invested much in
bringing the Project to this point are convinced that,
with all its dangers, this strongly novel approach is
necessary for the task we face; and if we succeed,
it will yield great benefits, both for the public and
for us, the participants, who will have the satisfac-
tion of an important job well done.
For this special sort of project is motivated by the
biggest novelty of all: the new role of science in the
advancement and preservation of our industrialized
civilization. For centuries the dominant theme of
our science has been taken from Francis Bacon's
aphorism "Knowledge and power meet in one." I
need not relate here the transformation of human-
ity's material culture that science has brought about;
nor the enhancement of human life, social, moral,
and spiritual, that this has enabled through the
conquest of the traditional curse of poverty (in at
least the more fortunate parts of the world). But
now we face a new, unprecedented problem: along
with its great promises, science (mainly through
high technology) now presents grave threats. We
all know about nuclear (and also chemical and bio-
logical) weapons; and about the menaces of acid
rain, toxic wastes, the greenhouse effect, and per-
haps also the reemergence of hostile species,
artificially selected for virulence by our imprudent
use of drugs and pesticides. It would be comforting
to believe that each such problem could be solved
by a combination of more scientific research of the
appropriate sort together with more good will and
determination in the political and techn910gical
spheres. Doubtless, these are necessary; but the
question remains: Are they sufficient? The record
of the first round of an engagement with these
biospheric threats is not encouraging. For example,
we do not yet know when, how, or even whether
global temperatures will be influenced by the new
substances being added to the atmosphere. This is
why, we believe, a novel approach is called for, if
our science-based civilization is to solve these prob-
lems that are so largely of our own making.
Indeed, we may see the issue not merely in terms
of science, but of our industrialized civilization as
a whole, since it has science as the basis of its defini-
tion, the science defined by the motto of Francis
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Bacon. And the problem that faces us is that the
sum of knowledge and power is now revealed to be
insufficient for the preservation of civilization. We
need something else as well, perhaps best called
"control". This is more than a mere union of the
first two elements; for it involves goals, and hence
values; and also a historical dimension, including
both the remembered past and the unknowable
future.
Can our civilization enrich its traditional knowl-
edge and power with this new element of control?
If not, the outlook is grim. There are always
sufficient pressures that favor short-term
expedients to solve this or that problem in tech-
nology or welfare, so that the evaluative concerns
and long-range perspectives necessary for control,
will, on their own, lose every time. That is what has
been happening, almost uniformly, in our
civilization until quite recently. Only in the last few
decades have scientists become aware that control
does not occur as an automatic by-product of knowl-
edge and power. Our awareness has increased
rapidly, but so have the problems. And we are still
in the very early stages of defining the sort of science
that is appropriate to this new function.
We might for a moment step back and look at
this industrialized civilization of ours. It is now about
half a millenium since the start of the Renaissance
and the expansion of Europe. That's roughly the
standard period of flourishing for previous civiliza-
tions; will ours prove more resilient to its own
characteristic environmental problems? It seems
likely that some of the ancient "fertile crescent"
cultures declined because of excessive irrigation;
and in various ways the Romans consumed great
quantities of lead. What would be our auto-
intoxicant of choice?
In some ways our material culture is really rather
brittle; our high technology and sophisticated
economies depend quite crucially on extraordinary
levels of quality control in technology and on highly
stable social institutions. Whether these could
absorb a really massive environmental shock is open
to question. The real resilience of our civilization
may lie not so much in its developed hardware and
institutions, as in its capacity for rapid adaptation
and change. It has, after all, continued to grow and
flourish through several unprecedented revo-
lutions: one in the common-sense understanding
of nature in the seventeenth century; another in
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the material basis of production in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries; and yet another in the
organization of society over much of the world in
the twentieth century. Perhaps it could be that the
latest challenge to this civilization, resulting from
the environmental consequences of our science-
based technology, will be met by the creation of a
new, appropriate sort of science. We can only hope
so, and do our best to make it happen.
What could such a new, appropriate sort of
science be? Isn't science just science? In some ways,
yes; but in others it is already differentiated. We
are all familiar with the differences between pure
or basic research on the one hand, and applied or
R&D on the other. In spite of the many points of
contact and overlap, they do have distinct functions,
criteria of quality, social institutions, and etiquette
and ethics. To try to run an industrial laboratory
as if it were within the teaching and scholarship
context of a university would be to invite a fiasco;
and equally so in reverse. Now we face the task of
creating a style of science appropriate to this novel
and urgent task of coping with biosphere problems.
Of course, there are many different institutions
doing research with just this end in view. Sometimes
they are successful; but success is more common
when they have a problem where the conditions for
success can be defined and met, and where the input
from research is straightforward. To the extent that
the problem becomes diffuse in its boundaries
(geographically, or across effects and causes),
entrained in crosscurrents of politics and special
interests, and/or scientifically refractory, then tradi-
tional styles of research, either academic or indus-
trial or any mix of the two, reveal their inadequacy.
This is the lesson of the great biosphere problems
of the last decade. Faced with problems not of its
choosing (though indirectly of its making), science,
which is the driving force and ornament of our
civilization, could not deliver the solutions. When
asked by policymakers: "What will happen, and
when?" the scientists must, in all honesty, reply in
most cases: "We don't know, and we won't know,
certainly not in time for your next decisions."
If this is the best that science can do, and it seems
likely to be so for an increasing number of impor-
tant issues, then the outlooks for effective policy-
making and for the credibility of science as a corner-
stone of our civilization are not good. Yet, I believe,
so long as scientists try to respond as if they face
simple policy questions determined by simple fac-
tual inputs, the situation cannot improve.
But what else can scientists do except provide
facts for policy? I hope that we can define the task
in new terms, more appropriate to our situation;
and that is an important component of the goal of
this project.
My work on this Project has already involved me
in an intellectual adventure; recasting my earlier
ideas about science had led me into paradox and
apparent contradiction. Rather than leading col-
leagues into them by gentle and easy stages, I have
chosen to exhibit them boldly in the title. We all
know what "usable knowledge" is, although it turns
out to be far from straightforward in practice [1]:
but "usable ignorance"? Is this some sort of Zen
riddle? I hope not. But if we are to cope successfully
with the enormous problems that now confront us,
some of our ideas about science and its applications
will have to change. The most basic of these is the
assumption that science can, indeed, be useful for
policy, but if and only if it is natural and effective,
and can provide "the facts" unequivocally. So long
as it seemed that those facts would be always forth-
coming on demand, this assumption was harmless.
But now we must cope with the imperfections of
science, with radical uncertainty, and even with
ignorance, in forming policy decisions for the bio-
sphere. Do we merely turn away from such prob-
lems as beneath the dignity of scientists, or do we
learn somehow to make even our own ignorance
usable in these new conditions? In this exploratory
chapter, I hope to show how even this paradox
might be resolved, and in a way that is fruitful for
us all.
Images of science, old and new
If I am correct in believing that our inherited con-
ception of science is inappropriate for the new tasks
of control of these apparently intractable biospheric
problems, then we shall all have to go through a
learning experience, myself included. Scientists,
scholars, and policymakers will need to open up,
and share their genuine but limited insights of
science, so that a common understanding, enriched
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and enhanced by dialogue, can emerge. My present
task is to call attention to the problem, and to indi-
cate my personal, rough, provisional guidelines
toward a method.
Insoluble problems
I may still seem to be speaking in paradoxes, so I
will suggest a question that may illuminate the prob-
lem. For background, let us start with the historical
datum that in the year 1984 we could not predict
when, or even whether, the Earth's mean tem-
perature will rise by 2 °C due to an increasing CO2
content in the atmosphere. Yet this prediction can
be cast as a scientific problem, for which there are
both empirical data and theoretical models. Why
these are inadequate is a question I must defer; but
we can (I hope) all agree that here is a scientific
problem that cannot be solved, either now or in any
planned future. And this is only an example of a
class that is growing rapidly in number and in
urgency.
I believe that such problems are still very
unfamiliar things; for our personal training in
science progressed from certainties to uncertainties
without any explicit, officially recognized markers
along the path. Almost all the facts learned as
students were uncontested and incontestable; only
during research did we discover that scientific
results can vary in quality; later we may have come
across scientific problems that could not be solved;
and only through participation in the governing of
science do we learn of choices and their criteria.
Now I can put the question, for each of us to
answer for him- or her-self: When, at what stage
of my career, did I become aware of the existence
of scientific problems that could not be solved? My
personal answer is not too difficult: as a philosophi-
cally minded mathematician, early in my postgradu-
ate studies I learned of classic mathematical prob-
lems and conjectures that have defied solution for
decades or even centuries. I have reason to believe
that my experience was exceptional for a scientist.
Certainly, I have never seen an examination in a
science subject which assumed other than that every
problem has one and only one correct solution.
Some may well exist, but they will be a tiny minority.
Similarly, research students may learn of the tenta-
tiveness of solutions, the plasticity of concepts and
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the unreliability of facts in the literature. But this
is a form of insiders' knowledge, not purveyed to
a lay public, nor even much discussed in scholarly
analyses of science.
Indeed, it is scarcely a decade since insoluble
scientific problems have become "news that's fit to
print". Alvin Weinberg brought them into recogni-
tion with the term "trans-science" [2]. Were these
a new phenomenom of the troubled I960s, that
period when environmentalists began to raise the
impossible demand that science prove the impossi-
bility of harm from any and all industrial processes
and effluents? No; ever since the onset of the scien-
tific revolution, science had been promising far
more than it could deliver. Galileo's case for the
Copernican Theory rested on his theory of the tides,
where he contemptuously rejected the moon's
influence and instead developed a mechanical
model that was far beyond his powers to articulate
or demonstrate. Descartes' laws of impact, funda-
mental for his system, were all wrong except in the
trivial cases. The transformation of the techniques
of manufacture, promised by every propagandist
of the century, took many generations to material-
ize. In the applications of science, progress toward
the solution of outstanding, pressing problems was
leisurely; for example the break-even point for
medicine, when there came to be lessrisk in consult-
ing a physician than in avoidan'ce, seems to
have occurred early in the present century.
None of this is to denigrate science; however slow
it was to fulfill the hopes of its early prophets, it
has now done so magnificently, nearly
miraculously. My aim here is to focus our attention
on a certain image of science, dominant until so
very recently, where the implicit rule was "all scien-
tific problems can be discussed with students and
the public, provided that they're either already
solved or now being solved". Each of us (including
myself) has this one-sided experience of "science
as the facts" embedded deeply in our image of
science. That is why I think it is a useful exercise
for each of us to recall when we first discovered the
existence of insoluble scientific problems.
"Atomic" science
If I am still struggling to find a new synthesis out
of earlier ideals and recent disappointments, in spite
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of having earned my living on just that task for 25
years, I cannot really expect colleagues or members
of the general public to provide immediate insights
that will neatly solve my problems. All I can do is
to offer some preliminary ideas, to share with col-
leagues from various fields of practice, and to hope
that out of the resulting dialogue we may achieve
a better understanding of the practice and accom-
plishments of science, as a mixture of success and
failure, and of our achieved knowledge and con-
tinuing ignorance.
It appears to me that we must now begin to
transcend an image of science that may be called
"atomic", for "atoms" are central to it in several
ways. The conception of matter itself; the style of
framing problems; and the organization of knowl-
edge as a social possession; all may be considered
atomic. I believe that such an image inhibits our
grasping the new aspects of science, such as quality
control, unsolvable problems, and policy choices,
that are essential for an effective science of the
biosphere.
The idea of atomism was at the heart of the new
metaphysics of nature conceived in the seventeenth
century, the basis of the achievements of Galileo,
Descartes, and Newton. The particular properties
of the atoms were always contested, and are not
crucial. What counts is the commitment to nature
being composed of isolated bits of reality, possessing
only mathematical properties, and devoid of
sensuous qualities, to say nothing of higher faculties
of cognition or feeling. Such a basis for experi-
mental natural science was quite unique in the his-
tory of human civilizations; and on that metaphys-
ical foundation has been built our practice and our
understanding of science.
That practice is best described as analytical or
reductionist. It is really impossible to imagine
laboratory work being done on any other basis. But
we can now begin to see its inadequacy for some
fields of practice that are largely based on science,
such as medicine. To the extent that illness is caused
by social or psychological factors, or indeed by mere
aging, atomic style of therapy through microbe
hunting is becoming recognized as inadequate or
even misdirected.
With the atomism of the physical reality goes an
atomism of our knowledge of it. Thus it has been
highly effective to teach science as a collection of
simple hard facts. Any given fact will be related to
prior ones whose mastery is necessary for the under-
standing of it; but to relate forward and outward
to the meaning and functioning of a fact in its
context, be it technical, environmental, or philo-
sophical, is normally considered a luxury, regularly
crowded out of the syllabus by the demands of more
important material. This is not just yet another
deficiency to be blamed on teachers. In his impor-
tant analysis of "normal science" T. S. Kuhn
imagines an essentially myopic and anticritical
activity, "a strenuous and devoted attempt to force
nature into the conceptual boxes provided by pro-
fessional education [3]."
Our conception of the power based on scientific
knowledge is similarly atomic. Engineers are trained
to solve problems within what we can now see to be
exceedingly narrow constraints: operational feasi-
bility within commercially viable costings. The
environment hit engineering practice with a sudden
impact in the 1970s because of protective legislation,
generally first in the USA and then elsewhere. It is
understandable that engineers should find it inap-
propriate for the fate of important dams to depend
on the breeding habits of a local fish; but it does
reflect on their training and outlook when they
repeatedly plan for nuclear power stations in the
State of California without first checking for local
earthquake faults. To be sure, the calculation of all
environmental variables, including the cultural and
psychological health of affected local residents, does
seem to take engineering far from its original and
primary concerns; but the demand for such extreme
measures arises from a public reaction to a per-
ceived gross insensitivity by engineers and their
employing organizations to anything other than the
simplest aspects of the power over nature that they
wield.
Now we have learned that power, even based on
knowledge, is not a simple thing. It is relatively easy
to build a dam to hold back river water; there is
power. But to predict and eventually manage the
manifold environmental changes initiated by that
intrusion is another matter. The flows and cycles
of energy and materials that are disrupted by the
dam will, all unknown to us, take new patterns and
then eventually present us with new, unexpected
problems. The dam, strong, silent, and simple,
simple engineering at its most classic, may disrupt
agriculture downstream (Aswan, the Nile), create
hydrological imbalances (Volga), or even be
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interpreted as imperialism (Wales)! Hence the con-
stant need for continuous, iterative control, lest an
atomized knowledge, applied through myopic
power, set off reactions that bring harm to us all.
We may say that a sort of atomism persists in the
social practice of science, where the unit of produc-
tion is the paper, embodying the intellectual
property of a new result. This extends to the social
organization of science in the erection of specialties
and subspecialties, each striving for independence
and autonomy. The obstacles to genuinely interdis-
ciplinary research in the academic context, hitherto
well-nigh insuperable, point up the disadvantages
of this style for the sorts of problems we now con-
front. It is significant that when scientists are operat-
ing in a command economy, being employees on
mission-oriented research or R&D, and not in a
position to seek individual advancement as subject
specialists, an effective exchange of skills is possible.
Thus the atomic ideal of knowledge is not an
absolute constraint; it can be suspended in the pur-
suit of knowledge as power; our present task is to
see whether it can be transcended in the attempt
to apply knowledge, produced by independent
scientists and scholars, to the new tasks of control.
Quality control in science
We may now begin to move outward from this
previous atomism, to enrich our understanding of
the scientific process. Here I am trying only to make
explicit what every good scientist has known all
along. I may put another question concerning the
personal development of each of us: When did I
become aware of degrees of quality in scientific
materials presented ostensibly as complete, uncon-
testable facts? I know that for some, either excep-
tionally independent or having a gifted teacher,
the awareness came very early, even at school. For
me, the moment was in my final year at College,
when I studied a table of basic physical constants.
There I saw alternative values for a single constant
that lay outside each other's confidence limits. I
realized then that the value of a physical constant
could be quite other than an atomic fact. Among
the discordant set not all could be right. Was there
necessarily one correct value there; or was it a
matter of judgment which cited value was the best?
The issue of quality is at the heart of the special
methodological problems of biospheric science. For
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hard facts are few and far between; in many areas
(such as rate constants for atmospheric chemical
reactions) today's educated guesses are likely to
appear tomorrow as ignorant speculations. The
problem of achieving quality control in this field is
too complex to be resolved by goodwill and
redoubled efforts. Later I build on Bill Clark's ideas
on making a first analysis of the task.
The problem of quality control in traditional
science has quite recently achieved prominence, but
still mainly in connection with the extreme and
unrepresentative cases of outright fraud. The enor-
mous quantity of patient, unrewarded work of peer
review and refereeing, where (in my opinion) the
moral commitment of scientists is more crucial, and
more openly tested, than io research itself, has
received scant attention from the scholars who
analyze science. Yet quality control is not merely
essential to the vitality and health of normal science.
It becomes a task requiring a clear and principled
understanding, if the new sciences of the biosphere
are to have any hope of success. The inherited,
unreflected folkways and craft skills of compart-
mentalized academic research are inadequate here;
and here we lack the ultimate quality test of practice,
realized mainly through the marketplace of indus-
trial research and R&D.
I envisage a major effort in our project being
devoted to the creation of appropriate methods and
styles of quality control. I hope that this will emerge
naturally from reflection on their own experience
by scientists who have already been engaged in such
work; but it cannot be expected to form itself
automatically, without explicit attention and invest-
ment of the resources of all of us. I return to this
theme in the final section.
Choice in science
My next theme is that of "choice"; here too it was
Alvin Weinberg who first raised the issue, early in
the 1960s [4]. Previous to that, the ruling assump-
tion, one might almost say ideology, had been that
real science required an autonomy that included
choice of problems and the setting of criteria for
that choice. But with the advent of "big science",
the public that supported the effort through a sig-
nificant burden on state expenditure was inevitably
going to demand some voice in the disposition of
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its largesse. This is not the place to discuss the
detailed arrangements, or the deeper problems of
that new "social contract of science". For anyone
involved with the IIASA Biosphere Project is fully
aware that biosphere problems are not to be solved
without massive investment of funds, in which pub-
lic and private corporate agencies are inevitably,
and quite legitimately, involved.
All this may seem so natural, that we must remind
ourselves how new it is, and also how little impact
it has made on the philosophical accounts of science
to which we all go for enlightenment and guidance.
There is a real gap between conceptions here; if
science consists of true atomic facts, whose value
lies in themselves, then what possible genuine
criterion of choice can there be for research? Of
course, the experience of research science is that
not all facts are of equal value; they vary in their
interest and fruitfulness, as well as in their internal
strength and robustness. Hence policy decisions on
research are possible, however difficult it is to
quantify or even to justify them with conclusive
arguments.
When we consider the criteria for choice govern-
ing mission-oriented projects, we find some com-
ponents that are more or less internal to the process
and others that are not. In the former category are
feasibility and cost (this latter being measured
against the demands of competing projects within
some preassigned limited budget). For this we must
take into account the aims or objectives of the pro-
ject, which are necessarily exterior to it and different
in kind from the research itself, for they employ
values.
In considering these external values, I make a
distinction between functions and purposes; the
former refers to the sort of job done by a particular
device; and the latter to the interests or purposes
served, or the values realized, by the job being done.
Functions are still in the technical realm, while
purposes belong to people and to politics. It is at
the intersection of these two sorts of effects that
policymaking for sciences and technology is
done.
The question of feasibility, while mainly technical,
is not entirely straightforward. For the assessment
of feasibility depends on a prediction of the
behavior of a device or system when it is eventually
created and in operation. To the extent that the
proposal involves significant novelty or complexity,
that prediction of the future will inevitably be less
than certain. Indeed, it is now clear in retrospect
that the great technological developments of recent
decades were made under conditions of severe
ignorance concerning not merely their social and
environmental effects, but even their costs of con-
struction, maintenance, and operation. There is an
old and well-justified joke that if a cost-benefit
analysis had been made at the crucial time, then
sail would never have given way to steam. But
many American utility companies might now reply
that a proper analysis, made on their behalf, of
nuclear power might have protected them from
the financial disasters that now threaten to engulf
them.
This point is not made by way of apportioning
blame for the troubles of that once supremely
optimistic industry. It can be argued that, say, 15
years ago it was impossible to predict which of the
possible mishaps would afflict the industry, and how
serious they would be. But in that event, we should
recognize the ineradicable component of ignorance,
not merely uncertainty, in forecasting the prospects
for any radically new technology.
Ignorance
The pervasiveness of ignorance concerning the
interactions of our technology with its environment,
natural and social, is a very new theme. "Scientific
ignorance" is paradoxical in itself and directly
contradictory to the image and sensibility of our
inherited style of science and its associated tech-
nology. Coping with ignorance in the formation of
policy for science, technology, and environment is
an art which we have barely begun to recognize, let
alone master. Yet ignorance dominates the sciences
of the biosphere, the focus of our Project.
The problems of applying science to policy pur-
poses in general have been given a handy title,
usable knowledge. For those problems of the
imminent future, we would do well to remind
ourselves of their nature by using a title like usable
ignorance. Its paradoxical quality points up the
distance we must travel from our inherited image
of science as atomic facts, if we are to grapple
successfully with these new problems. How we
might begin to do so is the theme of my discussion
here.
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Elements of a new understanding
To some extent the preceding conceptual analysis
follows the path of the maturing understanding of
many scientists of the present generation. First, as
students we mastered our standard facts; then in
research we became aware of quality; as we became
involved in the government of science we recog-
nized the necessity for choice; involvement in
environmental problems brought us up against
functions of devices and of systems, and the
frequently confused and conflicting purposes
expressed through politics. Still, we could imagine
that there was a hard core to the whole affair, in
the sort of basic, incontestable facts that every
schoolboy knows. Hence the intrusion of ignorance
into our problem-situation did not immediately
raise the specter of the severe incompetence of
science in the face of the challenges - or threats -
produced by the environmental consequences of
the science-based technology on which our civiliza-
tion rests.
Science in the policy process
This rather comfortable picture is analogous to the
traditional model of science in the policy process.
We may imagine this as a meeting of two sides. The
public, through some political machinery, expresses
a concern that some particular purposes are being
frustrated or endangered, say through the lack of
clean water. Administrators then devise or promote
devices and systems, physical technology, or
administrative agencies to perform particular func-
tions whereby those purposes may once again be
protected. For this they need information about the
natural process involved in the problem; for which
they turn to the scientists. The scientists provide
the necessary facts (either from the literature, or
produced by research to order) which either deter-
mine the. appropriate solution, or at least set
boundaries within which the normal processes of
political bargaining can take place. In that way, the
problem is solved or, at least, effectively resolved in
political terms.
However well such a model has fitted practice in
the past, it no longer captures the complexity and
inconclusiveness of the process of policy-related
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science in the case of biospheric problems [5].
Indeed, we may define this new sort of policy-
related science as one in which facts are uncertain;
values in dispute; stakes high; decisions urgent; and
where no single one of these dimensions can be
managed in isolation from the rest. Acid rain may
serve as the present paradigm example of such
science. This model may seem to transform the
image of science from that of a stately edifice to
that of a can of worms. Whether this be so, the
unaesthetic quality is there in the real world we
confront and with which we must learn to cope
somehow.
It may help if we employ another model: how
problems come to be chosen for investigation. In
the world of pure or academic science, problems
are selected by the research community. If a par-
ticular area is not yet ripe for study, available tech-
niques being insufficiently powerful, it is simply left
to wait, with no particular loss. (The adventurous
or foolhardy may, of course, try their luck there.)
In the case of mission-oriented work, they are pre-
sented by managerial superiors; though these are
expected to have some competence in assessing
feasibility and costs of the research in relation to
the goals of the enterprise. But in policy-related
science, the problems are thrust upon the relevant
researchers, by political forces which take scant heed
of the feasibility of the solutions they demand.
Indeed, it will be common for such problems not
to be feasible in the ordinary sense. Drawing on low
prestige and immature fields, requiring data bases
that simply do not exist, being required to produce
answers in a hurry, they are not the sort of enquiry
where success of any sort can be reasonably
expected.
It may be that our traditional lack of awareness
of the interaction of ignorance with scientific knowl-
edge has been maintained because science could
proclaim its g~nuine successes and remain at a safe
distance from its likely failures. Through all the
centuries when progress became an increasingly
strong theme of educated common sense, science
could be seen as steadily advancing the bound-
aries of knowledge. There seemed no limit in
principle to the extent of this conquest; and so the
areas of ignorance remaining at any time were
not held against science; they too would fall under
the sway of human knowledge at the appropriate
time.
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Now we face the paradox that while our knowl-
edge continues to increase exponentially, our rele-
vant ignorance does so, even more rapidly. And
this is ignorance generated by science! An example
will explain this paradox. The Victorians were
totally ignorant of the problem of disposal of long-
lived radioactive wastes. They had no such things,
nor could they imagine their existence. But now we
have made them, by science; and the problem of
guaranteeing a secure storage for some quarter of
a million years is one where ignorance, rather than
mere uncertainty, is the state of affairs. Thus we
have conquered a former ignorance, in our knowl-
edge of radioactivity, but in the process created a
new ignorance, of how to manage it in all its
dangerous manifestations.
Interpenetrating opposites in science
Science in the policy process is thus a very different
thing from the serene accumulation of positive and
ultimately useful factual knowledge, as portrayed
in our inherited image. Indeed, given the intrusion
of subjective elements of judgment and choice into
a sphere of practice traditionally defined by its objec-
tivity, we may wonder whether there can be any
endeavor describable as science in such circum-
stances. To this problem I can only begin to sketch
a solution, by giving two analyses, one static and
the other dynamic. The former elucidates the para-
doxical, or contradictory, nature of our situation,
and the latter indicates paths to resolution of the
paradox.
To begin with it is necessary for us to transcend
the simplistic picture of science that has been
dominant for so very long. For generations we have
been taught of a difference in kind between facts
and values. The latter were seen to be subjective,
uncertain, perhaps even basically irrational in
origin. Fortunately, science supplied facts, objective
and independent of value judgments, whereby we
could attain genuine knowledge and also order our
affairs in a proper manner. Those who protested
that such a sharp dichotomy was destructive of
human concerns were usually on the romantic or
mystical fringe, and could be ignored in the framing
of curricula and in the propaganda for science.
Similarly, the opposition between knowledge and
ignorance was absolute. A scientific fact could be
known, simply and finally. It could, of course, be
improved upon by the further growth of science;
but error in science was nearly a contradiction in
terms. The boundary between knowledge and
ignorance was not permeable; it simply advanced
with each increment of science, bringing light to
where darkness had hitherto reigned. Of course,
there have been many disclaimers and qualifications
tacked onto this simple model; we all know that
science is tentative, corrigible, open-ended, and all
the rest. But the idea that a fact could be understood
imperfectly or confusedly, or that a great scientific
discovery could be mixed with error, has been
brought into play only very recently by historians
of science.
Hence we are really unprepared by our culture
to cope with the new phenomenon of the inter-
penetration of these contradictory opposites. The
impossibility of separating facts from values in such
a critical area as the toxicity of environmental pol-
lutants is a discovery of recent years [6]. And the
creation of relevant ignorance by the inadequately
controlled progress of technology is still in the pro-
cess of being articulated by philosophers [7].
An immediate reaction to these disturbing
phenomena can be despair or cynicism. Some
scholars have elaborated on the theme that pollution
is in the nose of the beholder, and reduce all
environmental concern to the social-psychological
drives of extremist sects [8]. Politicians and adminis-
trators can take the easy way out and treat scientists
as so many hired guns, engaging those who are
certain to employ technical rhetoric on behalf of
their particular faction. Such solutions as these, if
considered as cures, are really far worse than the
disease. If dialogue on these urgent scientific issues
of the biosphere is degraded to thinly veiled power
politics, then only a congenital optimist can continue
to hope for their genuine resolution.
Viewed statically, these oppositions or contradic-
tions show no way through. But the situation is not
desperate once we appreciate that decision making
is not at all a unique event requiring perfect inputs
if it is to be rational. Rather it is a complex process,
interactive and iterative; the logical model for it is
perhaps less demonstration than dialogue. Seeing
decision making (or policy formation; I use the two
terms indifferently) as a sort of dialectical process,
we may imagine those central contradictions of
usable knowledge and usable ignorance being
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transcended, or synthesized, through the working
of the dialectical process.
Varieties of policy-related research
First, I show how these problems of policy-related
research may be differentiated, and in such a way
that the natural tendency of their dynamics is
toward a resolution. Drawing on recent work by
myself and my colleague, S. O. Funtowicz [9], I
distinguish two dimensions of such problems: sys-
tems uncertainties and decision stakes. The former
refers to the complex system under consideration,
including aspects that are technical, scientific,
administrative, and managerial; the uncertainties
are the ranges of possible outcomes, corresponding
to each set of plausible inputs and decisions. The
decision stakes are the costs and benefits to all con-
cerned parties, including regulators (both field
employees and administrators) and representatives
of various interests, that correspond to each
decision. In each case, we have complex sets of
ill-defined variables for aggregation into a single
index, hence each of the dimensions is only very
loosely quantitative. We distinguish only the values
low, medium, and high (Figure 15.1). When both
dimensions (systems uncertainties and decision
stakes) are low, we have what we may call applied
science; straightforward research will produce a
practical band of values of critical variables within
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which the ordinary political processes can operate
to produce a consensus.
When either dimension becomes moderately
large, a new situation emerges; we call it technical
consultancy. This is easiest to see in the case of
system uncertainty; the consultant is employed pre-
cisely because his or her unspecifiable skills, and his
or her professional integrity and judgment, are
required for the provision of usable knowledge for
the policy process. It is less obvious that even when
uncertainties are low, moderate decision stakes can
take the problems out of the realm of the routine.
But on reflection, this is the way things happen in
practice. If some institution sees its interests
seriously threatened by an issue, then no matter
how nearly conclusive the science, it will fight back
with every means at its disposal, until such time as
further resistance would cause a serious loss of
credibility in itself as a com petent institution, and
a damaging loss of power as a result. The public
sees such struggles most clearly in notorious cases
of pollution, when a beleaguered institution persists
in harmful policies (such as poisoning its workforce
or the local environment), to the point of being
irresponsible, immoral, or perhaps even culpable
(industrial asbestosis is a notorious recent example).
The outrage in such cases is fully justified, of course;
but it is an error to believe either that those par-
ticular firms are uniquely malevolent, or that all
firms casually and habitually behave in such a way.
No, it is just when caught in such a trap, however
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Figure 15.1 Interaction of decision
stakes and systems uncertainties.
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much of their own making, that institutions, like
people, will fight for survival.
Such cases are fortunately the exception. It is
more common for both systems uncertainties and
decision stakes to be moderate. Funtowicz and I
have been able to articulate a model of consultancy
practice, wherein the traditional scientist's ideal of
consensual knowledge is sacrificed on behalf of a
more robust sort of knowledge appropriate to the
problem. We call it clinical, from the field of practice
in which such a style has been developed success-
fully. In it we eliminate safety as an attribute (the
term now has a largely rhetorical meaning anyway)
and substitute good performance (which may
include the possibility of failures and accidents). In
the same vein, we generalize probability (with its
mathematical connotations) to propensity, and
measure to gauge; and for prediction we substitute
prognosis. In this way, we hope to express the
degree to which nonquantifiable and even non-
specifiable expert judgments enter into an assess-
ment. The outcome of the process (which is con-
ceived as continuously iterating) is not a general
theory to be tested against particular facts, but
rather a provisional assessment of the health of a
particular system together with the relevant aspects
of its environment. I hope that this model will be
useful in the Biosphere Project as it develops.
Passing to the more intractable case, where either
dimension is very large, we have what we call a total
environmental assessment. For here, nothing is cer-
tain, there are no boundaries or accepted methods
for solving problems; the problem is total in extent,
involving facts, interests, values, and even lifestyles;
and total in its mixture of dimensions and com-
ponents. Even here a review of history shows that
in such cases a resolution can emerge. For a debate
ensues, once an issue is salient; and while at first
the debate may be totally polarized and adversarial
in style, it may evolve fairly quickly. For both sides
are attempting to gain legitimacy with the various
foci of opinion, which ultimately represent power:
special-interest grou ps, administrators, politicians,
the media, respondents to opinion polls, voters.
They therefore necessarily invoke the symbols of
universality and rationality whereby uncommitted
observers can be won over; and in however oblique
and implicit a fashion, a genuine dialogue emerges.
Most important in this process, new relevant knowl-
edge is created by the requirements of the various
disputants; so that the issue is brought in the direc-
tion of technical consultancy if not yet science. For
example, issue-generated research can eventually
transform the terms of a debate, as in the case of
lead in motor fuel in the UK and Europ<: during
the early 1980s. Events that previously had not
been significant news suddenly became so; thus the
various nuclear accidents of the 1950s and 1960s
were of no great moment for policy purposes, while
Three Mile Island was a mortal blow to the
American nuclear power construction industry.
Hence a problem does evolve; a dominant con-
sensus can emerge; and then the losing side is forced
into a retreat, saying what it can while the facts as
they emerge tip the balance ever more decisively
against it.
There is, of course, no guarantee that any par-
ticular total environmental assessment will move
down scale in this way, or will do so quickly enough
for its resolution to prevent irreparable harm. But
at least we have here a model of a process whereby
a solution can happen, analogously to the way in
which great political and social issues can be (but,
of course, need not be) resolved peacefully and
transformed.
Debates on such issues are usually very different
to those within a scientific community. They cannot
presuppose a shared underlying commitment to the
advance of knowledge nor presuppose bounds to
the tactics employed by the antagonists. In form
they are largely political, while in substance osten-
sibly technical or scientific. Confusion and rancour
of all sorts abound. Yet, I argue, such apparently
unedifying features are as consistent with effective
policies for science and technology as they are for
political affairs in general. And they must be; for
the great issues of the biosphere will necessarily be
aired in just such forums; there are no other forums
to render these unnecessary.
The policy process and usable
knowledge
Now I discuss the policy process itself, in relation
to these phenomena of the interpenetration of facts
and values and of knowledge and ignorance. This
is not the place to develop schematic models of that
process, so I will content myself with a few observa-
tions. The first is that no decision is atomic. Even
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if an issue is novel, even if its sponsoring agency is
freshly created, there will always exist a back-
ground, in explicit law, codes of practice, folkways,
and expectations, in which it necessarily operates
even while reacting on the background. And once
an issue exists, it is rare indeed for it to fade away.
It may become less salient for policy and be rele-
gated to a routine monitoring activity; but it can
erupt at anytime should something extraordinary
occur. In an earlier IIASA study [10] we saw how
the concept of acid rain went through a cycle of
evolution of some 15 years from its announcement
by an eccentric scientist in Sweden, to its adoption
as an international policy problem. Another decade
may well pass before there is any effective inter-
national agreement; and yet another before the
problem may be effectively brought under control.
Nearly a lifetime - can we speak of a decision or
the facts in such a case?
Indeed, when we look at the duration and com-
plexity of those dialectical processes whereby a total
environmental assessment problem (its common
initial form) is gradually tamed, we see the necessity
for a differentiation among the functions per-
formed by the facts - or better, the inputs of tech-
nical information. Here I can do no better than to
use materials recently developed by Bill Clark [11].
He starts with authoritative knowledge - the tradi-
tional ideal of science, still applicable in the case of
applied science issues. This is supplemented by
reporting - not in newspapers, but in the accumula-
tion of relatively reliable, uncontroversial informa-
tion on a variety of phenomena, of no immediate
salience, but crucial when a crisis emerges. This is
the descendant of natu ral history, popular in past
epochs when clergymen and other gentlemen of
leisure could gain satisfaction and prestige through
their mastery of some great mass of material, per-
haps of a locality, perhaps of a special branch of
nature. The decline of this style of science, under
the pressure of changing institutions and the
dominant criteria of quality, is a clear example of
what I have called the social construction of igno-
rance. Harvey Brooks has recently shown what a
price we now pay for our ignorance, in the
impotence of what I call the clean-up or garbage
sciences in the face of our various pollution prob-
lems [12].
When science is involved in the policy process,
particularly in the technical consultancy mode, then
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impersonal demonstrations give way to committed
dialogue, and no facts are hard, massy, and impene-
trable. They are used as evidence in arguments,
necessarily inconclusive and debatable. In this case
we invoke metaphors to describe their nature and
functions; Steven Toulmin has suggested the term
"maps" (not pictures, or we might say dogmas, but
rather guides to action) [13]. I have developed the
idea of a tool, something that derives its objectivity
not so much through a correspondence with exter-
nal reality as through its effectiveness in operating
on reality in a variety of functions and contexts [14].
Passing to the more contested issues, we mention
enlightenment, which might involve enhancing
awareness or changing common sense. Perhaps the
most notable example of this sort of product in
recent times is Silent Spring by Rachel Carson [15].
Through it, the environment and its problems sud-
denly came into existence for the public in the USA
and elsewhere. We note that this function is per-
formed partly through the mass media; the role of
investigative journalism in the press, and especially
television, in enhancing the awareness of the non-
scientific public (and perhaps of scientists too)
should be more appreciated.
Once an issue has been made salient for the
political process, then science can be a complement
to interaction - that is, not being decisive in itself
in any unreflective way, but correcting common-
sense views, and providing crucial inputs when a
debate is sharpened. To take an example from
another field, the regulation of planned interfer-
ence with the life cycle of embryo and fetus will not
be reduced to the scientific determination of the
onset of life and individuality. But, just as technical
progress creates new problems of decision and
regulation, scientific information can provide chan-
nels and critical points for the ethical and ideological
debates on such issues.
Finally, Bill Clark mentions ritual and process;
since science is the central symbolic structure of
modern industrialized society, the invocation of
science to solve a problem has a political power of
its own. But such an action, if abused or even abor-
tive, may lead to a wider disillusionment with the
secularly sacred symbols themselves, with conse-
quent harm to the social fabric. W. D. Ruckelshaus,
sometime Administrator of the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, has identified this danger clearly,
in his warning of chaos if the agency is perceived
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as not doing its job [16]. Analogously, we may say
that the best thing to happen to the American
nuclear power industry was the outstandingly
independent and critical Kemeny report on Three
Mile Island [17]. If such a report had been widely
and effectively denounced as a whitewash
operation, the loss of credibility of the industry and
of its governmental regulatory agencies could have
been catastrophic.
With this spectrum of different sorts of usable
knowledge, and their corresponding variety of insti-
tutions and publics, we begin to see a practical
resolution of the abstract dichotomies of fact and
value, knowledge and ignorance. Of course, the
system as a whole is complicated, underdetermined,
and inconclusive. But that ,means it's like social life
itself, where we have many failures but also many
successes. The only thing lost, through this analysis,
is the illusion that the scientist is a sort of privileged
being who can dispense nuggets of truth to a needy
populace. Seeing the scientist as a participant, cer-
tainly of a special sort, in this complex process of
achieving usable knowledge provides us with some
insights on how to make his or her contribution
most effective.
Toward a practical approach
Here I hope to be constructive; and I can start my
argument with a topic mentioned early in my analy-
sis of the enriched understanding of science which
every researcher develops: the assessment of
quality. This is frequently the first exposure of a
scientist to the essential incompleteness of any scien-
tific knowledge; not merely that there are things
left to be discovered, but that the border between
our knowledge and our ignorance is not perfectly
defined. Even when scientific statements turn out
to mean not quite what they say, they are not
necessarily the product of incompetence or
malevolence; rather they reflect the essential incom-
pleteness of the evidence and the argument sup-
porting any scientific result. In a matured field, the
assessment of quality is a craft skill that may be so
well established as to be nearly tacit and unselfcon-
scious: we know that a piece of work is really good
(or not), without being easily able to specify fully
why. By contrast, one sign of the immaturity of a
field is the lack of consensus on quality, so that every
ambitious researcher must become an amateur
methodologist in order to defend his or her results
against critics.
Scientific quality - a many-splendored
thing
When we come to policy-related science, that simple
dichotomy of the presence or the absence of matur-
ity is totally inadequate to convey the richness of
criteria of quality, with their associated complexity
and opportunity for confusion. Here I can only
refer to the deep insights of Bill Clark and Nino
Majone, in their taxonomy of criteria of quality
among the various legitimate actors in a policy pro-
cess involving science. In their table of critical
criteria, they list the following actors: scientist, peer
group, program manager or sponsor, policymaker,
and public interest group. For each of these, there
are three critical modes: input, output, and process.
Mastery of that table, reproduced here (Table 15.1),
would, I think, make an excellent introduction to
the methodological problems of policy-related
sCience.
It may well be that as this project develops, we
will need to go through that exercise, if only to the
extent of appreciating that the research scientist's
criteria of quality are not the only legitimate ones
in the process.
However different or conflicting may be the other
criteria of quality they must be taken into account,
not only in the reporting of research but even in
its planning and execution. Now, anyone of the
actors in such a process must, if she or he is to be
really effective in a cooperative endeavor, under-
take a task that is not traditionally associated with
science: to appreciate another person's point of
view. This need not extend to abandoning conflict-
ing interpretation of facts (for a fruitful debate is
a genuine one) or to empathy for another's lifestyle
or world view. But for strictly practical purposes
each participant must appreciate what it is that
another is invoking, explicitly or implicitly, when
making points about the quality of contested
materials.
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This important skill has been called (by Clark and
Majone) "a critical connoisseurship of quality in
science." One does not merely apply one's own
specialist criteria blindly or unselfconsciously,
however excellent or valid they may be for one's
own scientific expertise or role. One must be able
to assess productions from several points of view in
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succession, by means of an imaginative sympathy
that involves seeing one's own role, one's own self,
from a slight distance. It may be that I am here
calling for the cultivation of attitudes proper to
literary criticism, a prospect that to some may be
even more alien than Zen riddles. But given the
complexity of policy-related science, in response to
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the complexity of biosphere problems, I can
envisage no easier alternative.
U sable ignorance
The preceding analysis has, I hope, made us
familiar with the richness of the concept of usable
knowledge in the context of incomplete science with
policy implications. Now I can attempt to make
sense of that paradoxical category, usable igno-
rance; for in many respects this defines our present
task as one that is qualitatively different from the
sorts of science with which we have hitherto been
familiar.
First, I have indicated one approach to taming
ignorance, by focusing on its border with knowl-
edge. This should be easily grasped with the
experience of research. Indeed, the art of choosing
research problems can be described as sensing
where that border can be penetrated and to what
depth. Similarly, the art of monitoring for possible
accidents or realized hazards, be they in industrial
plant or environmental disruption, consists in hav-
ing a border with ignorance that is permeable to
signals coming from the other side; signs of
incipient harmful processes or events that should
be identified and controlled. Thus the technical
consultancy problem is one where ignorance is
managed, through expert skill, in just this way.
Where ignorance is really severe, as in total
environmental assessment, then it is involved in the
problem in ways that are both more intimate and
more complex. For if ignorance is recognized to be
severe, then no amount of sophisticated calculation
with uncertainties in a decision algorithm can be
adequate for a decision. Nonquantifiable, perhaps
nonspecifiable, considerations of prudence must be
included in any argument. Further, the nature and
distribution of a wider range of possible benefits
and costs, even including hypothetical items, must
be made explicit. Since there can be no conclusive
or universally acceptable weighting of these, the
values implicit in any such weighting must be made
explicit. In terms of a dialogue between opposed
interests, this effectively takes the form of a burden
of proof: in the absence of strong evidence on either
side do we deem a system safe or do we deem it
dangerous?
By such means we do not conquer ignorance
directly, for that can be done only by replacing it
with knowledge. But we cope with it and we ensure
that by being aware of our ignorance we do not
encounter disastrous pitfalls in our supposedly
secure knowledge or supposedly effective tech-
mque.
The preceding account is prescriptive for future
practice rather than descriptive of the past. Had
ignorance been recognized as a factor in technology
policy, then, for example, the nuclear power
industry would today be in a far healthier state.
The easy assumption that all technical problems
could be solved when the time came has left that
industry, and the rest of us on this planet, with such
problems as the disposal of long-lived radioactive
wastes. In this case we must somehow manage
our ignorance of the state of human society some
tens of thousands of years into the future.
How many professional engineers have been
prepared by their professional training for such a
problem?
Coping with ignorance demands a more articu-
lated policy process and a greater awareness of how
that process operates. Great leaps forward in tech-
nology require continuous monitoring to pick up
the signals of trouble as they begin to arrive; and
both physical symptoms and their institutions
should be designed with the ignorance factor in
mind, so that they can respond and adapt in good
time. (This point has been amply developed by
David Collingridge in his Critical Decision Making
[7] and other writings.)
Recognition of the need for monitoring entails
that the decision process be iterative, responding
in a feedback loop to signals from the total environ-
ment of the operating system. Also, the inclusion
of ignorance in decision making, via the explicit
assignment of burden of proof, involves a self-
conscious operation of dialogue at several levels,
the methodological and regulative simultaneously
with the substantive. All this is very complicated, of
course, and the transaction costs of running such a
system might appear to be very high, not least in
the absorption of time and energy of highly
qualified people. But if these costs become a recog-
nized element of the feasibility of a project, let it
be so; better to anticipate that aspect of coping with
ignorance than either to become bogged down in
endless regulator games, or to regress to a simplistic
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fantasy of heroic-scale technological innovation,
thereby inviting a debacle sooner or later.
Coming now to an idea about the Biosphere Pro-
ject itself, I find the category of usable ignorance
influencing it in several ways. First, it should condi-
tion the way we go about our work; for we will be
aware that just another program of research and
recommendations is not adequate to the solution of
biosphere problems. Also, the concept of usable
ignorance may provide topics for a special research
effort within the Project. What I have described
above is only a rudimentary sketch of some of the
elements of a large, important, and inherently com-
plex phenomenon. With colleagues at Leeds Uni-
versity, UK, I have begun to articulate themes for
a coordinated research effort, involving the logic of
ignorance, studies of how some institutions cope
with the ignorance that affects their practice, as it
reveals itself in error and failure; and more studies
of how institutions cope with the threats posed by
their ignorance when their monopoly of practice,
or their legitimacy, is threatened.
More directly relevant to the immediate concerns
of colleagues on the Biosphere Project is the way in
which we will need to make our own ignorance
usable. For we are, after all, inventing a new scien-
tific style to respond to the new scientific problems
of the biopshere, simultaneously with the special
researches that are at its basis. We have various
precedents to remind us what is not likely to work.
The simplest is a scattered set of groups of experts,
each doing their own thing and meeting occasion-
ally to exhibit their wares. Synthesis of the efforts
is then left to the organizers of the meeting and the
editors of their proceedings. At a higher level, we
have the experience of multidisciplinary teams,
where each member must protect his or her own
private professional future by extracting and cul-
tivating research problems that will bring rewards
by the special criteria of quality of his or her subject
subspeciality. Here, too, the whole of the nominally
collaborative effort is only rarely greater than the
sum of its parts. Nor can we turn with much hope
to the task force model, which does bring results in
technology, for that depends critically on the sim-
plicity of the defining problem, and on an
authoritarian structure of decision and control. For
our problems are multidimensionally complex by
their very nature; and transnational cooperation is
achieved more by cajoling than by command. Hence
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none of the eXlstlllg styles of making knowledge
usable are appropriate for ignorance.
Conditions for success
It appears, then, that we need some sort of dialec-
tical resolution of the contradiction between the
autarchy of academic-style research and the dic-
tatorship of industrial-style development. There
seem to be two elements necessary to make such a
new venture a success. One is motivation: enough
of us on the Biosphere Project must see it as a
professional job, developing a new sort of scientific
expertise in which we can continue to do satisfying
work after the completion of this Project. I have no
doubt that if this Project succeeds, it will become a
model for many others, enough to keep all of us
busy for a long time. The other element is tech-
nique: devising means whereby the genuine mutual
enhancement of ideas and perspectives can be
accomplished. I indicated some of these at the very
beginning of this chapter, in describing some ways
in which the Biosphere Project will be novel.
We may well find ourselves experimenting with
techniques of personal interaction that have been
developed for policy formation, but that have
hitherto been considered as irrelevant to the austere
task of producing new knowledge. But since we,
even in our science, are trying to make ignorance
usable, we should not be too proud to learn about
learning, even in the research process.
The crucial element here may lie in quality assess-
ment and the mutual criticism that makes it possible.
Can we learn, sufficiently well for the task, to have
imaginative sympathy with the roles and associated
criteria of quality of others in different corners of
this complex edifice? We will need to comprehend
variety in scientific expertise, in methodological
reflection, in organizational tasks, and in policy for-
mation. If so, then we can hope to have what Bill
Clark has called a "fair dialogue," in which we are
each an amateur, in the best sense of the term, with
regard to most of the problem on which we are
engaged.
I believe that such a process is possible and that
it is certainly worth a try. The environmental prob-
lems that now confront us, as residents of this
planet, are now global and total. We in this group
cannot hope to legislate for all of humanity over all
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the salient issues [19]. But we can at least indicate
a way forward, showing that our civilization is
genuinely resilient in meeting this supreme chal-
lenge.
Conclusion and perspective
As an historian, I like to find support and under-
standing in the pattern of the past as it may be
extended into the future. In this connection, I can
do no better than to quote from an early prophetic
writing of Karl Marx. In the Preface to his Critique
of Political Economy [20], he gave an intensely con-
centrated summary of past human history as he
understood it, in terms of class structures and class
struggles. His concluding motto was, "Mankind
only sets those problems that it can solve." We must
try to justify his optimism in the case of this present
challenge. For we may understand it as our civiliza-
tion's characteristic contradiction: the intensified
exploitation of nature through the application of
knowledge to power, which threatens to become
self-destructive unless brought under control.
For my historical perspective on this, I would like
to review the evolution of science as a social practice,
as it has developed to create new powers and
respond to new challenges. In the seventeenth cen-
tury, the scientific revolution had two related ele-
ments: the disenchantment of nature; and the
articulation of the ideal of a cumulative, coopera-
tive, public endeavor for the advancement of knowl-
edge. With the decay of the ancient belief in secrets
too powerful to be revealed came a commitment to
a new style of social relations in the production of
knowledge. This was promoted as both practically
necessary and morally superior. From this came the
first scientific societies, and their journals provided
a new means of achieving novelty while protecting
intellectual property.
As this system matured in the nineteenth century,
with the creation of complex social structures for
the organization and support of research and
researchers, the early dream of power through
secular, disenchanted knowledge took on reality.
For this there were developed the industrial
laboratories and applied-research institutes, first in
Germany, but eventually elsewhere. From these
came the high technology of the present century,
on which the prosperity and even survival of our
cililization now depends.
The idea of using such applicable science as a
significant contribution to the planned develop-
ment of the means of production was first articu-
lated in the socialist nations, and popularized
everywhere by the prophetic writings of J. D.
Bernal. It lost its ideological overtones during
World War II; and now that planning is an
essential tool even in the market-economy nations,
science as "the second derivative of production" (in
Bernal's phrase) is a commonplace [19]. Even
academic research is now strongly guided by
priorities, set in the political process, and related to
the requirements of the development of the means
of production and of destruction. Boris Hessen's
classic thesis on The Social and Economic Roots of
Newton's Principia may have been crude and over-
simple for the seventeenth century: but for the
twentieth it is a truism. There still remains a
difference in slogans; in the socialist countries it is
"the scientific-technological revolution"; in the
others it is "don't come last in the microelectronics
race"; and only time will tell how these will work
out in practice.
Our present concerns are centered on the new
problems of the biosphere, involving an ecological
vision that ran counter to that of Bernal, and the
tradition to which he was heir. The "domination of
nature", the driving vision of our science-based
civilization, may turn out in retrospect to have been
just a disenchanted variety of magic [21]. The
recently discovered fact that we cannot dominate,
though we can destroy, may be the decisive chal-
lenge to our civilization. For the solution of the
problem of worldwide poverty through the
development of material production in imitation of
the West, even if possible in the social sphere, could
become ecologically devastating. Can the biosphere
provide the sources and sinks for a worldwide popu-
lation of a billion private automobiles? Hence, I
believe the new task for science is a total one, requir-
ing new concepts of its goals in human welfare as
well as new methods of achieving knowledge and
wielding power over nature under appropriate
control.
This Project is necessarily restricted to our part
of the problem, but it lies at the heart of it: can
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technological development be ecologically sustain-
able? If not, the prospects for our civilization resolv-
ing or transcending its characteristic contradictions
are not good. Like Rome, or classical Islam, we will
have had our own half a millenium of glory, and
then begin a decline, enfeebled and enmeshed by
problems that multiply faster than their solutions.
But if we have that resilience which has character-
ized Europe in the past, we may yet respond to the
challenge in time, and open the way to a new future
for humanity.
I hope that this somewhat apocalyptic perspective
does not seem too enthusiastic or grandiose. I cer-
tainly do not expect it to be shared by all of us, or
even by anyone in particular. But I believe that for
such a task of innovation as we are engaged on, we
need a perspective to give our efforts shape and
direction. Indeed, we can do with several com-
plementary perspectives out of which a synthesis,
at that level, can emerge. It is in this spirit that I
offer these views for your consideration and
criticism.
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Commentary
s. Rayner
Philosopher of science Jerome Ravetz makes an
eloquent case for the explicit recognition of the
borders of scientific knowledge in the science-for-
policy process. The call is far-reaching, not least
because the concept of usable ignorance that Ravetz
elaborates stretches the scientific imagination
beyond the mere recognition of uncertainty; we
may know much of which we are uncertain, little
of which we are assured, and vice versa. Ravetz
would have us pay attention to what is or is not
known - not merely to what is uncertain about
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which of a known range of probable outcomes will
actually occur. He is also concerned with the
resilience of our institutions - those of modern
civilization, not just of the scientific academy or
industrial laboratory.
His proposal for resolving the dilemma of igno-
rance in science for policy relies on the reflexive
capacity of scientific and policymaking institutions
to recognize and employ different types, as well as
degrees, of knowledge and nonknowledge, and to
incorporate the pedigrees of scientific facts in the
formal notations adopted for their expression:
By such means we do not conquer ignorance directly,
for this can be done only by replacing it with knowl-
edge. But we cope with it and we ensure that by
being aware of our ignorance we do not encounter
disastrous pitfalls in our supposedly secure knowl-
edge or supposedly effective technique [p 429].
Ravetz is arguing for a permeable boundary
between ignorance and knowledge that allows us to
review the antecedents and mode of gestation of a
scientific fact - not just the atomized commodity
that emerges from the knowledge-producing
process. Usable, as opposed to banal or trivial,
knowledge is in constant interaction with a state of
human ignorance.
The argument is powerful, and expressed with
convincing clarity. However, there is a dimension
to the problem of usable ignorance that Ravetz
points to but leaves unexplained. Yet this dimension
is crucial to the success of his prescription.
The incorporation of usable ignorance into
science for policy depends not only on the goodwill
of individuals, but on the permeability of the intel-
lectual boundaries maintained by disciplinary and
political institutions. One means of boundary main-
tenance, long recognized by anthropologists and
science-fiction writers alike, is the cultivation, within
a population, of ignorance about what lies outside.
In other words, we need to extend Ravetz's argu-
ment from the realm of not knowing to that of
choosing (consciously or unconsciously) not to
know. We must address the process of social con-
struction and maintenance of ignorance.
Ravetz quotes Marx's Introduction to the Critique
of Political Economy, "Mankind only sets those prob-
lems that it can solve." But, mankind's inability to
solve problems does not necessarily stem from the
absence of, or a limitation on, the capacity to
reason; neither is it an inability to obtain data or
construct facts with which to reason. It is axiomatic
in cultural anthropology that problems are selected
by mankind, in whole communities or specialist
subsections, such as religion, science, technology,
and politics, in accordance with an editing process
that excludes some kinds of questions because of
their societal implications. This is partly the basis
of the cultural theory of risk perception.
The publication of Douglas and Wildavsky's Risk
and Culture in 1982 [1] called the attention of risk
analysts in the science-for-policy process to the
argument that risks are defined and perceived
differently by people in different cultural contexts.
Hence, in complex societies, such as contemporary
USA, it is to be expected that there will be consider-
able disagreement between members of various
constituencies as to what constitutes a technological
risk, as well as about how such risks should be
prioritized for regulatory attention.
In other words, different scientific and political
institutions single out for attention technological
problems that they recognize as threatening the
most cherished values of their preferred social
order. They ignore two other kinds of problems.
Most obviously, they ignore those problems for
which they are confident that they have adequate
institutional forms to deal with in a routine fashion.
This is the case where societal trust in those institu-
tions is maintained at a high level. The second kind
of problem that both scientific and political institu-
tions ignore includes those problems that they can-
not recognize, because to do so would not merely
threaten their most cherished institutional values,
but would actually deconstruct the institutions
themselves.
This phenomenon is known as structural amnesia
to anthropologists, who first observed it in connec-
tion with the genealogical basis of certain East
African political and judicial institutions [2]. To
those who think that structural forgetfulness is a
phenomenon exclusive to exotic societies, I would
point out that the concept of structural amnesia has
since been employed to account for the socially
constructed ignorance of historical processes and
geographical constraints on political action that is
commonplace in certain kinds of political and
religious organizations in contemporary Western
societies [3].
The time has clearly arrived for the recognition
of structural amnesia in science. At the same time
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that Ravetz was presenting the concept of usable
ignorance to the Biosphere Project at IIASA, Mary
Douglas [4] was addressing the annual meeting of
the American Sociological Association on the topic
of the scientific community's resistance to Robert
Merton's account of simultaneous discoveries. Dur-
ing this address, Douglas implicitly pointed out that
the boundaries of disciplines are particularly fertile
locations for the social construction of ignorance.
Leading psychologists periodically remind their dis-
ciplinary colleagues that they tend to systematically
ignore the social context of individual thought and
behavior, but heed to the warning is invariably
short-lived. This is inevitable, given that the para-
digmatic centerpiece of psychological theory is the
individual psyche. To admit the sociology of knowl-
edge into psychology would be to risk losing the
disciplinary identity that distinguishes psychology
from sociology. Psychology characteristically con-
structs its problematics in a highly individualistic
framework and is therefore obliged to remain
ignorant of the social context of human behavior
and is consequently under strong pressure to
forget it.
My argument thus far brings us directly to
Ravetz's exciting contention that successful execu-
tion of the Biosphere Project requires "inventing a
new scientific style," and his critique of "multidisci-
plinary teams, where each member must protect his
or her own private professional future by extracting
and cultivating research problems that will bring
rewards by the special criteria of quality of his or
her subject subspecialty [p 430]."
Most so-called interdisciplinary research is multi-
disciplinary. It consists of different perspectives
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being brought to bear on a problem that is defined
by one of the participating disciplines - Ravetz's
autarchic approach to problems. Explicit recogni-
tion that some kinds of ignorance are socially con-
structed may facilitate the construction of truly
interdisciplinary approaches to science for policy.
This will require what I understand the Biosphere
Project intends, that is the joint formulation of
problematics by the whole team that is to follow
them up. This requires not only the good faith of
those involved in monitoring their own participa-
tion, but the creation of an institutional framework
in which the participants are able and prepared to
call foul, and be called for fouls when disciplinary
boundaries are being protected.
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Chapter 16
P. Timmerman
Mythology and surprise in
the sustainable development
of the biosphere
Editors' Introduction: The need for self-criticism and reflection on the part of those who
would understand interactions between development and environment is nowhere more
pressing than when dealing with our central theme of "surprise" (see Chapters 10 and 11).
Presented in this chapter is the view that our perceptions of what is surprising and what
is to be expected are strongly conditioned by our necessary, but largely unexamined,
myths about "how the world is". Alternative myths that emphasize equilibria or variability,
limits or adaptibility, are in turn intimately bound to the cultural and institutional settings
in which we find ourselves. The practical consequences of these various myths for
(mis)management of the biosphere are demonstrated through a number of historical case
examples. A synoptic perspective that explicitly recognizes the pluralism of social perspec-
tives on nature and surprise is argued to be an essential foundation for usable studies of
sustainable development.
Introduction
History is full of examples of managed systems that
have come to grief through an inability to under-
stand or respond appropriately to surprises. Yet
failures of this kind are now more dangerous than
ever before, since the margin for acceptable error
in managing the Earth and its resources is rapidly
disappearing.
The rise in various population and demand
curves worldwide is already "bumping the ceiling"
of a number of resource industries, of which the
fishing industry is the most obvious. In addition,
the need to maintain high, reliable outputs of goods
and services from what is becoming a global network
of technical monocultures [1] means that less and
less of the surrounding contexts can be left to
chance: vertical and horizontal integration is
becoming commonplace. Little room is therefore
being left to maneuver, to experiment, and to learn
through trial and error. As well as on our other
resources, critical pressure is being placed on the
resources of time and space - time in which to
recover, rehabilitate, or rethink; space in which to
regroup, restock, or reinvade.
It therefore becomes necessary, in however para-
doxical a form, to consider the question of possible
future uncertainties, crises, catastrophes - surprises
- to come seriously to terms with truly sustainable
development. The paradox is, of course, that these
particular threats to sustainability are largely due
to the very uncertainty or improbable nature of
what might happen; and that is - by definition -
difficult to conceptualize.
In recent years, and perhaps in part as a cultural
response to the increased concern with the future
trajectories of various natural and social systems,
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"the expectation of the unexpected" has become a
major theme of research in various areas, including
mathematics, risk assessment, economic theory, sys-
tems ecology, and anthropology [2]. New theories
and studies focus on the laws of chaos, on discon-
tinuity and on disequilibrium; and this seems to be
symptomatic of the beginning of a paradigm shift
[3] from the realm of the normal to that of the
abnormal or anomalous [4].
Paradigms and paradigm shifts are easy to pro-
claim and notoriously difficult to articulate. In the
case of a new paradigm deliberately focusing on
anomalies, the creative chaos of the shift becomes
as important as the coherent pattern of any ultimate
order [5].
During paradigm shifts (the world between para-
digms, so to speak), the barriers between disciplines
drop, just as a reversal of poles temporarily elimi-
nates magnetic field strength. In this interim period,
new combinations of sources, ideas, and conceptual
models may flood in - some of which are bogus,
but others of which will persist to form the ground-
work for better ways of explaining and exploiting
hitherto anomalous material. Of particular interest
are those new combinations that recur in a wide
array of subjects, indicating that similar sorts of
conceptual crises are occurring across a broad front.
This is what seems to be happening today with the
concepts of the unexpected, uncertainty, disequi-
librium, and surprise. These concepts are of par-
ticular concern for the development of plans for
long-term biospheric management, both because of
their obvious relevance to attempts to manage sys-
tems of bewildering complexity and because the
proposal to consider the biosphere as a sustainable
system provides a framework within which these
concepts can begin to be examined, compared, and
linked together in real-world applications.
To put all this into some tentative ordering for
discussion, it has recently been suggested [6] that
one approach to the management of biospheric
uncertainty might be to examine existing and pro-
posed conceptual combinations as forms of
mythology. One version of this approach is pro-
vided by Holling (Chapter 10, this volume) in his
discussion of ecological systems. What follows is
another elaboration of the same general approach;
but it is also an exploration of some other equivalent
combinations of myths and myth analyses that are
available in other areas subject to the same concep-
tual pressures.
Sustainable development of the biosphere
Why myths and myth analyses? One simple
answer is that many past failures of management
have been due to the misapplication of various
myths, especially myths about nature. A more com-
plex justification is that, like recent terms such as
vulnerability or resilience [7], surprise (which we
use as the generic term) has come into use to deal
with the qualitative character of quantitative events.
It is an attempt to bridge (or perhaps paper over)
the gap between some event or functional response
of a system and the interpretation of that event or
system by observers or managers.
As soon as this type of concept is employed, we
enter a world where interpretation is unavoidable,
and where the system being interpreted is subject
to historical, irreversible time. Time, that is, wherein
learning and adaptation, success and failure, can
make sense. When we employ concepts like sur-
prise, vulnerability, and resilience to evaluate the
long-term performance of the biosphere or its sub-
systems, we are projecting possible interpretations
of perceived reality over a time frame that is pre-
sumed infinite (sustainable) unless proved other-
wise. This is what Thomas Schelling, in reviewing
options for dealing with the carbon dioxide (C02 )
issue, calls "the problem of managing an indefinite
succession of future times [8]."
There is one major constraint on this projection
into infinitely unfolding historical time: the
bounded space of the planet. This is the tension at
the heart of the phrase "sustainable development
of the biosphere" - sustainable development has
time as its primary dimension, while the biosphere
is the present physical and biological space wrapped
around the globe. The boundedness of the bio-
sphere has always been there implicitly, but the rise
of the theme "spaceship Earth" [9] and the powerful
images of Earth recently projected back to us from
space have crystallized the concept of the limited
sphere into a cultural artifact of profound signifi-
cance. This was particularly well articulated by H.
Marshall McLuhan, who wrote the following in
1970:
Whereas the planet had been the ground for the
human population as figure, since Sputnik, the planet
became figure and the satellite surround has become
the new ground .... Once it is contained within a
human environment, Nature yields its primacy to
art, and experience yields precedence to knowledge.
The consequent upgrading of man's responsibilities
for the planet as environment would seem rather
obvious [10; emphases in original].
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Part of this new ground is expressed in the efforts
described elsewhere in this book - consideration of
what would be entailed in upgrading our responsi-
bility for the planet as environment (i.e., nature
yielding its primacy to human art). Another part is
expressed in what could be called an implosion of
sensibility: once one draws a boundary around a
field of activity, the internal connectivity of the parts
becomes a central concern, as does the threat of
internally generated surprises. Less and less can be
taken for granted, since proliferating internal dis-
ruption is now conceptually the source of potential
catastrophe. This has been summarized eloquently
by Kenneth Boulding:
The most worrying thing about the earth is that there
seems to be no way of preventing it from becoming
one world. If there is only one world, then if anything
goes wrong, everything goes wrong. And by the
generalized Murphy's Law, every system has some
positive probability, however low, of irretrievable
catastrophe.... Ultimately, of course, we must face
the spaceship earth on earth. Uncertainty, however,
is the principal property of the future, and time
horizons themselves have an irreducible uncertainty
about them [II].
To summarize then, in Holling's terminology, we
have entered into a new set of mythological assump-
tions. Sustainable development itself can be con-
sidered as a modern form of one traditional myth,
usually known as "utopia creation". This type of
projection carries the potential for a number of
mythical variants, ranging from the apocalypse of
nuclear holocaust to the creation of earthly
paradise.
What makes these particular myth projections so
interesting is both that they are now capable of
being modeled in great detail by computers and
other modeling tools and that in their detail they
make a claim on the actual future of our planet.
Because of this, it is worth exploring the matrix
from which these conceptual structures arose, and
the previous myths that they seek to supplant.
Equilibrium myths
The myths that have held sway until recently In
modern western civilization have been myths of
equilibrium. These myths tend to downplay ques-
tions of instability (or the unpredictable) in favor
of stability, control, and idealization against the
backdrop of absolute time and space. The rise of
these myths owes much to the context supplied by
Newton and Laplace, whose physical theories
specifically denied intrinsic unpredictability - La-
place assumed that given enough information, it
would be possible to predict the position of every
particle in the universe - and implied that the
passage of a system through historical time was only
an interesting variation on the true use of time as
an absolute and therefore reversible measure [12].
More than that, however, equilibrium myths
owed their power to the need to create a series of
models or methods of explaining the world without
constant referral to an external carrier of meaning.
This need occurred with the gradual withering away
of belief in a correspondence between the world
and the designs of a God "out there". Newtonian
mechanics pushed God as far off the stage as pos-
sible, but was unable to cope with the question of
complex design - hence the eighteenth century's
rhetorical gestures toward "the great chain of
being" and "the absent clockmaker", not one of
which was wholly convincing.
The need to explain complexity and diversity is
often mediated in myth through the exploration of
analogies in nature. The natural world presents the
spectacle of a very complex, diverse system,
apparently operating without interference. This
was one of the strongest arguments throughout
history for the existence of a God or gods; and
mythmaking has often taken its cue from cultural
attitudes toward nature. In the case of the modern
west, however, the key myth creation began else-
where, and was then transferred back to the natural
world.
The key equilibrium myth for our society derives
from the internally generated, self-regulating, and
self-sustaining world of economics. This myth
began in the confluence of the philosophy of natural
sciences and the study of social systems that charac-
terized the French and Scottish Enlightenments,
and culminated in the work of Adam Smith [13].
These philosophies and studies attempted for social
systems what Newton had done for physics: i.e., to
discover absolute laws based on simple, active prin-
ciples.
The simple active principle of the social myth was
discovered by an early eighteenth century moral
1438
philosopher named Mandeville, who wrote a satiri-
cal work entitled The Fable of the Bees [14]. In this
satire, Mandeville put forward an analysis of social
interactions that made the paradoxical claim that
the private vices of fraud and greed necessarily
promoted the public virtues of peacefulness and
wealth. Mandeville argued that seemingly chaotic
or counterproductive behavior at the individual
level could generate order at the societal or
macrocosmic level. This model was seized on by a
number of moral political philosophers, of whom
Adam Smith is the best known [15].
Smith's version, immortalized in The Wealth of
Nations [16], used the notion of the invisible hand
to finesse metaphorically the question of design in
the system. Then, as classical economics developed,
the explanatory power of this microcosmic competi-
tion-macrocosmic order model spread into other
areas. The strength of the model lay in its elegant
mechanical purity and its ability to bring order to
a vast array of hitherto unrelated data.
The two major weaknesses were, first, that the
need for an explanation of order led economics
into a myth of ideal historical equilibrium, i.e., that
the system is always at or approaching a perfect
stability; and, second, that the mythical model was
intolerant of any externalities or alternatives that
could not be captured by the mechanism. These
weaknesses (which some would call strengths) have
been the source of some of the main challenges to
the modern order based upon this basic myth:
(l) That the system is not tending toward equi-
librium, but crisis (e.g., Marxism).
(2) That nature and nonquantitative aspects of the
world should not be treated as externals or pure
input resources for some homogenizing market
(e.g., environmentalism).
The foundations of the crisis approach, exploited
by both crisis-seekers and the environmentalists,
were provided by Malthus [17]. Smith's economic
scheme, deriving as it did from natural law theory
and with its roots in classicism, was not necessarily
devoted to the infinite expansion of the economic
model; rather, Smith's world is one characterized
by balance and controlled equilibrium, where
supply and demand eventually converge on the real
natural price. Within one or two generations,
however, Smith's model was rapidly harnessed to
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arguments for the infinite possibilities of progress.
Equilibrium - without the constraint provided by
natural law (or God) - became the market without
any natural prices, achieving pseudoequilibrium in
the short term as it moved toward long-term pros-
perity. True stability was shunted aside.
Malthus' proposal that the natural tendency of
the economic system and the actors within the
market was, in the long term, to crash against a
population limit, cut - right at the outset of the
refashioning of the model - to the heart of equi-
librium as progress. Hence, the revulsion against
Malthusianism, and the long-standing refusal to
come to terms with it.
Malthus' argument was defeated, not - as often
argued - by the wealth generated in the nineteenth
century capitalist boom; but by the redirection of
economics away from classical economic theory with
its fundamental concern for the elements of pro-
duction -land, labor, and potentially scarce resour-
ces - toward the utilitarian calculations of neo-
classical economic theory, which put Smith's bal-
anced economic model at the service of a new
infinity: the infinite capacity of subjective desires,
as expressed through the auction of the market-
place. The market was the arbiter of whether or
not limits and scarcities were being approached.
The underlying processes that produced those
limits and scarcities were no longer relevant, unless
they could be expressed in the market.
Malthus was not refuted; just rendered
irrelevant. And, in this context, it should also be
recalled that it was John Stuart Mill, utilitarian and
economist, who in his Principles of Political Economy
both described the transformation of economics
that was taking place and also repudiated it by
being the first to mention the need for an ultimately
stationary economy - the forerunner of sustainable
development [18].
The bypassing of Malthus helps to explain why
equilibrium-as-progress also interpreted Darwin's
theory of evolution in the way that it did. Darwin's
discovery of the principle of evolution through
natural selection following upon his reading of
Malthus is legendary, and has often been cited as
an example of a theory that reflected the times
in which it was discovered [19]. What has not been
so often noted, however, is that the myth of equi-
librium in its new progressive form was so strong
that it ensured that much of the subsequent history
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of Darwin's theory would be devoted to evolution
and competition, rather than to the vagaries of
natural selection.
That survival of the fittest, for example, might
mean fittest for any and all environments, however
harsh, was unacceptable, since certain environ-
ments - the present, for example - are valued
higher than others. This meant that the historical
graininess of time and space was down played [20];
and, furthermore, the present became a stable
moral model to which nature had been tending all
along.
This, then, is the context in which equilibrium
myths arose and developed. They have been charac-
terized in many forms, of which the simplest is
perhaps the graphical representation of a point at
the bottom of a valley or cup-shaped curve, like a
pebble in a bowl (Figure 16.1). This represents the
basic equilibrium myth of stability.
Figure 16.1 Stability.
As the previous discussion has perhaps made
obvious, the myth of stability concentrates on the
bottom of the bowl, with all perturbations only
temporarily knocking the point away from that cen-
ter. Since the point is always defined by its position
relative to its resting place, there is, in principle, no
outside to the bowl - indeed, any perturbation so
strong as to cause the point to slip over the edge of
the bowl is both physically and theoretically cata-
strophic, since it destroys the principles by which
the myth is constructed. Any management strategy
based on the myth of stability is haunted by this
kind of vulnerability, and responds to it by making
at least two interlocking presumptions. The first is
that the best defence is to keep raising the sides of
the bowl, preferably to infinity (for, as noted, the
tendency to project this equilibrium system to
infinity is always present). This is either done by
building a lot of excess capacity or redundancy into
the system, or by damping down all oscillations to
consistently predictable levels.
A second presumption ·of the myth of stability -
especially when it is used to manage natural systems
- is that nature is infinitely reliable or benign.
Indeed, the natural myth associated with the myth
of stability is the myth of nature benign [21].
This secondary myth is necessary to the first myth:
when one fish stock is exploited, go on to the next,
and the first one will recover; if we could only
remove this particular stressor, the ecosystem would
respond favorably and predictably. Any unexpec-
ted natural event is either treated with bewilder-
ment or shunted into the category of "Acts of God"
(a revealing phrase). It is essential to the overall
myth of stability that consistency and continuity of
control be maintained; and it is this consistency and
continuity that serves as justification for many of
the management schemes in operation: surprises
are threats [22].
The obverse of the myth of stability is the myth
of instability. It, too, concentrates on the center of
the bowl, but, in this case, the bowl is inverted, with
the pebble on the outside. Any perturbation and
the pebble rolls off down the slope (Figure 16.2).
In natural systems, the best example of this may be
a simple closed predator-prey relationship - a pro-
liferation of prey leads to a proliferation of preda-
tors who eventually consume all the prey and then
starve to death. Alternatively, one might have a
system so fragile that a single, or very small, event
Figure 16.2 Instability.
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or impact cascades through it, shattering it swiftly.
Com plex systems sometimes have this property,
such as rockets that explode on launch due to a mis-
placed wire; classic examples may be found in sys-
tems of speculation, such as the South Sea Bubble
of the 1720s, where a single default can quickly
collapse an array of interconnected rumor.
As with the myth of stability, the myth of instabil-
ity is monolithic, since everything that happens
tends toward the system's destruction. As a result,
its secondary nature myth is that of nature malign
or intolerant. Management of the system - if there
can be any management of such a system - is para-
noic: the whole system is vulnerable and everything
is a threat. This is the reason why the myth of
instability is the simple obverse of the myth of
stability, and why it has been categorized as an
"equilibrium" myth - it is the demonic version of
the myth of stability, obsessed in a completely
uncreative way with the absolute maintenance of
the status quo.
The third equilibrium myth, which introduces
somewhat more complexity to the process of
categorization, is the myth of cyclical renewal. It is
obviously a variation on the main myth of stability,
but it brings into playa sense of rhythm or pulsation.
nature in this myth is benign overall; but it has
regular local malignities - e.g., winter - and while
the regularity of the seasons is predictable, the size
of the oscillations may not be predictable year by
year. This cyclical process brings into play for the
first time the question of historical time; and yet
neutralizes it by placing it in a broader perspective
(Figure 16.3).
Figure 16.3 Cyclical renewal.
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We are, however, introduced to the issue of scales
of time [23], which begin to playa greater role as
the myths complexify. It is all very well to assume
that the system will eventually and regularly return
to where it began, but the length of the phases of
the cycle could be of importance; after all, as Keynes
remarked, in the long run we are all dead. More
to the point, cyclical renewal hints at the possibility
that the system might be traversing a number of
unstable positions that make the system appear to
be in disequilibrium when looked at in a restricted
or short time-frame. The only way to be assured
that one is in long-term equilibrium is either to
obtain some external perspective on the trajectory
of the system or to operate through a complete cycle
to the point where those inside the system recognize
that repetition is occurring.
In addition, one wants to know if the cycle is truly
cyclic, or if it is following a spiral trajectory. The
incremental alternation in the trajectory may be
masked by the greater yearly fluctuations or noise
in the system. A now familiar example of this is
provided by the Mauna Loa data on the carbon
dioxide (C02) build-up in the atmosphere (Figure
16.4), where the breathing of the Earth fluctuates
according to the seasonal generation of CO2 , and
yet the overall trend is upward.
Variable myths
With the introduction of cycles and spirals, equi-
librium myths begin to depart from their original
simplicity. Eventually, perhaps as short-term dis-
equilibria multiply, or as the dissonance between
the myths and reality strengthens, alternative
mythical frameworks develop as possible replace-
ments or modifications.
The process takes two forms: one conservative
and one radical. The conservative replacement still
focuses on the concept of equilibrium, but the num-
ber of possible equilibria is multiplied. Using a land-
scape metaphor, the topography is seen as a number
of peaks and valleys, not just one peak or one valley.
The radical replacement, however, considers not
just the points moving up and down the peaks and
valleys, but also the possible movements of the
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Figure 16.4 CO 2 oscillations: mean monthly concentrations of atmospheric CO 2 at Mauna Loa. The yearly
oscillation is explained mainly by the annual cycle of photosynthesis and respiration of plants in the northern
hemisphere [24].
peaks and valleys themselves. The first could be
called the myth of multiple stability; the second the
myth of resilience.
The most important early version of the myth of
multi pie stability - the version that historically seems
to have been the first to displace the equi-
librium myth from its commanding position - was,
appropriately enough for this discussion, Keynes'
attack on neoclassical economics in the 1920s and
1930s. The heart of Keynes' approach was the
argument that, on their own terms, neoclassical
economists could be faced with the possibility that
the free market might well achieve equilibrium, but
that equilibrium would be stuck at a point too low
to achieve the benefits it was su pposed to produce.
However, if additional investment was created or
empowered by government, the economy would be
"kick-started", possibly up to a new, higher full
equilibrium. Keynes contended that the evils of the
depression were the result of a low equilibrium and
that government management could eliminate
them [25].
Apart from justifying government involvement
in the marketplace, Keynes' theory brought into
the open the necessity of incorporating real time
into economic theory and also the necessity of con-
sidering the operation of uncertainty in the minds
of investors during that time. The owning of money
(in, for example, the form of savings) was not just
for convenience; it was also a way of keeping one's
decision-making power free or liquid in the face of
an uncertain future.
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number of alternative points (Figure 16.5). Sudden
perturbations or a long-term policy that ignores the
underlying dynamics of the system can cause it to
fluctuate wildly and unpredictably. In other words,
Figure 16.5 Two stability domains. The effect of
predation mortality on recruitment of salmon popu-
lation. (a) The size of the unstable boundary popula-
tion under severe predation: there are two stability
domains. (b) The replacement line (where recruits
equal spawners) can shift, given changes in the
exploitation rate Raw The size of the boundary
population then shifts from Xo to xb [28].
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The incorporation of learning, anticipatory
behavior, and uncertain future into economic
theory has been the springboard for much of the
recent theoretical controversy in that discipline.
The first generation of post-Keynesians, including
Kaldor, Shackle, Sraffa, and others, explored the
ramifications of what an economic theory plunged
into historical time would look like, including the
need to examine surprises and other forces that
might thwart the perfect market [26]. And today,
post-Keynesians and neoclassical economists are
locked in controversy over the issue of "rational
expectations", an issue explicitly relating surprises
and historical time to the adequacy of the market
model and, by extension, to the orthodox myth- of
stability [27].
According to rational expectations theory, people
make mistakes in predicting the future, but they do
not make the same mistakes over and over again:
they begin to anticipate and they also learn how
government monetary and fiscal policies reverber-
ate through the economy. So, for example, infla-
tionary expectations begin to be incorporated into
wage settlements. For neoclassical economists (now
styling themselves New Classical Economists) these
expectations are instantly captured by the market,
which is only seriously knocked aside by completely
unpredictable surprises. This, from our perspec-
tive, is clearly another version of the myth of stabil-
ity. For post-Keynesians, however, the focus is not
on the market, but on the ways in which producers
and consumers circumvent the market, as expressed
in the aphorism: "The free market is a wonderful
thing - for everybody else." Independent price-
setting based on markups over costs of production,
long-term wage contracts, and oligopolies are only
some of the underlying structural inflexibilities
veiled by the market. These underlying
inflexibilities help to explain why the economic sys-
tem goes into periods of involuntary destabilization
and rece·ssion.
The post-Keynesians subscribe to the myth of
multiple stability and their interpretation of how
an economic system can suddenly produce surprises
and descents to new, unfavorable, equilibrium
points is practically identical to the myth of multiple
stability now envisaged by those trying to manage
natural systems. Many of the unexpected con-
sequences of natural-system management are due
to the basic assumption that there is one equilibrium
point for the system, while, in fact, there may be a
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the real danger is in trying to apply a myth of
stability - where nature is perceived to be infinitely
benign and homogenous - to a natural situation
where (at the very least) a myth of multiple stability
may prove more conducive to understanding.
Holling et at. [29] have collected a number of
examples in which resource management has been
counterproductive because it was based on a hope
that the myth of stability was present, along with
the secondary nature myth, that nature is essentially
cornucopian. A more sophisticated version of this
management myth recognizes that going from stock
to stock, replacing one species with another as the
first becomes depleted, is inadequate; but by con-
centrating on trying to guarantee that one par-
ticular species will not be depleted, it is hoped that
one can manage the stocks of that one species while
ignoring all the rest [30].
Unless this management strategy is carried out
with a great deal of knowledge and understanding,
it is prone to producing a myriad of surprises, which
perhaps give rise to a new natural myth - nature
as extraordinarily capricious, risky, or devious -
requiring more and more top-heavy absolute con-
trol solutions.
A policy of maximum sustainable yield for one
species may eliminate some other species or alter
the underlying dynamics of the ecosystem. The
system is then prone to producing unwanted sur-
prises. These surprises can be economically damag-
ing, since, in many cases, harvesting industries
develop on the prospects of stability, and become
locked into the highest supposedly sustainable yield
due to their massive investments in transport,
equipment, and processing facilities.
This locking-in phenomenon, the result of taking
a short-term equilibrium as a consistently sustain-
able equilibrium, is perhaps the single most impor-
tant example of the failure to shift mythologies
when trying to achieve sustainable development. It
stems from the power of the original myth of stabil-
ity which still hovers behind the myth of multiple
stability, since the heart of the modern technocratic
apparatus depends upon the capacity of the original
myth to flatten all externalities into market factors
- all inputs are infinitely substitutable; all perturba-
tions are temporary; the short term is indistinguish-
able from the long term. Only above a certain
threshold are events or commodities important;
below that, neither the mechanics nor the long-term
state of the system is of detailed concern.
A now-famous example of this unconcern was
provided by the collapse of the Peruvian anchoveta
harvest after the 1972-1973 EI Nino in the
southeastern Pacific. Despite quasi-periodic dra-
matic oscillations in harvesting possibilities and
repeated warnings and regulations concerning
overfishing, the anchoveta industry grew. The
resultant collapse meant that, with a 30% reduction
in the fishing fleet, the catch in the mid-1970s was
stuck at a level approximately one fifth of what it
had been [31].
More complex versIOns of multistable
phenomena are provided by predator-prey interac-
tions with various forms of density dependence,
foraging tactics, and refuges. In work, for example,
on spruce budworm infestations in New Brunswick
[32] it has been shown that a whole range of alterna-
tive equilibrium points (and zero equilibrium
points) can be generated by different mixes of the
parameters of the system and by various manage-
ment practices that incidentally create an emphasis
on - for instance - one predation type as opposed
to another.
Furthermore, Holling and other~ have explored
many ecological systems in which the jump from
equilibrium point to equilibrium point is prompted
by major phase changes in the system itself. In these
situations the system can be driven into irreversible
changes, often by means of a sudden "flip-flop"
from one stability domain to another [33].
Another example is provided by the recent work
of Steele and Henderson [34] on modeling pelagic
fish populations that have interesting fluctuation
patterns over the long term (e.g.. Pacific sardines
and Atlantic herring with 50 to 100 year peaks).
These species, and others, are now being heavily
fished and the fluctuations are becoming more
rapid. The authors suggest that these fluctuations
are jumps from one to another of three equilibrium
states:
(I) A state in which population density is high in
the absence of predators and is based on
resource levels.
(2) A state in which population density is low in the
presence of high predation levels, and is regu-
lated by the predators.
(3) An intermediate state where the system oscil-
lates between (I) and (2).
This is the now familiar multiequilibria world,
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except that the Steele-Henderson model deliber-
ately incorporates environmental fluctuations over
time (through the use of red noise spectra of
fluctuations appropriate to the sea). The model
emphasizes that increases in fishing pressure or
environmental change accelerate the flip-flops of
the system.
In other words, operating the system under the
assumption of natural persistence is not enough:
the nature ofthat persistence needs to be examined;
and the speed and quality of the oscillations of this
persistence can be more important than that they
keep recurring.
Of even more importance, however, is the rec-
ognition in Holling's work and in other recent
models (such as that provided by Steele and Hen-
derson) that the myth of multiple stability is not
good enough to cope with a system that is being
transformed by external management or that is
learning or adapting to various cycles of perturba-
tion. Assuming that there are a number of resting
points in a system is only slightly more dynamic
than assuming there is only one. The real paradig-
matic breakthrough is toward handling a situation
where everything may be changing at once.
It is here that the myth of resilience begins to
take shape. Equilibrium myths are ways of picturing
nature as natura naturata - i.e., nature as object,
fixed or fixable. The myth of resilience, on the other
hand, sees nature as natura naturans - nature natur-
ing - i.e., nature actively altering and responding
in various ways to predictable or unpredictable
stresses. This means that not only must one account
for the internal structure of a system and its poten-
tialities, but also the external context of chance and
unpredictable impacts must be incorporated. This
is because the system is presumed capable of some
sort of adaptive memory, i.e., learning through
historical time.
What makes the myth of resilience so difficult to
describe is that it is trying to accomplish so many
things at once, against an existing frame of stable
conceptual reference. Resilience quite deliberately
and radically embraces just those heresies expelled
by stability: ecological systems are neither in equi-
librium nor disequilibrium; they are not ideal-
izations, but realizations; chance is not only not
expelled, but is often a necessary condition for
system maintenance; diversity is welcomed, not
steamrollered; internal dynamics are ruled not just
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by the competitive microcosm, but by intermediate
and whole system factors - and by chance. Further-
more, a system may have a trajectory that is best
observed without consideration of ideal equilibrium
or climax; but as of interest in itself.
This kind of conceptualization might be illumi-
nated by looking at recent developments in
evolutionary theory and paleontology. The original
attack on equilibrium Darwinism, launched by
Stephen J. Gould and others, argued that evolution
was in fact operating by punctuated equilibrium;
that is, that species often formed quite rapidly and
then exhibited stability for millions of years [35].
This suggested that high rates of speciation or spec-
tacularly effective survival strategies might be as
important as gradual honing on nature's constantly
turning grindstone.
However, hardly had this theory achieved promi-
nence when theorists were faced with the possibility
that mass extinctions in the past might have been
the result of sudden chance events such as the
postulated impact of an asteroid on Earth at the
end of the Cretaceous period [36]. This new catas-
trophism implies that often it may be the norm
which is anomalous and that the best survival
strategy may be helpless against unplanned per-
turbations on a large scale. Evolution thus becomes
a process of surprises, mistakes, good luck, substan-
tial failures, dead ends, and useless victories on
many scales: and the world as we see it becomes a
unique historical artifact.
This example may help to explain why much of
recent ecological discussion has used language with
a qualitative or interpretative bias - the new myth
requires a new language for coping with the com-
plex relationship between quantitative events and
their qualitative expression through systems that
are learning as they go along. This language must
also describe how systems internalize externally
generated predictable and unpredictable events.
Hence, the concentration on adaptation and
resilience, and the continuing controversy in
ecology over whether or not diversity increases or
decreases stability. These can be seen as attempts
to capture conceptually the ways in which systems
react to uncertainty through historical time. Two
of the best known of the resilient approaches to
ecological management - stress ecology and adap-
tive environmental management - are consistently
groping with this issue [37].
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Vulnerability and resilience
The controversy in ecology of diversity/vulnerabil-
ity versus diversity/stability provides a good
example of this situation. At its most basic, the issue
depends on the ambiguities inherent in the word
stability, and that depends - as we have seen - on
whether the stability in question is local, global,
single equilibrium, multistable, or even just the per-
sistence through time of the shell of what was for-
merly a complex, thriving ecosystem.
The original conceptual model that related
complexity to stability was intuitive (as much as
anything), taking something from the myth of sta-
bility, as expressed in the "climax" equilibrium
ecosystem model, and something from the vulnera-
bility of simple predator-prey oscillations without
time or refuge resources [38]. We have already
mentioned the possible dangers of simplifying an
ecosystem by single-minded management and the
equation simple equals unstable is superficially plau-
sible. Models have shown, however, that - to take
only one example - adding more trophic levels to a
system may make it less resilient. A single system
such as a desert might be more persistent (and
therefore resilient?) than a tropical forest which has
a multitude of species, but which is essentially
fragile. Yet if the forest covered a very large area,
it might be difficult to change or destroy, except
locally.
Instances such as this could be multiplied, given
a refusal to specify what kind of systems are being
compared, what kind of goals are best for the sys-
tem, or what kind of perturbations it is likely to
face. For example, on this last question the work of
Connell, Grime, Tilman, and others indicates that
a certain amount and type of stress promotes diver-
sity in an ecosystem, by analogy with the way that
the presence of a predator may keep a larger num-
ber of prey species in lower equilibrium than if the
predator were removed, thereby allowing one prey
species to dominate [39].
The fact is that essential to diagnosing the stability
or the vulnerability of a particular system is a con-
tinuing reference to the historical and possible
future contexts within which it operates. Not only
has the system adapted to that context in most cases,
it has also adapted the context to its own ends. The
resilience of a system is due, in part, to the sum of
past vulnerabilities that it has overcome and to the
relevance of that learning experience to future
events. It may only appear to have been resilient in
retrospect, if it has been lucky enough to survive,
lucky enough perhaps to meet a crisis for which it
had been able to prepare. In this sense, a resilient
system has as its main defense the law of prob-
abilities which it has drawn up for itself and stored
as information in the form of species, overall struc-
ture, or functional availability.
The myth of stability, as has been argued, oper-
ates on the principle of damping oscillation and
maximizing available resources in defense. It is a
static response to a kaleidoscopic world, and is a
survival rather than an adaptive strategy.
The myth of resilience, however, assumes that all
things are vulnerable and that it is essential for
long-term survival (which means adaptation) to
learn from events and to be lucky enough to have
encountered a sequence of appropriate events.
Since very often the learning process is dangerous,
a resilient system treads a very fine line between
learning and collapse, i.e., it often deliberately puts
itself into hazardous situations - in other words, it
courts surprise.
Surprise
The heterogeneity of time and the complex physical
relations between a system and its context
necessarily involve the formation of surprises. The
attitude of a system and its managers to such sur-
prises is, as has been (we hope) amply stated, part
and parcel of its primary myth. Again, as was stated
in the Introduction, surprise is an elusive concept,
fraught with paradoxical uncertainty.
There are a number of ways of exploring sur-
prise, but here it may be wise to emphasize the
interactions between an event, the perceptions of
that event, and the basic frame of interpretative
reference which may accept or reject the implica-
tions of any particular surprise. To invoke interpre-
tation is once again to invoke myth; and in trying
to develop surprise into a working concept, it hap-
pens that actual myth criticism and anthropology
have a particularly interesting role. This could
be coincidental, but it is more likely to be due
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to simultaneous conceptual developments across a
broad intellectual front.
The myth framework proposed by Northrop
Frye, enlisted here because of his concentration on
the transformation of myth in the modern western
world from religious to secular patterns, provides
a good starting point. In works such as An Anatomy
of Criticism and The Critical Path, Frye [40] suggests
that, until the rise of secularism, the western world
operated according to the following fundamentally
Christian worldview. At the top was heaven, the
ideal paradise, perfection: at the bottom was hell,
complete imperfection. Between these two poles
was the world of nature, through which human
beings wandered. Because of sin, men would be led
to take the world of nature as the only real world
and would eventually be dragged down to hell. If,
however, they were able to perceive that their
humanity partook of something higher than nature,
they could become pilgrims, and would be able to
climb up to God. Each of these worlds or options
had its own set of metaphorical or image clusters
(e.g., paradise was up toward heaven on a hill) which
reinforced the structure.
Interestingly enough, Frye's pattern resembles
very closely the one we have been outlining, so we
may be involved in a very odd process of recapitulat-
ing aspects of previous theological myths on the
secular level. The parallels are compelling:
(I) Heaven - perfect, stable, self-contained, inter-
nally defined, infinitely timeless (myth of sta-
bility).
(2) Pilgrimage nature - Natura naturans. Nature as
a learning experience, altered by the perception
of the pilgrim and the course of the journey
(myth of resilience).
(3) Cyclical nature - the possibility of renewal in
nature (myth of cyclical renewal).
(4) Wandering nature - Natura naturata. Sometimes
stable, sometimes unstable, nature is unpredict-
able, and appears to need controlling (myth of
multiple stability).
(5) Hell- imperfect, drastic, catastrophic, eternally
static (myth of instability).
Essential to these mythical patterns is the use or
rejection of surprise. The myth of instability (hell)
produces no surprises because there is only one
result of the system. The myth of stability is
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equivocal, but cannot theoretically cope with major
surprises, because everything is theoretically know-
able or under control. It proposes itself as infinitely
all-knowing and timeless. For the myth of multiple
stability surprises are expected, but are unpredict-
able or have no wider context within which to func-
tion. For the myth of resilience, however, not only
is there surprise, but it is revelatory surprise. The
pilgrim is constantly tested, surprised, and educated
as he or she proceeds [41 J. Indeed, in Christianity,
such surprises are essential eruptions of meaning
into hitherto inexplicable reality. These are called
epiphanies and their function is suddenly to illumi-
nate the underlying meaning or trajectory of the
system (i.e., there is a redemptive heaven).
We can bring these speculations down to Earth
by comparing such a myth system to the work of
anthropologists, such as Mary Douglas [42J and
Michael Thompson [43], on the different types of
rationality expressed by different types of social
groups. The basic rationality (or background order)
of each group is seen as a function of, first, the
classification by these social groupings of those
anomalies or borderline cases that challenge the
accepted structure of reality, and, second, each
group's perception of the real risks and hazards.
The social context may be illustrated by a graph
(Figure 16.6), on which the horizontal axis rep-
resents group pressures (pressures to join and
pressures to exclude others) from low to high; and
the vertical line represents grid pressures (pressures
to provide a framework for reality by means of rules
or taboos).
The social contexts represented in Figure 16.6
are:
(1) High grid-high group, e.g., a caste system or
strong bureaucracy.
(2) Low grid-high group, e.g., a communal group
with few internal rules, but strong exclusive
ones.
(3) Low grid-low group, e.g., the entrepreneurial
capitalist.
(4) High grid-low group, e.g., the alienated,
befuddled citizen.
(5) The autonomous hermit.
Each of these five social contexts operates within
a particular worldview and each has a particular
relationship to those anomalies or surprises that
wcain
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Figure 16.6 The grid-group graph.
either do not fit into the operational categories of
the context or challenge the foundations of that
context. This presents us with yet another matching
version of our original set of myths. From Figure
16.6, the low grid-low grou p world is that of the
entrepreneur, the microcosmic operator of Adam
Smith's world, the myth of stability; all anomalies
or surprises are either ignored or treated as gambles
or as indications for the need to shift to a new set
of market inputs. The high grid-low group world
is the realm of the alienated citizen (or the failed
entrepreneur), to whom all anomalies and surprises
are indicators that "no one is really in control", i.e.,
the myth of instability. The high grid-high grou p
world is that of the myth of multiple stability - there
are thresholds to be maintained and surprises are
indications of areas where new control strategies
need to be considered. The low grid-high group
world is that of the myth of resilience; here the
world is seen to be discontinuous, with both short-
and long-term surprises in the offing. And last, the
center contains the potential for controlled cycling
through each of the other zones - cyclic renewal.
Frye's myth criticism reminds us that, in the
modern world, these social groupings are inter-
twined with the overall process of secular myth
formation. This is of cardinal importance when one
recognizes that since the Renaissance we have been
largely concerned with the left-hand side of Figure
16.6, i.e., the fate of the individual. Only in the last
century has the high grid-high group organization
of a worldwide bureaucracy and administration
come to dominate our lives. To expand on this
slightly, the elimination of the theological explana-
tion for all events, surprising or otherwise, meant
that the individual now became subject only to for-
tune. This is the world described by Machiavelli
[44] and central to the doctrine of the Renaissance
humanists. In this world, the genius or strong man
is master of his fate; or, if not altogether master, is
possessed of such virtues that fortune would smile
upon him and make him prosper. Unfortunately,
this pattern of rewarded virtue is subject to surprises
and uncertainties which undermine the doctrine of
the self-made man. Even a Leonardo da Vinci might
not be immune from a falling roof tile or a sudden
unexpected fatal illness.
One of the strongest drives of modernism is the
drive to remove this possibility of humiliation as
much as is feasible, as well as to hide from us the
ultimate undermining absurdity of death. This
chapter has nothing to say about the latter; the
former, however, had been transformed by the
growing power of science and bureaucratic manage-
ment to control much of the previously wayward
world and to reduce the role of risk in our lives.
This, we have argued, is the high grid-high group
quadrant of the social context graph, to which
the neutral, but systematic, rules of bureaucratic
rationality belong. Thompson proposes that this
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bureaucratic group has a dyadic relationship with
the entrepreneurial, individualistic grou p in the
stability quadrant. This is easy to understand: the
semiautonomous individual is still the fundamental
underpinning of western society; while, at the same
time, entrepreneurial capitalism remains (in the
west) the engine of prosperity. The bureaucracy is
thus committed to flattening out anomalies and
surprises from the perspective of the myth of sta-
bility.
By virtue of its position and ethos, however, the
bureaucracy is also committed to rules of systematic
rationality (as famously described by Max Weber
[45]). Its justification for existence is ultimately its
ability to manage rationally a world of increasing
complexity, since only the bureaucracy is sup-
posedly capable of acquiring all the information
necessary to calculate what would constitute "the
greatest good for the greatest possible number," or
provide for new Pareto optimalities (where further
improvements would leave no one worse off than
before). This means that the bureaucracy cannot be
- or be perceived to be - a reckless gambler.
Rationally, the bureaucracy is supposed to be con-
sidering the long-term good of its masters, the
public.
Much of the time, however, the bureaucracy can
mak~ forgiveable mistakes, because of the ability of
nature benign or cornucopian to be harnessed by
the entrepreneur. In any serious conflict over the
distribution of goods, the issue can be sidestepped
in rich societies by giving each participant in the
conflict a part or all of the ever-enlarging pie (or a
promissory note that part of the pie will come to
the participant in the near future). This gives the
bureaucracy an even bigger stake in nature benign
or cornucopian, because, when the possibility of
limits or shrinkage occurs, serious political decisions
based on conflicting moral values and preferred
social goals may have to be made - a prospect the
broadly utilitarian system is designed to avoid.
As a result, the bureaucratic management struc-
ture oscillates between nature cornucopian and
nature susceptible to rational management. Its
sophisticated analytic power can often present to
the manager the data indicating that the system is,
in fact, based on multiple stability points; but the
social context continues to drive the bureaucracy
toward managing the system as if there were only
one such point. The examples provided in this
Sustainable dfl'elopmenl of the biosphere
chapter and elsewhere in this book show that this
drive toward the myth of stability may cause the
managed system to flip-flop instead into instability
and collapse.
What the myth of resilience (and the attendant
concept of surprise) proposes is that the manager
of a system should try to move toward the lower
right side of the graph in Figure 16.6. Understand-
ably, however, the manager can be easily frightened
by the short-term loss of control that such a move
entails. Resilience seems to im ply the loss of all
control, just as if one were already in the domain
of instability, but this time the manager is expected
to "sit back and enjoy the ride". This flies in the
face of all notions of ordinary management practice.
To put it briefly, the loss of short-term control is
unacceptable; with the result that long-term under-
standing is impossible.
It is here that the concept of surprise comes into
its own and may prove to be crucial in convincing
managers and policymakers that resilient systems-
management is a viable proposition. First of all,
surprises should be reevaluated as indispensable
elements or tools for the understanding of how
systems operate. If they are handled properly, they
could even be seen as a valuable resource - in
Nietslche's phrase: "Whatever does not kill me,
strengthens me [46]."
For this reorientation to take place, however, we
need to have a clearer view of what kinds of surprise
we might have to handle; and, indeed, a clearer
view of surprise in general. To this end, and to join
together the disparate threads of our wide-ranging
discussion, we make a brief attempt to produce a
taxonomy of surprise, based on the concerns
already outlined (see Brooks, Chapter 11, this
volume).
In the context of economic theory, Shackle [47]
some years ago proposed the following definition
of surprise:
. .. surprise is that dislocation and subversion of
received thoughts, which springs from an actual
experience outside of what has been judged fully
possible, or else an experience of a character which
has never been imagined and thus never assessed as
either possible or impossible: a counter-expected or
else an unexpected event ...
Using this definition as a starting point, we can
formulate a taxonomy (which would serve as the
basis for the research agenda outlined in
r/
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the following section). As in Popperian [48] theory,
and as in the myth of resilience, surprises and
uncertainties in relevant contexts can be seen as
valuable sources of information.
Surprises can appear in four basic ways: they can
erupt from a system, irrupt (into) a system from
outside, they can bypass a system, or they can result
from the system and its external context mutually
creating an interactive surprise. The ability of these
trajectories of surprise events to inform the obser-
ver might be ranked on this scale of increasing
intensity:
(l) Anomalies - surprises that are marginal,
puzzling, but not enough to alter perception.
(2) Shocks - surprises that are extensive or inten-
sive, but which freeze the system or cause it to
act inappropriately.
(3) Epiphanies - surprises that are central and
reveal essential characteristics of the system
dynamics in a useful way.
(4) Catastrophies - surprises that destroy a system
before it can make any use of the event.
The myth of resilience is in the business of sur-
prises that are epiphanic without being catastrophic.
Uncertainty is harnessed in the service of under-
standing.
A research agenda
Can surprise thus described be put into the
framework of the sustainable development of the
biosphere?
Perhaps the most interesting suggestion
prompted by the taxonomy is that surprise as a
diagnostic tool may provide us with ways of coping
with the paradoxes implied by the management of
a bounded biosphere. For example, we might con-
sider engineering preemptive surprises, i.e., to
experiment with actual systems to see how they will
respond, but at a level of surprise below the cata-
strophic. We could - as in stress ecology - consider
how actual, inadvertent experiments-in-progress
are provoking responses out of substantially unex-
plored complex systems. In these and other ways,
we can learn to maneuver and adapt constructively
to the inevitable - but unpredictable - surprises that
are to come.
In this chapter I have argued, by analogy, implica-
tion, and example, that the sustainable development
of the biosphere is both indicated by and subject to
a parallel conceptual development, a development
that could best be described as a passage through
various mythologies. This conceptual development
would be of only marginal real-world importance
if there was no way of coming to grips with it except
in literary or symbolic contexts.
It happens, however, that in economic systems,
in the management of ecological systems, and in
the elusive formation of policy, some of these
approaches to coping with the uncertainties of the
present and the even greater uncertainties of the
future are already operational. And some of them
are also pathological. If surprises and uncertainties
are as potentially perilous for the sustainable
development of the biosphere as they appear to be,
then the incorporation of coping with surprise into
biospheric management - and into management at
other levels as well- is a priority; and it is amenable
to useful research programs.
Key elements of a useful research program, which
could be undertaken by the International Institute
for Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) and other
suitable organizations, would include:
(l) The proposed taxonomy of surprise needs to
be elaborated and, if possible, linked to other,
appropriate, adaptive management techniques
and concepts.
(2) Historical studies of ways in which natural and
social systems have responded to past surprises
and how they have incorporated the lessons
learned into their warning, responding, and
adapting mechanisms.
(3) Analysis of ways in which flexible, adaptive sys-
tems provoke small-scale surprises, continually
testing and upgrading their responsiveness to
environmental changes.
(4) Analysis of the scale of surprises, with a view to
fitting their time and space characteristics into
the scale change concepts now being developed
in ecological and historical research [49].
(5) Perhaps most urgent is the application of the
insights of the concepts of surprise and the myth
of resilience to the pathology of technical
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monocultures and the inappropriate manage-
ment of natural systems into self-simplification,
instability, and collapse. Clear, documented
examples of these phenomena, with the
appropriate conclusions drawn from them, may
pave the way toward a reorientation of policies,
thus bridging the gap between our present
short-term needs and the long-term goal of a
sustainable future.
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Commentary
M. Thompson
My fear is that Timmerman's important message
may not cut across all the disciplinary boundaries
as strongly as it should. He is too polite. My com-
ments, therefore, are aimed solely at remedying
this fault. I will try to say, as rudely as possible, what
it is that I think he is saying.
Making things subservient to ideas is seldom a
popular move, as Keynes discovered when he
pointed out that the practical man who claims to
have no use for theory is invariably the slave of
some defunct economist. Hard scientists, we might
expect, are scarcely likely to thank Timmerman as
he deftly sorts them into Malthus-slaves and Smith-
slaves on the basis of the myths of nature to which
they unwittingly subscribe. But personal popularity
is not what is at stake here nor, to nail another myth,
are all hard scientists resistant to this seemingly
threatening and insulting interpretation of their
endeavors. The "invisible college" that Timmer-
man invokes in support of his thesis is largely made
up of hard scientists, and even harder
mathematicians: an elite and anarchistic band of
high-achievers who are only too happy to find them-
selves rubbing shoulders with some of our more
adventurous and hard-thinking anthropologists,
theologians, literary critics, and historians. The new
paradigm that Timmerman calls for is, I suggest,
all around us. To ask when it will appear is like
asking "When will the Mafia get into politics?"
Of course we define problems and select facts so
as to defend and rationalize preferred patterns of
social relations; of course an event is not surprising
or unsurprising in itself, but only in relation to a
particular set of beliefs about how the world is; of
course a surprise is only a surprise if it is noticed by
the holder of the beliefs that it contradicts. In policy
debates as transscientific as the sustainable develop-
ment of the biosphere, to deny the existence and
centrality of such knowledge-shaping and attention-
directing processes is simply to reveal that you are
no longer in touch with the state of the art.
Myths of nature, as Holling has pointed out, are
not lies; they are partial representations of reality.
Such myths are the cultural devices by which we
can capture, in elegant and simple form, some
essence of experience and wisdom. Myths, in the
face of our inevitably incomplete knowledge, guide
our actions and moderate our fear of the unknown.
Without myths we would be in a bad way. Since
each is replete with accumulated wisdom, the ques-
tion is not whether we should have myths or not,
but, rather, which myths should we have. The
obvious answer is to have them all - to pool all that
accumulated wisdom and experience - but this
option, it would seem, is not available. Each myth
contradicts all the others, and to embrace one we
must first re jeet the rest. Timmerman's historical
survey, and a host of case studies in the area of
environmental policy, show us that we do this not
with reluctance but with alacrity. Different manage-
ment institutions home-in onto the different myths
and, once there, cling onto them as if their very
lives depended on them. Cultural theory shows us
that they do.
Preferred patterns of social relations - the ego-
focused network of the entrepreneur, the hierarchi-
cally nested group of the bureaucrat ... the
egalitarian bounded group of the coercive utopian
- are inevitably in contention with one another.
They have to be fought for, they have to be defen-
ded, and each strives to ensure its own viability by
inculcating in its constitutive individuals a distinc-
tive organizational culture - a view of the world, a
set of moral principles, a shared understanding of
the problems it faces, and a unified blanket of igno-
rance - that, above all else, is designed to ensure the
continued existence of that particular pattern of
social relations. The bureaucrat (Kuhn's normal
scientist) can no more come to terms with his struc-
tural ignorance than the entrepreneur (the interdis-
ciplinarian) can abandon her faith in the market
place of idea~, or the coercive utopian (the limits-to-
growth man) his conviction that there must be
radical change now, before it is too late. Each arrives
on the latest, and most presumptuous, battle-
ground - the biosphere - fully accoutred. Each sees
in it what he wants to see; what she has to see: the
facts that will justify the policies that will usher in
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the sort of planet he craves. "What a wonderful
place the world would be," cry the members of each
organizational culture, "if only everyone was like
us," conveniently ignoring the fact that it is only
the presence in the world of people who are not
like them that enables them to be the way they are.
We cannot synthesize the myths and the systems
of knowledge that they sustain; their fundamental
contradictions preclude this. Nor can we declare a
cultural truce and each bring our sustaining igno-
rances out into the open. There is no bias-free posi-
tion; there is no knowledge untainted by the institu-
tions that promote it; there is no cosmic exile. But
what we can do is concede that this is how things
are, and that the inevitable contradictions and con-
tentions in this state of affairs lead not to chaos but
to an essential pluralism. Nor are the cultural con-
straints that ever shape and update the myths of
nature the only constraints on this pluralism. There
are the natural constraints as well; that is where the
surprises come from. So the new paradigm, though
it rejects the traditional separation of facts and
values that has for so long kept the sciences and the
humanities away from each other, is founded not
on old-style relativism but on a pattern-creating
dynamic - a system - of constrained relativism. Cul-
tural constraints and natural constraints are both at
work and have to be explored together if we are to
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do the best we can for the biosphere which, like it
or not, is now at our mercy. To ask "Can we manage
the biosphere?" is to ask "Can we manage our
institutions?"
The new institutional economics provides us with
a handy guide for exploring these two important
questions. It is the ever-increasing scale and com-
plexity of our social transactions - our economic
system - that has propelled us from spectator to
lead actor on the biospheric stage. This means that
such ability as we have to manage the biosphere is
one and the same as the ability we have to manage
our social transactions. Markets, hierarchies, and
sects (egalitarian bounded groups) - the basic com-
ponents of our institutions - are best understood
as competing, yet complementary, arrangements
for the handling of social transactions. Each has its
advantages and its disadvantages and our concern
should not be with which one is right - that is a
meaningless question - but with the question of
appropriateness: "Which kinds of transactions are
best handled by which kind of institutional arrange-
ment?" There is no final solution; there is no com-
plete knowledge. All we can do is learn and tinker,
tinker and learn. Diversity, contradiction, conten-
tion, and criticism are our finest resources. We must
learn to husband them and make the most of them.
Divided we stand; united we fall.
j
Chapter 17
G. D. Brewer
Methods for synthesis:
policy exercises
Editors' Introduction: The ultimate challenge for the Biosphere Program is to think
creatively about exceedingly complex social and environmental phenomena that interact
and evolve over large time and space scales. The problems of analyzing, interpreting, and
ultimately synthesizing the vast quantities of scientific and human knowledge relevant to
the sustainable development of the biosphere are daunting.
Reviewed in this chapter are the alternative methods - models, simulations, and games
- that have been used to address these crucial tasks. It is argued that the experience of
the last decade shows large computer models to be more often obstacles than aids to
creative, exploratory thinking. It is recommended that, instead, a series of new experi-
mental "policy exercises" be undertaken, based on military experiences of free-form,
manual games combined with carefully crafted strategic scenarios. Specific procedures
for the policy exercises are described.
The problem
Information is the universal resource, the funda-
mental means by which human problems are under-
stood and resolved. It connects our past to the
present and helps us confront the future. Data we
collect and analyze and decisions based on them
determine how we and future generations live.
But there are difficulties. Although there are now
vastly improved means of observation and measure-
ment, particularly in the scientific realm, our capac-
ity to analyze, interpret, and use data for social and
policy purposes has failed to keep pace. Insufficient
effort is not the fault. Quite the contrary, vast
experience exists in the research and policy com-
munities to create and use information; but results
have been mixed.
Many possible reasons for lack of success exist.
Not as common are efforts to clarify these reasons,
so to make constructive and lasting improvements
[I]. The following discussion is so intended. It is
also wide ranging and provocative, with experiences
from a variety of substantive fields and disciplines
being recounted. Specific efforts to solve the energy
problem, the pollution problem, the extended juris-
dictions problem, or dozens of other problems sub-
sumed within the human and biosphere rubric all
offer potential insights and lessons for the future -
but only if we view such experiences as observation
points, not as personal investments to be both
attacked and defended. Likewise, no particular
intellectual discipline or professional group has
been conspicuously successful in its grasp and
resolution of some of mankind's most complex
and consequential problems. Which is not to
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say that such disciplines and groups have not
tried.
Many difficulties impede better creation and use
of policy-relevant knowledge. The complexity of
the systems involved, human perception and value,
limited theories and weak methodological tools, and
profound uncertainties about the future all figure
prominently. These vast topics matter and merit
serious, open, and relentless consideration.
Time is short; the needs are enormous. One may
be optimistic or pessimistic about the prospects. The
optimists, while acknowledging the difficulties, typi-
cally call attention to the propitious moment at hand
in which many substantial and fundamental changes
must occur [2]. The pessimists, as typically, counter
with gloomy forecasts of mounting catastrophes as
resources are consumed and overexploited, con-
flicts mount, and societies are tested as never before
[3].
I prefer to side with the optimists. The alternative
is simply too depressing. But casting one's lot with
the hopeful is not to underestimate the difficulties
nor to deny the realities. Consider for a moment
the kinds of problems we face.
Beyond rationality's reach
Take the site selection and construction of a nuclear
power plant. As long as the objectives are defined
in technical terms, such as devising an efficient plant
design or determining the amount of energy to be
produced, the problem may be difficult, but it is
still amenable to analysis. But when concern for the
environment, safety, and other competing and
value-laden objectives enter the picture, the prob-
lem passes beyond some threshold of difficulty and
overwhelms attempts at rational analysis. The sim-
plicity and clarity of technical facts yield to con-
troversy and subjectivity [4]. Facts, as commonly
understood, provide little definitive help in resolv-
ing such questions. As competing interests and goals
become more insistent, the problem becomes quite
insoluble. And as a consequence, it becomes nearly
impossible to produce a logically consistent set of
policies or programs. Attention to the "big picture"
gives way to "fragmented and personalized interests
and values," which are "difficult to reconcile with
integrated and rational planning and foresight [2,
piS]."
Sustainable development of the biosphere
Or take the problem of managing a specific
fishery, especially as concerns the potential contri-
butions science and analysis might make to it. There
is no theory capable of predicting the biological,
economic, political, and social consequences of a
natural event such as EI Nino off the Peruvian
coast that resulted in the collapse of one of the
largest fisheries in the world [5, 6]. There is even
confusion and dispute among scientists about the
underlying mechanisms of the event itself [7],
whether the anchoveta will ever return to abun-
dance [8], when this may happen, or whether any-
one ought to be planning or counting on anything
connected with the fishery in the future [9]. But
these are precisely the kinds of questions that must
be confronted, somehow.
Some focus on the economic dimensions of the
fisheries problem and none would dispute the
importance of doing so. The disputes arise when
the economic perspective is uninformed and
untempered by many other perspectives. A pure
economic solution that advocates efficiency through
open markets with centralized ownership of the
world's fish by nonexistent international authorities
is illustrative [10]. But despite its theoretical ele-
gance, this solution is simply not politically or practi-
cally feasible. And so, it is no solution at all.
Well-meaning agents in development agencies
and banks naturally fix on the investment potential
of fisheries in the developing world. To many of
them the fisheries problem is conceived as providing
capital to increase efficient harvesting, primarily by
upgrading boats and gear. Around the world, but
in southeast Asia particularly, the intended efficien-
cies have been achieved, but at other unaccounted
for and substantial costs:
Most of the coastal fisheries of Southeast Asia are
approaching or have exceeded maximally sustainable
yield, because of the tremendous increases in fishing
efforts over the last two decades. Ever increasing
numbers of small-scale fishermen and the introduc-
tion of highly effective gear types such as the trawl
have combined to pose a serious threat to these
valuable but vulnerable resources [II].
The biological threat has distributional consequen-
ces, too:
Rapid growth of trawler fleets which directly compete
with small-scale fishermen has increased the pressure
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and introduced a serious problem of distribution of
benefits from the fisheries [II].
Technological and economic efficiencies are real-
ized in the short term, while the resource remains
viable, at the expense of social goals of more equal
access to the resource:
Small-scale production units employ substantially
more people per unit of investment, result in wider
and more equitable distribution of income, and
spread ownership of capital over a substantial num-
ber of households [II].
The basic theme here is that investment and
development decisions must be taken with serious
regard for whole contexts, including important cul-
tural, social, and political dimensions. This has not
happened. The consequences are manifest and the
costs are rising dangerously.
A secondary theme is biological and relates to
resource vitality and the intelligence necessary to
keep it so. It also calls attention to the limited tools
and power of marine resource stewards. "All or
nothing", high technology versus artisanal, are
the gross choices facing the stewards. And these
choices may be about the best possible under preva-
lent constraints - facts of life neither biologists,
economists, investment bankers, nor politicians
want to deal with, or are equipped to deal with.
Science and the disciplined, rational principles
on which it is based are scarcely able to explain
these events, account for the practical realities, or
even begin to sort out or foretell their various con-
sequences. Prevalent analytic paradigms and par-
ticular intellectual perspectives are extremely
limited as a means to comprehend and inform real-
istic choices. And even in those instances where
choices have been made, where policies and institu-
tions exist, they "All too often are devised on the
basis of ridiculously simplistic views of the resource
system [5, p 237]." A very different way of thinking
seems to be called for.
The clash of perspectives
Our problems are intricate and changeable and
often mean very different things to those involved.
Neither the problems and the settings in which they
occur, nor the possible solutions stand still. They
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evolve naturally and in response to efforts to under-
stand and resolve them. Furthermore, despite the
considerable temptations of the optimal or best so-
lutions that enthusiasts seek and the individual disci-
plines seem to provide, what is thought to be optimal
from one perspective often turns out to be dreadful
from another.
The clash of perspectives quickly leads to a clash
of interests and to conflicts at the extreme. Little is
accomplished by presuming that everyone involved
appreciates specific problems the same way. Even
less is accomplished by ignoring legitimate differen-
ces in view and preference, whether one agrees with
or even understands them or not [12]. Individuals
exhibit highly different capacities to see, compre-
hend, and value events, circumstances, and environ-
ments [13, 14, 15]. What people see and what it
means to them is not the simple matter it appears,
but it is an essential starting point on the road to
improved policy knowledge.
So, for example, when the engineer says that a
specified nuclear power plant design will produce
a given number of kilowatts for a specific price, he
or she is placing a different emphasis and value on
the future than the environmentalist who worries
about safety and reliability. When an economist
talks about efficient markets and assumes that insti-
tutions are readily created to fit economic visions
of the problem, the equally important equity, distri-
butional, and feasibility goals others value and seek
are being slighted. And so it proceeds on through
a long list of people and perspectives.
So whose perception or grasp of problems is
better? No one's and everyone's: all relevant per-
spectives matter, each illuminates problems
differently, in both angle and intensity. When taken
together in composite, moreover, the various views
begin to give one a better sense of the complexity
of the whole [16].
Perspectives assume special importance as they
allow individuals to link the past with the present
and to imagine the future. In its most abstract and
aggregate form, the collective image has been
refered to as policy - a concrete manifestation of
the collective perception of the future [17, pp 25-
26]. The future is filled with numerous unrealized
potentialities, which individuals may imagine and
appraise according to their own experiences, iden-
tities, and expectations. Hopes, fears, and surprises
understandably suffuse the entire enterprise.
,
,
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Surprises: wishful and fearful thinking
The future is both contingent and intentional,
conditions seldom well accounted for in ordinary
policy research. The key point is that data are not
available about the future. Data represent an
historical accounting whose persistence into the
future is always problematic. Inconstancy we call
"surprise."
Past patterns may change in response to systemic
evolutions or because of direct intervention, i.e.,
policy choices. Heavy reliance on data from the past
imparts a conservative bias on one's reckoning of
the future. And the older the data used and/or the
farther into the future one pushes analyses based
on them, the more likely are surprises.
Relying on old assumptions about the world can
be as misinforming as depending on old data.
Ascher refers to this as "assumption drag," or "the
reliance on old core assumptions" with the con-
sequence of creating "some of the most drastic
errors in forecasting [IS]."
Fearful and wishful thinking about the future
have also had drastic consequences, especially in
military matters, but not only there [19]. Assuming
absolutely the worst about potential adversaries, and
then preparing accordingly, has given rise to worst-
case analyses among warfare specialists and self-
fulfillment by their policymaking clientele. Wishful
thinking follows from selected discernment and
optimistic biasing of facts about a likely opponent
compared with one's own capabilities. These com-
mon and distinctive styles of viewing the future are
evident in recent alarming analyses and rebuttals
over the prospects of nuclear winter [20], in many
of the analyses of the 1970s on the energy crisis
[21], and, of course, in the Star Wars debates of the
19S0s.
So what does this add up to? Among other things
one needs to be as self-conscious as possible about
the inherent biases found in any policy analysis and
to make these available for all to see and consider;
to treat all assumptions, beliefs, and perceptions as
transparently as possible; and to view the problem
at hand from as many different perspectives as time
and talent allow [22]. These matters have deep
intellectual roots and have stimulated controversies
over the years. Many of the problems revolve about
the methods and tools one uses in policy work, a
topic to which I turn next [23].
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A reconsideration of methods
There are many different categories of methods
and almost an equal number of reasons why each
might be used for policy purposes. This rich diver-
sity is not well appreciated, at least as one surveys
the methods commonly used and their usuallimita-
tions. In this section I set forth a range of methods
and potential applications and conclude by critically
listing basic problems encountered by those relying
on large-scale, machine (computer) models. In sub-
sequent sections of the chapter I build upon this
critique and elaborate different methods and pro-
cedures thought to be in better keeping with the
aspirations of the collective Man and Biosphere
Project.
Methods: models, simulations, and
games
For a variety of reasons it is difficult to define satis-
factorily what a model is or to state precisely what
gaming and simulation mean. However, four useful
methodological categories are distinguishable: analytic
models, machine simulations, man-machine games,
and free-form games [24]. And at least a working
definition of the term model is possible: it is a rep-
resentation of an entity or situation by something
else having the relevant features or properties of
the original [25, p 10].
Analytic models are usually quite abstract, poor
in the number of variables explicitly considered,
but rich in the ease of manipulation and clarity of
insight. They may describe a phenomenon or situ-
ation with a series of equations or they may rep-
resent a set of logical relationships manipulable
according to formal rules.
Numerically defined variables must be well
understood and their unit of measurement known.
A barrel of oil, in this sense, satisfies the require-
ments; distrust in one's government probably does
not. Despite the importance distrust may have in
given realistic settings, we have very little hard
knowledge about it. Rather than excluding or
including it in spurious mathematical form, it may
be necessary to treat distrust verbally.
Game theory, as a distinct specialty field, contains
many excellent examples of analytic models [26].
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Excellence here commonly derives from the
analyst's clear understanding of the severe limita-
tions of his or her model, most particularly the
simplifying assumptions made to secure representa-
tion. Another aspect is clarity about the differences
between the model and the part of reality it stands
for. In other words, little effort is expended trying
to capture everything in one model; alternative
formulations, emphasizing different features and
pursuing different questions, are accepted.
Simulation, a second category of methods, usually
means representation of a system or organism by
another, simpler, more abstract system or model
having relevant behavioral similarity to the original.
A machine simulation uses either digital or analog
equipment to achieve representation.
In contrast to analytic models, machine simula-
tions frequently involve many variables; many seem
to make a fetish of realism. This is often misplaced
and demonstrates a logical fallacy of pictorial real-
ism: a supposition that a model's usefulness is pro-
portional to its size and degree of detail.
Machine simulations are valuable under certain
conditions, but not others. In general, they are a
method of last resort to be used when:
(1) It is impossible or too costly to observe processes
or events in the real world.
(2) The observed system is beyond the reach of
other methods.
Machine simulations should not be used, or only
used circumspectly, when:
(1) Simpler techniques exist.
(2) Data are inadequate.
(3) Objectives are not clear.
(4) Short-term deadlines must be met.
(5) The problems are minor.
The superficial attractiveness of machine models
has led to their widespread use; however, such use
has been highly uneven in quality, despite the con-
siderable attention paid. Machine models have
proved very hard to control. Not only are scientific
and other appraisal standards poorly developed -
and applied - but there is little consensus among
professionals as to what are proper standards.
Advocacy and adversarial uses of these tools are
common.
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The contrast between the abstraction of analytic
models and the spurious realism of many machine
simulations suggests we consider options in the
middle of these.
Man-machine games place humans in the loop.
People may be used either as elements of the system
or as objects of study. In the former case, such as
a systems engineering or an operations research
study, humans may be used because they are
cheaper than software; in the latter, they may be
used because human factors, such as judgment, are
important for the problem being analyzed.
Free-form, manual gaming involves teams and a
referee group operating within the framework of
a scenario. If computational equipment is used, it
typically serves as an adjunct to ongoing activities.
Such games are designed to conform to a plausible
future situation and, in their most common,
military, application, these situations are conflictful.
A scenario describes key events from the past, pro-
vides a context for the present, and serves as a
common pool of information during play. Actions
and reactions of numerous players are examined
and woven together by the referee (control) team
during game play. Moves result from consideration
of options, ob jectives, and constraints by team mem-
bers, as mediated by control.
Free-form games do not prove anything in the
scientific sense. They do help portray the com-
plexities of the situations represented; their role
playing aspects aid understanding of different per-
spectives, including contradictions and inconsisten-
cies between them. Discovery is highly valued. Typi-
cally, positions, expectations, perceptions, facts, and
procedures are revealed and subjected to challenge.
Thus, imagination and innovation play central roles
in the drama of the free-form game. The game
allows players to challenge, and improve, the initiat-
ing scenario, including its explicit and implicit
assumptions.
Purposes
In characterizing models, simulations, and games
several distinctive purposes for their existence and
use have been mentioned. Explicit treatment of the
main possibilities is needed, however. Each of our
four categories has been used for operational,
teaching and training, experimental, and entertainment
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reasons, although not in equal measure for each
kind. Of these, the operational rationale is most
interesting. Operational models, simulations, and
games have many different characteristic applica-
tions (Table 17.1).
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Big models: part of the problem
The evidence mounts that large-scale modeling
activities meant to inform decision and policy pro-
cesses are not fulfilling their promise [27]. The
Table 17.1 Applications of operational models, simulations, and games.
Application Characteristics
Exploration
Planning
Cross-check
Forecasting
Group opinion
Advocacy
Stimulation of constructive explorations of problems that are either not well
understood or are misunderstood. Especially in free-form, scenario-based versions,
discovery and realization of unimagined difficulties are opportunities that occur.
(Usually linked with evaluation). Technical, doctrinal, and procedural inquiries
meant to prepare for or assess operational systems, e.g., weapons systems,
logistics systems, organizations, information systems, economic systems.
A back-up procedure to provide additional insight and confidence to
recommendations devised with other means. For example, expert opinion or
consultation - primarily based on experience - may be examined with games or
simulations to discover flaws or inconsistencies not reported or overlooked.
Making predictions, especially about poorly understood problems, is far less
interesting an application than several of the others here characterized. Users must
know what they want to forecast, be able to judge the value to be gained from
additional forecast accuracy, and have confidence that the builders of the
forecasting device possess a good abstraction of the system being studied.
Most realistic policy decisions are based largely on expert opinion and judgment.
While little explored or used, games and simulations have operational potential for
eliciting, clarifying, and improving expert opinion, considered individually or in
groups.
A competent modeler can build just about any bias imaginable into a game or
simulation. A one-sided case can be presented, unintentionally too, in support of a
partisan policy or position. In a bureaucratic context, the use of models, particularly
large-scale machine-based ones, has led to considerable confusion about the
differences between political processes and scientific ones. Advocacy need not be
pernicious, especially if its existence is openly admitted and its benefits are
consciously sought.
Of all the possible links between categories of
method and application, one that frequently
appears is machine simulation used for forecasting
and/or predictive purposes, at least this is stated as
the aspiration. Other types of methods and pur-
poses are far less evident, although the difficulties
commonly encountered by those producing and
using computer-based models, especially the large-
scale ones, are well enough known that other
approaches seem warranted. Several of these
difficulties are summarized next.
problem is deeply embedded and persistent. Some
of its deeper roots can be traced to basic confusions
that appear among those who commission, build,
and use these tools [28]; others are more funda-
mental and reflect a low-level understanding of
differences between policy analysis and scientific
work [29].
Any model, no matter what its size, embodies a
single perspective on a problem. That perspective
is sensitive to and qualified by the steps taken
to formulate it. The significance of the model is
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furthermore sensitive to and qualified by the
judgment exercised in interpreting it with respect
to its surrounding context. Once a problem's logic
is set out, alternative perspectives should be
generated and examined for their theoretical and
technical content. Thus different groups of
individuals need to work on complementary
analyses to illuminate a problem according to their
own distinctive capabilities, biases, perspectives, and
expectations [30].
Big models are seductive. The time, talent, and
resources necessary to produce them represent
large sunk and opportunity costs. Sunk costs, the
economic paradigm informs us, are meant to be
ignored; unfortunately, for many, the sunk costs of
large-model projects have to be rationalized so as
to justify them. Opportunity costs are seldom con-
sidered. But they may be considerable, especially
in settings where research and analysis monies are
finite and in demand. The seduction occurs as sunk
and opportunity costs converge. The models take
on lives of their own, i.e., become surrogates for the
reality they mean to mimic. The opportunities lost
are those related to the different perspectives and
paradigms, hopes and fears, and possible insights
that simply never surface to be examined, com-
pared, challenged, and considered.
There are other costs worth mentioning, too. And
these are denominated in measures of lost credibil-
ity, popular suspicion and mistrust, and heightened
tensions among professionals whose perspectives
and expectations about the future are sharply at
odds [29].
For discussion purposes consider the following
assertions about large-scale, operational, machine
models as a general class of endeavor:.
(1) Such work is more adversarial than most realize. As
de facto operational paradigms of analysis both
technocratic ilnd partisan styles dominate, de-
spite disclaimers and avowals of adherence to
conventional scholarly or textbook modes.
(2) The work is one-sided; it presents but one perspective
on a future rich in potentialities. Competing
groups of experts hardly communicate and
countervailing technical expertise is rarely cal-
led upon to strengthen a technical analysis by
playing devil's advocate.
(3) Quality control and professional standards are nil.
Were there adequate standards and expecta-
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tions about their enforcement, the considerable
controversies attending many big model pro-
jects would likely not occur.
(4) Data inputs have obscure, unknown, or unknowable
empirical foundations, and the relevance of much
data, even if valid, is unknown. "Hard" numbers
seldom are and, in any event, represent only
one perspective on problems that surpass
measurement's reach. Furthermore, the future
is not encompassed by the past; there are no
data for the future.
(5) The most interesting aspect of any analysis is the set
of assumptions used to fashion it. Since there are
no answers, as such, for the kinds of policy
problems we face, far better to concentrate on
the founding premises and preferences of an
analysis than on their extensions as results.
All of these assertions are meant to cause honest
reflection on the prevalent choice of method. And
from the forecasting and planning shortcomings
experienced with big model projects [18, 31] it is
both timely and appropriate to do so. For instance,
it appears that if one seeks forecast accuracy, then
multiple-expert opinion studies tend to be prefer-
able to. large-scale, model-based studies, because the
experts pay more attention to the timeliness and
relevance of their core assumptions and because
more of these assumptions, or perspectives, have a
chance to surface and be considered. "When the
choice is between fewer expensive studies and more
frequent inexpensive ones, these considerations call
for the latter [18, pp 202-203]."
Free-form, manual games
The basic task is to think creatively about exceed-
ingly complex physical and social phenomena,
interacting and evolving over periods of time unlike
those that usually hold the attentions of the public
and its leadership. Component subtasks are to iden-
tify the relevant knowledge about such phenomena,
to assemble it into a relatively coherent whole, to
discover missing pieces so that research priority and
responsibility may be assigned, and to stimulate
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thought about what, if any, human interventions to
set in motion - to avert unwanted outcomes or to
secure human benefits otherwise foregone.
These basics must be kept well in mind. Not to
do so risks diverting intellectual attention. The
applications and purposes for our analyses are
these: exploration, expert intragroup communication,
and group knowledge and opinion elucidation. Judg-
ment and opinion will certainly matter, sufficiently
so as to become integral objectives of study.
Advocacy, too, will playa distinctive role.
A strong argument has been made previously for
free-form, manual games to pursue these purposes.
More needs to be said about the historical roots,
intellectual rationales, and comparative strengths
and weaknesses of this analytic form.
Historical roots
Free-form, manual games are probably as old as
man in conflict [32]. Their military genesis in no
way detracts from their appeal and appropriateness
in other circumstances [33]. Indeed, the complexity,
uncertainty, and high stakes of warfare parallel
those we face in learning to sustain the biosphere.
In the military realm, the difficulty of the substan-
tive problems pushed analysts to discover thought-
ful techniques in tune with the challenges [34].
One such challenge was to properly account for
nonquantifiable but consequential factors, such as
political ones, that somehow had to be integrated
into both thinking and analyses. And, historically,
the political-military exercise was created and used
for just this reason [35].
Political-military exercises explored some
difficult questions that eluded or exceeded the
capacity of alternative analytic tools:
(1) What political options could be imagined in light
of the conflict situations portrayed? What likely
consequences would each have?
(2) Could political inventiveness be fostered by hav-
ing those actually responsible assume their roles
in a controlled, gamed environment? Would the
quality of political ideas stimulated be as good
or better than those obtained conventionally?
(3) Could the game identify particularly important,
but poorly understood, topics and questions for
further study and resolution? What discoveries
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flow from this type of analysis that do not from
others?
(4) Could the game sensitize responsible officials to
make potential decisions more realistic,
especially with respect to likely political and
policy consequences?
These questions are quite like those facing
analysts concerned with the sustainable develop-
ment of the biosphere. Think momentarily about
the typical problems they encounter: messy, hard
to specify (save selected parts of them), and inter-
laced with natural, social, and political elements and
processes.
Manual, military games, such as SAFE (Strategy
and Force Evaluation) have been used in compar-
able settings [36]. And while its substantial details
differ, its general purposes parallel our own.
SAFE provides a conceptual framework within which
to generate and examine new ideas. It helps to sys-
tematize issues and supply gross evaluations of
alternative strategies. It keeps the outlines of all com-
ponents in two interacting "big pictures" in balance
and in focus [36, p 17].
And later, these comments about simplification and
abstraction.
Games are frequently censured on the grounds that
they involve useless detail, serving only to cloud the
true issues, and also on the opposite grounds that in
some major respect they are overaggre-
gated .... [But each attempt to simplify] fails to
include a key feature and so requires successive
expansion of the structure [36, p 19].
Some problems are just difficult, in other words.
A brief review of the kinds of knowledge manual,
free-form games produce helps one appreciate their
role.
Rationales: strengths and weaknesses
This analytic form offers comparative advantages
in four broad areas:
(1) To study poorly understood dynamic processes.
(2) To study poorly understood institutional inter-
actions.
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(3) To improve the game environment by opening
participation to many with different perspec-
tives and special competences, on a continuing
basis over time.
(4) To prepare players for future research, analysis,
and even operational responsibility.
The many pockets of scientific knowledge about
the biosphere lack, for various reasons, coherence
and integration. Much of this information is
dynamic, where matters of rates of change of time
figure prominently. Many other aspects of it are
not, especially when one seeks relationships
between physical and social phenomena and proces-
ses. What, for instance, might it mean for economic
and political institutions to sustain major ecological
disruptions? No one knows much about this.
Genuine knowledge about institutions under
intense external stress is far from complete or
uncontested and typically gives heavy weight to
historical over potential patterns and practices.
The institutional issue also surfaces in terms of
the currently weak or nonexistent global authorities
or arrangements that biospherical sustenance may
necessitate. There is hardly a blueprint to organize
mankind to cope with or reverse tropical defores-
tation or genetic and species depletion. It remains
to be drawn, its institutional implications explored,
and its possible concrete forms tried out.
The better manual games lasted for periods of
time. They were not played once and for all, nor
did they produce a single solution to the formidable
problems they addressed. The point that the game
provided an environment and framework within
which ideas could be tried out, as Paxson notes, is
critical. DeWeerd takes this even farther in his
definition of the "contextual approach" in manual
gaming:
The utility of embedding complex problems in a
clearly defined context has long been recognized
by the research community .... A contextual
framework helps one to exclude irrelevant materials
and permits a concentration on the central problem
under analysis. One needs a context to avoid wasting
time in reaching a common approach to the subject
[37, p 403].
Many technical issues receive attention in this
mode of analysis, primarily because the scenarios
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used are accessible and relatively transparent. Are
participants using the same time and spatial scales
and references? Are the motivating scenarios inter-
esting and plausible - or at least interesting? Is
something important left out and, if so, are efforts
being made to find out what and put it in?
Participation of individuals from a wide variety
of backgrounds is enhanced because proceedings
are conducted in plain language. Besides providing
improved access, verbal descriptions allow
phenomena too complex to be represented pre-
cisely still to be considered. Depending on the pro-
fessionalism of those involved, a free-form game
may attain quite adequate standards of rigor and
respectability, albeit of a very different nature to
those sought in conventional scientific work.
The manual game environment is conducive to
learning as it allows those holding specific informa-
tion to share it within an understandable
framework. Points of agreement and disagreement
are very quickly and cheaply exposed. Questionable
matters of fact may be established; matters of taste
and preference can be identified as such. The power
of initial assumptions comes clearer to all as well,
and with self-consciousness comes the prospect of
thoughtful change.
The more general issue suggested here is that
players are involved, continuously and closely, so
that the elements of the game (and problem)
become both familiar and also open to critical
exploration. Play of the game, in short, improves
the game. A very common outcome of a three- or
four-day manual gaming experience (the culmina-
tion of many man-hours of preparatory effort) is
detailed criticism of the scenarios, the dynamics,
and the institutions and individuals involved. This
kind of caring professional criticism is extraor-
dinarily uncommon in, for example, a computer-
based study or model.
One needs to exercise care not to oversell this
approach. It is limited, as all techniques are. Some
argue that results of free-form games are unscien-
tific because th~ycannot be reproduced. Replication
is a fundamental experimental requirement, to be
sure, but it is far less urgent when one hardly
understands a problem's structure in the first place.
Dominant personalities, particularly in the con-
trol role, can be troublesome, especially in the
hierarchical military setting. An antidote here
emphasizes the collegial and peer aspects of the
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enterprise: everyone involved has something to con-
tribute and to gain. There are no answers.
Cost is often thought to be a problem, but the
issue is cloudy. When senior government officials
playa manual political-military exercise for a week,
the price tag can be high. But, as we are coming to
learn, the expense of more conventional analytic
forms can be significant too. Free-form games are
relatively inexpensive, especially as compared with
large-scale machine models. Also, they seldom run
the risk of substituting for the reality they mean to
portray.
Nor do they cut-off or restrict different or dissent-
ing views and preferences, another important cost.
A key need here is the generation of many potential
pathways into the future by running frequent, inex-
pensive, and expert-based studies. Exploration,
group opinion, shared expertise, and the
clarification of various individual and institutional
preferences all require such operational styles and
procedures.
Scenarios
Frequent and inexpensive studies come in many
shapes and sizes. However, a common feature is the
scenario, about which insufficient serious inquiry
exists [38]. In the following discussion the nature
and role of scenarios is sketched and woven together
with suggestions to consider operational modeling
as applied to exploration, group opinion, and
advocacy goals.
Ubiquitous, essential, and
misunderstood
The scenario is the fundamental building block of
all modeling and analysis.
After all, it is from our anticipations of environments
in which our systems are to operate (the state-of-the-
world, the conflict situations, and the tasks these
systems are expected to accomplish) that many of
our criteria for evaluating the performance of a given
system emerge. Thus, having a casual attitude toward
the scenario is often tantamount to having a casual
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attitude toward the selection criteria. If we accept
the proposition that our analyses can be no better
than the criteria we employ, then we must accept the
corollary proposition that our analyses can be no
better than our scenarios [39, p 300, emphasis in
original].
The scenario is the crux of the modeling process;
it is the basis for bounding and structuring a model
and it contains the criteria to appraise the work.
Scenarios have other favorable characteristics.
Since they usually rely on a verbal depiction they
are accessible; they are easily altered because they
are tentative and contingent; and they are future-
oriented as they depict past and present with both
likely and desired future possibilities [40, 41].
Defining characteristics
But what are scenarios? DeWeerd sums matters up:
"The scenario tells what happened and describes
the environment in which it happened [37, p 2]."
Brown extends this: a scenario is "a statement of
assumptions about the operating environment of a
particular system being analyzed [39, p 300]." Bell
clarifies further: scenarios are the representations
of "alternative futures," by which analysts "sketch
a paradigm (an explicitly structured set of assump-
tions, definitions, typologies, conjectures, analyses,
and questions) and then construct a number of
explicitly alternative futures which might come into
being under the stated conditions [42, pp 865-
866]." As a general matter, the scenario is the
analyst's image or conception of the process or
system being represented. It is not strictly speaking
a prediction, rather it is an explication of the
possibilities [42, p 866].
In contrast, imagine a negative or antiscenario:
an explicit statement of those features of reality the
analyst is not attempting to represent. The employ-
ment of such would go a long way toward exposing
and clarifying, in plain language, those features
being emphasized and those being left out of any
given analysis, as there inevitably must be. Ideally,
the construction of a scenario and its antithesis
would encompass all knowledge relevant to a prob-
lem, system, or process. The ideal is unattainable
as a practical matter, although paying attention to
important aspects of reality left out is not.
Methods for synthesis: policy exercises 465
Methods Uses
Table 17.2 Method types and uses: scenario
forms.
Machine simulations typically fix the context,
because of technical constraints imposed to give
specification and because of omissions, and they
focus on the calculable physical causes and con-
sequences of interest. The simulation characteristi-
cally has most of its scenario embedded within the
computer routine, where it is quite hard for most,
other than the model builder, to see or understand
it [45].
Of the very few man-machine activities still in
existence, most are used for teaching and training,
where the scenario is both buried in the machine
and rigidly held [46]. Training air traffic controllers,
for instance, can be done in a man-machine setting,
the main object of which is to indoctrinate players
according to rigid and well understood procedures
and practices. As a research device, the man-
machine game has been fruitfully employed to
study and plan for human-factor implications in
complex organizations and systems, e.g., for deter-
mining the optimum number, form, and location
of indicator instruments in a nuclear power plant
control facility. But, once more, the organizations
and systems are generally specifiable and rather
well understood.
Free-form, manual games are most appropriate
when specification and understanding are not pos-
sible or where disagreements about them abound.
But, depending on the overall purpose a free-form
game serves, the form its scenario takes will vary.
A scenario sets up the approximate initial condi-
tions of some setting or situation and provides time-
based clues as to the most likely or probable
sequencing and interactions of events. Using the
concept this way, and applying it to free-form or
manual games, reveals the importance of the game
as an exploratory device. We play the game using
the scenario to examine alternative developmental
pathways and the options that might be taken at
various times and that could affect outcomes. Open
is the creative possibility of learning something that
might not have occurred independently, either to
the scenarist or to other participants.
Machine models are scenario dependent, too, a
point not well made in the existing literature and
practice. The scenario basis for a machine model
merely sets up the initial conditions through the
specification of included variables and their interre-
lationships and the assignment of initial conditions
to the parameters. The time series the model pro-
duces represents one developmental pathway.
Frequently, no others are considered once a model
is tuned to produce plausible values. Foregone in
the process is the opportunity to create and explore
alternative pathways, specified in different ways and
employing different initial conditions than the one
set devised [43].
Methods, applications, and scenario
forms
The nature of scenarios contained within each
category of method (e.g., analytic models, machine
simulations) will differ according to the intended
applications and technical requirements of each.
This point is portrayed in Table 17.2.
Note that methods are ordered in Table 17.2 from
"hard" to "soft" as one moves down the column;
priority of use is signified by the ordering within
"Uses". Two additional types of methods are intro-
duced as well, thus to enrich the spectrum of
possibilities.
Analytic models typically have no explicit verbal
scenario. It resides in the mind of the analyst
responsible, but it exists nonetheless. In principle,
the guiding scenario could be externalized and one
probably should do so if the insights that analysis
yields are attractive enough to consider their pursuit
and adoption [44].
Analytic
models
Machine
simulations
Man-machine
Free-form
Seminars
Group
studies
Research: exploration, planning,
cross-checking
Research: planning, forecasting,
advocacy
Teaching-training primarily;
research: planning
Teaching; intragroup
communication; research:
exploration, group opinion
Teaching; intragroup
communication; research
Intragroup communication;
research
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When used for teaching purposes, for example, an
initiating scenario would provide the student play-
ers information needed to confront a problem and
would engage them actively with it. Almost by
definition (and in practice) this means that the
scenario will describe major moves the represented
actors have made as a necessary precursor to the
problem at hand. Teams are told, in effect, "You
made these decisions in the past and their con-
sequence is a nasty problem. Now deal with it."
When intended to foster intragroup communica-
tion, this scenario style won't work. In this case, the
initiating scenario is drawn from a realistic situation
of interest and importance to the players. No goad-
ing is required to engage them. Rather, the objective
is to lay the groundwork for discussion of a real
problem, typically proximate in space and time.
Research applications are of most interest to us
[47]. Scenarios in this instance are clearly treated
as tentative, exploratory, and incomplete, in accord
with the level of incomprehension of the problem
being explored [40]. As a practical matter, the
scenario writer, control (game director), and all
team members are peers, any or all of whom have
equal right to question, modify, or improve the
initial scenario.
The manning of a free-form research game is
critical. A diverse array of skills and backgrounds
(relevant to the problem) must be represented on
the teams. The collective endeavor is intended to
share these differences in systematic and insight-
yielding ways. Variety in the opinion, attitudinal,
and belief premises and structures represented
must be sought, clarified, and accepted as legitimate
by all participants. Mutual professional respect,
including tolerance for differences in discipline,
style, method, and central concerns, is equally
essential.
What is a "good" scenario?
This is the wrong question. It should be: How well
does a given scenario meet the game or research
purposes for which it was intended? A good scenario
should be problem oriented, as determined by its
success in focusing attention and opening up
unknown possibilities. It should layout biases for
collective scrutiny and consideration, not bury them
under a bushel. It should not unduly violate com-
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mon sense, in the senses of being honest, credible,
consistent, and intellectually satisfying. It should
not be expected to cover all situations and all prob-
lems; for that, many other scenarios will be needed.
A good scenario is explicit; it exposes its terms
for easy reference by all interested in the problem.
It is only when a scenario can be communicated to
others that it can be evaluated or acted on. Implicit
scenarios can hide biases, conceal assumptions, and
are capable of being reshuffled to meet objections
or unexpected developments. To the extent they
do, they are bad.
Goodness and badness are sometimes equated
with a scenario's credibility or acceptability to a user.
Realistic in this case is used to describe a good
scenario and unrealistic serves the bad: this can be
misleading. For situations close at hand and near
in time, the best approximation to conditions gen-
erally presumed to be existing by informed persons
yields greatest acceptance and inspires greatest
interest and confidence. But for situations more
remote and further ahead in time, credibility and
acceptance themselves may be lacking because of
failed consensus [48].
Since no one can predict the long-term future in
detailed and specific terms, any scenario set there
is liable to be rejected by some as implausible,
incredible, or slanted. The near term is easier and
allows present trends to be extended and accepted.
The longer term portends real uncertainties,
manifest as surprises, discontinuities from past
trends and practices. Studies of the long-term
future will always provoke rejection of selected
parts. But the point, after all, is to avoid surprises,
and "to avoid surprises one cannot take for granted
that the future is merely the scaled-up version of
the present [49, p 3]." The problem needs to be
frankly recognized by pointing out when and why
a discontinuity has been introduced in the scenario
and analysis. Credibility in this case cannot be expec-
ted to develop from a consensus of views, certainly
not when such is lacking.
A good scenario concentrates attentions by pro-
viding a common framework and reference. It
delineates boundaries of a problem clearly to satisfy
demands for honesty, credibility, and relevance. It
introduces as little unintentional bias into collective
proceedings as possible, but it also allows intentional
bias to surface and be explored and challenged. A
bad scenario does none of these things. It features
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great unexplained leaps from one point or event
to another; it uses gimmicks to achieve its ends; or
it sweeps problems under the rug by attributing
them to a series of miscalculations.
Policy exercises
This chapter has covered a great deal of territory,
but then the aspirations of this volume (and the
project it portends) invite wide scope. Despite this,
several themes guided the journey, and these
require summary. Afterward, a proposal based on
them is offered for consideration.
Major themes
Dazzlingly large amounts of information relevant
to man and the biosphere exist or can be identified
as important and relevant. Much of this is rightly
scientific in character in the sense that it concerns
natural phenomena, the description and
specification of which produces cumulative and
shared knowledge. It is critical that this chapter's
intentionally strong argument is not misunderstood
so as to deny the essential role scientific information
must play in our mutual concerns and deliberations.
However, there is another very broad class of
information that is not, strictly speaking, scientific
nearly so much as it is human. And lest the appropri-
ateness of this distinction escape one, recall our
given terms of reference: the discovery of construc-
tive and lasting improvements in our understanding
of the biosphere and man. The implications are
plain enough despite the incredible difficulty of
seeing them through.
Very high on the list of difficulties is coming to
terms with, if not to a full understanding of, the
ineluctable fact that human perceptions of the world
- past, present, and particularly in the future - are
highly variant. Furthermore, such diversity need
not be considered evil or irrational. Indeed, from
it springs the creative inspiration that marks man
as such. A fundamental requirement is thus to
release for the common good the creative energies
of ourselves and others.
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As somewhat harshly argued here, prevailing atti-
tudes and styles of knowledge creation and use have
too often done precisely the opposite - by denying
the legitimacy of different perspectives and prefer-
ences, by adhering narrowly to intellectual para-
digms ill-suited to the challenges all confront (and
then dissolving into brittle squabbles when the
limitations of each are exposed), and by favoring
tools and methods used to solve problems only
remotely like those facing us (and continuing to use
them despite lack of success).
As a practical matter the work to be done can be
identified. Realistic problems must be character-
ized, in their relevant contexts, according to as many
points of view as possible, thus to expose differences
so as to resolve them, if possible, or to live with
them, if not. Such characterizations must proceed
openly and with utmost respect for matters impor-
tant, but unknown or even unknowable. Utmost
respect means not only the assembly of technical
and factual information, including contentious ele-
ments, but also subjective and preferential informa-
tion which, almost by definition, will mirror wide
differences and inconsensus existing in the world
at large. There are no answer~,only imaginings and
possibilities, no one of which is necessarily best for
everyone for all time.
As an intellectual matter the work ahead can also
be identified, despite the enormous difficulties
honest engagement with it creates. Five broad tasks,
outlined below, come to mind.
Goals must be clarified. Put another way,
preferred events to be sought over the long haul
must be explicitly considered. The requirement
extends to cover both individual and institutional
preferences, where institution is taken in its
broadest sense.
Past trends, giving particular emphasis to man's
interactions with the environment, must be carefully
delineated. Among other reasons for doing so is
the need for clarity about the sources of problems
currently in the fore. They came from somewhere
and have been caused by something, and by
someone.
The intellectual and scientific task to improve
comprehension of what is causing what and why
needs less emphasis, despite its essentiality. The
difficulty comes as we try to open our minds to the
possibilities that many scientific paradigms have
something to contribute and that no one or group
,
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merits special treatment and regard. There are no
sure bets, no royal roads.
The projective task has been emphasized
throughout this chapter to include gaining as clear
a vision as possible of where we are heading and
why. Obviously this cannot be done or done well
without an understanding of what we wish to accom-
plish, how well we have succeded in the past, and
why. The five broad intellectual tasks are, in other
words, mutually dependent and supporting.
Emphasis on only one at the expense of the others
will not work.
And, finally, comes the creative task of discover-
ing and inventing new means to avert futures
imaginable (but unwanted) and to secure those
more preferred. At the very least, one wishes these
means to succeed in time by leaving mankind no
worse off. At the very best, possibilities are only
limited by our own imaginations.
Basic requirements
Practical and intellectual requirements must be
joined in systematic fashion, not treated piecemeal
or in isolation. This is a very tall order. It also runs
contrary to most current thinking and practice,
which implies that extraordinary efforts will be
required for its accomplishment.
The tall order I have in mind can be sketched;
its development will, however, be both risky and
problematic. The risk derives from many sources,
of which the main ones have been previously iden-
tified. The problems are not so easily foretold,
although they are to be anticipated.
A policy exercise is a deliberate procedure in which
goals and objectives are systematically clarified and
strategic alternatives invented and evaluated in
terms of the values at stake. The exercise is a pre-
paratory activity for effective participation in official
decision processes; its outcomes are not official
decisions. Those engaged in policy exercises may
on occasion include those with decision authority,
primarily as a means to elicit information from this
point of view. However, the core analytic group
responsible for the policy exercise must be ever
mindful of the nonbinding, unofficial nature of
their shared work and its outcomes.
The active analytic paradigm guiding overall
work, I would suggest, should be a consensual one.
This does not rule out other types, however, but
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only if partiCipants self-consciously declare their
intentions to pursue advocacy or technocratic or
partisan ends as a means to clarify specific options
or possible actions of mutual concern and interest.
Participants must, in time, learn restraint: by
relaxing customary identifications with paradigm,
position, and place. But at the same time, conscious
efforts need to be made to include an unusual assort-
ment of highly talented and variously trained
individuals. Some sense of this follows from think-
ing through the five intellectual tasks previously
identified. Specification of trends, for instance, is a
function historians are trained to perform. But how
often are historians included as peers within normal
policy research efforts? Honest confrontation with
matters of goals and preferences implicates human-
ists, philosophers, psychologists, and even literary
and artistic talents. It does more than just implicate;
it requires their active participation in policy exer-
cises under conditions of respect equal to those
accorded scientific specialists.
Respect is the absolutely essential ingredient,
albeit an elusive one attained only through uncom-
mon tolerance for perspectives and preferences not
understood or shared. As a procedural matter, all
participants in policy exercises become objects of
study, not merely its agents. The quest of such study
is better comprehension and appreciation of exist-
ing and legitimate differences, including their con-
sequences for collective problem characterizing and
clarifying work.
Questions of the following sort could guide such
effort (all taken with respect to participation in the
policy exercise itself):
(1) Are the participants more or less sensitized to
the interdisciplinary dimensions of a problem?
(2) Are they more or less disposed to ask questions
that call for information not previously con-
sidered (or appreciated)?
(3) Do they improve in their abilities to reduce
tendencies to exaggerate the "hardness" of
some data (and derivative conclusions); to
increase their acceptance and understanding of
"softer" forms?
(4) How does the policy exercise affect conceptions
and images of past trends, if at all?
(5) How are conceptions of the future influenced,
if at all? Are participants more or less free
of negative feelings about speculating as to
the future, particularly about challenging
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conventional limits of thought on the part of
salient groups or individuals? Are they more
sanguine or pessimistic about the future? Is the
future envisioned as culminating in catastrophe
(if so, when?) or in revolutionary reconstruc-
tions of institutions in desirable ways? Or in
fluctuating cycles without trend? Are these per-
spectives new or are they continuations of pre-
vious assumptions?
The point of asking and pursuing these questions
explicitly recognizes that knowledge creation and
use are far from neutral activities but, rather, are
integral with the whole of policy processes.
Note that I have consciously avoided using the
phrase problem solving, which has been pre-
maturely and unconstructively applied in cases
where even a rudimentary grasp of important mat-
ters has not yet been attained. The main intents,
thus, of the policy exercise are to discover as much
about given problems as time and talent allow; to
clarify as openly as possible differences of opinion
affecting specific and common perceptions of the
problem; and to integrate all pertinent knowledge,
from a variety of sources using a range of methods,
for general edification and consideration.
The matter of methods itself deserves investiga-
tion and improvement. Previous classification
efforts were intended to at least identify some over-
looked and underused possibilities, several of which
conform, at least in principle, to the general
requirements of the policy exercise. Much more is
needed here, including the possibility of devising
entirely new techniques and procedures to advance
the common enterprise.
The practicality of creating new methods when
faced with difficult problems unyielding to the old
has historical precedent: witness the bursts of crea-
tive energies attending operational and systems
analyses at certain points in their evolution. More,
I believe, can be recovered from these experiences
if appropriate questions are asked of them. And
the agenda for the policy exercise would, indeed,
include such retrospective stock takings.
Procedures
The policy exercise finds its procedural roots in
scenario-based, free-form games. It is as much artis-
tic as it is scientific in its style and means, a charac-
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teristic that in no way denigrates the activity. Or,
as Webster's defines art:
1. creativeness. 2. skill. 3. any specific skill or its
application. 4. a making or doing of things that have
form and beauty .... 8. any craft, or its principles.
9. cunning (Webster's, 1970, p 41).
Substantive knowledge, insight, an ability to
abstract, flexibility, and a willingness to build and
rebuild many representations of interesting
phenomena are additional ingredients that one can
imagine adding to the success of a policy exercise.
The "form and beauty" in this case relate to the
images and words used to portray settings, interre-
lationships, and events - past, present, and future.
A scenario is the portrait, the verbal model [50].
Other artistic tools of the trade come to mind.
Maps, drawings, graphs, and pictures - both still
and dynamic - play important roles in melding
imaginings with measurements and providing par-
ticipants with a vivid sense of the whole [51]. Fur-
thermore, the combination of the verbal with the
diagrammatic ought to allow many different ver-
sions of problems to be created, tried out inexpen-
sively, explained to those involved, and thrown away
if faulty or no longer interesting. The emphasis
here is on making many different renditions of a
complex setting, not on concentrating intellectual
energies on just one.
At the heart of the policy exercise is a core group
of some 10 to 15 individuals, each of whom con-
tributes a distinctive set of skills, perspectives, and
concerns about the general problem. Commitment
and continuity of this group are absolutely essential.
Occasional outsider participation is to be en-
couraged, especially if important questions mem-
bers of the core group pose can be answered this
way. What is to be avoided is the devolution of the
policy exercise into an ordinary conference or sem-
inar format.
As a practical matter, it is not physically possible
to have the core group together most of the time.
However, computer teleconferencing technologies
are sufficiently developed to allow far more intellec-
tual contact, at reasonable costs, than ever before.
For a policy exercise on important global issues to
operate, computer teleconferencing is an essential
ingredient [52]. The large-scale, once-every-great-
while, global conference serves one class of purposes
- calling attention to issues and sketching out an
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agenda are two important ones. The policy exercise,
as envisioned here, is quite differently intended, as
its special procedural characteristics suggest.
Reconsider the previously mentioned five intel-
lectual tasks. Each member of the core will be asked
to present, for collective appraisal, verbal and/or
written assessments of the underlying goals of rel-
evant groups and individuals in the context of past
trends, factors conditioning these trends, probable
future outcomes, and possible methods to deflect,
encourage, or otherwise alter these outcomes.
These assessments are not intended for public dis-
semination. They are for internal use only, as it
were. Furthermore, these assessments are not ran-
domly generated, but follow in response to an evolv-
ing agenda, set through mutual consultation and
agreement.
The "closed shop" aspect of the core group's
activities, at least as it conducts its basic work, cannot
be stressed enough. Since the policy exercise is not
interested in positions already adopted nearly as
much as it is in creating new ones based on richer
understanding, intellectual maneuvering room
must be established and honored. The problem of
engendering personal and professional respect has
already been emphasized.
Policy is choice about the future. Participants will
thus be encouraged to make independent estimates
about probable outcomes for problem elements.
Such independent judgments may be summarized,
compared, discrepancies considered, and common
expectations about the future clarified [53]. As
events unfold and new information is brought to
bear, the initial estimates can be reconsidered. Over
time, such estimates may themselves be appraised,
not to assign personal credit or blame but to deter-
mine what assumptions, scenarios, and techniques
worked and why?
The policy exercise must employ many different
methods. A basic reason for much of this chapter
is to remind others of several promising, but under-
used possibilities. More will probably be needed,
including the creation of entirely new techniques,
methods, and procedures. But keeping the effort
simple is probably a good idea at first. This belief
naturally leads one to represent our problems in
simple, abstract, and comprehensible ways. "Model-
ing simple, but thinking complex", as the old
modeler's dictum holds, is the order of the day.
Verbal and visual representations need particular
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emphasis and development ... a main reason why
scenarios have been heavily stressed here .
To store, recall, and share information -
especially in a multinational, multilingual setting -
audiovisual aids must be devised and used to a far
great extent than conventional academic conferen-
ces and seminars do. In general, the purposes to
be served are collecting, evaluating, presenting, and
disseminating pertinent information about the
problem context. The created environment of the
policy exercise is, in effect, the collective institu-
tional memory.
The general attitude sought for members of the
policy exercise is one of critical imagination. Specula-
tion based on one's exposure to the evolving collec-
tion of facts and understandings about the world
is encouraged. Ego and public reputation are pro-
tected by mutual agreement and out of respect for
one another and for the importance of the collective
endeavor. However, wild speculation untempered
with critical judgment is disallowed. The judgment
sought here comes from within one's self as well as
from colleagues similarly engaged.
If there is a prevalent procedural or operating
style, then it would be purposively eclectic. Given the
problem at hand, no piece of information, no means
of communicating or representing it, and no means
to probe and discover are to be excluded.
The roles of judgment and opinion
The problems of interest to us here are not readily
dealt with technically. A considerable amount of
judgment must be exercised. This does not mean
a mysterious, intuitive insight that cannot be
described and justified, however. It does mean tak-
ing greater care than usual to discern their sources
and consequences.
Many judgments are hard to discern and analyze.
An adequate account of them likely involves much
discursive recitation, of at best passing interest to
busy decision makers and many others. Nonethe-
less, working to know and perceive the judgmental
bases underlying any analysis must be just as impor-
tant for a decision maker as the conclusions set
forth. Or, to put it otherwise: What are the assump-
tions and how and why were they made? What
technical judgments were made and what are their
consequences? These apparently simple questions
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are essential procedural concerns of those engaged
in policy exercises.
Discovering attitudes, based on reactions to
opinion statements, is possible [21, 54]. And gaining
an understanding about the attitudinal and belief
bases of those engaged in this collaborative
endeavor provides an opportunity to clarify inevi-
table sources of difference and disagreement - so
as to anticipate and perhaps resolve them before
they become sticky and intractible.
Even more interesting possibilities could be ex-
plored. For instance, in the setting of the scenario-
based, free-form game, what differences occur as a
consequence of matching teams of disparate atti-
tudes and beliefs to work a specific problem? It
could be extremely interesting, as well as creating
an opportunity to examine, in a controlled and
collegial setting, likely future conflicts - and then
working to overcome them [55].
Various group judgment techniques meant to
elicit expert opinion in systematic ways have been
developed over the years, although many analysts
have objected to them on narrow scientific grounds
[56]. Other problems have been noted as well: deter-
mining whose judgment to seek; problems of pool-
ing ignorance (and then believing it); interpreting
results and making use of them.
The general challenge that pursuit of expert
opinion raises can be posed as a paradox. In trying
to enumerate judgmental and preferential elements
within an analysis, thus to reduce complexity some-
what, one risks adding to shared uncertainty by
imparting a false sense that more is known than is
realistically possible.
Advocacy
The same can be said for advocacy. It is pervasive
and probably inevitable. If so, rather than futilely
stemming the tide, it may be more sensible to move
with its flow, so to take advantage of the powerful
forces advocacy represents.
A case can be made for advocacy. Actually, there
is nothing intrinsically wrong with individuals pro-
moting a perspective, disciplinary paradigm, or a
derivative policy preference. But only so long as
other advocates have their day in court and the
rules of the adversarial game are clearly spelled out
beforehand. Perversion of the intellectual and
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policy processes occurs when advocacy is one-sided
and when no one bothers to describe the rules ... or
play by them.
There is nothing intellectually or morally wrong
for one to make the best possible case for a given
line of behavior. Such may present an interesting
hypothesis, the full consequences of which can be
grasped only through aggressive promotion. Theo-
logical debate, in an earlier time, was explicitly
adversarial. It also had the intellectual advantage
of organizing questions and permitting the jury or
auditors to confront more adequately different posi-
tions. And as judicial and legal practices demon-
strate, when the rules are spelled out and honored,
loss of a debate or case need not imply personal
condemnation.
What is crucial is whether the best case is made
in an intellectually honest way, and whether oppor-
tunities exist to criticize and make other "best pos-
sible" cases. But, as before, the real trick is remem-
bering that the case made is only one of numerous
possibilities, no one of which necessarily fits the
expectations, hopes, and fears of all those involved.
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Commentary
N. C. Sonntag
Since the early 1960s, there has been an ever
increasing number of experiments attempting to
use the tools of operations research to somehow
optimize man's exploitation of the biosphere. In
more recent years there has emerged a recognition
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(albeit sometimes reluctant) that the resources we
wish to exploit are part of a very complex, dynamic
system full of uncertainties and surprises that defy
the principals of optimality and force us to be con-
tent with improvements, however modest they be.
In truth, this "recognition" was a quantum leap in
our level of understanding of the biophysical sys-
tems to which we are inextricably linked. As part
of this quantum leap, it became increasingly obvious
that the methods and tools we hoped would be the
panacea for all that ails us with respect to the bio-
sphere were not what we wanted them to be. The
answers were not there for the taking. In our des-
peration for solutions we focused almost exclusively
on product (e.g., the best decision, the best plan)
and attempted to fit all of our elegant tools into
each and every problem to obtain that product. The
consequences were failures: some of them cata-
strophic, many of them costly, and most of them
embarrassing. The common methods for synthesis
in resource management (e.g., analytic models,
simulation, man-machine games) were put on the
defensive, and rightly so. It forced the practitioners
to rethink the purpose and utility of their tools and
thereby to learn from the failures.
In Garry Brewer's chapter the reader is first led
through an eloquent and insightful synthesis of
these painful lessons and then introduced to the
concept of free-form, manual games. A strong argu-
ment is presented for the need to develop a free-
form approach to man's development and manage-
ment of the biosphere. Before presenting a specific
comment I have on the free-form idea, I would like
to first describe what I see as the major theme in
Brewer's recommendations.
As mentioned above, until recently the use of
models in resource management focused on the
development of product. What Brewer is calling
for, in my opinion, is a shift to a focus on process.
Notwithstanding the need to develop a good prod-
uct (i.e., solution), the process by which the product
is developed is crucial to its acceptance and eventual
implementation. The designers and implementers
of policy must be responsive and responsible to a
large and diverse set of interests and so demand
that the synthesis process account for and integrate
these interests in the analysis. Understanding
exactly what this process is can be best accomplished
by reviewing the chief characteristics of the process,
as described in Brewer's chapter.
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(l) It develops a contextual framework (through
consensus) at the beginning to facilitate con-
centration on the central problem under
analysis.
(2) It includes in the analysis all those with Interests
relevant to the problem and gives them every
opportunity to critique and contribute from the
outset.
(3) It develops and applies creative methods of
communication (e.g., audiovisual aids, various
levels of documentation, workshops, and other
forms of collective proceedings) extensively
throughout the analysis.
(4) It has a strong focus on the development and
maintenance of consensus. A successful out-
come is more likely if an analysis builds on a
continuing set of agreements.
(5) It uses tools and methods that promote dis-
covery, clarify key issues and differences, and
integrate across disciplines.
(6) It explicitly recognizes the pervasive nature of
uncertainty in biophysical and social systems.
Therefore, the process is adaptive and flexible
in both design and implementation.
(7) It involves an unusual assortment of highly
talented and variously trained individuals at an
equal level of respect and integration.
Implementation of a process with these charac-
teristics is certainly a challenge, but not one from
which we should shy away. Brewer's enthusiasm for
a process like the free-form, manual games
developed by the military is not only well argued,
but also provides some application experience that
policy analysts concerned with the development of
the biosphere can turn to for some "hard knocks"
insights and lessons. However, I would like to draw
the reader's attentioll to a process very similar to
the free-form approach that was developed
explicitly to deal with resource management prob-
lems and now has over a la-year track record of
applications to "real world" problems. The method
is called Adaptive Environmental Assessment and
Management (AEAM), is described in a book of the
same name [1), and is further reviewed in Sonntag
et al. [2).
AEAM, with various levels of success, incorpor-
ates each of the above process characteristics and
has, over the last decade, been applied to over 100
resource management problems in North and
SlI.Ilaillob/e delle/ojl/nenl u/lhll biosphere
South America, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Of
particular interest to us here is one of AEAM's key
tools for synthesis and communication: develop-
ment of a simulation model of the system of interest.
In a typical application of AEAM, a simulation
model of the biophysical-social system is built in an
interactive workshop attended by 30 to 40 people
representing all the key interest groups (e.g., policy,
management, scientific, public, special interest) and
facilitated by 4 or 5 highly experienced modelers
also trained in group dynamics and facilitation.
Through a series of structured exercises, the work-
shop participants build the model framework in a
highly transparent environment and the modelers
translate the framework into computer code to
allow for eventual scenario gaming at the end of
the workshop and after.
In direct contrast to Brewer's experience, these
models have been developed successfully in situ-
ations where data were inadequate and short-term
deadlines had to be met. Further, the models were
designed and implemented in a style that stressed
consensus and avoided any particular individual's
bias (albeit recognizing the workshop has a bias).
So why the difference? After some thought one
realizes that philosophically the difference is not as
great as it first appears. Rather, it is a difference in
how a strong focus is provided to the process. In
AEAM, the model serves as the framework around
which to develop the policy analysis. The model's
predictions (i.e., the obvious products) are useful in
aiding the analyst to evaluate the options, but the
more important products are the resultant con-
sensus on structure and the sense of cooperation
and communication that are established through
the group process. The interesting feature is that
the building of the computer model provides a very
effective way of forcing participants to articulate
their biases (i.e., individual mental models), thereby
allowing all the participants the opportunity to
review, critique, and understand each other's point
of view. What is critical to appreciate is that the
model (as it is manifested in computer code) usually
does not playa central role in the eventual develop-
ment of products. Rather, it serves a supportive
function as a "state-of-the-knowledge" group
hypothesis that is set up to be invalidated and then
suitably revised at future workshops.
The possible entry of a free-form, manual gaming
process into the realm of resource management is
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an eXCltmg prospect and should be given every
opportunity to contribute to our desperate need to
come to grips with the issues of sustainable develop-
ment of the biosphere. Where I see it playing a key
role is in our attempts to evaluate policy for interac-
tions between socioeconomic development and the
natural environment that operate over large spatial
and temporal scales (e.g.. acid rain). At the hemi-
spheric to global scale, an AEAM modeling
approach (as it is currently practised) would likely
place unreasonable constraints on the analysis.
Therefore, to follow Brewer's advice, our prevalent
procedural or operating style must be purposively
eclectic (" ... no piece of information, no means of
communicating or representing it, and no means
to probe and discover are to be excluded [p 470]"),
and the next step is to take the best features of the
two approaches and develop a hybrid. In doing so,
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however, we must ensure that the people we hope
to serve (i.e., policymakers and management) are
involved as much in the design as in the eventual
application of this new process. A failure to do so
would be ignoring one of the major lessons of the
previous decade.
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